In the context of global security concerns, humanitarian crises, and skill shortages migration and immigration have become central to economic, political, and social debates at the beginning of the twenty-first century. And while migration and immigration have certainly not escaped the attention of social scientists, the study of both remains the most ‘under-serviced’ academic domain with respect to introductory texts. It is not surprising then that even fewer books have explored the contours of these social phenomena from an explicitly geographical perspective – in other words, in terms of ‘space’, ‘place’, and ‘scale’.

*Migration* is an advanced, yet accessible, introduction to migration and immigration in a global context. It offers a critical, multi-disciplinary approach to the subject, borrowing from human geography, political science, social anthropology, and sociology. However, unlike other broad volumes on the subject, it emphasizes a theoretical and conceptual approach to the study of migration. Specifically, *Migration* adopts a unique geographical approach by employing spatial concepts such as place, scale, and territory. Using these spatial concepts, the author argues that most studies of migration begin with either an undue emphasis on nation-states as a lens on migration or on the contrary rely on exaggerated notions of transnationalism. *Migration* neither neglects the importance of nation-states nor the significance of transnationalism, but it focuses on how local contexts matter to migration. The book covers such topics as migration categories, the explanation of different forms of migration, migration and employment, the geopolitics of migration and immigration and citizenship, rights, and belonging.

This text is not simply an encyclopaedic overview of migration theories, trends, and facts; rather, it is designed to have lasting intellectual value by providing particular arguments in each theme-based chapter. While it advocates certain arguments, it is also clearly written in an engaging and accessible manner for an undergraduate audience. Its clear structure is complemented by a combination of pedagogical features, such as case-study boxes, summary questions at the end of each chapter and a glossary. The book is designed for courses and modules on migration and immigration at the undergraduate and postgraduate levels and both students and academics will find it exceptionally useful.

**Michael Samers** is Associate Professor of Geography at the University of Kentucky. His research interests include the urban and economic dimensions of migration, as well as Islamic banking. He is the co-author with Noel Castree, Neil Coe, and Kevin Ward of *Spaces of Work: global capitalism and geographies of labour*. 
Praise for Migration

‘Given the contemporary salience and topicality of issues around international migration, this book represents an original and critical contribution to debates. Unusually, it examines migration through an explicit engagement with spatial perspectives, yet at the same time draws upon and brings together literature from a number of different disciplines, making it an appealing and highly valuable resource for a wide and varied audience.’

Johanna L. Waters, University of Liverpool, UK

‘In a market dominated by texts by anthropologists, economists, political scientists, and sociologists, such a contribution is long overdue. Samers’s sensitive treatments of concepts such as the friction of distance, context, and scale cast new light on terms like transnationalism and social networks as well as on the practices that compel people to leave home to try to make a life for themselves and their families elsewhere.’

Richard Wright, Dartmouth College, USA

‘Migration explores the local contexts shaping migrants’ lives by going beyond – and beneath – the usual national statistics and transnational flows. As a conceptual roadmap to the ever-expanding migration literature, it should be essential reading for both established scholars and those new to migration studies.’

Deirdre McKay, Keele University, UK
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The Key Ideas in Geography series will provide strong, original and accessible texts on important spatial concepts for academics and students working in the fields of geography, sociology and anthropology, as well as the interdisciplinary fields of urban and rural studies, development and cultural studies. Each text will locate a key idea within its traditions of thought, provide grounds for understanding its various usages and meanings, and offer critical discussion of the contribution of relevant authors and thinkers.

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This book is designed as a critical, multi-disciplinary, and advanced introduction to migration (and immigration) as part of Routledge’s Key Ideas in Geography series. It is generally aimed at advanced undergraduates and Masters-level graduate students undertaking courses on migration and immigration. While the subject of migration has received enormous attention in academic journals and books across the social sciences, introductory texts on the matter are few and far between. Even fewer books have explored migration through a critical and explicit engagement with spatial concepts. In fact, geographers, who might have otherwise placed spatial concepts at the forefront of their discussion, have produced only a handful of books uniquely about migration or immigration.¹

In this respect, Key Ideas in Geography: Migration (henceforth called Migration) has five distinctive features. First, it remains the only text in more than a decade to show how geographical or spatial concepts can be used critically to understand migration. Second, it is designed to be an avowedly multi-disciplinary text, borrowing as it does from human geography, political science, social anthropology, sociology, and to a less extent economics. Third, all of the chapters focus on key terms, theories, concepts, and issues concerning migration and immigration. Fourth, Migration is not simply an encyclopaedic overview of migration ‘facts’, trends, and migration systems based on world regions or nation-states, as is often the case in other volumes. Rather, it is designed to have lasting intellectual value by espousing a core argument. The central argument in this book is that in the context of migration, spatially-explicit concepts such as ‘transnationalism’ require more nuance, while many of the concepts and theories which have thus far neglected space or have not been ‘treated’
spatially, need to be re-written with space in mind. This is not simply a matter of academic concern; a critical appreciation of space will enable us to intervene more appropriately in policy debates in order to address some of the terrible practices that compel disadvantaged people to migrate and the difficult lives they lead in the countries of immigration. A fifth distinctive feature of the book is its pedagogical objective. In this regard, I have sought to combine a carefully defined structure, accessible language, boxes that explore for example, case studies of migrant-related experiences in particular places, annotated suggestions for further reading, useful websites and relevant films, as well as summary questions for student learning at the end of each chapter.

The goal of the Key Ideas series, namely to combine a highly readable, advanced introductory text, with a core argument or set of arguments, presents a tall order for any author. This may be even more the case with the subject of migration, which is itself so diverse and wide-ranging that encapsulating it into a single volume has forced me to narrow considerably the range of theoretical and substantive material. Indeed, there are literally thousands of papers and hundreds of books published on various dimensions of migration and immigration every year. I have certainly left out many studies that I would have liked to include. In this respect, the process of narrowing the book involved three choices. First, the text is meant as a portrait of the present and the ‘recent past’, and the majority of the substantive material is gleaned from the last decade. I do however draw on some older comparisons in a few places in the book, but it was simply not possible to engage with the longer-term historical development of the issues in this text. Second, I seek to provide readers with a sense of the intellectual history of migration ideas, since it is my contention that much research on migration suffers from an intellectual amnesia. Third, I have relied on my own strengths in the context of migration to provide further direction to the book. That is, I have, over the years, limited my research to ‘low-skilled’, ‘low income’ or ‘low-paid’ (rather than highly-skilled and highly paid) migration from poorer countries to richer ones. This pattern of migration is covered disproportionately in this volume, although the book seeks to move beyond this exclusive thematic and geographical focus.

Migration and immigration are likely to remain at the heart of economic, political, social, and environmental debates in the twenty-first century. In this context, I only hope that I offer a readable, enlightening,
and lasting volume that will help us understand migration and immigration, not just in the present, but in the past and future.

Michael Samers
Lexington, KY, USA
15 May, 2009
I could not have written this book without the assistance of a number of friends and colleagues. I would like to thank especially Gill Valentine at the University of Leeds and Sarah Holloway at Loughborough University for inviting me to write this book as part of the Key Ideas series. Andrew Mould and Michael Jones at Routledge pushed me to devise, and more importantly, finish the project. Jennifer Page at Routledge handled the administrative details, and Solveig Gardner Servian copy-edited the manuscript. Patricia Ehrkamp and Andy Wood in the Department of Geography at the University of Kentucky read drafts of certain chapters. Mathew Coleman in the Department of Geography at Ohio State University provided me with some useful references. I express my sincere gratitude to Dick Gilbreath, Brittany Frasure, Matthew Basanta, and Eric Truesdell at the Gyula Pauer Center for Cartography & GIS, University of Kentucky for their work on the maps, figures and tables. Five anonymous reviewers offered excellent comments and suggestions, and ensured that this project did not consist solely of my own interests and musings. Finally, Debra Gold provided indispensable companionship, support, and most of all patience.


For the discussion of ‘Lillian’ in Chapter 1: Reprinted by permission of the publisher from Suburban Sweatshops: The fight for immigrant rights by Jennifer
For the paraphrased discussion of ‘Laika’ in Chapter 1, I am grateful to Women’s Studies International Forum, Vol. 29, Anne-Marie Hilsdon, Migration and human rights: The case of Filipino Muslim women in Sabah, Malaysia, p. 12, 2006, with permission from Elsevier.

For Figure 1.1, I am grateful to the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Population Division, for permission to use data from International Migration 2006 (Wall Chart on-line).


For Table 1.1, I am grateful to the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Population Division, International Migration 2006 (Wall Chart on-line).

For Table 1.2, I am grateful to the OECD for permission to adapt Table A.1.4. Stocks of foreign-born population in selected OECD countries, International Migration Outlook: SOPEMI 2007, OECD 2007.

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For Table 1.6, I am grateful to the OECD. The data is based on OECD (2007), International Migration Outlook: SOPEMI 2007, p. 53, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/022174831538.

For Table 5.1, I am grateful to Marco Martiniello and the University of Amsterdam Press to adapt Table 2 by Harald Waldrauch, Voting rights of third country nationals in western Europe (25 EU states, Norway and Switzerland), pp. 110–11 from Martiniello, M. (2006) Political participation, mobilization and representation of immigrants and their offspring in Europe, Migration and Citizenship: Legal status, rights and political participation, edited by Rainer Bauböck.
INTRODUCTION

A very short article on November 6, 2007 in the French newspaper *Le Monde*, reported that 47 ‘clandestine’ (or ‘undocumented’ or ‘illegal’) immigrants drowned at sea off the coast of Mauritania trying to reach the Canary Islands, a group of islands owned by Spain and a stepping stone for migrating to the Spanish mainland and eventually elsewhere in the European Union (see Map 1.1).

Far from an unusual story, such human tragedies are played out on a daily basis without any dramatic media coverage, or world-wide protest and remorse. Aside from the immediate explanation of an ill-equipped boat and the limited resources of its passengers, why did this happen? Why did these migrants use a clearly inadequate vessel instead of travelling by a less treacherous land-based route? Why did they agree to undertake such an arduous journey to an uncertain destination and future? Or to put it more broadly, why do people migrate and what sort of reception will they find in their new destination? Why is there such seeming indifference to this kind of tragedy? Indeed, *how could this happen?* This book seeks to answer these questions in general and many others related to migration through a *geographical* or *spatial* perspective. This perspective involves an attention to ‘space’ and to such spatial concepts or metaphors such as ‘place’, ‘node’, ‘friction of distance’, ‘territory’, and ‘scale’. I adopt such an approach because while so many volumes address the subject of migration, so few involve a critical and explicit engagement with spatial concepts.
Let me return to the tragedy above. From what we know about the difficult migratory routes from western Africa to Europe, many of the passengers in this case were probably not from Mauritania at all, but from African countries further to the south (such as Senegal, Nigeria, The
Congo, and Liberia). This pattern of migration has developed not necessarily because of a tightening of the southern Moroccan border, but rather because increasingly since 2005, migrants have been unable to gain access to Spain through the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Mellila in northern Morocco. For many migrants, Ceuta and Mellila have become attractive destinations. For example, in 2002 the BBC (British Broadcasting Company) reported the case of a 23-year old Liberian migrant named Kafumba, whose migration to northern Morocco involved a 5-hour swim in the sea. He recounts how an “Arab man pointed to Ceuta and told me this is Spanish territory . . . He said if I got here my problems could be over, so I just got in the sea and came here. I didn’t know what would happen or whether I’d make it or not. When I got here I was very happy” (cited in the BBC News On-line, May 28, 2002). Once a comparatively easier means of gaining access to mainland Spain and ultimately the European Union, the borders around Ceuta and Mellila have been increasingly fortified in a troubling echo of the former Berlin Wall. This increasing security involves double barbed-wire fencing, watch towers, water cannons, security cameras and fibre-optic motion detectors controlled by the Spanish Civil Guard who police the 2–5 meter space between the 3–6 meter high fences with guns. This increased security would not have been possible without the financial assistance from the European Union (about 40 million euros), which targeted the money in response to a week of confrontations among migrants and Spanish authorities. Between September 29 and October 3, 2005, hundreds of migrants housed in camps set up by the Moroccan government and international aid agencies, constructed make-shift ladders to scale the fences and enter the enclaves. While many succeeded, the Spanish Civil Guard opened fire with rubber bullets and in the struggle, five migrants were killed. As entry through Ceuta and Mellila became increasingly difficult, a sea-based migration developed between Mauritania and the Canary Islands, of which the tragedy discussed above is but one example. Given the thousands of migrants choosing the sea route, Moroccan and Spanish authorities then began to cooperate in patrolling the waters between Mauritania and the Canary Islands in 2006, in order to stem the estimated 2,100 people migrating annually. This in turn has had two effects: redirecting migration towards Ceuta and Mellila despite increasing fortification, and stimulating seaward migration from Senegal, even further to the south (BBC News On-line, May 28, 2002).
How can an explicit attention to geographical concepts help to shed light on these series of events? To begin with, social networks communicate the value of particular destinations among migrants, and places such as Ceuta and Mellila have both an imagined and potentially real promise for migrants like Kafumba. Second, these harrowing incidents point to different scales of regulation, among them the continuing ability of territories such as national states to decide who can enter and who cannot, and how supra-national territories such as the European Union step in to shape migration control. Yet the enforcement of migration regulation happens in particular places, and the interaction between migrants and Spanish Civil Guards in Ceuta and Mellila produce a particular local geography of enforcement. These more local spaces of regulation and enforcement seem to shape an entire migratory system which extends as far south as Senegal. Above all, the events described above show the desperation of migrants to cover vast distances, often by the cheapest available option to reach the European Union and other wealthier states. What this discussion does not show perhaps is how the relationship between wealthier and poorer countries creates these migrations, and the reception migrants might have once they do succeed in settling in the richer countries, but we will explore these issues later in the book.

This critical engagement with geographical concepts seems equally vital insofar as it enables us to assess what Sheller and Urry (2006) call ‘the new mobilities paradigm’ in the social sciences; in other words, the idea that theory in social science can be renewed again by exploring ideas of mobility rather than taking stability and stasis as the natural state of affairs. In the same vein, Favell (2008) argues that migration should be a ‘subset’ of mobility studies, and mobility and migration accepted as the norm. Once we accept this, ‘nation-states’ will no longer be the benchmark against which such migration and mobility is gauged. While I applaud much of this emphasis on mobility rather than ‘stability’, ‘stasis’, or nation-state centred analyses, and I recognise that mobility is part and parcel of the lives of millions of people across the world, it also questions whether international migration – particularly of asylum-seekers, refugees and low-income migrants – can be uncritically subsumed within this mobility approach. I say this since territorially-defined borders and immigration regulations do much to impede mobility, though they also serve to create it.

This book draws unashamedly from across the social sciences, includ-
ing works in anthropology, economics, human geography, political science, and sociology. Moving beyond the tidy world of disciplines is essential since migration is multi-faceted, having cultural, economic, political, and social dimensions. Yet its complexity also ensures that encapsulating these various dimensions in a single volume will forever be a challenge. In order to rise to this challenge, I maintain a focus on international ‘low-income’ migration and immigration (including asylum-seekers and refugees), the causes and consequences of such migration, as well as the experiences of migrants and immigrants. It does not ignore other forms of migration, but I choose this focus because the book seeks to provide an avowedly critical treatise, not an arid and detached commentary on the geographical dimensions of migration, or a repository for a barrage of statistics, nor a synoptic review of every type or dimension of migration. By critical, I do not simply mean that this book is an attempt to think ‘long and hard’ about (spatial) concepts and ideas, but that this text is concerned with those migrants who are on the whole disadvantaged.

The volume has four additional foci. First, it places an emphasis on migration from the so-called ‘global south’ (or broadly speaking poorer countries) to the ‘global north’ (in large measure, the richer countries). While this distinction between ‘south’ and ‘north’ may seem crude given the enormous diversity within these two hemispheres, I show in this book that making this distinction is important for explaining why people migrate, but may be less so for other issues, such as the kinds of work that migrants perform. Second, I focus on the experiences of migrants and immigrants within the global north, though experiences in poorer countries are not neglected. Third, this book provides some discussion of ‘highly-skilled’ or ‘high-income’ migrants. It has often been asked by more critical observers to what extent highly-skilled or high-income migrants should be the object of academic scrutiny since they are a comparatively privileged group of migrants. I share these concerns, although many of those who are considered highly-skilled in their own countries end up performing menial jobs in the country of immigration, and they too are subject to racism and other exclusionary processes. By the same token, my interest in highly-skilled migrants also stems from their role in constructing the economic structure of richer countries, often, but not always at the expense of many people in poorer ones. Fourth, I also devote some attention to the migration of students, or what...
is now called ‘international student mobility’. Like highly-skilled migrants, many student migrants may be relatively privileged compared to other low-income immigrants and asylum-seekers, but they too are subject to security fears and their manifestation in tighter visa controls, racist violence, discrimination and exclusion. And like highly-skilled migrants, international students serve the interests of governments in terms of economic development, and universities in terms of their search for greater financial resources, a diverse student body, and intellectual prestige.

As the aims of this book suggest, migration involves different people in a variety of situations, some more desperate than others. Most academic discussions of these situations are often expressed in quite abstract terms. In this section then, I begin by discussing three vignettes of migrant lives in order to place a ‘human face’ on the discussion of migration categories that follow.

MIGRANT STORIES AND KEY TERMS AND CATEGORIES IN THE STUDY OF MIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION

Laika (Jacqueline), the ‘illegal’ immigrant in Malaysia

Hilsdon (2006, 4–5) recounts the story of Laika, 22 years old, who came to Sabah (the Malaysian part of the island of Borneo) in the 1990s from the island of Mindanao in the Philippines. She arrived as a teenager in Pulau Jaya, Sabah. Her passport and visa were ‘fixed’ (that is to say, illegally arranged) by a relative before she left the Philippines. In Sabah, she began working at a local restaurant and eventually met a man, Salim, who she later married, in part because she could not live on her meagre wages of some 300 ringgit (about US$ 94) per month. In addition, her illegal visa had expired, and for that reason it could not be renewed and she could not obtain the necessary documents to return home legally. Jacqueline was hardly the only person to face this situation as many women (but not just women) have faced questions about whether their visas were ‘good enough’ to continually stand up to official scrutiny. Thus Jacqueline, like so many others, have avoided public places such as shopping centres, markets, hospitals, government offices, and public transport where police and other immigration officials increase their policing activity.
The story of Asha, the asylum-seeker in Finland

Asylum-seeking – especially from Middle East – is a significant dimension of migration to Scandinavia. Around 1990, many Somali asylum-seekers began migrating to Finland. Tiilikainen (2006) offers us the story of Asha. Born in Mogadishu, Asha got married and had two daughters and a son while studying at the university for two years. Civil war erupted in Somalia, and Asha fled city and country. As a 24-year-old woman, Asha joined her brother in Finland where she sought refugee status. Asha was never joined by her husband and they eventually divorced. After three years, she was finally given approval to bring her three children from Somalia, but she also adopted another two children from her brother who passed away. Taking care of her children and other household responsibilities as a single mother, Asha heroically studied to become an assistant nurse and began working at a hospital. As the years passed, trouble frequently found her son, and he eventually ran away. Unable to reconcile the ways of her son with her new-found Islamic religiosity, Asha took her five children and left them with their grandmother in England. She returned to Finland alone, but eventually went back to England, enrolling at the local university and settling in the same city as her mother and five children.

The story of Lilliam, the ‘low-income’ immigrant in New York

In the suburbs of New York City, many Latino immigrants eke out a meagre living in the wealthy towns on the north shore of Long Island. Gordon (2005) documents the life of Lilliam.

Not far away, night has fallen in the kitchen of a middle class Long Island family. Lilliam Araujo, who lives with the family, cleans their home, and cares for their daughter, sits in the dark at the breakfast table, the phone line wound tightly around her shoulders like an umbilical cord. Her voice, hushed to avoid waking up the sleeping people on the second floor, is warm but firm: “Did you do your homework, papi? Is your brother home? No you can’t wait up for him to come from work. It’s late already . . . Seven years old and seventeen, they live alone in a small apartment she rents two towns away. She left El Salvador for them: to keep the older one from being
recruited by the military or the guerrillas in their increasingly conflict-ridden town, to save the younger one from being caught in the ever more frequent crossfires of the Salvadoran civil war. But the best work she could find on arrival was a live-in domestic job at the rate of $160 a week for 65 hours of work, less than $2.50 an hour. A single mother, she took the job and got the nearest apartment she could afford for her sons. Bathing and dressing and hugging a child not her own, she is plagued by the question of whether she is doing better by her boys here, or worse. As for herself . . . as she moves out of the kitchen and towards the stairs, her mind drifts toward her days in El Salvador, the coffee-growers’ cooperative where she served as secretary, the degrees she had been earning at night and on weekend in psychology, social work, and teaching, the courses she taught at the local business college, the house she owned. It feels like another life.

(Gordon, 2005, 11–12)

The above stories represent only a very small fraction of the kinds of migration that exist in the world, and the sorts of issues that migrants face. What they suggest at the very least is that migration is a complicated, challenging, and diverse phenomenon involving changing statuses and multiple geographical trajectories. Some authors refer to this as a condition of ‘migrancy’, or “the movement and process rather than stability and fixity across both space and time” (Harney and Baldassar, 2007, 192). Whatever the degree to which migrants live fluid lives, governments, citizens, the media, authors of policy reports and authors of books like this on migration routinely use such categories to discuss the lives of migrants. Thus, even if we find these categories unhelpful or downright oppressive, we would find it difficult to make sense of national immigration policies as well the vast literature, academic or otherwise, on the subject of migration. It is for this reason that we turn to a careful analysis of some basic terminological and categorical issues that will figure centrally in the chapters that follow.

Migrants seem to fit both into and across different types or categories of migration that imply a certain citizenship or residence status (e.g. internal or international, temporary and permanent, legal and undocumented), and different modes of entry (e.g. as asylum-seekers, refugees, low-income and highly-skilled workers, students, and so on). Concerning
their mode of entry, they may also be classified by academics, policymakers, or statisticians as ‘forced’ or ‘voluntary’. Given the apparent fluidity of migrant lives across these different categories and modes of entry, it has now become common in migration studies to reject the significance of these categorizations in some cases (e.g. Faist, 2008; Richmond, 2002). As Faist argues,

... dichotomous distinctions such ‘as origin’ vs. ‘destination’ and ‘emigration’ vs. ‘immigration’ no longer hold, if only because many traditional emigration counties have become both transit and immigration countries, Turkey being a typical example. Less obviously, other dichotomies such as ‘temporary vs. permanent’ or ‘labour migrant vs. refugee’ also no longer hold if the goal is to map trajectories of mobile populations.

(Faist, 2008: 36)

Ironically, collapsing together or at least confusing categories is also a feature of the popular press. For example, at one point during the early 2000s when the issue of asylum had flared in political debates in the United Kingdom (UK), the more salacious newspaper tabloids concocted nonsensical terms like ‘illegal asylum-seeker’. Quite simply, someone cannot be an asylum-seeker and an illegal migrant. If an asylum-seeker’s claim is rejected and that person chooses to stay in the UK without the knowledge of UK authorities, then and only then could they be considered ‘illegal’, but then they cease to be an asylum-seeker. The point of this anecdote is to assert that categories around legal status and modes of entry should still be seen as meaningful, even if this book acknowledges the complexity of migrants’ trajectories. As such, below I elaborate on some commonly used terms and the different types or categories of migration, reasons for migration, and various modes of entry.

Let us begin with the simple distinction between internal and international migration. Internal migration involves those who move within their own countries, for example from rural to urban areas. Often this assumes the form of ‘circular migration’ in which migrants move back and forth between rural and urban areas. Although I will touch upon large-scale internal migrations (such as in China) in this book, our main concern is again with international migration, even if the two are commonly related. International migration can be defined as the act of moving across
international boundaries from a country of origin (or country of emigration) to take up residence in a country of destination (or country of immigration).\(^3\)

Such international migration may involve just one country of origin and destination, but it might also involve different ‘steps’ or ‘stages’ between various countries before a migrant moves on to her or his ‘final’ destination. This is sometimes referred to as temporary or sojourner migration. We saw this in the story above of Asha. In official terms, temporary migration refers to international migrants whose duration of stay in a given country does not exceed three months (this is the OECD\(^4\) definition of a ‘temporary migrant’). It is certainly a plausible definition given how many countries limit migrants to let us say a tourist visa of three months before they must leave the country, but international migration might also be ‘permanently temporary’, entailing frequent returns to the country of origin, and much has been written in the last decade about this common practice of circular migration.

Others will stay in a foreign country for years as permanent residents without ‘naturalizing’ (that is, becoming a citizen of a particular country). It may make sense to call these individuals immigrants rather than migrants. Thus, I will generally use the term ‘migrants’ and ‘migration’ to refer to those who find themselves in a condition of more temporary residence in a country of destination. While in practice the distinction between the two is far from clear, referring simultaneously to migrants and immigrants and migration and immigration all of the time would become tiresome for the reader. Thus, I will sometimes use the term ‘migration’ to refer to both conditions, especially when it concerns a very broad or general discussion.\(^5\)

I would highlight one significant caveat to this whole discussion, though. While there is a tendency to focus on an individuals’ longer-term legal residential and work status, such as whether they possess ‘Green Cards’ or permanent residency stamps in their passports, the same person may be constantly dreaming of returning to the country of origin, or what is often called the ‘myth of return’. Thus, the temporality or permanence of a migrant’s stay may also be read from a psychological rather than simply a legal standpoint. As Sayad (1977, 1991) and Bailey et al. (2002) have argued, migrants live with a ‘permanent sense of the temporary’ and a ‘temporary sense of the permanent’.

Another crucial distinction is between legal and undocumented migration.
Legal migrants are those individuals who have express authorization of the national government to reside in the country of destination. Yet here a further distinction is necessary, namely between legal migrants who have only the right of residence, and those who have the right to both residence and work rights. In addition, some migrants will have further stipulations or regulations attached to their resident rights, such as the right to bring in one or more family members, and/or the right to work, but only for so many hours per week. In contrast, undocumented migrants (also called illegal, irregular, clandestine, and unauthorized migrants) are those individuals who cross international boundaries either without being detected by authorities (often called clandestine entry) or who overstay their visas. I will use the term ‘undocumented’ as it appears to be the term preferred by many migrants themselves, at least in the US and many European countries. Furthermore, some observers of migration, and migrants themselves, have insisted that ‘no-one is illegal’. That is, no-one can be ever outside the law (e.g. Cohen, 2003). Less common perhaps is the case of legal immigrants who violate their work conditions stipulated by their visas, such as working more hours than is permissible (what Anderson et al. 2006 call ‘semi-compliance’). In this case, migrants may also be considered ‘illegal’ (‘semi-compliant’) and subject to the terrible reality of deportation.

A prominent academic distinction in the migration literature is between forced and voluntary migrants. This also provides some grounds for discussing different modes of entry. It should be emphasized that the reasons people migrate exist on a continuum between forced and voluntary, and thus determining precisely who is ‘forced’ and who is ‘voluntary’ is difficult. However, it is common to distinguish between two types of forced migration: the migration of asylum-seekers and refugees, as recognized by international conventions, and those who are ‘forced’ to migrate for reasons of poverty or low wages – what is commonly called ‘economic migration’. In terms of asylum-seekers and refugees, there are two principal international conventions that govern, but do not completely determine, who will and who will not receive protection: the United Nations ‘Geneva Convention’ (the ‘1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees’), and the 1967 (‘New York’) Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.

Using the definitions generated by these agreements (I elaborate on these below), asylum-seekers are to be understood as individuals who are
seeking asylum or refugee status in another country, and thus they enter a country as asylum-seekers. They may or may not in turn be granted asylum or refugee status by a particular national government. Refugees are often ethnically or nationally defined groups, granted refugee status by a state or international organization, and recognized and inscribed in international law, prior to their arrival in another country. Yet individuals may be also granted refugee status after a certain period of seeking asylum. It is possible then that the mode of entry into another country may be very different for an asylum-seeker and refugee. An asylum-seeker may enter a country clandestinely (and thus illegally) but later claim asylum in that same country. It is a government’s decision based on their interpretation of the Geneva Convention and the 1967 protocol whether to grant refugee status or some other status to the migrant. The Geneva Convention stipulated that individuals,

As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.8

In addition to the stipulations set out above, a refugee should not be subject to non-refoulement; that is, no state should return a ‘refugee’ to a country where she or he fears persecution without ‘due process’ (in other words, the right to a legal hearing) (Newbold, 2007). The Geneva Convention emerged out of the context of WWII and applied only to persons migrating before 1951 in Europe. It was thus geographically exclusive and rested upon “Eurocentric, Orientalist, even racist constructions of African peoples and politics” (Hyndman, 2000, 11). The 1967 protocol dissolved this geographic exclusion for persons claiming asylum after 1951, but we could hardly call the effects of the protocol to be liberal and welcoming. In 2007, 147 states have ratified one or both of these legal instruments (UNHCR, 2008, see notes 7 and 8), and the determination of a ‘refugee’ is in part determined by how states (if they have in fact ratified the Convention and the Protocol) interpret both the
Geneva Convention and the 1967 protocol. Much of this determination weighs on the interpretation of ‘fear’ (Hyndman, 2000; Newbold, 2007). Indeed, the definitions of refugees and asylum-seekers are contested, and actual practices of treatment diverge from any definitional accuracy laid down in international conventions and international law.

Nonetheless, in principle, if an individual is granted refugee status, and depending on the state in question, this usually means that such a person and their family will be granted similar rights to those of legal migrants (perhaps even more rights), and a certain degree of social support. This might include anything from legal assistance to education and housing. However, most of the world’s refugees are not part of the requisite networks, nor do they have the resources to reach the richer countries where an ‘adequate’ level of support can be provided. Thus, it is in the poorest countries of the world, not in Europe or the United States (US), where by far the greatest number of refugees eke out a living in shanty-towns and similar sites, or rest on the generosity of refugee and other ‘humanitarian’ agencies such as the UNHCR in refugee camps.

We might categorize ‘economic migration’ as another form of forced migration. People may be seeking an escape from poverty or unemployment and below subsistence wages, chronic disease, malnutrition, or some long brewing ‘environmental’ calamity (which may have decidedly human causes) and which may be either the cause or the effect of the above. For governments of the richer countries, and not just the richer countries, adjudicating between who or who is not a ‘genuine’ asylum-seeker is far from straightforward. Given the declining acceptance rates of asylum-seekers over the last decade in regions such as Europe, as well as the restrictive means by which many richer country governments interpret international refugee conventions, those who are not deemed to be fleeing immediate and serious political danger are unlikely to be accorded much sympathy by these governments at the beginning of the twenty-first century (e.g. Papastergiadis, 2006). In short, those who are ‘forced’ by poverty are imagined by governments as ‘voluntary’ and so-named ‘economic migrants’. The term ‘economic migrant’ and ‘economic migration’ may have negative connotations and assume a pejorative tone; that is, economic migrants are often imagined in relation to ‘more deserving’ refugees. In the UK for example, when the government and the public have perceived certain migrants to be ‘economic
migrants’ rather than ‘true’ asylum-seekers, they have been labelled as ‘bogus’ asylum seekers. A significant question then is whether and how rich country governments should distinguish between those suffering from political persecution and those suffering from severe economic hardship, particularly when the conditions of the latter may be an effect of rich country policies.

This brings us to the fault lines between forced and voluntary migration, and the relationship between highly-skilled and low-skilled/low-income migration. It would be tempting to simply map low-skilled and highly-skilled on to forced and voluntary migration respectively, but this would be in many instances an erroneous mapping. First, labour sociologists have long admonished that there is no globally accepted definition of ‘skilled’ and ‘less skilled’, and certainly no-one is ‘unskilled’ (e.g. Gallie, 1991). In fact, people who migrate have all kinds of skills, but they are not recognized by the governments or firms of the countries of immigration at particular times and even for particular areas within countries. In that sense, governments and firms’ definition of ‘skilled’ and not-so-skilled varies over space and time. Nonetheless, many states have immigration categories which determine who is considered skilled, less skilled, unskilled, or indeed anywhere in between. Thus, so-called highly-skilled migrants (those with secondary or post-secondary education, including doctors, computer engineers, nurses, and bankers) can be contrasted with low-skilled migrants, those who generally lack secondary or post-secondary education, or who lack the requisite professional qualifications to obtain ‘highly paid’ jobs.

Second, there are many highly-skilled migrants whose movement may be deemed ‘voluntary’. That is, they seek to gain international working experience, open a new business, join their families, and so forth, and millions of low-income or low-skilled migrants who may be ‘forced’ to one degree or another to migrate, depending on their available economic options. However, there are also many highly skilled migrants who are fleeing political persecution and poverty, and low-skilled and low-income migrants who may be migrating for higher wages, to join families, to seek adventure or any combination of these. In this case then, we should shy away from a neat correspondence between skill and the voluntary or forced motivations for migration.

The use of the above categories whether by governments, the media, academics, or anyone else makes it clear that migration is clearly not just
a matter for migrants. We therefore turn our attention to some issues and debates that involve the relation between migrants and governments and citizens. My discussion is not designed to be comprehensive, nor does this book address all of these issues head on. Rather, it is a selective exposition, aimed at laying the groundwork for the analysis in the four chapters that follow. The first of these issues concerns the causes and consequences of migration.

KEY ISSUES AND DEBATES CONCERNING MIGRATION

The causes and consequences of migration

Why do people migrate? What encourages or enables specific kinds of migration to continue? How does ‘space’ matter to these questions? In short, what are the causes of migration? These questions are of far more than academic concern. For example, the policies of governments in the richer countries, manifested for example in an unequal trading system and its detrimental effect on farmers in poorer countries, partly explain international migration. War, environmental stress, and chronic unemployment, which may also be directly or indirectly related to the policies of richer countries, can shape migration patterns too. The causes of particular kinds of migration, like undocumented migration, are partly a product of national states’ restrictive immigration policies. The causes may also be found in the cultural, political, and social marginalization of specific groups of people, in particular nation-state or sub-national regions, which impel or encourage them to migrate. The causes may be found in social networks which connect individuals between different places, whether they be family members, asylum-seekers, or students, and whether it involves state policies in the form of emigration and recruitment agencies, or smugglers and traffickers. The causes might be located in gender expectations and oppressions from the impact of domestic violence on women’s propensity to migrate, to men’s desire to migrate in order to ‘be a man’, as sometimes seems to be the case, for example, among Albanians migrating to Italy or the UK (King et al., 2006). Given these various ‘causes’, we may find that we wish to address any or all of them, not necessarily because they lead to migration, but they may themselves reflect social problems and inappropriate policies that cry out for our attention.
These various causes cannot be divorced from each other and may be mutually reinforcing. What seems clearer now after more than a century of intensive migration research is that the causes of migration are not unrelated to the consequences of migration in the countries of emigration. Indeed, over the last decade especially, many scholars of migration have turned their attention to the relationship between migration and development, now dubbed the ‘migration-development nexus’ (e.g. IOM, 2008a). This is not surprising since for much of the last 40 years in at least the richest countries, low-skilled and low-income migration from poorer countries has been seen generally as a ‘bad thing’ by governments. Governments have sought ways to stem the movement of low-skilled and low-income migrants. And it was a commonplace assumption that ‘development’ (in the form of industrialization and perhaps democratization) would stem such a movement of people. This assumption has now given way to a vigorous debate that we will explore further in Chapter 2.

Nonetheless, the interest in the relationship between causes and consequences have prompted authors such as Castles and Miller (2009) to argue that the emphasis on trying to understand ‘root causes’ is now perhaps misplaced. Rather, we should move away from trying to ‘stop migration’ by understanding its causes, and instead gravitate towards understanding how greater mobility may be harnessed for the benefits of both origin and destination countries, including the migrants themselves. This is certainly a laudable research agenda and one that deserves far more attention, but this book also maintains that understanding these causes may provide the grounds for a more equitable world in which international forms of mobility, however much it may be harnessed, does not need to be inevitable.

The question of employment for migrants

A second key issue is the relationship between migrants and work. Work is a core dimension of migrants’ livelihoods, even if migrants such as asylum-seekers, family members, or students may not move simply for the purposes of work and they may never engage in waged labour when they reach their destination. Thus for governments, citizens, migrants, and migrant organizations, the world of employment raises a number of concerns. Chief among them is the character of work that migrants perform. Migrants work across the occupational spectrum but many
migrants around the world are relegated to some of the most low-paid and arduous jobs in agriculture, care-work, construction, mining, and other service work such as in hotels and restaurants, regardless of the skills they have. Why are migrants relegated to such work, or why do migrants find the work they do? What obstacles do they face in finding work? A simple response to these questions is that they lack the necessary education, qualifications, or skills to compete with citizens in job markets. A more rounded response might turn to the stereotypes and racist assumptions held by employers, which are decidedly geographic in character. Another fuller response might turn to the networks of information among migrants about the availability of certain jobs in neighbourhoods with an already existing immigrant population.

Often the work that migrants perform is informal in character, that is, unregulated by governmental authorities, and migrants may not be always paid for the work they undertake, or as I mentioned above, they may be paid so little that they find it hard to pay the rent and eat, let alone have enough to send back to perhaps desperate relatives waiting for these transfers of income. What policies address the widespread use by employers of undocumented immigrants for informal employment, and should further policies tackle this issue? This is a question for the governance of migration.

The conflicted task of governing migration

A third issue is how various levels or ‘scales’ of government (international, national, regional, and municipal) and their respective citizens view and respond to migration. When migration and other social phenomena are regulated at and through various levels of government, we refer to this regulation as governance. For some governments and citizens, migration is a process to be actively encouraged; for others, it is something to be vigorously resisted, sometimes at great financial and social cost. The encouragement of especially low-income migrants or the acceptance of asylum-seekers and refugees (as opposed to foreign students or highly-skilled migrants) seems to spark the ire of many citizens and the more nativist-leaning media in countries across the world, though there are significant exceptions, such as the more laissez-faire attitudes of, let us say, employers and their representatives who rely on low-paid immigrants. The reaction to migration is not, however, simply a
matter of the level of government involved nor a product of distinct
groups in society with different interests, but related to complex geog-
raphies, with some regions, cities, or towns more welcoming than others.
For example, areas where there is a large concentration of citizens of
immigrant origin may be more accepting of migrants than another
region with very few residents born overseas, though the reverse may be
true as well (Wright and Ellis, 2000b). This points to a sometimes
unrecognized dimension of governance, and that is how migration,
migrants and pro-migrant non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also
serve to shape migration policy. To put it differently, we can say that
governments are far from in control of migration.

Governments of the richer countries struggle to find a balance
between meeting the literal dictates of the Geneva Convention and the
1967 protocol on refugees and the desire to severely limit the number of
asylum-seekers and refugees. A serious issue is the increasing criminaliza-
tion of asylum-seekers and refugees, and the impact of security concerns
on policies of protecting those fleeing persecution. This criminalization
and securitization is now manifested in the proliferation of off-shore
island detention centres and other similar spaces which now seem to
operate partially outside the purview of national and international law
(e.g. Ong, 2006). Nonetheless, it would be incorrect to assume that these
same governments are not actively seeking immigrants. In fact, before the
global recession beginning in 2007–8, the so-called global search for
‘talent’ meant that countries were deeply involved in discussions of how
to recruit highly-skilled migrants, while at the same time attempting to
restrict or manage other kinds of migration. Paradoxically, governments
also recognize the vital contribution of undocumented migrants to per-
form work now abandoned by more middle-class citizens. This need to
balance complex objectives has given rise to the doctrine of ‘migration
management’, a host of international migration management committees
and organizations, and increasing chatter about the possibilities of a
‘global mobility regime’.

In many respects, the immigration politics of poorer countries is the
mirror image of the rich countries. The former seem to be as preoccupied
as much with emigration policies as they are with immigration. That is, poorer
countries are concerned with how to both retain skilled labour and how
to export low-skilled labour in order to ensure the continual flow of
remittances and reduce unemployment. Nevertheless, the government
agencies in poorer countries that are responsible for managing migration are also preoccupied with the migration of refugees across international boundaries, large-scale rural to urban migration, whether forced or not, and the movement of low-income workers into their own countries.

The question of citizenship and belonging for and among migrants

A final issue concerns citizenship and what is often called ‘belonging’ in the migration and citizenship literatures. One of the fundamental desires for many (but certainly by no means all) migrants today is obtaining legal (or formal) citizenship in a country of immigration. Nation-states, administrative regions within nation-states (such as the German Länder), and even cities have different laws and construct different rules for especially formal citizenship. While citizenship in most countries is not easily obtained; some countries’ citizenship is more easily obtainable than others, depending on one’s officially recognized ethnic or national background as well as other characteristics that a migrant may possess (money, skills, time spent in the country, to name just a few). Meanwhile, the different levels of government and publics in the countries of destination continually question the value of migration and thus the ease with which formal citizenship may be obtained. For migrants, obtaining such citizenship is only one part of the process of what might be called ‘integration’ within the countries of immigration. Migrants are also plagued by problems that impact on their substantive citizenship. Substantive citizenship can be understood as the issues that concern the daily lives of immigrants: matters of family, finding an adequate place to live and work, choosing decent and appropriate schools, participating in relevant organizations and events, the problems of finding quality legal advice, and accessing health care. These challenges are exacerbated on a daily basis by racism or expectations of certain kinds of cultural behaviour, often generated by a variety of state-based organizations, or citizens, and even other migrants. Substantive citizenship also concerns a sense of ‘belonging’. Though migrant identities constantly change vis-à-vis citizens, other immigrants, and compatriots remaining in the country of origin, they are shaped by influences associated with the country, region, or village of origin and other axes of differentiation including age, gender, religion, and skin colour. The ability to express this identity or
these identities in the country of immigration in which they settle is a particular concern for many migrants. At the same time, many migrants also wish to adopt at least some of the cultural, political, and social practices of the majority of citizens in the country of immigration. Yet if the expression of people’s identities were only an individual issue then neither governments nor the media would afford it much attention, but managing diversity (that is managing people’s cultural, political, and religious identities) is something that governments feel is necessary to regulate the relationship between migrants, citizens, economic development, and indigenous political institutions and parties.

GLOBAL TENDENCIES AND ESTIMATED PATTERNS OF MIGRATION ACROSS THE GLOBE

In the latest edition of their Age of Migration, Castles and Miller (2009, 10–12) outline six general trends associated with ‘contemporary’ migration: 1) ‘the globalization of migration’, or what might be better called its diversification; 2) ‘the acceleration of migration’, or what might be simply referred to as the greater number of people migrating; 3) the ‘differentiation of migration’, in other words the diversification of types and modes of entry discussed in the previous section; 4) ‘the feminisation of migration’, or the higher percentage of women migrating relative to men; 5) ‘the growing politicization of migration’, meaning that migration has moved to the centre of global and national political debates; and 6) what they call the ‘proliferation of migration transitions’, in other words that some long-time countries of emigration such as Poland and South Korea have themselves either become countries of transit or countries of more permanent immigration.

As I noted above, we have already discussed the trend of ‘differentiation’. That leaves the remaining tendencies, and here I focus only on the first two, the ‘acceleration of migration’ and its ‘globalization’, in order to provide the reader with some idea of the number of migrants residing in countries outside their country of birth. It is these patterns that theories of migration seek to explain, and which we will explore in some detail in Chapter 2. Unfortunately, to provide some broad overview of global migration requires that we use existing data which is commonly glued to a ‘methodological nationalist’ frame, meaning that data is collected on a country basis. The data tends to involve measurements of
stock (a horrible metaphor used to describe the number of immigrants in anyone country at a particular moment in time) and flow (an equally problematic, fluvial metaphor which documents, generally speaking, the one-way movement of people). Some of the data for poorer countries especially can be taken as probably very inaccurate, and a notable problem of data on migration is its incompatibility. Countries measure migration and who is a migrant and immigrant in often very different ways. Nonetheless, while it has become common to critique the problems of data, international organizations such as EUROSTAT, the International Organization of Migration (IOM), the OECD, and the United Nations are aware of the incompatibility of data, and are in fact working towards providing reasonable data on return migration and rectifying the incompatibility of nationally-collected data (IOM, 2008b).

These data issues aside, the ‘acceleration’ of migration is visible in the estimated rise in the number of migrants world-wide from 176 million migrants in 2000 to about 193 million in 2005. Of these, some 30 to 40 million are thought to be ‘unauthorized’ (undocumented) immigrants. And depending on what strategies motivate us to collect data, we might include the vast number of asylum-seekers and refugees, estimated to be somewhere between 9 and over 14 million people. In total though, migrants comprise ‘only’ about 3% of the world’s population in 2008 (IOM, 2008b). As Zlotnick (1998) noted, if ‘our age’ is considered to be an ‘age of migration’, it is not from global statistics that we can draw this conclusion. Nevertheless, let us explore some of these statistics in a little bit more depth.

Table 1.1 provides rough comparisons of 20 ‘non-OECD’ countries with the largest number of migrants (with percentages relative to total population and those countries ranked in order of the percentage of the population that are migrants). The Table is also graphically represented in Figure 1.1. Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1 do not include asylum-seekers, refugees, and undocumented persons. What is striking is the large number of migrants residing in the Gulf States (in particular the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia), but also neighbouring states such as Iran and Jordan. This is equally noticeable in terms of the percentage of their total population. And if Europe and North America are considered to have a high percentage of migrants, this is relative to Hong Kong and Singapore, where nearly half of the people are considered migrants.

Table 1.2 provides (probably more reliable) data on the total number of
migrants (the ‘foreign born population’) in selected OECD countries. In most OECD countries, the number of migrants has risen substantially since 1996, and Table 1.3 shows the number of migrants (‘foreign born population’) in selected OECD countries by their percentage of the total population. Table 1.3 is also graphically represented in Figure 1.2. Table 1.3 and Figure 1.2 show, perhaps surprisingly, that the largest numbers of migrants reside in Luxembourg, Australia, and Switzerland (over 20% of the total population), and that Ireland has experienced the most rapid growth (4.1%) in the number of migrants between 1996 and 2005. In

Table 1.1 Countries not covered by OECD data with the largest number of migrants by absolute migrant population; by percentage, and same countries in order of the largest number of migrants by percentage of the population, 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number (in thousands)</th>
<th>% of the population</th>
<th>Countries in order of the largest number of migrants by % of the population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>12080</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>6833</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>6361</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>5700</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>3254</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>3212</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>2999</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>2502</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>2371</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2225</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>1843</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied Palestinian</td>
<td>1680</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1669</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>1669</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>1639</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1328</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>1191</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1106</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from United Nations (2006)
Figure 1.1 The number of migrants (‘foreign-born population’) in selected non-OECD countries by their percentage of the total population

Source: Data from Table 1.1
### Table 1.2 The total number of migrants ('foreign-born population') in selected OECD countries (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>4258.6</td>
<td>4315.8</td>
<td>4334.8</td>
<td>4373.3</td>
<td>4417.5</td>
<td>4482.0</td>
<td>4565.8</td>
<td>4655.3</td>
<td>4751.1</td>
<td>4829.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>895.7</td>
<td>872.0</td>
<td>843.0</td>
<td>893.9</td>
<td>873.3</td>
<td>923.4</td>
<td>1059.1</td>
<td>1100.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>999.2</td>
<td>1011.0</td>
<td>1023.4</td>
<td>1042.3</td>
<td>1058.8</td>
<td>1112.2</td>
<td>1151.8</td>
<td>1185.5</td>
<td>1220.1</td>
<td>1268.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>4971.1</td>
<td>5082.5</td>
<td>5165.6</td>
<td>5233.8</td>
<td>5272.0</td>
<td>5448.5</td>
<td>5568.2</td>
<td>5670.6</td>
<td>5774.2</td>
<td>5895.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>440.1</td>
<td>455.5</td>
<td>434.0</td>
<td>448.5</td>
<td>471.9</td>
<td>482.2</td>
<td>499.0</td>
<td>523.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>265.8</td>
<td>276.8</td>
<td>287.7</td>
<td>296.9</td>
<td>308.7</td>
<td>321.8</td>
<td>331.5</td>
<td>337.8</td>
<td>343.4</td>
<td>350.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>111.1</td>
<td>118.1</td>
<td>125.1</td>
<td>131.1</td>
<td>136.2</td>
<td>145.1</td>
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<td>302.8</td>
<td>307.8</td>
<td>319.0</td>
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<td>251.6</td>
<td>271.2</td>
<td>288.4</td>
<td>305.9</td>
<td>328.7</td>
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<td>390.0</td>
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<td>137.5</td>
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<td>663.0</td>
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<td>32341</td>
<td>35312</td>
<td>36520</td>
<td>37591</td>
<td>38343</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** OECD/SOPEMI (2007b: 330)

**Notes:**

1. Mexico, Poland and Turkey are eliminated for both reasons of sparse data and lack of sufficient space.
2. Figures after 1998 in this row above 1 million are rounded to nearest thousands of persons for lack of space.
the former, the reliance of these countries on migrant labour to fill its least-skilled positions as well as family reunification are probably responsible, while Ireland’s rapid economic growth, demand for highly-skilled migrants, relatively liberal immigration policies during that period, and general integration into the Europe’s wider migration system are partly the reasons for the expansion of migration to Ireland.

Table 1.4 shows the ‘inflows’ of ‘foreign nationals’ (not the total number of migrants residing in the country). Noteworthy are the decline in the number of migrants entering Portugal from 2004 to 2005 (−16%) against an increase of 43% in New Zealand. In Canada, the US and the UK, the number of migrants has also risen rapidly.

Table 1.5 provides global estimates and patterns of so-called ‘non-warehoused’ and ‘warehoused’ asylum-seeker and refugees. With the

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**Table 1.3** The number of migrants (‘foreign-born population’) in selected OECD countries by % of total population, 1996, 2000, and 2005; in order of highest percentage in 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>percentage change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>33.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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<td>23.0</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>21.9</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
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<td>13.5</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>12.6</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
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<td>.006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Adapted from OECD/SOPEMI (2007b: 330)
exception of Tanzania, it is primarily the Middle East and South Asia which are the location of the largest number of ‘warehouse’ and ‘non-warehouse’ refugees.

Finally, Table 1.6 provides some figures for student migration, or
international student mobility’ as it is now also called. From 1998 to 2004, the number of overseas students more than doubled from about 1.4 million to 2.7 million (IOM, 2008a). The geographic concentration of students in the wealthier countries (approximately 85% of all foreign students) is also marked by a concentration (nearly half the world-wide total) in the Anglophone countries (the US, the UK, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand in that order), largely because of the possibility of learning English combined with the perceived quality of higher education institutions in these countries, and the possible employment and settlement prospects that one might be afforded afterwards. The US hosts by far the greatest number of foreign students (more than half a million), but the US ranks 32 out of 35 listed countries in terms of the percentage of all students. Macao, Fiji, Cyprus, New Zealand, and Qatar have the highest

Table 1.4 The migration of ‘foreign nationals’, 2003–2005 to selected OECD countries Permanent-type migration (standardized statistics)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>12,900</td>
<td>15,900</td>
<td>13,300</td>
<td>−2,500 −16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>221,900</td>
<td>212,400</td>
<td>198,600</td>
<td>−13,800 −6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>168,900</td>
<td>173,900</td>
<td>168,600</td>
<td>−5,200 −3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>79,700</td>
<td>80,700</td>
<td>78,800</td>
<td>−2,000 −2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>51,900</td>
<td>57,100</td>
<td>56,800</td>
<td>−300 −1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
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<td>25,800</td>
<td>900 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>60,800</td>
<td>57,000</td>
<td>60,700</td>
<td>3,800 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>167,300</td>
<td>179,800</td>
<td>12,500 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>72,100</td>
<td>75,300</td>
<td>81,300</td>
<td>6,000 8</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>47,900</td>
<td>49,100</td>
<td>53,800</td>
<td>4,700 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>17,400</td>
<td>16,400</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>1,700 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>9,400</td>
<td>11,500</td>
<td>12,700</td>
<td>1,200 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>221,400</td>
<td>235,800</td>
<td>262,200</td>
<td>26,400 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>703,500</td>
<td>957,900</td>
<td>1,122,400</td>
<td>164,500 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>258,200</td>
<td>307,300</td>
<td>362,400</td>
<td>55,100 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>120,100</td>
<td>153,100</td>
<td>184,300</td>
<td>31,200 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>48,400</td>
<td>41,600</td>
<td>59,400</td>
<td>17,700 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>35,900</td>
<td>n.a. –</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total (less Belgium and Norway)**

| Total (less Belgium) | 2,244,500 | 2,614,000 | 2,915,100 | 300,800 12 |
| Total (less Belgium) | –         | 2,637,200 | 2,938,000 | 301,700 11 |

Source: Adapted from OECD/SOPEMI (2007b: 36)
percentage of foreign students, while Russia and South Africa also receive the highest number of students for ‘non-OECD’ countries. Approximately two-thirds of foreign students in richer countries are from poorer countries.

We have seen the significance in terms of the numbers of people

---

**Table 1.5** Countries with the largest numbers of both ‘non-warehoused’ and ‘warehoused’ asylum-seekers and refugees, compared with North American and selected European countries, December 31, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of total refugees and asylum-seekers</th>
<th>% of total country population</th>
<th>Largest group of refugees by nationality (by total number)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1,877,800</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Afghanistan (1,876,300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1,852,300</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>Iraq (1,300,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip</td>
<td>1,047,200</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Former Palestine (1,047,200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1,003,100</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Afghanistan (914,700)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank</td>
<td>745,000</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Former Palestine (745,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>617,100</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>Iraq (450,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>432,500</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Burundi (331,900)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>420,400</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>China (110,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>406,000</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>Myanmar (396,700)</td>
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<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>325,800</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Former Palestine (270,800)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>323,600</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>Vietnam (310,900)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>319,400</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>Somalia (196,200)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Europe and North America**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of total refugees and asylum-seekers</th>
<th>% of total country population</th>
<th>Largest group of refugees by nationality (by total number)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>159,500</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>Afghanistan (84,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>151,200</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>China (16,800)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>97,800</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>Croatia (70,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>Iraq (19,800)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>28,900</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>Serbia (9,700)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>26,600</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>Eritrea (3,600)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>Sri Lanka (2,000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** World Refugee Survey (2008)

**Notes:**

Table 1.6 International and/or foreign students in tertiary education, 2000 and 2004 (ranked in order of Total percentage of foreign students of all tertiary enrolment in 2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>International students as a percentage of tertiary enrollment in 2004</th>
<th>Foreign students as a percentage of tertiary enrolment in 2004</th>
<th>Index of change in the number of foreign students, total tertiary (2000 = 100)</th>
<th>Number of foreign students 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Advanced research programmes</td>
<td>Total tertiary</td>
<td>Advanced research programmes</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
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</tr>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>40.3</td>
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<td>11.3</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>21.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>n.a.</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>33.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>31.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>19.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>20.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>n.a.</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
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<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>18.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>n.a.</td>
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<td>7.8</td>
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<td>3.9</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
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</table>

(Continued Overleaf)
Table 1.6 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>International students as a percentage of tertiary enrollment in 2004</th>
<th>Foreign students as a percentage of tertiary enrolment in 2004</th>
<th>Index of change in the number of foreign students, total tertiary (2000 = 100)</th>
<th>Number of foreign students 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total tertiary</td>
<td>Advanced research programmes</td>
<td>Total tertiary</td>
<td>Advanced research programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3.4</td>
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Source: OECD/SOPEMI (2007b: 53)
migrating above, but we have hardly spoken of its diversity beyond the vignettes cited in the previous section. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there were certainly some less documented and perhaps surprising migrations such as Welsh and Lebanese-Syrians to Argentina, Indians to Fiji, or of Japanese to Peru. Yet with the exception of maybe Australia, there are grounds for making the case that migrants’ countries of origin and their ‘destinations’ have diversified, especially since the post-WWII period in the wealthier countries (e.g. Faist, 2008). From the 1950s to the about the 1980s, most migrations to the wealthier countries could be labelled as ‘post-colonial’ or ‘neo-colonial’ (Samers, 1997b) in character, consisting of people from former European colonies migrating to the former colonial powers in Northern and Western Europe in particular, or from countries that were dominated by the prevailing interests of the US government, such as the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Puerto Rico. At the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, migrants to the wealthier countries hail from a remarkable number of countries. For example, as Smith (2005) notes, some 24 nationalities existed in Los Angeles and New York in the 1920s, now there are some 150. There are Filipinos in Italy and Lebanon, Somalis in Liverpool and Minneapolis, Algerians in London, Sri Lankans in Paris, and South Koreans in the United Arab Emirates, to name just a few examples of both post-colonial migrations and migrations unrelated to past colonial linkages. In some cases though, this diversity is exaggerated or misunderstood, such as in Los Angeles. It may be taken as the paradigmatic city in terms of poly-ethnicity, but it appears to be far less diverse than London or New York, given the high percentage of Mexican migrants relative to all migrants in Los Angeles (Benton Short et al., 2005). In this sense, Figure 1.3 provides a depiction of the 25 cities with the largest number of ‘foreign-born residents’ around the world.

At this point, we should have a fairly comprehensive picture of the different types of migration, the migration patterns based on national territorial statistics, and a hint of the diversity of migrations. I will now devote our time to a necessary discussion of some basic building blocks of society which are commonly used in human geography and the social sciences more broadly. These will serve as the foundation for the arguments in this book and ultimately for explaining the many facets of migration.
Figure 1.3 Twenty-five cities with the largest number of ‘foreign-born residents’ around the world

Source: Adapted from Benton-Short et al. (2005)
SOCIAL THEORY, SPATIAL CONCEPTS, AND THE STUDY OF MIGRATION

Social concepts and the study of migration

For many social scientists, the concepts of structures, institutions, agents, and social networks provide the fundamental, if conventional elements of social theory. Perhaps the most contested are structures. There are at least two understandings of ‘structure’. For so-called ‘structuralist’ or ‘functionalist’ thinkers, structure(s) are akin to the skeleton of buildings; ‘things’ that as Giddens (1984) remarks are “‘external’ to human action” (p. 16). They are therefore conceived of as either enabling or constraining certain kinds of human behaviour. Thus, in a way, structure might be viewed as what keeps human in their places, both socially and spatially. This understanding of ‘structure’ is witnessed in some of the more ‘crude’ Marxist and neo-Marxist writings of the 1970s, but also in some of the earlier work on ‘globalization’ in the 1990s. There was (and for some, still is) a tendency to see the ‘global economy’ or ‘global capitalism’ (the more critical term for the global economy) as a structure which bears down upon or constrains nation-states, institutions, groups and individuals in society. Many observers agreed, however, that this ‘reified’ the ‘global economy’ or ‘globalization’; in other words, that structuralist thinkers attributed causal power to abstractions (e.g. the global economy) that in fact neither existed nor had causal power (see e.g. Gibson-Graham, 1996; Massey, 2005). Certainly, other corners of human geography and the social sciences wielded their own structures, such as the feminist literature and its conception of ‘patriarchy’.

In any case, in joining this critique of reification, the sociologist Anthony Giddens (1984) proposed a second and different understanding of structure, namely that it consisted of a combination of ‘rules and resources’ that shapes social action (p. 25), and that structures did not just constrain social action, but that it “enabled involvement in this action” (Cloke, Philo, and Sadler, 1991, 98). Hence, in his duality of structure, Giddens maintained that “the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organize” (1984, 25). What he means is that structures constrain and enable social action, but social action also shapes structures (i.e. rules and resources). This ‘duality of structure’ formed part of what he calls
‘structuration theory’ and we will explore this theory in more depth in Chapter 2 as a potentially useful way of understanding at least the causes, if not the consequences and experiences of migration and immigration.

Returning to the idea of the ‘global economy’ or ‘global capitalism’ above, I will tread a fine line in this book between on the one hand, viewing global capitalism as a set of forces that has a relatively fixed architecture and which, I argue, does impel people to migrate from poorer to richer countries; and on the other, the idea that the global economy is itself composed of institutions, individuals, and social networks that make the rules and control resources.

A second frequently used concept in the social sciences is that of ‘institution’. Institutions can certainly be organizations, which might include the UK Home Office, the US Department of Homeland Security, the United Nations High Commission on Refugees, an immigrant-run ‘hometown association’, a school, a refugee help centre, employer recruitment agencies, or any number of similar organizations. Such institutions deploy a whole range of discourses and techno-rational procedures in order to exercise power and control over policy domains and people – what the social philosopher Michel Foucault calls ‘technologies’ or ‘techniques of power’ (Foucault, 1977). Yet ‘institutions’ might also include less tangible entities such as marriage, the family, household, and other forms of social arrangements. This brings us to the third social concept or category that concerns us, namely ‘agents’. By ‘agents’, I mean human groups (e.g. Moroccans immigrants in a small town in Spain) and individuals (a particular migrant). This differs from some other notions of agents in the social sciences (see e.g. Fuller, 1994; Murdoch, 1997), but it is one that we will adhere to in this volume. In this respect, agents do not come ‘pre-formed’ but are shaped by structures and institutions, and develop in interaction with other agents. Here, agents are not to be understood as the passive ‘. . . dupes of structural determination’ (Cloke, Philo, and Sadler, 1991, 97); that is, they have ‘agency’, or the capabilities, behaviours, and practices of individuals or groups. They can and do exercise power to shape structures, institutions, other agents, and social networks. However, the degree to which different ‘agents’ (that is migrants and migrant groups) can in fact exercise different forms of power over, through, or against these structures, institutions, and other agents is partly one that we will explore in the rest of this book.
The idea of social networks has become extremely popular in the social sciences and particularly in migration studies as a way of overcoming ‘dualisms’ such as global/local, and macro/micro, to connect structures, institutions, and agents, as well as quite simply to explain migration and understand immigration. For Goss and Lindquist (1995) ‘social networks’ “... are generally defined as webs of interpersonal interactions, commonly comprised of relatives, friends, or other associations forged through social and economic activities that act as conduits through which information, influence, and resources flow” (p. 329). Such networks assume many different forms, from relationships of kin to relations between institutions and other institutions, between institutions and individuals; between individuals who are distant from each other and whose knowledge of each is restricted to the function or functioning of the network. Furthermore, these networks may be official or unofficial, visible or secretive, long-distance or local, and they may involve relatively ‘weak ties’ (Granovetter, 1973) or strong ones. They may involve symmetrical relations of power or asymmetrical relations (where everyone in the network does not exercise power equally). They may be beneficial to migrants’ well-being insofar as they strengthen ‘social capital’ or they may be detrimental insofar as they impede access to other networks, institutions, markets, and so forth. Nonetheless, the concept of social networks and more specifically migrant networks (Boyd, 1989; Massey et al., 1987, and Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993) has been criticized as a ‘chaotic conception’ (Sayer, 1984), a loose umbrella concept which obscures more than it illuminates. At the same time, the structure and operation of such networks have been viewed as inadequately theorized for at least two reasons. First, they miss significant agents and institutions such as employers and employment recruitment agencies (Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Krissman, 2005). Second, since social or migrant networks have become quite dominant in sociological understandings of migration, this has the effect of eclipsing matters of space. In other words, one might get the impression that migrants are unproblematically connected across the globe without the impediment of distance or borders. It is for this reason that we divert our attention now to some spatial concepts.
Spatial concepts and the study of migration

As I discussed earlier in the Introduction, the reason for undertaking such a task is to address the paucity of careful and critical ‘spatial thinking’ in migration studies. In particular, I am motivated by a spatial dilemma created by two seemingly opposed concepts. On one hand is the problem of taking the nation-state as the starting point or basic lens for analysing migration issues. This has been variously called ‘embedded nation-statism’ (Taylor, 1996), the ‘territorial trap’ (Agnew, 1994) or now more commonly ‘methodological nationalism’ (e.g. Beck, 2000b; Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2003). On the other hand are the limitations of what might be labelled ‘methodological transnationalism’ (see e.g. Harney and Baldassar, 2007). Though they are far from opposites, there is no doubt that the turn towards transnational perspectives reflected in part dissatisfaction with ‘methodological nationalism’. Methodological nationalism refers to the on-going academic practice of viewing social processes through the lens of the ‘nation-state’ despite more than a decade’s critique of this particular perspective on the world. In the context of migration, transnationalism generally refers to ‘to multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the border of nation-states’ (Vertovec, 1999, 447). Unfortunately, the literature which mushroomed in the 1990s around the concept of transnationalism (see Vertovec, 1999 and Portes et al., 1999 for reviews) failed to adequately conceptualize what ‘national’ means, and how ‘supra-nationalism’ or ‘localism’ figured in shaping migration and immigration.17 Clearly, what is needed is a more sophisticated treatment of space than that which is offered by either methodological nationalism or methodological transnationalism. The problem of resolving these debates surely stems in part from the desire among social scientists to find the spatial concept to understand migration (Leitner et al., 2008). It is the argument of this book that such a pursuit is not fruitful. Rather, we need a plurality of spatial concepts to understand migration. Below then, I first explore some meanings of ‘space’ itself, and then outline five spatial concepts that are essential to understanding migration. These are:

- Place
- Nodes
- Friction of distance
Some meanings of space

Like other geographical concepts, the idea of ‘space’ is slippery and contested (Massey, 2005). Perhaps one of the most simple, but significant arguments about the nature of ‘space’ is that it cannot be understood without reference to society. In short, space has no meaning by itself, and we should therefore speak of ‘socio-spatial’ relations (Soja, 1989), in other words how space and society interact. The celebrated theorist of space Henri Lefebvre (1974[1991]), famously developed a triadic understanding of space, involving ‘spatial practice’, ‘representations of space’, and ‘spaces of representation’ (p. 33). It is only with the second and third of these with which we will be concerned here. Thus, representations of space refer to the ‘spaces’ conceived by architects, government officials, urban planners, and, well, authors of books on migration! In contrast, the spaces of representation refer to people’s lived understanding of space, the vernacular spaces if you will of migrants (Delaney, 2005). This vernacular understanding of space brings us to the way in which ‘space’ is viewed in relation to ‘place’.

Place and migration

For humanistic geographers, space is more abstract and more ‘empty’ than place (Cresswell, 2004). For example, if I speak of ‘regulatory spaces of immigration’, this would presumably not invoke strong emotional feelings amongst readers. In contrast, if for instance I asked an asylum-seeker about her stay in an asylum detention centre, let us say the Oakington Reception Centre in the British county of Cambridgeshire; this particular detention centre becomes a ‘place’ of lived experience and a site of meaning. But ‘place’ may also be simultaneously the site (or not) of the provision of basic necessities, such as food, clothing, and shelter. Cities and towns, neighbourhoods and workplaces, and cafés and parks are all examples of ‘places’ that involve at the same time lived, meaningful experiences and the provision of basic necessities. In that sense, it is common to view ‘place’ as ‘something’ more localized – or on a ‘smaller scale’ than space (Cresswell, 2004). In this volume, I will accept this
definition for ‘place’ (and by contrast the definition of ‘space’) even if it is not accepted by everyone, and even if it remains problematic (Massey, 2005). Indeed, we must tread cautiously with this conception of place because there is a danger in thinking that places always involve desirable experiences, fond memories, homogeneity, safety, stability, or supportive and inclusive relationships (Harvey, 1996; Massey, 2005). The example above of the Oakington reception centre in the UK may be a place of supportive relationships among co-asylum-seekers but it is unlikely to be a place of desirable experiences or fond memories. Nonetheless, as Massey (1994) has pointed out, ‘places’ may also be diverse, cosmopolitan, and open to ‘outsiders’ such as immigrants, or they may be ‘exclusionary’ and characterize some people as outsiders (Sibley, 1995; Cresswell, 2004).

**Nodes and migration**

A second concept associated with ‘space’ (and ‘place’ too) is the idea of nodes. As a vast literature on networks now argues, nodes form part of networks in a ‘space of flows’ (Castells, 1996, Volume I, 410–18). Castells widely received analysis is in large measure referring to the networked inter-connectedness of economies across the world. He is especially concerned with new information and communication technologies (ICTs) and their impacts. While he discusses the impact of these ICTs on people, I think we need to remain critical of this flow or fluvial metaphor in the case of low income migrants especially. This is so because, as I argued in the beginning of this introduction, national governments make some forms of mobility and migrancy difficult, though they also enable or force it. Nevertheless, for Voigt-Graf (2004), who has explored and ‘mapped’ the lives of Indian transnational communities in Australia and elsewhere, one cannot understand ‘transnational spaces’ without referring to networks and nodes. For Voigt-Graf, nodes refer to “Countries, regions or places that are linked by flows” (p. 29). A node can be a ‘cultural hearth’; that is, an area where “the culture of migrants originally developed” (p. 29) such as in the Punjab in north-western India. Nodes can also refer to the ‘new centres’ of a transnational community, let us say Sydney, where roughly half of the Punjabis in Australia live. The important point here is that such nodes are part of networks or the trajectories of certain migrant groups that can span the globe, but that
these ‘nodes’ are also real and complex ‘places’ (cities, towns, neighbourhoods, etc.), in which migrants grow up, work, find housing, face ethnic and racial discrimination, raise sons and daughters and build communities.

Friction of distance and migration

‘Friction of distance’ refers to “the time and cost of overcoming distance” (Knox and Marston, 2005, 25), and it is not entirely surprising that it seems have been forgotten in the migration literature. This is probably the case because innovations in transport (air travel, etc.) and communication technologies (the Internet, e-mail, phone) have apparently lowered the cost and reduced the time of overcoming distance and because migrants seem to transcend vast distances regularly. There is no reason, however, to assume that this is uniformly so for all migrants in all parts of the world, or that transport and communications will be ever cheaper relative to migrants’ income and other expenditures. Fluctuations in the cost of energy over the last few years suggests that the problem of ‘overcoming distance’ will not disappear.

Certainly, distance alone may be a poor explanation for understanding patterns of migration (think, for example, of the settlement in the 1960s of the Moluccan Indonesians half a world way in the Netherlands, because of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia). But it also might help to explain the large number of Indonesian women now working as domestics in Malaysian and Singaporean middle-class households only a few hundred miles away across the Strait of Malacca, or the large number of Ukrainians working across the border in Poland, or Polish migrants working across the border in Germany. Thus, the tired refrain that ‘distance no longer matters’ needs to be assessed through careful comparative analysis and by differentiating among different kinds of migrants. Contrary perhaps to popular opinion, geography is not history (see e.g. Graham, 2002).

Territory, territoriality, and migration

Let us now move to our third set of spatial concepts: territory and the idea of ‘human territoriality’ (Sack, 1986). At its simplest, according to Storey (2001), ‘territory’ refers to ‘a portion of geographic space which
is claimed or occupied by an institution or person or group of persons. It is thus an area of “bounded space” (p. 1), and ‘human territory’ is a human strategy to affect, influence, and control (Sack, 1986, 2). Territory and territoriality entail therefore an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ (Delaney, 2005). These ‘insides’ and ‘outsides’ are, however, more stark and policed in some cases than in others, and with different implications. As Delaney (2005) puts it, “Unauthorized incursions into a co-worker’s cubicle may be grounds for disciplinary action but not grounds for a military reprisal” (p. 14). He argues further that “not every enclosed space is a territory. What makes an enclosed space a territory is first, that it signifies . . . [something] . . . and second, that the meanings it carries or conveys refer to or implicate social power. But meaning and power are not independent of each other” (p. 17). According to Delaney, the existence of territory ‘works’ or is acceptable because the relationship between power and meaning are seen as natural and obvious. Indeed, for many non-migrants and perhaps some migrants as well who benefit from a certain kind of territoriality, it might seem odd to question the sanctity of territories (especially national territories) and the right for governments to exercise power over such bounded spaces. In contrast, for migrants who resent and protest the existence of territorial borders or certain territorial regulations such as national immigration policies, territories and territoriality are not seen as ‘natural’ but malleable. Migrants live in hope for the construction of new forms of territoriality. We can say then that territories and territoriality are not permanently fixed and territories do not simply act upon migrants; rather, territories are porous and migrants themselves shape the nature of territory and territoriality.

Human territoriality can involve anything from the territory of a national state to the territory of a firm or organization. It can concern the UK, a state in the interior of Brazil (a sub-national region), the European Union (a macro-region), disputed zones such as the ‘western Sahara’, a Canadian province, a section of the city of Istanbul, the ‘space’ of a textile plant in India, a neighbourhood, and someone’s work cubicle. In short, territories should not be thought of as restricted to national states, and ‘micro-territories’ can be as significant as ‘macro-territories’. While human territoriality is enormously varied (Delaney, 2005), territoriality is a significant dimension of national states in particular, and they exercise enormous control over migration and immigration. It is for this reason
that a certain version of territoriality will figure centrally in our spatial toolbox.

‘Scale’, ‘scalar’, and their relationship to understanding migration

Territory is also associated with ‘scale’ and ‘scalar’, the final set of spatial concepts to be discussed. The use of ‘scale’ as a term or concept in critical human geography is nothing short of ambiguous and vague, and it has rarely been employed in the migration literature (Glick-Schiller and Caglar, 2010). Never really defined outright by critical human geographers, ‘scale’ has become a difficult and contested term (Marston et al., 2005). During most of the 1990s, it seemed to refer mainly to spaces (or territories?) of political-economic processes (e.g. the ‘local’, ‘national’, ‘macro-regional’, and ‘global’). Hence, ‘scale’ seemed to be a substitute for different ‘levels’ of governance. It was common in the 1990s for instance to speak of the ‘re-scaling’ of economics, politics, or culture from the ‘national scale’ upwards to the ‘global scale’ (the process of globalization) or downwards to the local scale (the process of localization) (e.g. Jessop, 1997). But others criticized this idea of fixed scales (or territories?) and argued that scale should be viewed as fluid and ‘relational’ (in other words, scales only exist insofar as they relate and interact with each other). They are therefore socially constructed over time, and one should not necessary privilege any scale (let’s say the global or national) over another beforehand (e.g. Brenner, 2001; Leitner and Miller, 2007; Mansfield, 2005; Swyngedouw, 1997). In the same vein, Mansfield argues that the notion of ‘re-scaling’, that is when for example, global processes become more important than ‘national’ ones, should be thrown out in favour of an analysis of the ‘scalar dimensions of practices’ (Mansfield, 2005). What Mansfield means is that no social process fits neatly or should be associated with any one scale. Instead, we should focus on the process first and then explore its spatial (or scalar) dimensions. Note here that the word ‘scalar’ appears to have eclipsed ‘scale’ in twenty-first century geographical writings. In any case, the important point is that ‘scalar’ now seems to imply the ‘spatiality’ of certain social processes, but what is ‘spatiality’? We might say that it refers to the overlapping or complex spaces of creation, interaction, resistance, and other aspects of the exercise of power by governments, institutions, citizens, and migrants alike. Certainly, different social processes have
different spaces, spatial dimensions, or ‘spatialities’, but it is contradiction-
yory, confusing, and inconsistent to refer to scalar as the ‘spatiality’ of a
process, particularly when in many studies scale itself is either never
defined, is not considered a fixed container for social processes, or both
rejected and accepted as a territory or the spatial extent of some process.

Since this unclear and/or confusing usage of scale and scalar has
become central to the literature in critical human geography, how can we
resolve this problem? One way might be to better define how I use the
terms ‘scale’ and ‘scalar’ in this book, and then explain what is meant by
spatiality or even ‘scalar spatialities’. In this book, I define scale as ‘terri-
tory’ (a ‘container’ so to speak such as a national state, a sub-national
entity such as an American state, a macro-region such as the European
Union, but also a human body, and so on). However, I do not see these
‘containers’ as forever fixed, non-porous, or so stable that they cannot
evolve. I also define scale in terms of the spatial extent of any given
process expressed in territorial terms. Thus, the migration of people can
cross or encompass many scales (territories). When the migration of
people involves multiple scales and when multiple scales (territories,
odies, cubicles, etc.) are involved and/or are interrelated in regulating
this migration, I will use the term ‘scalar’ or ‘scalar spatialities’ inter-
changeably, because ‘scalar’ is an adjective that describes when a process
is subject to, but also transcends particular scales.

A brief example can better illustrate my point here. At the beginning
of the twenty-first century, migrant workers in Germany were regulated
by a ‘double regulation system’. If a German firm wished to employ an
‘unskilled’ non-EU worker, it had to first search at the (Federal) Central
Placement Agency. Once a provisional job offer had been made, the firm
had to ensure that no EU worker was available from the local employment
office associated with a specific municipality (city, town, etc.). Once a
certificate had been issued from the Local Employment Office, the for-
eigner could obtain a visa to enter Germany, and subsequently the
employment contract. In turn the employment contract generated a resi-
dence permit (OECD, 2000). Thus, we can say that migrant workers were
subject to different scales of regulation, or that the scalar regulation of
migrants is both Federal and local. Thus, we can talk both of the scale of
governance as well as the scale of migration control and its territorial
extent (Germany). However, this scalar regulation can also be referred to
in terms of the ‘scalar spatiality’ of labour market regulation, because this
process of regulation in particular involves many scales. In sum, my argument in this book is that scale should be used in two ways, as a synonym for territory, and as the spatial extent of a process or ‘something’ in terms of scale (the national or global scale of a process, for example). Scalar or scalar spatiality refers to the way in which a process is subject to or transcends multiple scales.

SUMMARY OF THE INTRODUCTION AND STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

I opened this Introduction with the argument that a critical appreciation of spatial concepts or metaphors should be central to our understanding of migration. I initiated the remainder of the discussion in this chapter with first, a story of migration between northwest Africa and Spain, and second, with some vignettes of migrant lives to humanize migration and show the challenges that migrants face. The stories suggest a set of key issues and debates around migration that are difficult to understand without a fuller analysis of some of the terms and categories that are used in debates about migration. These terms and categories of migration are both useful and problematic simply because migrants are subject to these categories by citizens, governments, and the media, but they also transgress them. I then explored some data on the ‘acceleration’ (i.e. growth) and ‘globalization’ (i.e. diversification) of migration. Migration involves a diverse range of people: highly paid and low-paid workers, asylum-seekers and refugees, students and family members, those who emigrate voluntarily and those who are forced to one degree or another. Some may migrate for a couple of months, others for several years, and still others permanently.

I then outlined four key issues relating to migration including first, the causes and consequences of migration, especially how migration is related to ‘development’ in poorer countries; second, the question of employment for migrants; third, the governance of migration, including some differences between the richer and poorer countries, and finally some of the issues that governments, citizens, and migrants face with respect to citizenship and belonging. This discussion was not meant to be exhaustive, but rather to highlight some important cultural, economic, political, and social fault lines across the globe with respect to migration, as well as to ‘set the scene’ for the chapters that follow. However, in order
to think about or understand these issues, I argued that we first require a set of social concepts (structures, institutions, agents, and networks), and I suggested a more 'structurationist' perspective which acknowledges the 'rules and resources' associated with 'global capitalism'. However, consistent with a more structurationist approach, understanding migration through global capitalism is necessary but insufficient since agents (such as migrants and citizens), institutions, and migrant networks also shape global capitalism and migration. Finally, I discussed some spatial concepts (the meaning of space itself, place, node, friction of distance, territory, and scale) and the necessity of deploying them with more critical reflection in order to better frame migration. The aim of this book is once again to build a more explicitly spatial approach to migration, one that does not rely solely on world regions, nation-states, or transnationalism, and one that seeks to understand in particular the movement of the less advantaged.

**Structure of the book**

The chapters of this book are designed so that each chapter clearly follows the other. Chapter 2 seeks to explain migration across international boundaries, drawing upon some major theories of migration. The chapter will begin by very briefly reviewing the various theories of why people migrate, follow with a brief set of criticisms and finish by explaining how to inject space in order to develop a more robust understanding of migration. If Chapter 2 provides a study of the diversity of migrant imperatives and decisions, including migration for the purposes of work, Chapter 3 explores how labour migrants ‘fit’ in the labour markets of countries across the globe, and some of the working conditions they face. The main purpose of Chapter 3 then is two-fold: to explain how labour markets operate beyond the often simplistic representations peddled by the media, and to elucidate some of the working conditions under which migrants must labour. This chapter also suggests that the nature of the work that migrants perform (and the conditions and social relations bound up with it) may shape their sense of ‘belonging’ in the countries of destination, as discussed in Chapter 5. The emphasis is on low-skilled/low-income migration, with some attention to trafficking and ‘highly-skilled/high-income migration’. For example, it discusses the changing contours of both formal and informal labour markets, the
skill requirements of these sectors, and how migrants fit into these jobs through processes of gendered and ethnic/racial stereotyping. The chapter begins by reviewing the theoretical/conceptual material on the relationship between migrants and labour markets, and I move beyond this literature by discussing what I call ‘international labour market segmentation’ (ILMS) (Samers, 2008). With this theoretical/conceptual discussion in hand, the next part of the chapter illustrates my arguments with respect to different patterns of migrant participation in labour markets across the world. This chapter will serve as basis in part for understanding governmental responses to migration in Chapter 4.

Chapter 4 is divided into two parts. The first part reviews a range of theories and of migration politics and policies, and in the process I explore actual practices in relation to these theories. I focus in particular on how these various approaches or theories fail to make explicit issues of space, especially the importance of sub-national entities such as towns. While there are common processes in the production of migration control across the globe, I maintain that wealthier countries are facing a different set of migration issues from poorer countries. The response to this has been the general doctrine of ‘migration management’, and I show how migration policies frequently encounter political opposition from a variety of groups and institutions. Yet the chapter also highlights how these oppositional movements are neither simply international nor national in character, but are often sub-national and highly localized.

The second part of the chapter focuses on poorer countries. I elaborate on how southern governments pursue a tense balance of opening borders to refugees and labour migrants, consistent with a loose regionalism on the one hand, and on the other strictly control the movement of such persons because of desperately high unemployment levels and the risks of political stability. I provide examples of this restrictionism, and I summarize this section of the chapter by highlighting this mixture of cooperation and often militarized control that marks the migration regimes of southern governments.

Chapter 5 (‘Migration, citizenship and belonging’) claims that social scientists’ reading of citizenship and belonging employ under-developed notions of ‘socio-spatial relations’ with the respect to migration. Following the general argument of the book, I demonstrate in this chapter how using a geographic lens can shed light on the nature of, and relationship
between migration, citizenship, and belonging. The emphasis is on the wealthier countries of the ‘global north’, though I use examples from other countries in the ‘global south’ to illustrate my arguments. After an explanation of the chapter’s geographical premise, I begin by drawing an initial distinction between legal forms of citizenship; citizenship as economic, political, and social rights; citizenship as political participation and citizenship as belonging; and I use this four-fold distinction to divide the chapter’s discussion into four separate, but related sections.

In the Conclusions (Chapter 6), I bring together the summaries of each chapter, and emphasize how a geographic lens on ‘migration issues’ should not be ‘tacked on’ as an afterthought to what seem to be somehow non-geographic issues, but that the issues themselves are constituted through the geography of social relations (including the borders, institutions, regulations, laws, and cultural hopes, fears, and expectations that spring from them). It concludes finally that the question of migration is likely to remain at the heart of economic, political, social, and cultural discussion in the twenty-first century, and that ‘spatial thinking’ has much to contribute to such debates.

FOR FURTHER READING

Age of Migration by Castles and Miller (2009, 4th ed.), the annual reports of the IOM (World Migration Reports) and the annual OECD’s International Migration Outlook as well as the report of the Global Commission on International Migration (2005), present widely-received synopses of migration across the globe, and discusses many of the terms and issues described in this chapter for various regions of the world. Migration News is a free on-line news service hosted by the University of California-Davis (http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn) that publishes monthly reports on all dimensions of migration for all regions of the world. For the UK, Chapter 37 by Koser in Cloke et al.’s (2005) Introducing Human Geographies represents a useful and simple exposition of some chief issues concerning migrants and refugees. For Migration within Asia, Hugo (2006) in Geographical Research has written a very useful overview of migration within Asia. Migration Theory: talking across disciplines edited by Brettell and Hollifield (2008) offers an insightful survey of different disciplinary approaches to migration; what makes them distinctive, and some of the convergence between them. Chapter 6 by Susan Hardwick
entitled ‘Place, Space, and Pattern’ offers a clear, if American-centric introduction as to how geographers might look at some migration themes. On the social concepts discussed in this book, see Cloke, Philo and Sadler (1991) Approaching Human Geography, for a comprehensive foundational discussion. Delaney (2005) has written a great introduction to ‘territory’. The first half of the article by Marston, Jones III, and Woodward (2005) in Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers provides a useful and critical summary of the problems of using scale. The journals Ethnic and Migration Studies, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (for the UK and Europe in particular), and the International Migration Review (more oriented towards the US, Canada, and to a less extent Australia and New Zealand) all provide a bounty of articles on at least immigration in the richer countries. The World Migration Report (listed above) published by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) provides global and national level statistics for most countries. The International Migration Outlook published annually by the OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) and more specifically its migration division SOPEMI provides a wealth of information on the OECD countries (essentially countries in the EU, North America, as well as Japan, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey).

**Useful Websites**

The following are the principal, official government websites for a selection of predominantly English-speaking countries:

**Australia**: Department of Immigration and Citizenship (www.immi.gov.au/)

**Canada**: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (www.cic.gc.ca/english/index.asp)

**New Zealand**: Immigration New Zealand (www.immigration.govt.nz/)

**Singapore**: Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (www.ica.gov.sg/index.aspx)

**United Kingdom**: The Home Office (www.homeoffice.gov.uk/) and within it, especially the UK Border Agency (http://ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/)

**United States**: Homeland Security (www.dhs.gov/ximgrn/), and within it, especially US Citizenship and Immigration Services (www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis) and US Immigration and Customs Enforcement
The Migration Policy Group (www.migrationpolicy.org/) offers a useful information and data bank.

From an international perspective, the International Organization for Migration (www.iom.int) provides a varied range of publications and statistics, as does the United Nations (www.un.org), particularly their Population Division, but also the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, International Migration and Development, and the Global Migration Group.

Some academic, international, non-governmental, and data-provider websites (these sites also contain numerous links themselves)

Age of Migration website (the authors of *Age of Migration* have established a very useful website with its own list of links, photographs, and additional case studies) (www.age-of-migration.com/)

Asia Pacific Migration Network (http://apmrn.usp.ac.fj/)

COMPAS (Centre on Migration, Politics, and Society), University of Oxford (www.compas.ox.ac.uk)

European Centre for Research on Migration and Ethnic Relations (ERCOMER), University of Utrecht (www.uu.nl/uupublish/onderzoek/onderzoekcentra/ercomer/24638main.html)

Forced Migration Online (www.forcedmigration.org/)

International Organization on Migration IOM (www.iom.int)

International Dialogue on Migration (also part of the IOM) (www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/lang/en/pid/385)

Metropolis International (http://international.metropolis.net/index_e.html)

Migration Information Source (www.migrationinformation.org)

Migration News (http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn)

Migration Policy Institute (www.migrationpolicy.org/)

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (www.OECD.org)

Refugee Studies Centre (www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/)
Some meta-sites and other major organizations that list pro-migrant organizations in different regions of the world

For Asia
Asia Pacific Mission for Migrants (www.apmigrants.org/)
Migrant Forum in Asia (www.mfasia.org/mfaAbout/AboutMFA.html)

For Australia
A list of migrant support organizations can be found at A Just Australia – Australians for just refugee programs (www.ajustaustralia.com/home.php)

For New Zealand
See for example the New Zealand Federation of Ethnic Councils (www.nzfec.org.nz/page/home.aspx)

For Europe
Migration Policy Group (www.migpolgroup.com/)
PICUM (Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants) (www.picum.org/) (also contains a long list of organizations elsewhere in the world)

For the United States
A list of migrant organizations can be found at (www.publiceye.org/research/directories/immig_grp_defend.html)
and also at the National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights (www.nnirr.org/immigration/immigration_map.html)

Some suggested documentary and ‘fictional’ films concerning migration and immigration on DVD*

(*The country indicated after the date indicates where the film mainly takes place)

A day without a Mexican (2004), US, 100 min.
April Children (Aprilkinder) (1999), Germany, 85 min.
Bread and Roses (2000), US, 110 min.
Beautiful People (1999), UK, 107 min.
Brothers in Trouble (1996), UK, 102 min.
Crossing Arizona (2006), US, running time unknown
Dirty Pretty Things (2003), UK, 97 min.
From the Other Side (2002), 99 min. Documentary available from www.frif.com
God Grew Tired of Us (2006), US, 89 min.
Hostage (Omiros) (2005), Greece, 105 min.
Inch’Alla Dimanche (2001), Algeria and France, 98 min.
In this World (2002), UK and various countries, 88 min.
La Haine (1995), France, 95 min.
La Misma Luna (Under the Same Moon) (2008), Mexico and US, 106 min.
Little Jerusalem (La Petite Jerusalem) (2005), France, 94 min.
Lost Boys of Sudan (2004), US, 87 min.
My Son the Fanatic (1999), France and UK, 87 min.
Night of Henna (2005), US, 92 min.
Romántico (2004), USA, 80 min.
Saving Face (2004), USA, 96 min.
Taxi to Timbuktu (1994), 51 min. Documentary Available from www.frif.com
The Gatekeeper (2002), US, 103 min.
The Other Europe (2006), Various European countries, 58 min. Available from www.newsreel.org

SUMMARY QUESTIONS

1. What are some of the pitfalls of collapsing migration into mobility studies?
2. Why is ‘skill’ a difficult term to use in the context of migration?
3. In what ways is migration ‘diverse’?
4. Why is migration not simply a matter for the countries of immigration?
5. This book suggests that the ‘global economy’ or ‘global capitalism’ is an example of which social concept? What are the problems of using this concept to explain migration?
6. What are the difficulties of using the term ‘scale’ and how does the book deploy the idea of scale?
EXPLAINING MIGRATION ACROSS INTERNATIONAL BORDERS

INTRODUCTION

Migration is a bewildering set of processes to understand, and there is no shortage of theories to explain why and where people migrate. Exploring theories should be more than just an academic exercise, however. Understanding why people migrate may point to processes of global structural inequalities and disadvantage that warrant our attention. A key theoretical issue then is that the explanation of migration may be different for different (groups of) people over time and space. This in turn suggests that an overarching theory of migration is an impossibility, or at least too abstract as a lens on the variety of migrations that have occurred across the world and throughout history (e.g. Brettell and Hollifield, 2008). One helpful way through the range of explanations is to distinguish, as Massey et al. (1998) do, between theories that explain the creation or the initial phase of a particular migration, and theories that explain subsequent phases, that is the ‘continuation’ or the ‘path dependency of migration systems’ (Collyer, 2005, 700). No doubt, this distinction has value, but in practice what initiates and continues different forms of migration overlap. Boyle, Halfacree and Robinson (1998) offer another distinction, between determinist theories (theories that on their own determine migration behaviour and patterns) and integrative theories (theories that bring together different theoretical and conceptual propositions). This
distinction has merit too, but often so-called determinist arguments integrate a number of different political, cultural, economic, environmental and social processes, and integrative theories can be remarkably determinist. I would add to this that we can delineate between explanatory and critical theories, though what exactly constitutes ‘critical’ is not always clear. As a consequence of the limitations of these various distinctions, we are faced with a dilemma: how to make migration comprehensible? While I discuss whether certain theories seem to be primarily concerned with the initiation or continuation of migration, and whether they are explanatory or critical, I have organized my discussion of the various theoretical approaches around Boyle et al.’s framework. I do this because they focus on the socio-theoretical foundations of the theory involved, rather than on often thorny assumptions about when and how a particular migration began and/or continued, or indeed whether the theory is in fact critical.

With the above in mind, this chapter explores ten different theories of, or approaches to, international migration. I begin with a set of more determinist theories, namely 1) Ravenstein’s laws and push-pull approaches, 2) neo-classical economic analyses, 3) behaviouralist approaches, 4) new economics approaches, 5) dual labour market and labour market segmentation approaches, 6) structuralist and related understandings; a set of more integrative or mixed approaches, including 7) social-network (or migrant network) analysis, 8) transnational arguments, 9) gender-sensitive analyses, and 10) structurationist perspectives. Massey et al. (1993) reminds us that these different theories or approaches have such different ‘levels of analysis’ that they are not ‘inherently incompatible’ (p. 433), but

the various models reflect different research objectives, focuses, interests, and ways of decomposing an enormously complex subject into analytically manageable parts; and a firm basis for judging their consistency requires that the inner logic, propositions, assumptions, and hypotheses of each theory be clearly specified and well-understood.

(p. 433)

Nonetheless, some of these approaches have overlapping premises or units of analysis (let us say households and networks, for example),
which are not mutually exclusive. All have been subject to considerable scrutiny. In the pages that follow, we will explore these connections by systematically reviewing the theories above. At end of this theoretical review, I briefly discuss some of their limitations, including two glaring problems. The first is that the state tends to disappear in ‘pure’ versions of these theories. Some of the early theories, namely push-pull, neoclassical, and behavioural suffer egregiously from this problem. Yet strikingly, it also appears in more recent arguments about globalization and transnationalism. So, while the role of states in migration is crucial, we will have to wait until Chapter 4 for a more in-depth discussion of this.

A second, but perhaps less obvious problem is the continual failure to integrate a sophisticated conception of ‘space’ in theoretical reasoning, despite all of the attempts in the cavernous literature on ‘transnationalism’ (I will discuss this later in the chapter) to overturn the methodological nationalism of previous approaches and studies. This may be as true of accounts of migration by self-recognized geographers, as it is of other social scientists. In light of the ‘problem of space’ then, I draw on the various spatial concepts discussed in the Introduction to this book, along with an eclectic theoretical approach to migration as a means of understanding migration. The emphasis will be on low-income migration from poorer countries to richer ones (the subject – for better or worse – of most international migration theories), though some attention will be paid to explaining other types of migration, including migration into so-called welfare sectors (such as the migration of nurses) and highly-skilled migration (e.g. computer engineers and doctors), asylum-seeking, and smuggling and trafficking.

DETERMINIST ACCOUNTS

The beginnings of migration theory: Ravenstein’s ‘laws’

Let us begin by revisiting the work of the nineteenth-century geographer Ravenstein. While it may seem odd to return to a geographer’s lengthy and painstaking studies in the Journal of the Statistical (or Royal Statistical) Society in 1885 and 1889 concerning internal migration in the UK, Ravenstein’s ideas still haunt neo-classical approaches to international migration. Troublesome as it may seem for researchers on migration today, there seems to be some return to the ‘methodological individualism’ of his
analysis. Methodological individualism simply means that individuals function as the unit of analysis. Importantly, Ravenstein’s undertaking involves a study of migration using mainly sub-national census data from counties, cities, towns, and villages. Yet he also categorizes migrants into ‘short-distance’, ‘stage-migrants’, ‘long-journey’ and ‘temporary migrants’, thus avoiding a homogenization of different forms of migration. For Ravenstein, the primary reasons for migration are higher wages or better work (‘work of a more remunerative or attractive kind’, 1885: 181), and in that sense, an economic determinism prevails. At the same time, and as noted above, Ravenstein’s approach can be characterized as ‘methodologically individualist’.

Ravenstein is most noted for his ‘laws of migration’. Although there is some question over how many ‘laws’ he actually stated (Tobler, 1995), below I provide an abbreviated selection of seven of his laws from his 1885 paper (see Ravenstein, 1885, 198–99, and Lee, 1969). These supposed laws are as much about empirical patterns as they are about the causes of migration.2

1) He argues from the point of view of the demand for migrants that groups of migrants travel relatively short distances and develop into a ‘current’ of migration to the ‘great centres of commerce and industry’, and this current is a reflection of the number of people in the area of origin as well as the number of people in the area of destination.

2) His second law relates to the ‘natural outcome’ of the first; namely that the residents of a rural area will move to a surrounding and rapidly growing town or city. As migrants move from the surrounding rural area to the neighbouring town or city (so-called absorption), rural depopulation occurs and these rural areas are then attractive to migrants from even further afield. The town or city then eventually becomes a pole for migration from throughout the country, in this case the UK.

3) Third, he claims that a process of ‘absorption’ occurs (the in-migration and reception of migrants from certain areas) at the expense of ‘dispersion’ (‘out-migration’ from certain areas).

4) From ‘law’ number 3 immediately above then, every ‘current of migration’ produces a counter-current.

5) Long-distance migrants generally migrate to the ‘great centres of commerce and industry’.

6) Explaining migration across international borders 55
6) Those in rural areas migrate more than the natives of towns or cities.
7) Women migrate more frequently than men.

What should be gained from Ravenstein’s seven ‘laws’? At first sight, they may seem dreadfully antiquated, if nothing else than for their apparent determinacy and lack of any explicit theoretical foundation. The former is especially noteworthy, given that the social sciences (or at least its critical corners) have abandoned such attempts at law-making for more complexity and indeterminacy. Yet this is to dismiss some of the value of his proclamations too easily. Indeed, he seems to point to some persistent patterns and processes associated with international migrations that are witnessed today by many scholars of migration. To begin with, whereas global migration is not simply the result of differences in wages between countries and the prospects of a ‘better’ job, there is no doubt that below subsistence wage levels, unemployment, and dangerous or demeaning work do drive people to migrate (e.g. Castles and Miller, 2003). In short, migration may partly be determined by economic concerns, without us having to necessarily subscribe to economic determinism. Second, his categories of migrants and migration seem to anticipate many of the categories used in the analysis of migration today. In fact, what he calls ‘stage migration’ was initially recuperated by ‘dependency theory’ in the late 1960s and 1970s (I discuss this theory later in the chapter) and has remarkable resonance for the increasing interest lately in ‘stages’ of internal and international movements. This sort of stage migration is now called ‘circulation’ – rather than migration as a single movement from point A to point B. Third, his claim that ‘long distance’ migrants generally move to the ‘great centres of commerce and industry’ is reflected in much (but certainly not all) of the migration of the second half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, at least from poorer countries to richer countries. We only have to think of Frey’s (1998) notion of ‘immigrant gateway cities’ and Sassen’s ‘global city hypothesis’ (1991) to illustrate this relationship between immigration and large, economically dynamic cities. Fourth, Ravenstein observed that one should not ignore the role of women as migrants. Consider, for example, the following passage:

Woman is a greater migrant than man. This may surprise those who associate women with domestic life, but the figures of the census
clearly prove it. Nor do women migrate merely from the rural districts into the towns in search of domestic service, for they migrate quite as frequently into certain manufacturing districts, and the workshop is a formidable rival of the kitchen and scullery.

(Ravenstein, 1885, 196)

His emphasis on women as migrants is notable, given that over the next hundred years, most theories of migration remained remarkably silent about the role and experience of women in migration (Morakvasic, 1984).

Ravenstein’s analysis suggested a set of push-pull factors that drove migration – an idea later elaborated upon by Lee (1969); that is a set of factors that ‘pushed’ migrants from one region (or country), and a set of factors that ‘pulled’ them to another region (or country). Such push factors might include rapid demographic growth (see Box 2.1), poverty

**Box 2.1 IS LABOUR MIGRATION A RESULT OF ‘DEMOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES’?**

A now widespread view is that rapid demographic growth in many poorer countries of the global south combined with the demographic slow-down (‘below population replacement levels’) in countries of the global north (especially Germany, Italy, Eastern Europe, Russia, and Japan) is driving labour migration. This seems to make sense. Employers in richer countries are unable to find workers so they either send for them or hire those that are already resident in the country. The logic is simple and compelling: there is too much work to be done in the richer countries and not enough hands to do it. In contrast, there are too many hands in poorer countries and not enough work to make use of them. But let us take a moment to think more critically about this. First, some sub-national regions in both the richer and poorer countries are growing rapidly and are job-rich, while others are growing very slowly, even declining, and are job poor, so this methodologically nationalist approach is problematic from the very start. Second, national and more local economies in the rich countries can adjust to the absence of migrant workers, though this may be extremely painful

continued
for everyone. How do they ‘adjust’? Substituting technological innovation for workers is one way; another way is by making existing employees work harder, ceasing certain forms of production or services, and/or moving them elsewhere when and where this is possible. One of the most drastic adjustments responses to slow demographic in the richer countries is taking place in Germany where the German government has implemented a 4 billion euro programme called ‘Elterngeld’ to encourage professional mothers to exit the workforce and have children by paying these would-be mothers (Carle, 2007). Notice that the programme is designed for ‘professional’ women, meaning German and not generally-speaking, Turkish or other immigrant women. A third and perhaps the most significant problem with the demographic disparity argument is that it deploys a ‘neo-Malthusian’ view of population growth in poorer countries. In other words, it sees population as a problem relative to economic (or environmental) opportunities and resources, rather than seeing a problem with the socio-economic organization of the societies that have rapid demographic growth. In other words, rather than conceptualising labour migration as the result of a demographic disparity, an alternative way of viewing labour migration is to see it in relation to the type of ‘development’ that occurs in poorer and richer countries (and how policies of the rich world and institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank shape ‘development’ in the poorer countries) and not a problem of too many people in one part of the world and too few in another.

(eespecially related to inequalities in land tenure as in Latin America), political repression, war, and ‘environmental crises’ such as resource depletion. ‘Pull factors’ might include job opportunities, a ‘better’ standard of living, medical treatment, freedom from political repression, and even just buying and selling goods (‘cross-border’ migrants from Lesotho, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, to South Africa during the late 1990s comes to mind here – McDonald et al., 2000). In some cases, it might not be clear whether something can be considered a push or pull factor,
such as the search for ‘adventure’ among younger migrants (Goss and Lindquist, 1995).

In less sophisticated studies of migration, ‘push and pull factors’ are still used to explain migration, mainly but not exclusively, from poorer countries or regions to richer ones (see e.g. Hugo, 1996, on a broad study of ‘environmental disasters’ and global migration; Hamilton et al., 2004 on fisheries and out-migration specifically; Perrin et al., 2007 on the implications of nurse migration for the Philippines, Wilson and Habecker, 2008 on African migration to Washington DC, and Li and Bray, 2007 on mainland Chinese student migration to Hong Kong and Macau). As this metaphor has persisted, it has become part of a received, though fading wisdom about what drives migration. Let us take resource depletion as an example. Hamilton et al. (2004) offer a study of fishery depletion in the waters surrounding the Faroe Islands (between Scotland and Iceland). After a sharp decline in fishing stocks in the early 1990s, virtually the whole of the fishing industry suffered from massive losses, the gross national product of the Faroe Islands fell by a reported 40% and unemployment soared from virtually 0 to 25%. The result they show was a consequential ‘out-migration’ of younger people, including young adults with children, and in particular ‘female flight’. They argue that female flight from rural villages stemmed from ‘push and pull factors relating to female roles in rural villages compared with the more diverse opportunities available in towns and cities’ (p. 449). They never tell us what these ‘roles’ are, and they never tell us why fish stocks are declining in the first place. They do, however, argue coherently that such resource depletion led to out-migration from the Islands, or at least from villages to larger towns. This is a fairly straightforward discussion of causal ‘push factors’, but other studies of push factors, like war, are not necessarily discussed in such a discrete way, in which quantitative ‘factors’ are divorced from other cultural, economic, political, and social processes and conditions at other scales.

For example, in Mahler’s (1995) wonderfully evocative but also sobering book American Dreaming, she emphasizes that most Salvadoran migrants to Long Island in the suburbs of New York arrived during the period immediately after the 1980s civil war in El Salvador, and many because of events relating to that civil war, including declining opportunities for employment. But she also shows how often plentiful (but very poorly paid) jobs existed on Long Island; how the two countries were
linked through foreign policies, how US employers actively recruited Salvadorans in the 1960s, and how Salvadoran migrant networks figured in bringing migrants to Long Island specifically (see also Bailey et al., 2002). That is, she connects a range of simultaneous processes in the country of emigration and immigration without discussing them as a set of ‘push and pull factors’. Nonetheless, the notion of push and pull factors continue to flourish in the neo-classical economic approach to migration, and it is to this literature which we now turn.

The neo-classical economic approach

Neo-classical economic writings on migration began with studies of mainly internal migration within either poorer or richer countries, rather than international migration between poorer and richer ones (Massey et al., 1998). Sometimes called the ‘functionalist’ or ‘traditional’ approach to migration, the neo-classical economic literature on migration is considerable and diverse, but here I consider only a select set of widely-rehearsed studies. According to Massey et al. (1998), the neo-classical approach can be divided into macro and micro theory. From a macro neo-classical perspective, the work of Lewis (1954) and Ranis and Fei (1961) stand out as initial contributions, albeit in the context of explaining economic development. More specifically, these were attempts to show the relationship between the demand for labour in urban areas and the supply of labour in rural areas, and how internal rural-to-urban migration shaped the economic development of both. Broadly speaking, they argued that urban labour markets would eventually absorb ‘supplies’ of cheap labour from rural areas which would decrease the supply of labour in rural areas, thus raising wages. However, in urban areas, the labour supply would increase, thus causing wages to fall. The result would be an equalization of wages between rural and urban areas, and when wages are equalized, migration ceases (Enke, 1962). While these studies were based on internal migration, they informed the neo-classical debate on explaining international migration, and are labelled ‘macro’ because they did not investigate the individual reasons for migrating.

The neo-classical perspective also pointed to another migration which ‘mirrored’ (Massey et al., 1993) the movement of migrant workers from poorer countries to richer ones. This other migration is initiated by the relative lack of capital in poorer countries which also attracts inter-
national capital (foreign investment) and along with it individuals with higher levels of ‘human capital’ (in other words, managers, professionals, and other ‘skilled’ workers from richer countries) who can reap substantial awards in poorer countries which are relatively bereft of both capital and higher levels of human capital. The temporary migration of European and North American engineers to countries as distinct as the Philippines and Saudi Arabia illustrates this quite well. One of the implications of this is that migration causes wages to rise in the poorer country, and wages to decrease in the richer country, ultimately leading to wage equalization across the world. The end result, according to the basic neo-classical framework, is that this migration will lead to equilibrium as people migrate from job-poor regions to job-rich regions, thus balancing people with available economic opportunities.

In the micro-perspective, migrants are ‘rational’ individuals, responding to ‘perfect’ or ‘various pieces of information’ (Borjas, 1989, 461) about their economic opportunities in both the country of emigration and the country of immigration. They are ‘utility maximizers’, usually by maximizing income, the possibility of employment, and/or other employment conditions, and who seek ‘better’ opportunities in the region or country of immigration. In the earliest contributions to a micro-theory of migration, Todaro (1969) and later Harris and Todaro (1970) and Todaro (1976) were responding to the limitations of Lewis and Ranis and Fei’s arguments about wage differentials, and provided notable revisions to their model. To be more specific, Harris and Todaro argued that the presence of a large group of unemployed or underemployed people in cities in the poorer countries would affect the ‘probability’ of finding employment. Migration is therefore only partly a response to real income differentials; it is also a response to the expected or perceived wage differentials based on the probability of eventually securing a job in the ‘modern industrial’ sector, rather than in the traditional sector (or informal employment). Here, time is important and migrants may move with their longer-term total income in mind; the larger the expected income, the more likely are individuals to migrate. Their approach is more behavioural than the strictly wage-differential theory, and suggests other socio-psychological explanations for migration (Kearney, 1986; Molho, 1986). We will return to this idea very shortly, but for the moment, let us move to the human capital version of neo-classical theory.
In the human capital version of neo-classical theory, Sjaastad (1962), for example, viewed migration as a means of investing in one’s human capital (though Sjaastad did not use that term), but also as a function of one’s human capital. One can then discern the likelihood of migrating from the amount of human capital a person possesses. In order to maximize migrants’ human capital, migrants must weigh the costs (travel costs, the time spent searching for work and being unemployed, immigration regulations, the problems of learning a new job and language, as well as other less tangible psychological costs associated with migration) with the benefits (higher wages, better employment conditions, and so forth) (Borjas, 1989).

The behavioural approach

Like neo-classical analyses, the behaviouralists focused on individuals as the unit of analysis, but they remained wary of neo-classical explanations in part because they seemed to be guilty of the so-called ‘ecological fallacy’, that is, making inferences about individuals from the study of groups of people. To be more specific, because it appeared that particular nationally-defined groups of people moved from low-wage countries to high-wage countries, that did not mean that all individuals migrated for reasons relating to wage differentials (Boyle, Halfacree, and Robinson, 1998).

Scholars working in the behaviouralist vein, such as Mueller (1981), Clark (1986), and Wolpert (1965), were concerned to understand a migrant’s cognition and decision making (or the psychological reasons) for choosing a particular place as a destination (Boyle, Halfacree and Robinson, 1998). And like many neo-classical analysts, they were also concerned primarily with internal, rather than international, migration. However, what distinguishes the behaviouralists from the neo-classicists is that the former were as much interested in the apparent ‘irrationality’ (rather than the rationality) of individual decision-making, especially in terms of why migrants chose certain destinations. Wolpert (1965) in particular sought to understand what he called the ‘place utility’ of particular-migrants, and he argued that migrants chose particular destinations because they offered the ‘highest place utility’ (or satisfaction). This utility did not necessarily concern ‘expected wages’, nor did it necessarily involve an individual ‘cost-benefit analysis’ around improving
one’s human capital, for example. Migrants may choose certain locations to be closer to their relatives for emotional reasons, or because they have simply heard of a place before migrating. Yet, the behaviouralists also focused on why people migrate altogether, not just why they migrate where they do. In this sense, Wolpert (1965) focused on the question of tolerating a certain degree of ‘stress’ (or discomfort) in the country of emigration. However, stress in the country of emigration did not lead migrants to compare this stress with the possibilities of stress in the country (or place) of destination. Rather, it was the degree of stress in the country of emigration, and whether it passed a certain threshold which would impel people to migrate. From Wolpert’s perspective, migrants are therefore satisﬁers (seeking satisfaction), rather than ‘maximizers’ (seeking optimization) (Boyle, Halfacree, and Robinson, 1998; Conway, 2007). While this earlier literature – especially by demographers and geographers – could be characterized as more analytical, quantitative, and pre-occupied with generating laws, or at least patterns or theories of migration, scholars across the social sciences are incorporating increasingly a more ethnographic and interpretative approach to answer why and where people migrate.

Without acknowledging the idea of ‘place utility’, Wilson and Habecker (2008) asked in their ethnographic ﬁeldwork why African migrants chose Washington DC as a destination instead of other cities. What they found is that African migrants perceived all capital cities to be centres for business, cultural, and educational opportunities, because the migrants insisted capital cities in African countries are also the primary locus for such opportunities. They also found that many Africans perceived Washington to be more accepting of ‘black’ and ‘international’ people, full of international institutions, quieter and less expensive than New York for example, and a better place to raise their children. Clearly then, ‘place utility’ is complicated.

The new economics approach

A fourth approach to understanding international migration is the so-called ‘new economics paradigm’. This term is really an invention of Massey et al. (1993, 1998) and not a term to which economists would necessarily subscribe. At any rate, the emphasis here is not so much on individuals, but on families, households, and other units larger than
individuals. The work of Stark (1991) in particular stands out. From this perspective, families and other units allow the maximization of income but they also allow for the minimization of risk associated with the problem of labour and other markets. In the language of the new economics approach, households can address risk by diversifying the allocation of scarce resources (Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Massey et al., 1993). That is to say, the labour of some family members (or ‘scarce resources’) may stay behind in the country of origin while others may migrate. If economic conditions deteriorate in the country of origin, then family members overseas can compensate through the use of remittances (the money that is sent home by migrants). Massey et al. (1993) identify four examples where risk minimization occurs: crop insurance markets, futures markets, unemployment insurance and capital markets. I briefly summarize these issues below. In terms of the first, most families in poorer countries do not have crop insurance in the case of crop failure; where this is the case, remittances play a role in providing funds. Similarly, in poorer countries where there is usually no futures market (a commodity market in which a certain price is guaranteed for the future delivery of some commodity) and usually no large investors to absorb any losses if the future guaranteed price falls below the cost of producing the good, migration once again serves as a means of addressing income risks from fluctuations in crop prices. In terms of unemployment, unemployment insurance is once again either non-existent or weak in poorer countries, and migration (and any potential remittances) plays a role in mitigating the risk of unemployment. With respect to capital markets, farm families might need capital in order to buy certain kinds of seeds, fertilizers, irrigation, and other equipment. Non-farm families may wish to finance the education of family members, or purchase capital goods for re-sale in local markets. The problem is that banking institutions in poorer countries can be unreliable in terms of savings and loans; loan capital is scarce, and in any case, it is difficult for many families to qualify for a loan. The remittances generated by migration serve as a means of providing capital and savings for investment purposes. The point here is that it is not so much the total family income that is important, but the source of income. In other words, families wish to diversify the sources of their income to ensure against risks. Furthermore, families are not simply interested in maximizing absolute income as in neo-classical theory, but maximizing income (or minimizing their
deprivation) relative to other families in, let us say, the village of origin by using migration as a strategy (Massey et al., 1993, 1998).

**Dual labour market and labour market segmentation approaches**

This approach is most associated with its pioneer, the economist Michael Piore. In his widely regarded book, *Birds of Passage*, Piore (1979) argues that it is not so much ‘push factors’ in the countries of emigration but ‘pull factors’ and namely the presence of a dual labour market in the richer countries (or in the language of the time – ‘modern industrial societies’) that drives migration. For Piore, this dual labour market consists of a primary and a secondary sector. The first is dominated by ‘native’ (i.e. citizen) workers, and contains more highly paid and stable jobs with better working conditions and greater possibilities for promotion. Employers may invest considerable training in these jobs, and firing workers may be expensive and/or difficult. In contrast, the secondary sector, dominated by migrants, contains poorly paid and unstable jobs with poor working conditions and little possibilities of promotion, employers invest very little training in this sector, and firing workers may be easier. It is difficult to attract ‘native’ workers into secondary jobs because of their low pay and poor working conditions, and thus employers look to migrant workers to fill these positions. The creation of these jobs precedes the migrants who fill them. While Piore’s overall argument figured prominently in studies of migration and labour markets in both Europe and the US, it rarely appeared as a central argument for the initiation or continuation of migration. Some subsequent literatures do approximate his approach, however.

The first is Sassen’s ‘global city hypothesis’, but I will discuss this later in the chapter. The second is a substantial body of work that connects the growth or existence of informal secondary-sector-type jobs with the demand for undocumented immigrants in richer and poorer countries. The work in this vein goes something like this: there is a reduction in the number of more formal employment opportunities in poorer countries, leaving informal jobs as the only option for citizens and migrants alike. At the same time, there is a proliferation in small sub-contracted firms that offer only informal jobs in the richer countries. Given that a large proportion of migrants in both poorer and richer countries are undocumented, and given their undocumented status, researchers argue that their illegality
means they have little choice but to accept very low wage informal jobs. The result is that undocumented immigration facilitates (but does not determine) the expansion of informal employment, which in turn creates a demand for undocumented immigration, and the two processes are argued to be mutually reinforcing (for overviews, see Portes et al., 1989; Quassoli, 1998; Samers, 2005; Williams and Windebank, 1998).

Unfortunately, the dual labour market hypothesis and related studies employ very simplistic categories. Observers of American labour markets fathomed that there were not just two sectors in the labour market, and Reich, Gordon, and Edwards (1973) used the term ‘labour market segmentation’ to refer to the ‘innumerable cells’ within American job structures. Distinct operational rules are said to regulate each cell (a cell can be considered a group of similar jobs within a firm), with some workers in certain cells having more chances of promotion than others, some having higher pay than others, and some having better working conditions than others. But few studies have developed a more sophisticated conception of how labour market segmentation might stimulate migration (Bauder, 2005; Samers, 2008).

This became clear in a third and related literature, which is the large body of work that exists on ‘immigrant’ or ‘ethnic entrepreneurship’ and its spatial manifestation: ‘ethnic enclaves’ (Light, 2005 provides a review). This literature concerns both immigrant entrepreneurs and the migrant wage earners they employ, but once again it tends to rely on a very crude distinction between the two. Nevertheless, Massey et al. (1998) summarize the consequences of the development of such enclaves, which tend to demonstrate the ‘continuation’ of migration rather than its initiation. If and when these enclaves form, they begin with a small number of immigrant entrepreneurs who have the cultural, financial, human, and social capital to begin a business in an urban area, under the necessary social and economic circumstances. They call on other migrant workers of the same ethnic background to work in these firms. Employers benefit because they have a large pool of potential workers which allows the firms to be competitive vis-à-vis firms outside the enclave who may not be able to draw on such a large pool of workers. Employers in the enclave also benefit because they profit from a spatially concentrated demand for their ethnic or immigrant-specific products and services. Through the ethnic solidarities between employers and employees, workers balance the possibility (or even promise) of employment and future advance-
ment with the long hours, arduous work, and loyalty to their current employer (e.g. Ahmad, 2008a; Ram et al., 2003a). These same employees may themselves become entrepreneurs, and through norms of ethnic solidarity, are eventually also expected to hire their co-ethnics. As the enclave expands, so does the need for migrant workers, and as Massey et al. (1998) put it, ‘immigration can, quite literally, generate its own demand’ (p. 32).

Structuralist approaches

Structuralist explanations for migration – sometimes labelled ‘macro’ or ‘political economy’ approaches – generally have their foundations in various Marxist, neo-Marxist, and historical-sociological readings of capitalism. In this sense, it remains unclear whether they are designed as theories of migration specifically, or theories of capitalism, (neo-) colonialism, imperialism or neo-liberalism, in which migrations are viewed as pivotal. In any case, there are various strands within this literature, including dependency theory, articulation theory, world systems theory, globalization arguments, global city arguments, neo-liberalism, and most recently the idea of the ‘migration-development nexus’. Let us now discuss the first three of these.

Dependency theory, articulation of modes of production theory, world systems theory

During the 1970s and 1980s, scholars employed the above approaches to focus on the considerable labour migrations that were occurring during the second half of the twentieth century, namely from the Caribbean and Latin America to the US, from Europe’s former colonies to the countries of northern Europe (e.g. France, Germany, the Benelux countries, and the UK), or from a number of southern African countries to South Africa. In that respect, they tended to emphasize the problems of political-economic inequality, and the ‘development of underdevelopment’ through international capitalism. Other perspectives within this broad approach focused on trade inequality manifested in unequal exchange (wage differentials) between richer and poorer countries linked through a history of class inequality, colonialism, imperialism, and the racism and xenophobia that both justified and facilitated their
persistence (e.g. Burawoy, 1976; Castles and Kosack, 1973, Castells, 1975; Cohen, 1987; Miles, 1982; Portes and Walton, 1981).

In the Latin American-inspired dependency theory, migration within Latin America and between Latin America and the US in particular, was argued to be the result of the inequalities generated by the penetration of US agribusiness operations in Latin America, and Mexico especially. With the cooperation of the Mexican government’s support for more commercialized agriculture, these operations led to the gradual impoverishment of Mexican peasants (small subsistence-oriented land-owners) by dispossessing them from their land and reducing the demand for agricultural labour in Mexico. This in turn drove Mexican peasants to seek work in US agriculture (Wilson, 1993). Yet US corporate investment also contributed to this relation of ‘dependency’ by siphoning off the most highly productive workers from Latin America, and contributing to what many call ‘brain drain’ (Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Kearney, 1986; Castles and Miller, 2003).

The ‘articulation of modes of production’ theorists claimed that capitalism (or capitalist social relations) had not flattened or eliminated so-called pre-capitalist modes of production in an even manner, and countries and regions were unevenly integrated into the capitalist system (Cohen, 1987; Portes and Walton, 1981).6 The ‘penetration’ and development of capitalism in so-called traditional societies had the effect of disrupting existing agricultural, household, and other social relationships, thereby throwing people off the land which led to their incorporation into ‘capitalist sectors’ and eventually to their international migration to the richer countries (e.g. Portes and Walton, 1981; Samers, 1997b). At the same time, this penetration and development of capitalism relied on the social reproduction (see Box 2.2) performed under ‘pre-capitalist’ relations, often by women (e.g. Wolpe, 1980; Kearney, 1986; Meillassoux, 1992).

When migrants worked in capitalist sectors but were supported by pre-capitalist social reproduction or when workers’ wages were so low that they could not even ‘adequately’ house, clothe or feed themselves, it was commonly labelled ‘super-exploitation’. The point is this: since workers in the poorer countries were being uprooted and migrating overseas, capitalists could now rely on the so-called internationalization of super-exploitation. Since capitalists in the rich countries now relied on the internationalization of super-exploitation, this allowed for, or
facilitated the movement of workers from the global south to the north (Kearney, 1986).

A third and related, but also more influential approach emanates from the writings of the sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, 1979) and his ‘World systems theory’. Wallerstein saw the world as a single capitalist system, composed of nation-states within regions that were progressively incorporated into this world system, and which were part of either the ‘core’ (at the time he was writing, this meant North America, Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand), the ‘semi-periphery’ (for example, Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong, Mexico, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan), and the ‘periphery’ (most of the remaining countries in the world). These different zones of production and consumption were linked through an international division of labour. For Wallerstein, the gradual penetration of capitalist relations into these peripheral non-capitalist

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**Box 2.2 WHAT IS ‘SOCIAL REPRODUCTION’?**

Social reproduction is a Marxist-Feminist inspired term which has come to mean the process by which people are housed, fed, clothed, educated, and generally raised to become workers and/or citizens under capitalism. In short, people need to be reproduced in particular ways to make them ‘ready’ for capitalism. In the so-called ‘domestic labour debate’ of the early 1970s, feminist scholars began to criticize Marxist theories of capitalism because they neglected the contribution of women’s work to ‘reproducing’ capitalism. In other words, household work by women, feminist scholars argued, not only created economic value in itself, but was integral to the reproduction of men and their work. The assumption then was that there was a functional relationship between processes of social reproduction and the continuation of capitalism. In other words, capitalism relied on this social reproduction in order to exist, and social reproduction existed to further the development of capitalism (see e.g. Malos (1980) on early theorizing in general, and in the context of immigration, Sassen-Koob (1984). Cravey (2003) and Smith and Winders (2008) provide more recent discussions of social reproduction and immigration in the US ‘South’).
societies since the sixteenth century had created a single world capitalist system that impelled the migration of workers to the ‘core’ or the ‘semi-periphery’. In this respect, world systems approaches to understanding migration differ somewhat from dependency theories, insofar as the former did not so much stress a relationship of inequality and dependency between a ‘developed’ and an ‘underdeveloped’ set of countries, but rather how states (and relations within states) were incorporated into a constantly transformed capitalist world-system. However, as we will see immediately below, there were noticeable similarities in the focus of both these theories (Wilson, 1993).

Writings that reflected Wallerstein’s general framework focused increasingly on multinational corporate investment and other dimensions of neo-colonialism in more ‘peripheral’ countries since the 1960s. Such studies concentrated on the myriad disruptions to non-capitalist social relations, especially in agriculture. This might include the breakdown of traditional land holdings by capitalist agribusiness and other interests, the mechanization of agriculture, the development of cash crops, and the application of synthetic fertilizers and pesticides. But it also might include raw material extraction by either multinational corporations or the comprador governments of the global south, for sale on world markets. Together, world systems proponents argued (like articulation theorists) that these would reduce the demand for traditional farming labour, disrupt existing patterns of employment, and in general destabilize non-capitalist forms of social and economic organization. This would in turn encourage internal and eventually international migration. At the same time, the development of export processing zones (EPZs) and the industrialization of other regions of the (semi-)periphery led to at least two migration-related processes, first EPZs increasingly involved the employment of women, and with it, the growing unemployment of men, which also produced greater internal – essentially rural to urban migration. By the same token, where EPZs were established, a concomitant increase in traded goods and services through improved transport and communications took place, and where such links became both more intensive and extensive, migration followed (Fröbel et al., 1977; Sassen-Koob, 1984). This could not have happened, these authors argue, without the accompaniment of ideologies or discourses of cultural domination which are mediated and reinforced through mass communications (Massey et al, 1993, 1998).
Over time, a variety of macro-sociological analyses built on Wallerstein’s fundamental argument, among the most notable perhaps is Cohen’s (1987) sympathetic critique of world systems theory. Cohen maintained that capital in the richer countries had created what Marx called a ‘relative surplus population’ (a ‘reserve army of labour’ ready and willing to work in difficult conditions for low pay). Against the ‘trade-obsessed’ world systems theorists then, Cohen argued that trade relations were only a surface manifestation of the ability of richer countries to “unlock a giant migratory stream” (1987, 42) that served two purposes. First, the populations of the poor countries were held in reserve (literally) by capital, to be ‘called up’ when the business cycle expanded. Second, that the existence of this reserve drove down the value of labour power, as the ‘working classes’ of the rich world were constantly threatened by other immigrants who could or would work for less. While these arguments have considerable resonance today, and we will reassert their importance later in this chapter, their popularity has waned in the migration literature.

Globalization, global cities, neo-liberalism, and the migration-development nexus

A second set of structuralist arguments relating to migration, namely globalization, global cities, neo-liberalism, and ultimately the idea of the ‘migration-development nexus’ intersect with each other, but we can nonetheless discern differences in their emphasis. The first of these – globalization – is not so much a theory as a concept that entails a combination of processes and forces that operate in the world together. Observers on either side of the political spectrum argued that by the 1990s we were living in a ‘globalized’ world. Global capitalism had truly extended its reached everywhere (or nearly everywhere), so that few sub-national regions were untouched by the complex networks and flows of capital, goods, services, information, and people (Held et al., 1999; Mittelman, 2000). According to many scholars of globalization, the world was experiencing unprecedented interconnectedness in terms of the speed of such connections, their extensity (the reach of these connections), and their intensity (the density and strength of those connections) (Held et al., 1999).

Very soon however, this depiction of globalization as novel,
omnipotent, and all encompassing gave way to more sober, spatially-sensitive, feminist and historically-nuanced treatments of the subject (Amin, 2002; Cox, 1997; Nagar et al., 2002). To highlight but one example of this re-thinking, Held et al. (1999) identified three perspectives on globalization: the hyperglobalist perspective which saw globalization as a fundamental transformation of the global economy, including the worldwide liberalization of capital, commodities, services and people, the end of the nation-state, and perhaps the ‘Americanization’ of culture. This ‘hyperglobalist’ perspective was mobilized by both the left and the right, although in a different terminology and tone. The right saw globalization as a form of liberalization that would spread ‘western values’ and ‘western prosperity’. Scholars on the left of the political spectrum offered at least two related arguments. First, they viewed globalization as the unfortunate manifestation of a ‘neo-liberal’ ideology and neo-liberal policies. In brief, neo-liberalism means favouring markets and trade liberalization as a solution to a range of social ills, rather than emphasizing social policies. The result is the obliteration of worker-favourable regulations, social protection, and the privatization of public goods in richer countries. Simultaneously, it extended ‘structural adjustment’ measures in poorer countries, including the further opening of these economies to foreign investment, further promoting export-led industrialization, commercializing agriculture, reducing welfare and other state budgets, limiting overseas development aid and encouraging remittances instead (e.g. Harvey, 2005).

Somewhat on a different track, the sceptic perspective denied that globalization was a particularly ‘new’ phenomenon, claiming that the world was actually ‘more globalized’ during the period of the ‘gold standard’ at the end of the nineteenth century than it was at the end of the twentieth. These scholars compared the levels of migration from poorer to richer countries during these two periods, and found little justification for the claim that the more contemporary period of globalization (from the 1960s to the 1990s) signalled an age of vastly increased numbers of migrants (Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Zlotnick, 1998). The ‘transformationalist perspective’ emphasized that there were both continuities with earlier periods, but also unprecedented changes and contradictory tendencies, such as the formation of regional trading blocs instead of truly global trading.

Another set of arguments questioned whether ‘globalization’ should
be seen as some sort of unstoppable juggernaut or a structure ‘out there’ pressing on people to immobilize them. To view globalization in this way would have the effect of actually dis-empowering people, especially women (e.g. Gibson-Graham, 2002; Nagar et al., 2002). Finally, many geographers dismissed the argument that globalization was eradicating the uniqueness of ‘place’ or that the globalization simply determines what happens at the local level. Rather, the global is in the local, and the local is in the global, and we should instead speak of a ‘global sense of place’ (Doreen Massey 1994) or ‘glocalization’ (Swyngedouw, 1997).

Despite these divergent arguments, the globalization approach (including the transformationalist perspective) points to the role of transport and communications in facilitating and promoting migration. Specifically, scholars of globalization argue that the cost, time, and difficulty of longer-distance travel and communication fell dramatically over the course of the twentieth century. These changes allow for the construction of social (or migrant) networks between the countries of origin and destination, for – among other things – the sending of remittances, the ease of circular (rather than just one-way) migration, visits of family members, encouraging the movement of asylum-seekers, and smuggling and trafficking through media generated images of material wealth in the countries of destination (Massey et al., 1998; Richmond, 2002). For those who subscribe to the above, we have entered an ‘age of migration’ (Castles and Miller, 2003; Brettell and Hollifield, 2008).

Since globalization is a concept that encompasses so many processes or variables, it is difficult for researchers to use it to analyse migration. Nonetheless, this has not stopped some from using the banner of globalization to focus on the ability of individuals, groups, and their respective networks to span the globe in unprecedented ways (e.g. Richmond, 2002; Ong, 1999). Ong (1999) for one, shows how wealthy Hong Kong businessmen use flexible forms of citizenship in the form of dual citizenships and a variety of visas to respond to the ‘global political economy’ (read ‘globalization’). So-named ‘astronauts’ because of the amount of time they spend on airplanes, they move back and forth routinely between Hong Kong and the west coast of the US. Others, such as Samers (1999), have used the concept of globalization reservedly to discuss the relationship between geo-political economic restructuring in France, and the lives of North African immigrant workers in the Paris automobile industry. Global competitive pressures in the automobile industry shape
the lives of migrant workers, who in turn shape the fortunes of the industry. Still others have examined the relationship between globalization, migration, and the impact of remittances on the country, region, or village of origin (e.g. Orozco, 2002). Though without any comprehensive engagement with the concept (or discourse) of globalization, Hyndman’s (2003) study of the relationship between Canada and Sri Lanka is a useful illustration of the links between processes of globalization (such as aid and remittances) and asylum-seeking. It also serves to illustrate a certain ‘migration-development nexus’ (see Box 2.3).

**Global city arguments**

In *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo* (1991), Sassen develops yet another line of thought in the neo-Marxist/globalization vein, but this time focused on the countries of immigration and whose arguments about labour markets are redolent of Piore’s (1979) dual labour market hypothesis. Sassen (1991) offers a considerable contribution to the ‘world city’ debate (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982) by claiming that international migration from poorer to richer countries would not have happened without the related development of ‘global cities’, and that immigration has itself contributed to the development of these cities. Among others, she argues that global or world cities emerged during the 1970s to become the centres of multinational corporate headquarters, and related ‘producer services’ (such as accountancy, legal services, management consulting, and finance). Producer services create a demand for highly-skilled (migrant and non-migrant) labour, but also for low-income (migrant) labour to service the very demands of high-income labour. To be more specific, a veritable army of low-income migrants increasingly work in the restaurants where the wealthy dine, clean the homes and offices where the wealthy live and work, and care for their children or their elderly parents. These are only examples, and migrants fill vacancies in countless other positions in the burgeoning service industries of these putatively global cities because employers either choose not to, or cannot hire citizen labour. In this respect, Sassen (1991) develops a ‘demand side’ argument in which changes in jobs creates a demand for migrants. In a later piece, however, her argument is more supply-side-oriented (see Sassen, 1996b). That is, she claims that the presence of a large pool of immigrants shapes the structure of the labour markets in these cities,
Box 2.3 GLOBALIZATION AND SRI LANKAN MIGRATION TO CANADA

Canada has had rather loose links with Sri Lanka owing to the British Empire and the two country's membership of the British Commonwealth. The first Sri Lankans arrived in Canada in the early 1950s. Given its export-oriented turn during the late 1970s and 1980s, Sri Lanka became a favourable target for development aid and one of the largest recipients of foreign aid by the 1980s, including from Canada. The escalation of the civil conflict between the Sri Lankan government dominated by Sinhalese and the ethnically persecuted Tamils in 2001 forced Tamils to seek asylum in a number of countries, including Canada. Tamils chose Canada in particular for at least three reasons. First, there was an already existing Tamil 'community' there, especially in Toronto. Second, Canada had already allocated additional allowances for Sri Lankan asylum-seekers during the 1980s, because it had “comparatively generous refugee legislation and adjudication policies” (Hyndman, 2003, 265). Third, there was a sizeable immigration program, and the generally strong educational qualifications of Sri Lankans met the immigration and human capital criteria of the Canadian government. Over time, this only further cemented the strength of the already existing ‘Tamil diaspora’ in Canada, which by the early 2000s were mainly living in Toronto and numbering anywhere from between 110,000 and 200,000. Many Tamils read and listen to Tamil-oriented newspapers and radio shows in the Toronto area, and many but not all Tamils in Canada maintain close cultural, financial, political, and social links with Tamils in Sri Lanka, including funding for the Tamil liberation Tigers (which have waged armed conflict against the Sri Lankan government and army). Such connections point to another approach to migration: transnationalism, which I explore later in this chapter (for further reading, see Hyndman, 2003).
thus reinforcing the duality of these labour markets, and thus the demand for low-income migrants (Samers, 2002). 

**Neo-liberalism**

In the discussion of globalization in an earlier section, I spoke of the imposition of structural adjustment policies (see note 9) in the late 1980s. Structural adjustment can be viewed as a policy extension of what many critical social scientists call ‘neo-liberalism’. Neo-liberalism as a concept is contested and observers of it interpret it in different ways. For the purposes of our discussion here, neo-liberalism will refer to a combination of policies, programmes, and discourses (sometimes the term ‘ideology’ is also used). Sociologists and geographers have stressed that neo-liberalism has different variants in different national and sub-national contexts. More specifically, Peck and Tickell (2006) outline what they call ‘roll-back’ and ‘roll-forward’ neo-liberalism.

1) **Roll-back** neo-liberalism in the richer countries entails cutting or severely reducing social programs, especially those associated with public housing, food provision, unemployment insurance, medical care, and public health. Social reproduction is no longer viewed as the sole responsibility of the state. This is accompanied by the elimination or severe curtailing of trade union power and the de-regulation (or ‘flexibilization’) of labour markets. In the poorer countries, many of the same processes occur, in large measure because of a deepening of structural adjustment policies.

2) **Roll-forward** neo-liberalism in both richer and poorer countries concerns a privileging of markets and the logic of competition over the logic of government-managed and government funded social reproduction as the most efficient and effective means of solving social problems and allocating goods and services in societies. This impels people to be responsible for their own individual welfare (what might be called the ‘individualization of responsibility’). In the richer countries, roll-forward neo-liberalism involves the tacit or explicit support (financial or otherwise) of corporate business (‘capital welfare’) as well as regressive taxation (cutting the taxes on the wealthiest citizens) at the expense of progressive taxation (reducing taxes on the poorest). With regard to immigration, the
recruitment of highly-skilled immigrants (including students) by governments is privileged and liberalized by visa policies and other procedures. To complement highly-skilled migration, and despite any anti-low income immigrant rhetoric or policies by national and other governments, there is also a ‘malign neglect’ by governments of undocumented migrants to ensure a cheap ‘supply’ of labour. The above policies and practices, whether they involve immigration or not, are encouraged by a pervasive set of discourses circulated by governments, think-tanks, institutes, organizations, and the popular media who espouse neo-liberal ideas (see e.g. Bauder, 2008 on immigration and the neo-liberal media in Germany). In the poorer countries, the process of structural adjustment is deepened through the on-going liberalization and encouragement of foreign direct investment, remittances, and trade (e.g. the reduction in tariffs and quotas, and the development of ‘cash crops’ for export). These are imposed, willingly or not, on the governments of poorer countries by such international bodies as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization.

Neo-liberalism encompasses other elements, but those are the basic components that should concern us here. Most geographers’ accounts of neo-liberalism agree that it assumes different forms around the world, with some national states or sub-national regions more neo-liberal than others. What should be gained here is that the neo-liberal policies of international institutions that are largely dominated by the US and the richer countries, such as the IMF and the World Bank, seem to have resulted in greater poverty and deprivation in the poorest countries. As a consequence, this seems to have created a greater need for migration, but it should not be seen as simply evidence of a ‘push factor’. Rather, it should be viewed as an indication how the policies and practices of richer country governments, firms, and international bodies are intertwined with migration. However, what is striking about the migration studies literature is that, despite all the chatter about neo-liberalism, much of the literature tends to focus on the country of destination (e.g. Varsanyi, 2008), and there is a paucity of studies which actually break-down neo-liberalism into a set of principles or variables that can be analysed in the countries of origin to gauge the effect on migration. One of the few studies in this vein is by Massey and Capoferro (2006) (see Box 2.4).
Box 2.4  NEO-LIBERALISM AND EMIGRATION FROM THE CITY OF LIMA, PERU

Massey and Capoferro (2006) analyse the effects of structural adjustment policies along neo-liberal lines that were imposed upon Peru in 1987. This led to rising unemployment and underemployment, declining real wages and a growth in informal employment relative to formal employment. Inflation rose from an annual rate of about 89% from 1980 to 1987, but jumped to 4,000% in 1990 and peaked at 7,000% in 2000. As inflation soared, real incomes (i.e. incomes adjusted to prices) fell sharply, by about 40%. To explore the effects of this on emigration from Peru, Massey and Capoferro use data from ethnographic research and their ‘ethnosurveys’ as part of their Latin American Migration Project (see http://lamp.opr.princeton.edu/). They collected data on the life histories of family members in approximately 500 families in three middle-/lower-middle class neighbourhoods of Lima. What they found was that structural adjustment/neo-liberal policies had a real effect on international migration between 1988 and 2000. Massey and Capoferro show that before structural adjustment policies were implemented in 1987, families with higher levels of education, who had migrated before, and who had children over the age of 18, were more likely to migrate. After 1987, the level of ‘human capital’ of migrants diminishes in importance and instead, knowing someone who migrated previously in the neighbourhood (‘social capital’ generated from social networks) seems to matter more in explaining who migrates. However, what they also found is that the number of migrants going to other Latin American and Caribbean countries fell from 36 to 24%, since those countries were also suffering from structural adjustment. New destinations such as Spain and other countries in Europe became popular, while the US became slightly less popular. Why did Spain, for example, become more attractive as a destination? Perhaps it is partly because the Spanish government actively privileged Spanish-speaking migrants over others in the early 1990s (Cornelius, 1994).
Neo-liberalism and international student mobility?

Besides labour migration, we might also view international student mobility (ISM) through the lens of neo-liberalism. ISM has grown rapidly (by 52% between 1998 and 2004) (IOM, 2008a, 105) and it has diversified geographically. It is possible that neo-liberalism is at the root of the growth of this phenomenon, although it may be easier to explain why student mobility has expanded rapidly through neo-liberalism than to explain where it has expanded. In terms of the former, one might view the growth of student mobility from at least three perspectives: from the perspective of migrants themselves; from the strategic sights of national governments; and from the outlook of universities. For students, the desire to improve one’s career prospects either in their home country or in other national spaces, as a means of securing emigration in the future, for language acquisition, or simply for adventure and an opportunity to be away from their parents, are all possible reasons. While some of these reasons may not be related directly to neo-liberalism, that job opportunities have declined or are limited in certain poorer countries, or that English has become a dominant world language may in fact be related to neo-liberalism. For governments, visa policies are used to favour the migration of students (barring the couple of years after September 11, 2001) in what Faist (2008) calls a move from a ‘red card’ to a ‘red carpet’ strategy (p. 33). Indeed, governments recognize that international students in engineering and the sciences in particular can provide the seeds of innovation and patent creation, which are central to the perception, reality, or rhetoric of a global neo-liberal landscape of economic competition. There are certainly other reasons that governments encourage ISM, such as the desire for cultural exchanges, but this can only be very indirectly attributed to neo-liberalism. For universities, who actively recruit foreign students, they are once again required to fill positions in science and engineering programs since these programs often struggle to find able and willing domestic students. This brings universities both considerable financial resources as well as prestige and international diversity in their student bodies (IOM, 2008a). That the pressure of national and international rankings might drive the desire to enhance certain academic programs, and hence the search for foreign students, is not new. However, these pressures may have intensified over the last 20 years, and they may be partly attributable to (as well as a part of) neo-liberalism.
One of the trends in education which may actually stem ISM is the construction of ‘western’ universities overseas, such as the broad range of American universities with campuses in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar, for example. The same might be said for British universities, such as Nottingham University’s campuses in Ningbo, China and Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. \(^{14}\) The question remains, however, whether the opening of foreign branches of universities as a competitive strategy will tend to lessen or further encourage migration. From what we know about other forms of migration, investments overseas may in fact increase rather than deter international student mobility, especially if it is linked to highly-skilled migration. Nonetheless, many foreign students have chosen to follow distance-based courses on-line (a product one might say of the growth of technologies associated with globalization) rather than to migrate overseas or even attend the foreign branch (IOM, 2008a). Since there appears to be no comprehensive study to discern this relationship between international student mobility, and this form or stage of the internationalization of education, its implications remain to be seen.

**The migration-development nexus**

Exploring the relationship between development and migration is hardly a theory, but this literature has the merit of connecting the ‘here’ and the ‘there’. And though not new by any means, there has been an increasing interest in the relationship between ‘development’ and migration over the last decade, what might be called the ‘migration-development nexus’. \(^{15}\) This is witnessed in the innumerable conferences, programmes and reports by international agencies and organizations on the matter (e.g. GCIM, 2005; UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, 2006; Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals or TOKTEN; Migration for Development in Africa or MIDA) (Faist, 2008). Our interest here is how ‘development’, or what is perceived by the literature to be a ‘lack of it’, might serve to explain migration. During the second half of the twentieth century, it was believed widely that migration could stimulate economic development in poorer countries as migrants sent remittances home or would return to the country of origin with skills, knowledge, and other financial resources (de Haas, 2006). This would then have the effect of reducing emigration to the richer countries (de Haas, 2007). As de Haas (2006) remarks, there is a resurrection of
this sort of thinking in the twenty-first century, and migration has become the ‘new mantra’ (Kapur, 2004) for development. However, as de Haas (2006) also notes, there are both ‘optimists’ and ‘pessimists’ in this debate concerning the consequences for migration and economic development in poorer countries.

The pessimists, whose outlook also dates to at least the 1960s, subscribe to a more ‘dependency’ argument. They focus on at least two negative consequences of migration for development. The first is the apparent ‘brain drain’ in terms of the loss of skilled labour, and in some cases, a loss of more manual farm labour from certain regions in the countries of emigration. Consider for example that approximately one-third of engineers and researchers from poorer countries are working in the OECD countries (Faist, 2008, 32). For the pessimists, when return migration does happen, it creates new divisions within the country, region, town, or village of origin, which can then lead to a loss of ‘community’, or at least new social forms. The result is a disruption of existing and more ‘environmentally sustainable’ agricultural practices that depend upon long-standing social hierarchies and labour practices. Economic stagnation may result, unemployment may rise rather than decrease as a consequence, and migrants may find return migration difficult and return instead to the original country of immigration. Second, the pessimists argue that remittances may act to reduce poverty among households in the country of origin but that remittances do not necessarily lead to broad-based sustainable economic development, generally understood at the national scale. This is because financial remittances may encourage spending on imported luxury items in the country of emigration such as large homes, expensive cars, and so forth, rather than in more productive investments that would help to reinforce or build domestic and export-led industries. People then become dependent upon a remittance economy, and on occasion might even abandon productive activity in order to migrate. At the same time, investments in homes or the purchase of luxury goods leads to inflation in the national or more localized economies, which then raises prices on basic goods for those who have not migrated, and impels these individuals or groups of people to also migrate. Thus, rather than development, the result is quite the opposite (a review of this perspective can be found in Castles and Miller, 2009, Nyberg-Sorensen et al., 2002, and Faist, 2008).

On the optimist side, migration will lead to economic development
for similar reasons that scholars claimed it would during the post-war period. Yet now, instead of there being a ‘return option’ for migrants, there is a ‘diaspora option’ (Barré et al., 2003, in Faist, 2008, 33), meaning that migrants can and do foster continual ties between places of origin and destination. Circular migration is viewed as even more likely to result in ‘brain gain’ or ‘brain circulation’ (the back and forth movement of skilled people between various countries of emigration and immigration) rather than to ‘brain drain’. Migrants are thus viewed as ‘development agents’ in a period of ‘co-development’ (Faist, 2008). From this perspective, financial remittances are not simply used for the purchase of luxury items, but for entrepreneurial activity. Black and Castaldo (2009) find plenty of evidence for this in their study of migrants returning from Europe to Ghana or the Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), as do Maron and Connell (2008) for migrants returning to the Asia-Pacific island of Tonga from Australia, New Zealand, the UK and the US. In addition, remittances may counter problems of recession in the poorer countries and because the money is usually transferred individually or collectively through such companies as Western Union, it avoids state corruption or in many instances taxation. Perhaps even more notable now is the importance of ‘social remittances’. Social remittances refer to the ideas, practices but also finances that migrants bring home or send home, and which contribute to the construction of schools, roads, religious institutions, hometown institutions, and other social institutions (Levitt, 1998) for the benefit of those ‘left behind’ (Toyota et al., 2007). National governments view these social remittances as enormously valuable. For example, the Mexican government created its ‘Tres-Pour-Uno’ program in 2001 – a matching program whereby each ‘migradollar’ sent home through a hometown association to, let us say, build a school house in a particular village, is matched by US$1 each from the Federal, state and local governments in Mexico (Faist, 2008; Orozco and Rouse, 2007). And global remittances in general, as so many books, journal articles, and reports now point out, are considerable. By 2007, remittances had reached some US $318 billion worldwide (up from about US$150 billion in 2001 or US$40 billion in 1990) and about two-thirds of this money went back to poorer countries, and not simply the poorest. In China, 50% of the foreign direct investment (FDI) comes from the 30 million overseas Chinese, compared to India where the figure is about 10%. In fact, by the early 2000s, the amount of remittances in dollars was
double the level of overseas development assistance from richer countries (IOM, 2008a; Faist, 2008).

However, both Faist (2008) and de Haas (2006) find these debates overly polarized and simplistic. For instance, rather than countries suffering outright from ‘brain drain’, Faist prefers to speak of different stages and types of ‘brain drains and gains’ with differential impacts for different groups of people in the countries of emigration. He even talks of a ‘global brain chain’ (p. 32), when, let us say, doctors from Canada migrate to the US, and doctors from South Africa migrate to Canada. In contrast, de Haas (2006) uses insights from the ‘new economics of labour migration’ approach (discussed earlier in the chapter) to explore the ways in which migrant families rather than just individuals rely on remittances to improve their livelihoods and diversify risk. Leaning more towards the optimists, de Haas argues in the context of the Todgha valley in southern Morocco that instead of simply spending money on imported luxury items when migrants return to Morocco from France, Spain, Belgium, or the Netherlands, migrants do tend to invest their remittances in productive activities which can have important ‘multiplier effects’ that benefit both migrants and non-migrants alike. This might include investing in the installation of motor-driven water pumps in southern Morocco as a solution to the limitations of traditional forms of small-scale irrigation, which then allows migrants to open up new farmland beyond the oases, hire paid labourers and overall contribute to the increasing productivity of agriculture. Yet it also includes the construction or purchase of ‘modern’ homes which provide more space to house large families. These new homes offer increased security, improvements in health; they act as an investment against loss, and the possibility of income generation through leasing. Purchasing a home is therefore not strictly a vehicle for improving a migrant’s status. While academics may not view this as ‘development’, de Haas believes that this ‘reflects a narrow view of development’ (p. 575). Migrants have also invested in grocery stores, coffee houses, restaurants, taxis, delivery vans, among other ventures, and non-migrants have benefited from the businesses that these ventures create. This has led to a demand for labour among both non-migrants and internal migrants, and internal migration from other regions in Morocco has increased into the largest town (Tingha) in the Todgha Valley. Yet de Haas warns that the beneficial benefits realized through return migration and remittances are not likely
to immediately contribute to the cessation of emigration. On the contrary, it is likely to increase it in the short to medium-term\textsuperscript{16} as aspirations among would-be migrants rise.

Furthermore, de Haas (2006) admits that return migration and remittances have also contributed to social breakdown, for example between the traditional landed elite and the now emancipated share croppers, among others. Emerging disputes between these groups has led to the dissolution of village institutions which served to enforce common law – a legal system that ensured the collective regulation of land and water management. Traditional underground irrigation systems have therefore dried up from poor maintenance, which forces non-migrants to install water pumps. This then lowers water tables and contributes to the desiccation of traditional irrigation systems. The consequence has been unsustainable farming practices, the abandonment of new farms, and hence wasted investment. Those unable to invest in pumps are forced out of agriculture.

In sum, de Haas writes “It is therefore important not to jump to the conclusion that the migration optimists were right because the migration pessimists turned out to be wrong . . . By postulating that migration is a household strategy to overcome local constraints on economic production and development, we should not infer that migration ‘therefore’ contributes to development in sending areas. This would be like falling back from one determinism to another” (p. 579). What is extremely valuable about de Haas’ analysis then is his tendency to situate his analysis at multiple scales, from villages in the valley, to the biggest town in the valley, to the region, to Morocco as a whole, and finally to Europe.

In any case, beyond Morocco, the veracity of either view is difficult to assess, not least because it is difficult to isolate the impacts of return migration or ‘brain circulation’ on economic development, and there is simply inadequate research to support fully either of these arguments. A further complication is that while return or circular migration may contribute to economic development, national data on economic development only tells us a very general story, or rather it highlights a problem of the scale of analysis. Migrants returning to one region of a country may stimulate economic development in that region, but other regions (and groups and individuals) may be left out and even hindered by the process of migration. As de Haas (2006) writes, “the fundamental
question for researchers is not whether or not migration leads to certain
types of development, but why migration has more positive development
outcomes in some migrant-sending areas and less positive or negative
outcomes in others” (p. 579).

Nonetheless, other more critical participants in the debate question
whether we can identify ‘positive development outcomes’ at all, even
by alternative material measures such as owning a house. To take two
examples, Lawson’s (1999) study of internal migrants from rural areas
in Ecuador to the capital city of Quito, and Silvey and Lawson’s (1999)
account of migration in Indonesia, show instead that the cultural attach-
ments to a village of origin and its way of life highlights the ambivalence
that migrants feel about migration to urban centres and the ‘moderniza-
tion’ of their lives. In this way, cultural and emotional attachments
become important to the practice of migration and seeing ‘development’
in one place as ‘better’ and the ‘lack of development’ in another as
‘worse’, represents an unhelpful binary opposition. Migrants instead
feel multiple attachments across different places. Places should not be
characterized as better because they are ‘modern’ and worse because
they are ‘not modern’. This is one reason why the spatial concepts we
employ are important for how we understand the causes and con-
sequences of migration.

INTEGRATIVE OR MIXED APPROACHES

Social network explanations for migration

Though hardly new, research on the importance of social networks in
migration increasingly became a subject of analysis in the 1980s owing
to, among many others, the work of Douglas Massey and his colleagues
on Mexican migration to the US (e.g. Massey et al., 1987; Singer and
Massey, 1998), but there are certainly many earlier studies in anthropol-
ogy and sociology (see the reviews in Boyd, 1989, and Brettell and
Hollifield, 2008). Research on networks might be encapsulated within
what is broadly called a ‘migration systems’ paradigm (Massey et al.,
1987; Gurak and Caces, 1992), a way of looking at migration through
the historically-rooted and network-based cultural, economic, political,
and social linkages between the country of origin and destination, often
in regional terms, for example between the oil-exporting countries of
the Middle East and South Asia, between Europe and its former colonies, between southern African countries and South Africa, between the US and Latin America; between Southeast Asian countries, and so forth.

For authors concerned with social networks, networks are more than just ‘migration chains’ (e.g. MacDonald and MacDonald, 1964), they are defined as the ties that bind migrants, previous migrants, and non-migrants within and between the countries of origin and destination. They are viewed as mediating between structural forces and the individual agency of migrants (Massey et al., 1993, 1998) or to put it differently, they connect the social and individual reasons for migrating (Goss and Lundquist, 1995). Commonly called ‘migrant networks’ (Massey et al., 1987) or ‘network-mediated migration’ (Wilson, 1993), such networks might include kin and friendship ties through villages (sometimes referred to as ‘strong ties’), or other networks based around a perception of common cultures or ethnicities (sometimes called ‘weak ties’), both of which rely on a certain degree of mutual trust (Tilly, 2007). Both of these types of networks or ‘ties’ are sometimes manifested in hometown associations (“an organization of migrants from the same town or parish in a host country who congregate primarily for social and mutual aid purposes” – Caglar, 2006, 1–2). Social networks, whether or not they involve hometown associations, can provide food, shelter, information about and access to jobs, information on health care and services, religious organizations, as well as recreation and emotional support. That is, social networks not only provide the financial and other resources to migrate, but they figure prominently in settlement and the continuation of migration (Boyd, 1989; Levitt, 2003; Massey et al., 1993, 1998; but see Collyer, 2005).

Some proponents of the migrant network idea argue further that unlike the very first migrants from a particular country of origin (or region within that country) who may bear enormous costs and risks in migrating, it is commonly claimed that later migrants can rely on social networks to lower the costs and risks of migration, which only further increases migration. As migration increases, social networks also increase and the process is reinforced. Eventually, broad sections of the societies from which migrants originate also migrate. This process is cemented further if immigration policy is more restrictive. In this case, migrants increasingly settle in the country of destination, which enhances the development of migrant communities, which in turn strengthens net-
works both within the country of destination and between the country of origin and destination. For many authors, these network resources (sometimes called ‘social capital’) are viewed as ‘positive’ (read ‘supportive’) and are argued to change with the length of settlement. As the period of settlement grows, family reunification is argued to be more likely, increasing the existence of family based networks in the receiving society. However, over time, the volume and amount of remittances may decline (they may also increase), and membership in ethnic and non-ethnic based voluntary associations in the country of destination may also increase (or decline) (Blue, 2004; Boyd, 1989; Massey et al., 1993, 1998).

There is a parallel social network literature that paints a less flattering picture of social networks. First, in a study of Algerian asylum-seekers in the UK, Collyer (2005) shows that while social networks and social capital may be important to both settled and new migrants, stricter immigration policies relating especially to asylum-seekers (such as requiring proof of longer-term financial support) may force some settled immigrants to reduce their support for new co-ethnic asylum-seekers, even if they are friends. Second, while Massey et al. argue that the next generation of migrants can lower the costs and risks of migration by building on existing social networks and the ‘higher levels of human capital’ associated with the first generation (Massey et al., 1987, 1993, 1998), Reniers (1999) shows in the context of Turkish and Moroccan migration to Belgium that this may not necessarily be the case, in fact the opposite might be true. Those with the least human capital migrate first, and those with higher educational attainment, for example, migrate later.

Third, it is not simply the ‘strong ties’ of family, kin, and hometown associations which constitute the social networks of migration, but also other networks that involve a whole range of actors operating both legally and illegally from large employers and their sub-contracted employment agencies, to government and private recruiting agencies, to smugglers and traffickers (e.g. Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Kyle and Koslowski, 2001; Krissman, 2005). Thus, certain kinds of networks cast a long shadow over the tendency to interpret the metaphor of ‘social networks’ as something intrinsically beneficial to migrants. Take smuggling and trafficking, for example. These are social networks that are world-wide phenomena but which have ambiguous consequences for migrants. For this reason, below I devote a little bit of time to exploring their implications for migration. But what is the difference between smuggling and trafficking?
For Salt (2000) and Kyle and Dale (2001), smuggling (‘migrant importing’) occurs when someone is transported illegally (on foot, by truck, boat, etc.) across an international border. The fee is often paid up front by the migrant to the smuggler. In fact, Salt and Stein (1997) see smuggling as essentially a profit-making operation, and therefore ‘as a business’. They offer one of the most widely-received and sophisticated accounts of smuggling. Central to their account is also the multiple spaces involved in smuggling networks, including three separate stages: the stages of mobilization (that is the spaces where the ‘journey’ begin), en route, and insertion (the process by which they seek asylum and the process of obtaining necessary resources for survival) (van Liempt and Doomernik, 2006). Smuggling in this sense is common between Latin American countries (especially Mexico) and the US (see Box 2.5), but also, for instance, between east Africa, central Asia and the European Union (see Box 2.6).

**Box 2.5 SMUGGLING FROM MEXICO TO THE UNITED STATES**

Perhaps one of the most well-known patterns of smuggling is between Mexico and the United States (e.g. Massey et al., 2002; Nevins, 2008). Although this primarily involves Mexicans, it also includes Ecuadorians, Guatemalans, Nicaraguans, and many other migrants from Central and South America, who often travel through Mexico. Whatever their nationality, when migrants attempt a crossing into El Norte (the North), this often involves the use of coyotes (professional smugglers) who may take an individual, a few people, a family, or even a larger group and lead them across la linea (the physical border between Mexico and the US). Sometimes they will accompany them to a particular town or city in the United States, but more frequently they are left to their own devices, accompanied only by a little food and water. Attempting a crossing without a coyote is exceedingly difficult, but it is also dangerous with a coyote. The now militarized border (Andreas, 2000; Dunn, 1996) stretches some 1,000 miles from about a ¼ mile off Imperial Beach in southern California to the desert of Arizona. This includes
15,000 border agents (some with automatic weapons), 700 miles of double fencing, infra-red detection technology, specially designed vehicles, watchtowers, and seismic sensors. While crawling through tunnels, cutting through sections of the fences, and swimming across the Rio Grande river are all means of circumventing the border, more likely now are desert crossings as border enforcement has simply pushed smuggling and other crossings into the desert, further away from the cities and towns that dot the border and which are the sites of ever increasing control. Because of the frequency of these desert crossings, some 700 people have died each year between 1999 and 2005 from dehydration, heat exposure, murdered accidentally in drug trade shootouts (another part of border exchange), or even shot by the so-called ‘Minutemen’ (the American, anti-illegal immigration vigilantes). A sign on a Tijuana wall near the border asks Cuantos Mas? (How many more?) [will die]. Apparently, more than 4,000 people have died since 1995 trying to reach their destination. It is estimated that about one-third of all people trying to cross the border get caught, although upwards of 92% will attempt to cross again, perhaps repeatedly. However, it is becoming increasingly difficult. Stepped-up border enforcement since the 1990s, but especially since September 11, 2001 appears to have slowed smuggling in the most guarded locations based on the number of apprehensions, but it is unlikely to completely stop smuggling given the desire of migrants to cross into the US (Nevins, 2008).

Box 2.6 SMUGGLING INTO THE NETHERLANDS:
NETWORKS AND MIGRANT AGENCY ACROSS
MULTIPLE SPACES

It is common to blame smuggling on ‘globalization’, global structural inequalities and the ruthless profit-seeking, criminal behaviour of smugglers. This is by no means an unreasonable accusation, but a closer and alternative look at smuggling allows us to see more

continued
human agency, and complex networks operating through multiple spaces. In their study of smuggling between Iraq, Ethiopia, and Georgia to the Netherlands, van Liempt and Doomernik (2006) agree with Salt and Stein (1997) that smuggling is a global business with both legal and illegal dimensions. But they argue that Salt and Stein neglect changes in state policies and that they fail to account for migrants’ agency, the relationship between smugglers and the smuggled (the migrants), migrants’ experiences, and their motivations, which are not strictly economic in nature. Rather than just seeing migrants as passive victims, and smugglers as ‘merciless criminals’ (Liempt and Doomernik, 2006, 173), Liempt and Doomernik want us to see migrants as purposeful agents, and smugglers as business people. In fact, they remind us that in US research, many of the smugglers actually own restaurants, barber shops, and the like. In their study of trafficking to the Netherlands, they find that many of the smugglers were actually smugglers of goods but discovered they could earn more money smuggling people. They were motivated in fact by their own bad experiences as migrants, and they knew the border regions very well.

Migrants seem to have favoured destinations, and they choose particular countries because of past colonial linkages, the perception that certain countries are ‘culturally close’ to their own; because they have friends or relatives there, or because a country has a positive reputation in the migrant’s mind, including its ability to offer protection and safety. Migrants do also make economic calculations based on the cost of the trip. For instance, an Iraqi man, who was given the price of various destinations by a smuggler (Canada – $US10,000; Germany – $8,000, and the Netherlands – $US7,000), chose the Netherlands because it was cheaper. However, migrants do not always end up where they prefer. Quite the contrary. As one man reported, he wanted to go to Sweden to be with his relatives, but was abandoned at a service station in the city of Eindhoven, and had to claim asylum in the Netherlands. In this all too common scenario, migrants are left without valuable support networks, and have to rely on the state for survival.
Nevertheless, the migrants do not see smugglers as criminals and there is little stigma attached to them in the former Soviet states, according to their study of Georgians. Rather, they are seen as facilitators or ‘service providers’ who will bring them to their destination for a price. As one migrant put it, ‘I would not call him a smuggler. At the border I was allowed to walk with this man for $400 and then he was so kind to hand me over to people who brought me to the nearest city for free’ (p. 173). But as facilitators, they are also seen as ‘bad people’. For example, one man does recognize that migrants ‘were locked up in safe houses and badly treated by smugglers’ (p. 174), while another man acknowledges that ‘they have dollars in their eyes and they lie a lot to you so that you will pay them more’ (ibid). If the smuggler can grant the wishes of the migrant, if they can keep their word and be successful at the operation, then it makes them more desirable as smugglers.

Migrants often contact smugglers through friends and relatives. Trust is important, and in the towns and villages of origin, ‘good’ smugglers gain a positive reputation as individuals who can provide food, shelter, rest en route, and have an expert knowledge about borders and obtaining passports and visas. Sometimes migrants find their smugglers on the way between let us say Iraq and the Netherlands, for example in Istanbul.

Likewise, smugglers recruit migrants in order to grow their business, even offering guarantees by allowing for multiple attempts for only one fee. Sometimes, they postpone the demand for the fee until safe arrival in the destination, and the relatives in the country of origin are then contacted for the fee. Smugglers choose certain routes based on the ease of travel, transport infrastructure, and asylum and immigration policies. Until about mid-2001 when Dutch asylum policy changed fundamentally, the Netherlands was very attractive to smugglers. Before 2001, the high acceptance rate for asylum-seekers, the variety of grounds upon which one might be accorded asylum, the relatively generous reception centres, free language training, secondary education for minors, free medical care, legal aid, clothing, and insurance all offered an incentive for smugglers since they could all but guarantee
their ‘clients’ a successful resolution to their voyage. Surprisingly, even the lengthy procedures for granting asylum meant that smugglers could ‘park’ migrants in the Netherlands as a country of transit, while smuggling them to another country at a later date. Yet the lengthy process combined with comparatively generous benefits made the Netherlands attractive as a final destination as well. In addition, penalties for smugglers were comparatively low until about 1996. For all of the above reasons, the number of Iraqi, Iranian, and Somali asylum-seekers in the Netherlands increased rapidly during the first half of the 1990s. This had the effect of strengthening these communities in the Netherlands, and making the country more attractive to their compatriots in the countries of origin. In general, asylum requests expanded from about 4,500 in 1985 to approximately 52,000 in 1994, before halving the following year, and dropping to some 13,400 by 2003. While the decline after 1994 probably related to the end of the war in the former Yugoslavia, several immigration and labour market policies were also passed in 1995 to clamp down on what the government and much of the Dutch public perceived as abuse of the asylum system and social welfare. Furthermore, in 1996, jail sentences for smugglers who were caught increased from about 1 to 4–8 years, depending upon the extent and organizational capacity of the smuggling operation. In 2000, the Aliens Act accelerated asylum procedures, and decisions had to be made within 48 hours. This inevitable conversation between government officials and an individual asylum-seeker is typically practiced ahead of time by the migrant in order to convince the official of their dire circumstances. If, however, an asylum-seeker’s case is rejected, that individual would be denied all benefits. Increasing restrictions at Schiphol airport in Amsterdam after the mid-1990s and then again in 2001 triggered smugglers to no longer see the Netherlands as a country of transit, but often a failed destination for asylum-seekers. So while migrants try to inform themselves of the benefits of different destinations, migrants only rarely get their wish of destination. As Leimpt and Doomernik insist, migrants hardly exercise power over the smugglers. On the contrary, where migrants end up often depends much
on the action of the smugglers. And the smugglers react to national immigration policies, over which they themselves have little power. Nevertheless, the smugglers figure heavily in how migrants travel and where their final destination might be.

The spaces of smuggling are more complex than a route from A to B, though. To begin with, these networks involve ‘in-between’ spaces and places such as Istanbul. Istanbul is a major node in migrant networks that follow the old silk road. And it is here that a ‘visa mafia’ exists and might provide false visas and related identity papers to migrants who have found themselves willingly or unwillingly in the city. Another example recalled by van Liempt and Doomernik of the multiple trajectories and spaces involved in smuggling is the well-known tragedy in June 2000 of 58 Chinese migrants who were found at the port of Dover suffocated in a container on the back of a lorry (truck). The 60 migrants thought they would be taking a direct flight to the UK, but were shuffled from their village in Fujian province to the provincial capital, and then to Beijing, by flight to Belgrade, taxi to Austria, flight to Paris, train to Rotterdam, housed above restaurants in Rotterdam, and then into a container packed with tomatoes. The container was put on the back of lorry and on to a ferry from Zeebruge, Belgium to the port of Dover on the south coast of England. Of the 60 migrants who left Fujian province, only two survived through the toxic air and crippling dehydration (for two fuller accounts of this story, see ‘Chronicle of the Dover tragedy’ and ‘Search for a new life ends up in a cauldron of death’, *The Guardian*, 5 and 6, April 2001). During this decade, the media have documented similar, equally horrific stories, and there is little reason to believe that such tragedies will not continue to happen. Migrant agency or not, smuggling should rarely be seen as anything other than a troubled and dangerous business, a point that Liempt and Doomernik fully realize.

Trafficking (‘slave importing’) is also a business; it usually carries with it a substantial debt burden and involves forced labour after migrating, often to pay back the smuggling debt. This work may last for more
than several years in order to pay off individuals involved in the specific social networks of trafficking. The nature of the work performed varies enormously from case to case. It is common in most countries of the world, including within Asia. For Kyle and Dale (2001), Myanmar and Thailand represent a common and disturbing pattern of sexual trafficking in particular. In both countries, it involves local elites (village leaders for example), states or governments (corrupt border guards, police officers, highly-placed government officials, policy-makers), trafficking agents, employers (especially brothel owners), the consumers of sex, and unsuspecting migrants (women, and sometimes girls and boys as young as perhaps 12) who are forced to perform sex and sexual work without wages.

So whether social networks involve coercion, trickery, or clandestine connections between unscrupulous agents, institutions, government officials, and customers, or whether it involves more voluntary linkages which are more beneficial to migrants’ welfare, they are often called ‘transnational’ and it is this perspective to which we now turn.

Transnationalism and migration

If the concept of globalization seems to deprive people of their agency and has a rather economistic, deterministic, and disempowering inflection to it, the idea of transnationalism appears to be its more migrant-focused, agent-centric and perhaps cultural successor. For Vertovec (1999), transnationalism “broadly refers to multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states” (p. 447). It soon became clear though that such a definition covered a vast array of issues and processes, including those that were economic in character (e.g. Bailey, 2001; Vertovec, 1999; Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt, 1999; Smith and Guarnizo, 1998). In an earlier and pioneering volume and with specific reference to immigrants, Basch, Glick-Schiller and Blanc (1994) conceptualized transnationalism “as the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (p. 7). This at least has the merit of a narrower definition focused on immigrants.

At the same time, some scholars claimed that transnationalism – much like the idea of globalization – could not be considered as new. Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2002) make this point eloquently:
The recent boom in research on transnational communities did not discover ‘something new’, but was the result of a shift of perspective away from methodological nationalism. The discovery was a consequence of an epistemic move of the observer, not of the appearance of new objects of observation.

(p. 218)

However, our concern at this point is not so much with the character of transnational communities and their senses of belonging and identity (which we will return to in Chapter 5) as it is to identify the precise unit(s) of analysis involved; whether the processes associated with the idea or concept of ‘transnationalism’ can be used to explain migration, and whether the discourse of transnationalism is any different from globalization.

To begin with, the unit of analysis in transnational studies seems to be a combination of the ‘local communities’ of origin and destination, and locally-grounded yet globe-spanning or border-crossing post-colonial ‘diasporic networks’ that involve what Michael Peter Smith (2001) calls variously ‘translocalism’, ‘transnational urbanism’, or ‘distanciated yet situated social relations’ (p. 237). These networks are often further disaggregated into other analytical units such as households, other formal or informal institutions – especially homeland associations – and economically-oriented transactions such as remittances and commercial trade (Faist, 2008; Smith, 2005). When we refer to ‘diasporic networks’, it must be recognized that the concept and definition of ‘diaspora’ is itself contested (Blunt, 2007; Brettell and Hollifield, 2008; Brubaker, 2005; Cohen, 1997), although ‘diaspora’ might be reasonably defined as the spreading out of certain communities from an original homeland to their regrouping and the formation of new communities in a ‘new’ land. In turn, by ‘diasporic networks’ we mean the social, cultural, political, and economic links that migrant communities maintain across international borders. These links may also be psychological, involving especially an emotional or imaginative attachment to a ‘people(s)’ or ‘place(s)’ of origin. The words ‘people(s)’ and ‘place(s)’ here are used purposefully for two reasons: first, since diasporic networks may involve multiple places of origin, migrants may feel and practice a sense of belonging to more than one village or region and to more than one ethnic or linguistic group; second, their attachment to, let us say, a particular village (rather
than necessarily and only to a nation-state) suggests that the term ‘transnationalism’ may be either a misnomer or an incomplete understanding of belonging. That is, it is not clear whether their belonging and practices should be defined as transnational, as translocal or transurban (Barkan, 2004; Faist, 2008; Smith, 2005), or when it indeed involves only two countries, bi-local or bi-national. Perhaps any spatial metaphor is inappropriate, and we should instead call such networks ‘pan-ethnic’ (Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007). Yet even the label ‘pan-ethnic’ may be ‘essentialist’ insofar as it assumes homogeneity within ethnic groups,19 and often transnational linkages are cut across by differences in age, generation, gender, religion, class position, and other axes of differentiation. In other words, it is difficult to see precisely how transnationalism can serve to perpetuate migration, when our understanding of the concept itself is rather insecure (Portes et al., 1999).

Nevertheless, what might be different between an explanation of migration based on transnationalism and an explanation of migration rooted in a globalization (or structuralist/neo-Marxist-inspired) reading? We can identify two related distinctions. First, Smith (2005) argues that arguments about globalization as something ominously big, economic, structural, uncontrollable, operating “behind people’s backs, so to speak” (p. 236), are problematic (see also Gibson-Graham, 2002), though it is also a mistake to see transnational networks as evidence of a new kind of agency. Smith reflects on this wisely:

Given the emphasis in transnational studies on the empirical practices of transnational social networks as both a medium and outcome of human agency, some have sought to position transnationalism research as an agency-oriented successor to the now-tired nostrums of the globalization discourse. But this take on the structure-agency dialectic must be carefully framed if we are to avoid constructing yet another rigid binary between transnational cultural agency or translocal political practices and global economic (re)structuring.

(2005, 236)

For Smith then, structures are real, but they operate at both the ‘local’ and ‘global’ levels. The ‘local’ drives the transnational, and the transnational shapes the local.
Brettell and Hollifield (2008) offer a second possible distinction between an earlier more ‘miserablist’ migration literature, driven by the debilitating forces of globalization, and the new literature on transnational diasporic networks. This distinction rests on the ‘voluntarism’ of the migrants involved: they are no longer viewed as ‘uprooted’ (p. 120). In other words, migrants are not forced by economic and social disruption to migrate with trepidation and difficulty, but rather subjects who move with ease – really circulate – between different countries and cultures. That is the argument anyway, and there is plenty of evidence that at least high income migrants do this with relative impunity, though certainly with the obstacle of immigration visas and other checks. For example, Indian computer engineers or entrepreneurs working in the computer industry in Silicon Valley (south of San Francisco) helped to establish the Indian computer technology industry centered on Bangalore in southern India, which in turn stimulates further migration between Bangalore and Silicon Valley, and which is supported by the Indian state (Saxenian, 2005). In contrast, Castles and Miller (2009) doubt that the majority of migrants live such transnational lives, given insufficient evidence. And certainly with considerable justification, Michael Peter Smith (2005) rebukes what he sees as this ‘celebration of hybridity’ or fluid transnationalism (see earlier Mitchell, 1997), arguing that

this serves to erase the fact that no matter how much spatial mobility or border crossing may characterize transnational actors’ household, community and place-making practices, the actors are still classed, raced and gendered bodies in motion in specific historical contexts, within certain political formations and spaces

(p. 238)

While in this book I subscribe to Smith’s more critical view, the point that we need to take from this literature is the idea of transnationalism as involving a twist on globalization arguments through its assertion of the importance of migrant networks. And it is these globe-spanning networks (whether they are cultural, economic, political, or social) that serve to stimulate and perpetuate migration.
Gender-sensitive approaches to migration

During the 1980s and 1990s, it became something of a mantra to resent the neglect of gender (or more specifically women) in the study of international migration, and for a long time it was assumed that women only migrated as dependents (Kelson and De Laet, 1999; Kofman, 1999). There is now a rather voluminous literature that seeks to overcome the long-time male bias of migration studies (for reviews of the literature on migration and gender, see e.g. Kelson and DeLaet, 1999; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994; Morokvasic, 1984; Kofman, 1999; Pessar and Mahler, 2003; Piper, 2006; Silvey, 2004a). While, remarkably, major annual migration reports (e.g. ‘International Migration Outlook’ – published by the OECD) continue to neglect the sex breakdown, Pessar and Mahler (2003) argue that the project among critical academics to address the male bias of the literature has progressed to the point that “the pendulum . . . [has] . . . shifted so far in the opposite direction that the male migrant as study subject disappeared almost to the same degree as the female migrant had previously” (p. 814). At the same time, Pessar and Mahler (2003) claim that the migration literature has “simply redressed the male bias by adding women; in other words, by treating gender largely as the variable sex” (p. 814). The point as Pessar and Mahler argue is to “treat gender less as a variable and more as a central concept for studying migration” (p. 814). Put differently, the relationship between men and women should figure at the heart of our explanation of migration.

These basic observations aside, the literature on how migration is shaped by one’s sex or gender relations involves at least four key dimensions: 1) the fundamental role of states in both encouraging differential types of migration among men and women, but also controlling men and women’s unequal right to migrate; 2) the nature of intra-family and intra-community gender relations as mediated by states, and how this shapes both emigration and return migration; 3) how perceptions of more equitable gender relations abroad tend to shape migration; and 4) explaining the migration of domestic workers in particular.

Concerning the first dimension, the state in the country of immigration is seen as creating and regulating the migration of women. For example, in the UK from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s, migrant women were assumed to be dependents and prohibited from working. It was only in 1989 that migrant women could bring in their husbands and fiancés,
and from that point onwards, the number of dependent migrant men increased (Kofman, 1999). It is acknowledged, however, that such gendered restrictions vary over space and time, and are shaped by the age, class position, ethnicity, generation, religion, and the recognizable skills of particular migrants. Yet states in the country of emigration are also actively involved in facilitating and regulating who migrates and who does not. This is accomplished not by simply regulating migration on the basis of one’s sex, but also by shaping gender relations and expectations (see e.g. Silvey, 2004b on Indonesian migrants to Saudi Arabia; Tyner, 2004 on the migration of Filipino women; and Yeoh and Willis, 1999 on Singaporean men migrating to China with their wives remaining in Singapore).

A second dimension of this literature is how gender relations inside and outside the family in the country of emigration (as mediated by the state) combined with gender relations in the country of immigration (and also mediated by the state) might explain the differential migration of men and women. In this regards, there is a rich literature on Mexican migration to the US, for example, which documents these interrelationships. Migration from Mexico to the US has, over much of the twentieth century, been numerically dominated by men, many of them caught in the binds of crop failure, or inadequate crop yields and low income. Gender norms and gender subjectivities (how men and women are viewed and regulated, and how they view and regulate themselves) have impelled men to migrate, and women to either join their spouses later in the US or stay behind to tend the fields and perform other domestic tasks. This gender division of migration may itself reinforce or modify existing gender relations, and shape the socially and emotionally fraught migration process (see Box 2.7).

Levitt (2001) shows that men who migrate often have a higher status than those who do not, and women may consider them to be more marriageable. For the men who do not migrate, their masculinity is called into question (‘be a man’ and migrate), in part because of the gendered assumption that they should be able to support a family, which is difficult if they stay and remain on the farm in Mexico (Massey et al., 1987). Those who have documented status in the US are also commonly viewed as more masculine than those who have undocumented status, which may encourage lengthier migration stays and eventually settlement among Mexican men (Pessar and Mahler, 2003).
In contrast, Mexican women who migrate are often accused of upsetting community norms and expectations, though such norms can certainly change over time (e.g. Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994; Boehm, 2008, and see King et al., 2006 on return migration to Albania). However, the result is not simply that women stay behind and men migrate; rather, as Pessar and Mahler (2003) argue, Mexican women are gaining increasing independence.21 In that respect, some Mexican women have migrated to marry a (Mexican) man in the US in order to become wealthier, while others have migrated because they fear the infidelity of their husbands, or insist that their husbands return home. Many Mexican migrant women, on the other hand, are more eager to stay in the US, because although they encounter difficult conditions in the US (including what is

| Box 2.7  TRANSMATIONAL GENDER RELATIONS IN A PHONE CALL FROM EL SALVADOR? |

Mahler (2001) recounts the fascinating subject of phone calls between non-migrant wives in El Salvador and the Salvadoran men in the United States. Not only is there a problem of the limited number of phones available, but the phone company in El Salvador only allows expensive ‘collect calls’ to the US. If and when the wife of a migrant can reach their husband, they must plead them to accept the call. When they do, the husbands know how expensive a collect call can be and have every interest in keeping the calls very brief. The women, on the other hand, must reach out to their husbands emotionally in order to ask for more money to be sent home. This emotionally fraught situation points to the unequal relations between men who migrate and women who do not (see the discussion in Pessar and Mahler, 2003, p. 24).

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At the same time, many Mexican men do not choose to settle in the US, since for among other reasons, it is paradoxically also a threat to their masculinity as they ‘lose control’ over their wives and children in Mexico. Many prefer instead to maintain a farm back in Mexico and continue farming with their children in an environment where they can retain and even enhance their status as ‘men who migrated’, and therefore exercise more power over their family. Many Mexican migrant women, on the other hand, are more eager to stay in the US, because although they encounter difficult conditions in the US (including what is
often their first experience with wage labour), they also feel a sense of liberation in the US, from their husbands or other elements of gender oppression in Mexican society. In particular, they seem to have more freedom to voice their political wishes in the US than in hometown and other political associations in Mexico. In sum, the literature on gender and migration – at least from Mexico – suggests that the propensity for return migration is shaped by the gendered experiences and differential desires to stay in the country of destination amongst men and women (e.g. Goldring, 2001; Massey et al., 1987). However, the discussion of Mexican migration above is not meant to represent the nature of gender relations and their consequences for migration everywhere in the world, yet it does seem to involve elements that are present in many migrations around the globe (see e.g. King et al., 2006).

A third dimension is the belief that gender relations may be more equitable abroad. Here, the concern is with how the perception or imagination of gender relations in the countries of immigration shapes the propensity to migrate. This has shown to be the case for women in the Dominican Republic who see apparently happier women returning from the US and wish to do the same (Levitt, 2001). Yet their imaginations may also be disappointed if the reality of equality does not live up to their expectations, such as the case of many Asian, Latin American, and Middle Eastern women who migrate to Switzerland looking for a more equal relationship with a ‘western’ man (Riano and Baghdadi, 2007).

A fourth dimension involves the demand for women to work in what might be called the three Cs – caring, cleaning, and catering. This phenomenon occurs across Europe, North America, and especially in Asian countries such as Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore (e.g. Yeoh and Huang, 1998), but it is not by any means restricted to richer countries. The feminization of migration may be in part attributable to this increased demand for migrant women, in contrast to the mid-twentieth century when manufacturing jobs in the rich ‘western’ countries were stereotyped as ‘jobs for the boys’ (e.g. McDowell, 1991). And it is domestic workers in particular (those who care and clean, such as childminders, cleaners, live-in and live-out maids, nannies, and so forth.) that have received enormous – perhaps disproportionate – attention.22 The demand for ‘care work’ and care-workers is said to have increased over the last two decades because:
1) The governments of richer countries have reduced their role in caring services.

2) The average age of the population in wealthy countries has increased (the so-called ‘greying’ or ‘ageing’ of the population, especially in Europe).

3) The rise of dual earner couples, and the limits in the number of hours that men (but also women) can and/or are willing to spend on domestic responsibilities.

4) Fewer citizen workers are available and/or are willing to provide these services and/or are deemed to be too expensive relative to especially immigrant women.

5) The increase in the size of people’s homes over the last two decades, and an apparently growing concern about the appearance of homes (in other words, the desire to have immaculate ‘trophy’ or ‘showcase’ homes). This seems to be especially associated with at least the UK and the US (Anderson, 2001b).

In other countries, and Saudi Arabia in particular, the reasons for the high demand for domestic workers are not dissimilar but also unique: the movement of Saudi women from public to private sector employment, the recognition by the Saudi Arabian government that migrant domestic labour increases labour market flexibility through the ability to hire and fire migrant domestic women according to the political and economic whims of ‘Saudi society’, and the decreasing contribution of Saudi women to domestic labour all contribute to a high demand for domestic labour, especially from Indonesia (Silvey, 2004b). Yet the above reasons are exclusively demand-focused, and the migration of domestic workers is driven and supported by a lattice of labour export brokers and remittance agencies in the countries of origin, such as in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines. These agencies commonly provide would-be migrants with travel arrangements, appropriate visas, and sometimes a specific position within a family, and in the case of remittance agencies, the processing of large sums of money. These agencies may be formal or informal; they may provide genuine employment and opportunities for social mobility, or they may simply offer heinous working conditions in the countries of immigration (Parreñas, 2001, Silvey, 2004b).

Many of these domestic workers are undocumented, and this adds
another layer of explanation. Anderson (2001b) for example, suggests that it is not simply costs which explain why so many domestic workers are undocumented immigrants. Rather, it is the common practice of having to work some 12 hours a day in a hyper-productive ‘any job/always on’ condition. Furthermore, she adds that a ‘racial ideology’ persists insofar as middle-class (often ‘white’) women in the richer countries feel a sense of superiority by hiring women of colour from poorer countries. And this demand for undocumented female migrant domestic workers is likely to persist unless household wealth declines, unless people dramatically change their spending habits, unless there is a change in the household division of labour among men and women; unless public spending on public child care increases, unless stricter legislation on the use of undocumented migrant labour is enacted, or if labour-saving devices such as ‘household robots’ become more widespread (Samers, 2005).

Yet besides domestic workers, there is a considerable demand for doctors, nurses, office cleaners, sex (or sexual) workers, restaurant workers and other catering positions. Untangling the reasons for this demand is not easy, since to begin with all of these positions perform vastly different functions. The demand for doctors and nurses may relate to the purported decline in the state-financing of health care in the wealthier countries – what many have associated with ‘neo-liberalism’, and thus the demand for immigrant doctors and nurses remains buoyant as immigrants can be paid less to keep costs down (Raghuram and Kofman, 2002). But why do immigrant women ‘keep costs down’? Their legal status may be more precarious (even for doctors) because of gender-biased immigration policies and/or because of sexist hiring practices in other spheres of work, or because of limited employment opportunities and the feminized inflection of poverty in poorer countries. For all these reasons, women may ‘accept’ lower salaries or wages and poorer working conditions.

The demand for office cleaners and restaurant workers may be explained through other theories, such as the dual labour market or global city arguments, but these theories neglect gender too, and many of these jobs in services are stereotyped as ‘female’ by employers, or even by migrant women themselves. Together, this may restrict migrant women to certain types of jobs. In any case, many of the women recruited into such jobs are also undocumented immigrants as the pressure to keep wages low by price-competing employers and cost-conscious households encourages their hiring (Anderson, 2000a).
Structurationist approaches

The limitations of a purely structuralist analysis of migration, a scepticism concerning the usefulness of the ‘migration network’ idea, and the desire to break down the distinction between determinist and humanist approaches to understanding international migration, led some scholars of migration to turn to Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory (see e.g. Conway, 2007; Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Halfacree, 1995; Mountz and Wright, 1996). However, the paucity of studies that involve an explicit engagement with structuration theory is noticeable and may seem odd given that structuration seems to act as a compromise or middle way between structure and agency, but perhaps its abstract theoretical constructs require a precise transfer from theory to evidence, which many observers of migration may find difficult to undertake.

Nonetheless, one of the most faithful and prominent adoptions of a structurationist approach is that of Goss and Lindquist (1995). They believe that a ‘structurationist approach to migration’ is applicable to rural-to-urban or circular migration within particular countries, but they use international migration to illustrate the value of the approach. Recall from the Introduction to this book that Giddens views structure, not as, let us say, the ‘global capitalist system’, but as rules and resources, which human agents are knowledgeable about, and which they use to achieve certain aims, albeit through reflective practices (‘reflexive monitoring’). In this process, the rules and resources are both reproduced and transformed. As rules and resources are repeatedly mobilized and manipulated by human actors, whether by those who have fewer resources or those who have many, social practices develop over time into ‘institutions’ (or in Giddens’ term ‘sedimented social practices’). For Goss and Lindquist (1995) then, “what has previously been identified as migrant networks . . . [should] . . . be conceived as migrant institutions” (p. 335). These migrant institutions join the individual migrant to the overseas employer and the global economy more generally. There is, as they say, an “institutionalization of migration” (p. 336) and

An international migrant institution is a relatively permanent feature of social life that results from the regularization of social interaction for the purposes of overseas employment and which in turn regulate interaction and structures access to overseas employment through
the operation of institutional rules and resources. It is usually a complex institution consisting of knowledgeable individuals and the agents of organizations (from migrant associations to multinational corporations [MNCs] and other institutions (from kinship to the state). We offer this as an alternative to the somewhat idealistic concept of migrant networks developed under the systems and other integrative approaches.

Their argument that the idea of migrant networks is ‘idealistic’ stems presumably from their scepticism about the lack of attention to the operation of power in these networks. In other words, they see migrant networks as institutions which are rife with particular kinds of power relations, and which may not be beneficial to low income Filipinos in particular. Finally, in outlining their call for an analysis of the ‘migrant institution’, Goss and Lindquist do agree curiously that there is a ‘global economy’ out there, which cannot be controlled by these institutions, let alone the individual agents (migrants or otherwise) themselves. This suggests some affinity with a more standard reading of structuralism, and with the structuralist approach.

Even if few authors have rigidly mobilized Giddens’ precise structurationist schema, many recognize implicitly the significance of structures, institutions, and individual agency for explaining migration. This is reflected more recently in a ‘biographical approach’ to migration which might be better understood as a methodology, rather than a specific theory of migration. The ‘approach’ is qualitative, involving in-depth biographical or life histories and narratives which can be seen as part of a more widespread interest across the social sciences in the use of ‘ethnography’ – a methodology which entails close, daily, participant observation with research ‘subjects’ and is concerned as much with meaning as with explanation. It is therefore ‘methodologically individualist’ but unlike the earlier forms of methodological individualism; however, it is qualitative and often motivated by a desire to ‘de-stabilize metanarratives’ (Ní Laoire, 2007, 373), in other words, to question the value of more determinist, all-encompassing theories.

Boyle, Halfacree, and Robinson (1998) identify three dimensions of this methodology. First, migration is not to be viewed as a simple decision at a particular moment in time, such as comparing the utility of places.
Instead, these reasons also relate in some way to the migrant’s past and anticipated future. The reasons for moving are seen as being part of the migrant’s whole life – in their biography – and thus are unlikely to be appreciated fully just by asking blunt questions such as: Why did you move? Instead there is a need for in-depth qualitative work, enquiring around the subject and building-up a picture of the migration decision from a variety of angles, demonstrating how and where it fits into a person’s life.

(pp. 80–81)

Second, different migrations have unique yet varied causes, and it is the objective of the researcher to tease out the importance of different processes, reasons, emotions, and so on, which result in migration. The consequence of recounting these narratives leads to eclectic descriptions which may be as much about identity as behaviour, and it is therefore difficult to represent the decision-making of migrants. This difficulty of representation, however, may be a strength rather than a weakness of the methodology. Third, migration is embedded in cultural processes, and migration is therefore “a very cultural event” (p. 81, emphasis original). Biographical narratives therefore move beyond simply maximizing, satisfying or other formal models of decision-making.

ASSESSMENT OF THE APPROACHES

Explanations of migration may be better understood as originating from different political standpoints (or ‘situatedness’); they are devised of different philosophical foundations, different substantive foci (that is, they are designed in part to address only certain kinds of migration), different units of analysis and spatial assumptions. It is with these latter three elements (substantive focus, unit of analysis, and spatial assumptions) with which I am most concerned. In Table 2.1 below then, I illustrate the differences in the approaches we have discussed based on these three elements, but I also add which social scientists might be more associated with these approaches.

Which theory is most appropriate then? This is the time I suppose to deliver the ‘punch-line’ of the chapter, but I am afraid that I must stall for a little bit more. By now, some readers will have made up their own minds as to the most applicable of these approaches. This is fair enough.
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<th>Spatial assumptions</th>
<th>Likely scholars involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dual labour market/segmentation approach</td>
<td>Labour market demand in richer countries for migrant workers based on employer imperatives</td>
<td>‘Modern industrial societies’ and the ‘techno-productive structures’ of employers during post-WWII capitalism</td>
<td>Methodologically nationalist</td>
<td>Anthropologists, sociologists, and economic geographers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structuralist approaches (dependency theory, articulation of modes of production, World Systems theory)</td>
<td>Changes in the (global) capitalist system and its effects on migration</td>
<td>Capitalism and migration patterns/migrant groups divided by nationality, gender and ethnicity</td>
<td>Methodologically, nationalist, and regionalist</td>
<td>Across the social sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structuralist approaches (Globalization)</td>
<td>Effects of global flows, structural constraints and opportunities (innovations in transport and communications) on migration.</td>
<td>The global economy/global economic restructuring; transport and communications innovations</td>
<td>Interpenetrating scales (or territories) (e.g. supranational entities, nation-states, regions, localities)</td>
<td>Across the social sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structuralist approaches (Global cities)</td>
<td>Effects of the global economy on the development of large, economically dynamic and diverse cities</td>
<td>Global economy and ‘global cities’</td>
<td>Methodologically globalist and urbanist</td>
<td>Across the social scientists, but especially sociologists and human geographers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structuralist approaches (Neo-liberalism)</td>
<td>Changes in the (global capitalist system relating to ‘roll back’ and ‘roll forward’ neo-liberalism and its effects on migration</td>
<td>The global economy/global political and economic transformations, especially those detrimental to poorer countries</td>
<td>Methodologically global, but also interpenetrating scales</td>
<td>Across the social sciences, but especially anthropologists, sociologists, and human geographers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Structuralist approaches (migration-development nexus)</td>
<td>Relationship between countries and regions of immigration and emigration, especially the impact of remittances</td>
<td>Countries, regions, and locales of emigration and immigration, but focus on the countries of emigration</td>
<td>Predominantly methodologically nationalist, but diverse scales of analysis are used</td>
<td>Across the social sciences, but especially anthropologists, ‘development’ geographers, and ‘development’ sociologists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social (migrant) network theory</td>
<td>Migration through group, region or village, household, and individual behaviour</td>
<td>Networks of groups and individuals</td>
<td>Methodologically diverse, but emphasis on transnationalism, trans-localism, trans-urbanism, etc.</td>
<td>Across the social sciences, but especially anthropologists, human geographers, and sociologists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnationalism</td>
<td>Diverse cultural, economic, political, and social migrant or diasporic links which are global or cross-border in character</td>
<td>Diverse – diasporic networks, local communities (cities, towns, and other places) migrant and immigrant groups; households economic transactions</td>
<td>Diverse – transnational, trans-urban, trans-local, bi-local relations</td>
<td>Across the social sciences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued Overleaf)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory of migration</th>
<th>Substantive focus</th>
<th>Unit of analysis</th>
<th>Spatial assumptions</th>
<th>Likely scholars involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender approach</strong></td>
<td>Diverse, but focus on women migrants and gender relations; domestic labour and household relations</td>
<td>Individuals, households, groups; patriarchal structures</td>
<td>Methodologically pluralist (nation-states, regions, towns and villages)</td>
<td>Across the social sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structuration theory</strong></td>
<td>Potentially all forms of migration, but sparsely applied</td>
<td>Individuals, groups and institutions</td>
<td>No particular spatial assumptions</td>
<td>Across the social sciences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Some might insist that no single theory can explain all forms of migration across time and space, and this is fair enough too. Some may choose a more integrationist standpoint. This is laudable, and one that I would encourage. However, I would also caution the reader that some of the differences between these approaches mean they are downright incompatible. For example, it is difficult to combine structuralism, gender perspectives, network approaches, structuration, and biographical narratives, with a neo-classical perspective, when the former are clearly implicit or explicit critiques of a theory of migration based on individual economic rationality and push-pull factors.

At this point, I have chosen not to critique each and every theory systematically as I would not want to subject the reader to such a laborious undertaking (a task that has already been accomplished for most of these approaches in Massey et al., 1993, 1998, and Boyle et al., 1998 – see suggestions for further reading at the end of the chapter). Furthermore, and as I imply above, some of the differences between these approaches are enough to suggest the limitations of each other. However, I will spend a little bit more time criticizing the conventional view and comment very briefly on the strengths and weaknesses of subsequent approaches in order to move to that promised and now elusive theoretical punch-line.

To begin with, this book does not see some approaches as especially useful, particularly push-pull and neo-classical conceptions of migration. In terms of push-pull theories, let us return to the example of African migration to Washington DC (Wilson and Habecker, 2008). It is ironic that the Africans who choose to locate in that city mention the presence of international development institutions such as the World Bank as attractive, since it may be the policies of this very institution or similar institutions that are partially responsible for the migration of their more impoverished compatriots to European countries, as described for example in the opening pages of this book’s Introduction. It is a shame then that Wilson and Habecker (2008) never explore the possible connections between migration to the US, and US and European-dominated economic policies in Africa.

With respect to neo-classical conceptions, they are flawed on both micro and macro grounds. From a micro perspective, the neo-classical theory works with atomized (in other words isolated), ahistorical individuals who are ‘rational economic actors’ (homo economicus), and who
respond to real or expected earnings differentials. Certainly, the real or expected differences in employment and wages between countries or regions might explain some forms of migration at certain times, but it seems to be the case rather that migrants are more akin to ‘satisfycers’ than ‘utility maximizers’. That is, migrants, if it is indeed economics that motivates them, are more likely to emigrate if their living conditions are so dreadful that it is difficult to stay, rather than to a comparatively small wage differential and the precise possibility of employment. The psychological and financial costs of migration may outweigh any expected gains in wages. Migrants do not always move to a region or country where wages are the highest, nor do they move where the greatest employment possibilities exist (Massey et al. 1998), and indeed one might find the whole approach ludicrous for asylum-seekers, refugees, and those who are sexually trafficked.

From a macro perspective, the greatest number of migrants does not originate in the poorest countries and does not necessarily migrate to the richest. If that were the case, there would be large numbers of, let us say, Sudanese in Luxembourg. And the argument that migration leads to wage equalization between regions, or more absurdly between countries, is patently untrue. Wage equalization, if it happens, cannot be gauged simply in national terms, and much else, besides migration, might contribute to wage equalization (Massey et al., 1998).

Behaviouralist approaches have the advantage of focusing on ‘satisfying’ rather than ‘maximizing’ behaviour and the assumption that many migrants only leave when it becomes no longer possible to stay under ‘humane’ conditions (the notion of ‘stress’), a point that Douglas Massey and his colleagues (1998) recognized as a key element of migration at the end of the twentieth century. However, the initial literature tended to neglect the relationship between migration and the structures of the global capitalist system, or at least global political and economic forces. It also neglects the significance of gender relations, migration networks, immigration policies, and a more sophisticated understanding of ‘place utility’. For what exactly constitutes ‘place’ in this context? After all, the attraction of African migrants to Washington DC is a matter of inter-locking scales or territories: the territoriality which makes Washington attractive, and the territoriality which makes the US attractive more broadly.

If we turn to more critical or at least non-neo-classical approaches, each – with the exception of many structuralist and gender-sensitive studies – are also
guilty of neglecting the role of states when these theories are used in their ‘pure’ form. And each mobilizes often ill-defined and problematic spatial concepts. Beginning with the more determinist theories, so-called ‘new economics approaches’ were a welcome corrective to the methodological individualism and rationality of neo-classical approaches, and yes households, household budgets, and household decision-making matter, but households only rarely function as cohesively and rationally as the theory might suggest. To borrow a common psychological expression, the household acts like a dysfunctional family, or as Goss and Lindquist (1995) put it, households are not “unified strategic actors” (p.327). There is also a need to attend to how a more thorough and thoughtful conceptualization of places, scales, networks, and so forth can help us explore how families adopt different strategies, and how the outcomes of these strategies relate to particular spaces. De Haas (2006) accomplishes this to one extent or another in his study of the Todgha valley in Morocco (discussed earlier), but there is a need for more careful and explicit spatial thinking here.

The dual labour market hypothesis and related segmentation approaches are glaringly deficient because they focus completely on labour demand in the richer countries, and essentially neglect the countries of origin. In any case, there are not just two sectors within the world’s various labour markets, and workers fit within a much more complex spectrum of jobs. States figure little in its basic theoretical proposition, and the study of ‘space’ (beyond richer and poorer countries) is altogether absent.

In contrast, a broader structuralist approach might seem politically attractive because it points to fundamental spatial and class-based inequalities in (what is now the disputed idea of) a global capitalist system. It highlights a new phase of globalization or a new global political economy: structural adjustment, neo-liberalism and the veritable creation of migrations from poorer countries, but also richer ones. This globally induced migration also creates sub-national spaces in the form of ‘global cities’ which emerge as places with dramatic inequalities and labour market polarizations that create a demand for low and high income migration. Yet such Marxist-inspired analyses often lack an inadequate understanding of the role of states at different scales, and especially the role of immigration policy. They provide little room for human agency and the in-depth study of institutions, networks, families, and social axes of differentiation in different ‘places’ that would allow for a multi-scalar
and more nuanced appreciation of the different forms of migration within variegated spaces of origin, destination, and between.

Arguments that employ specifically the concept of ‘globalization’ also suffer from a hyperbole about the decline in transportation and communication costs and the ease of movement. The cheapening of these innovations may make it cheaper and easier for some to conquer physical distance at particular times, but not for others; they certainly do not spell the end of distance (compare Graham, 2002, and Doreen Massey, 2005). Thus, using globalization to explain (the growth of) all forms of migration would be inadequate and misleading (Samers, 2001). In fact, in the context of heightened security concerns since September 11, 2001, it may now be, generally speaking, more difficult than ever for low-income individuals to migrate to the richer countries especially without encountering enormous obstacles – literally walls and fences!

In terms of the more integrative theories, social (or migrant) network analysis has a number of strengths. First, it provides a critique of the determination by either structural forces or individual agency, and thus points to the relevance of structuration. It questions the importance of wage disparities between countries, and argues that the social networks formed between different migrant communities in the country of origin and destination matter more than wage inequality, for example. Second, concentrating on migrant networks allows us to see how such networks transcend territories, thus highlighting the porosity of apparently fixed scales. Third, it also offers the unique insight that because of social networks, pioneer migrants lower the cost and risks of migration for newer ones. Yet there is a danger in a strict focus on networks. It might give the impression that such networks reach across space without the impediment of borders, the vicissitudes of visa policies, the trickery of smuggling and trafficking agents, the cost of airline tickets, intra-family disputes, the prevalence of racism and intra-group suspicions fuelled by the problems and sometimes scarcity of low-paid work (e.g. Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Grzymala-Kazlowska, 2005; Gurak and Caces, 1992; Krissman, 2005).

Many transnational studies provide a richer understanding of space, identity, and their implications for migration, as they move beyond methodological nationalism and an exclusive focus on the region, city, town, and village in the country of emigration or immigration (methodological localism if you will). However, despite the countless books and papers which seek to complicate or re-theorize notions of space, from
'transnational spaces' to 'translocalism' and 'transnational fields', these concepts are still not satisfactory. Are certain migrant practices really reflecting a sense of transnationality or indeed translocalism, or something even more spatially plural? At the same time, are these practices reflecting social categories around class, gender, ethnicity and multiple ideas of nationhood even within the same 'nation-state', rather than just national or local belonging? A second problem is that transnational research recognizes the significance of states and immigration policies, yet these are generally not treated comprehensively. Third, the emphasis on social networks lends itself to a more celebratory understanding of migration, rather than on how immigration policies and the more deleterious forms of networks (trafficking, for example, and networks of elites) shape migrants’ lives in harmful ways. And fourth, as Castles and Miller (2009) point out, there is a question whether most migrants really live the transnational lives as described in some accounts.

From a different angle, the now abundant feminist and gender-sensitive literature on international migration has enormous value. It emphasizes how national gendered discourses, and gender relations and expectations in sub-national spaces and places, shape the propensity to emigrate and return. It underscores the importance of domestic labour in the wealthiest regions and cities of both richer and poorer countries as driving a demand for female labour because women are stereotyped in certain ways across different places and spaces. It does, however, risk neglecting the structural political and economic processes operating to configure migrant networks and gender relations itself. It may also ironically privilege the study of women over men and particularly economic sectors in which women are dominant numerically.

By this point, structuration theories might seem an attractive theoretical friend. After all, we may find comfort in choosing a ‘middle way’ proposition. That structures, institutions, and actors matter is no doubt appealing, and it is an approach which I support wholeheartedly. However, Goss and Lindquist (1995) seem to overemphasize how social networks solidify into institutions. Social networks do not always develop into institutions, formal or otherwise. This relatively minor criticism aside, that leaves us with biographical narratives. Here, critical researchers on migration return to the methodological individualism of earlier approaches, although the assumptions and the methods employed are vastly different. Problems arise, however, when biographical narratives
and ethnographic ‘data’ are to be interpreted. Here, theory should play its part; otherwise how do we make sense of migrants’ stories? How do we know which ‘data’ should be collected; what should be left out and what should be included when we recount these stories? And precisely with whom should we conduct research, and how does that affect our findings?

And now I suppose it is time for the punch-line. Perhaps not surprisingly then, I argue that a combined set of theories – with the exception of neo-classical and push-pull conceptualizations – is necessary. Structures, institutions (especially states), social networks, and social axes of differentiation along the lines of age, class, gender, and ethnicity matter to our understanding of migration. However, the idea of ‘structures’ raises a particularly thorny theoretical problem, and I want to devote a little bit of time to the defence of the relevance of structures. It is certainly less ‘fashionable’ now (and perhaps it is not simply a question of fashion) to talk of ‘structures’, primarily because they are associated with Marxist or world system-type analyses and ‘something’ ‘beyond us’, ‘out there’, often global in character which serve to disempower people. Instead, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, many critical migration researchers now prefer to talk of ‘elite networks’, migrant networks, migrant-based, and grassroots or community-oriented non-governmental organizations (NGOs). They also prefer to emphasize the importance of cultural, political, and social discourses, often through the concept of ‘governmentality’ (see Chapter 4) that shape migration. Such network and post-structuralist accounts are insightful and politically useful since it allows us to free ourselves from the potentially debilitating shackles of structures. Quite simply, if we do not conceive of structures as existing, then we can erase them from ever constraining migrant practices. This is fine, but there may be an ‘intellectual masquerade’ at work. Let me elaborate. Wealthy or other elites that exercise power over others through discourses or material practices used to be called up until, let us say, the 1970s and 1980s, part of the ‘class structure’ of capitalist societies. Since then, there have been enormous debates about the status of ‘class’ and ‘class structure’, at least in the richer countries (e.g. Lee and Turner, 1996), and now there is a common tendency to speak of ‘elite networks’ instead. As I said, this may be politically useful, but it can eclipse what Sklair (2001) calls the ‘transnational capitalist class’. We can certainly think of a ‘transnational capital class’ as a network (that is, a network of individuals associated with particular institutions and states who exercise
considerable power) but as a class as well with certain interests. The transnational capitalist classes exercise power over other networks (or classes), especially networks composed of migrants more disadvantaged than they are. As a transnational capitalist class, their existence is predicated on the existence of the less fortunate. To put it differently, certain networks may in fact be evidence of certain structures. In sum then, structures, institutions, and social networks should be part of a robust approach to migration. I say part of, because as it now has hopefully become clear, any approach to migration requires a discussion of ‘space’, and that is where we are headed in the next section.

Towards a spatial approach to migration

All research on migration is in a sense geographical, since it takes place somewhere, and all work in the social sciences on migration involves spatial categories (e.g. small towns, agricultural towns, cities, urban regions, rural regions, poor regions, rich regions, developed and underdeveloped countries, global north and global south, space, place, locale, social field, transnationalism, transnational social field, trans-local field, and so forth) (e.g. Silvey and Lawson, 1999). Much of this unfathomably large body of work on migration (and not necessarily immigration) fails to adequately define spatial concepts. When there is a genuine attempt to do so, it is remarkable how loosely spatial terms are used, sometimes with very little scrutiny or precision. Even ‘transnationalism’, which no doubt has enormous value, is, as I suggested earlier, either inadequate or flawed.

In the obsessive twenty-first century haze of looking for transnationalism, mobility and flows, the literature on transnationalism tends to neglect the effects of relative territorial fixity; in other words, territories are fixed for ‘moments’, not eternity, but in those ‘moments’ they have an effect on individuals, institutions, structures, and social networks, migrant or otherwise, and this relationship is reciprocal and ever changing. In short, territories and places of all kinds shape migrant behaviour because they have material effects; migrant behaviour shapes territories, because places are struggled over and migrants have material effects on these same territories. Perhaps the most obvious manifestations of this are international borders and immigration policies. Ironically, they are designed to have a deterrent effect on migration, but they have the perverse effect of stimulating undocumented migration for example, because ‘how else
are you going to get in’? The large movement of undocumented migrants and asylum-seekers, or those who overstay their tourist or student visas, may also drive worried governments to reinforce borders further. It is not just national territorialities that matter, however. The particular zoning requirements, specific tax regimes, and local ordinances against the presence or activities of undocumented immigrants and others who are deemed to be ‘out of place’ in municipalities also matter. Here I am thinking, for example, of the many ordinances in the US against either undocumented immigrants or the many informal locations where both legal and undocumented ‘day labourers’ gather to be hired for the day. This has the effect of dissuading further migrants to arrive in these towns, or to discourage those already there to settle. Similarly, in the Netherlands, the Mayor of Rotterdam proposed in 2003 to block any further migration to the city because of public fears of the city being overtaken by ‘culturally distant’ and needy immigrants (The Guardian, ‘Rotterdam plans to ban poor immigrants from moving in’, 2 December, 2003).

Territories do not need necessarily to be local, regional, national, and global but they can be, and they can also entail other hybrid or combinatorial territories which cannot be captured under the usual categories of local, national, and so forth (I have in mind here workplaces which have their own rules and regulations, but are also subject to national laws). Different processes might entail different territorialities, but such territories are porous and dynamic, not fixed, and are re-shaped by the actions of migrants themselves through a multitude of structures, social networks and institutions. An attention to multiple territorialities, scales, and places then, suggests a less spatially presumptuous approach which does not necessarily prioritize methodological transnationalism, localism, or whatever ‘ism’ is chosen over another. Territories matter but none are privileged beforehand. It is this conception which is required for any theory of migration, and which I hope the reader will take along to understand the subsequent chapters.

Conclusions

This chapter has reviewed and assessed a wide range of approaches that attempt to explain migration. As Massey et al. (1998) and Portes (2000) noted a decade ago, these theories cannot be adequately evaluated for their veracity, given that in the very least, the world-wide evidence is
simply not sufficient. This might make a long review of migration theory or approaches seem fruitless, tedious, or detached from the more rich ethnographic and narrative accounts of migration. This would be an unfortunate assessment. Such a review is absolutely essential, even for ethnographic research. That is, the approaches that I have explored in this chapter have illuminated different ‘ways of seeing’ migration. They require the employment of distinct methodologies when conducting research with migrants, and raise questions about precisely whose voices should be sought out, and ‘what to see’, that is, how to interpret (stories of) migration through the lens of certain spatial and social metaphors. Yet rather than leave the choice completely open to the reader, I have chosen instead to point readers to certain approaches over others.

In that sense, I have shown how tempting it is to explain migration through a set of ‘pushes’ and ‘pulls’. Yet migration is more than the summation of a balance sheet between a set of push and pull variables delineated by origin and destination countries. We need to move away from this sort of conceptualization, to one which connects the multitudes of ‘heres’ and ‘theres’ in more complex and interwoven ways. The term for this now, in at least human geography, is a ‘relational approach’. A more appropriate lens should involve the intersection of scales, territorialities, structures, institutions, social or migrant networks, and a critical engagement with social axes of differentiation such as age, class, gender, and ethnicity. This has the advantage of moving beyond the stubborn grip of methodological nationalism, but also the apparently more critical and progressive conception of transnationalism or trans-localism. This critical engagement captures a key ‘missing link’ in all of these theories, namely the role of states. This will be the subject of Chapter 4, but we shall leave that for a moment, in order to explore another dimension of the migration and immigration experience, the world of work. This is fitting since work and labour markets also figure in state discourses and policies concerning migration and immigration.

**FOR FURTHER READING**

In addition to the literature at the end of the Introduction to this book, the following texts provide very useful overviews of migration theories, and which also appear throughout this chapter:

SUMMARY QUESTIONS

1. Explain some of the limitations, but also the insights that we might gain from Ravenstein’s (1885) classic text.
2. What is wrong with push-pull and neo-classical economic theories of migration?
3. Discuss at least two variants of a structural approach to migration.
4. Explain some of the ways in which a gender-sensitive approach contributes to our understanding of migration.
5. What is meant by a structurationist approach to migration?
6. Discuss some of the ways in which ‘space’ should figure at the heart of any approach to migration.
3

GEOGRAPHIES OF MIGRATION AND WORK

INTRODUCTION

The scholar and writer Mike Davis (2006) paints an eye-opening and at times frightening picture of the ever-expanding city of Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates. Somehow invisible to most people who visit the gleaming new shopping malls, extraordinary mega-projects, and vertiginously high skyscrapers of Dubai, are its migrant workers, mainly from India and Pakistan, who have laboured as contract construction workers and constitute something to the tune of 25% of Dubai’s workforce. While the elite and the middle classes live out their more luxurious air-conditioned daily lives, many migrant workers toil 6 days a week, for 12 hours a day in the heat of this desert city. Racial or religious discrimination are common, as are the close watch of security guards and spies within the workforce. Employers sometimes disappear and never pay the required wages. Migrant workers live in squalid quarters, sometimes up to 12 people in a room. Working toilets and air conditioning are an unheard of luxury; in many cases, so is running water in remote desert camps from which workers are bussed to construction sites in the centre of Dubai. The term ‘contract-worker’ is employed, but this is little more than a euphemism. Passports are often confiscated at airports by recruitment agents; visas control their movements as they are tied to a particular employer. South Asian workers are said to be banned
from up-market shopping malls, golf courses, and expensive restaurants. The United Arab Emirates does not observe the International Labour Organizations’ labour regulations and has refused to be signatory to the International Migrant Workers convention. Human Rights Watch estimated that perhaps more than 800 people have lost their lives in construction work, covered up by the government and unreported by companies. Davis (2006) explains the government’s attitude towards its migrant workers:

Dubai’s police may turn a blind eye to illicit diamond and gold imports, prostitution rings, and shady characters who buy 25 villas at a time in cash, but they are diligent in deporting Pakistani workers who complain about being cheated out of their wages by unscrupulous contractors, or jailing Filipina maids for ‘adultery’ when they report being raped by their employers. To avoid the simmering volcano of Shiite unrest that so worries Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, Dubai and its UAE neighbours have favoured a non-Arab workforce drawn from western India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and the Philippines. But as Asian workers have become an increasingly restive majority, the UAE has reversed course and adopted a ‘cultural diversity policy’ – ‘we have been asked not to recruit any more Asians’, explained one contractor – and to reinforce control over the workforce by diluting the existing national concentrations with more Arab workers.

(p. 66)

Employers, however, have failed to find the citizen workers that are now required by the government. Citizens simply do not wish to work for the $100 to $150 a month that construction firms paid around 2005, and migrant workers have begun literally to riot against their low pay and poor working conditions. Yet Dubai continues to expand on the backs of their labour (Davis, 2006).

Dubai may be an egregious example of the use of migrant labour to build capitalism’s cathedrals, but migrant workers are central to the functioning of economies (see Table 3.1, which provides data on the number and percentage of ‘foreign workers’ in OECD countries). Harald Bauder (2005) sums this up concisely in the opening paragraph of his book:
Imagine if you will, that, on the same day, all migrants and immigrants decide to return to their countries of origin. The Filipina nanny would pack her bags and leave the family in Singapore whose children she has been raising. The suburban couple in San Diego would be without their Mexican gardener who worked for less than five dollars an hour. Italian farmers would find the fruit rotting on their trees because their cheap migrant workers left the orchard. New York’s manufacturing sector would collapse because a large portion of the workforce is absent. Worse, Wall Street would be closed because cleaners, security guards, office staff, and taxi drivers are unavailable. Many sectors of the economy in industrialized countries would come to an immediate standstill. The rest of the economy would follow within days, if not hours. Although not your typical doomsday scenario, this hypothetical example illustrates that our economy depends on the labour of often ‘invisible’ international migrants.

How and in what ways do migrants become integrated into the economic activity of other countries? To begin with, we must distinguish between explaining migration and explaining labour migration. As we learned in the Introduction to this book and the previous chapter, people migrate for innumerable reasons. If people migrate specifically for work purposes, this may involve at least four channels. First, either people decide to migrate for work because they expect ‘better’ employment conditions, including higher wages, and these expectations are shaped by various media (TV, radio, the Internet, newspapers, and so forth) which announce work in particular countries, regions, cities, or towns. Second, people migrate because friends, relatives, and acquaintances alert them to work overseas, and offer the necessary accommodation and food while the migrant ‘finds their feet’ and lands that expected or promised job. Third, people may emigrate simply because an employer recruits them directly, often with the help of friends and relatives, private labour agents, or the governments in the countries of origin. The latter establish labour recruitment or ‘labour export’ agencies to organize the large-scale movement of workers. This is the case especially with the Philippine and Indonesian governments for construction workers and nurses, but also for a range of jobs across the occupational spectrum. In the case of
Table 3.1 Foreign and foreign-born labour force in selected OECD countries, 1999 and 2005 (in thousands and percentages)

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<td>610</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>413</td>
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<td>562</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>385</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<td>173</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>97</td>
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<td>1,379</td>
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<td>8.6</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from OECD/SOPEMI (2006: 50 and 2007: 63)

Notes:

(1) Data varies in terms of its source (e.g. Labour Force Survey, Census, etc.) and for some countries such as Canada and Finland the data for 2000 is actually from 2001 and 1999 respectively

(2) Data for Greece includes those workers who entered Greece on a work visa

(3) This includes legal, foreign residents with only short-term permission to work, but not permanent or long-term residents

(4) Illegal ‘overstayers’ are included

(5) For 1999, this includes resident workers, but not cross-border workers

(6) Data only covers those countries which supply information on the percentage of foreign-born and foreign workers
highly-skilled immigrants, this is often accomplished through private firms or public organizations such as national health services in European countries. Fourth and related to all of the above, migrants may be recruited illegally, often trafficked, and this occurs even among highly-skilled immigrants who are fleeing their countries for a variety of reasons. They may ultimately claim asylum, or they may not and remain undocumented. In both cases, they often end up doing low-paid work.

The purpose in this chapter, however, is less to describe and explain labour migration and more to illustrate how and why migrants are found in certain types of economic activities and employment, and how and why they experience the working conditions they do. This is the subject of the remainder of the chapter, and it proceeds as follows. First, in order to explore the working practices and experiences of migrant workers, I begin by revisiting some theories that attempt to explain the outcomes of migrants within labour markets. Two broad competing perspectives stand out: human capital theory and labour market segmentation theory. After reviewing and critiquing both, I move on to what I call ‘international labour market segmentation theory’, using that as a guide to understand both the outcomes and experiences of migrant workers throughout the world.

UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MIGRANTS AND WORK

The conventional view (human capital theory and its limitations)

A dominant theory in the analysis of employment is human capital theory (abbreviated from this point onwards as HCT), which owes its popularity to the work of the economist Gary Becker (1964), and continues to be the principle theory used by economists, some economic geographers and sociologists of immigration, and many policy-makers around the world. HCT proclaims that labour market outcomes (or how people perform in the labour market in terms of their salary or wages, that is, the ‘price of their labour’) are the result of the combination of what an individual – for our purposes here a migrant – brings to the labour market. This might involve a person’s skills, educational qualifications, and abilities, and/or their rational choices concerning a mix of
status, job conditions, and earnings. Thus, economists say that the price of a person’s labour is the result of investments into one’s human capital.

There is certainly evidence to support the theory, and HCT studies have also evolved from the more crude analyses of earlier decades, and now use and incorporate numerous ‘control variables’ to show how human capital changes over time, and how age, changing immigration policies, disability status, citizenship status, gender, national and ethnic background, ‘race’, and other characteristics beyond just one’s skills and qualifications matter for a migrant’s prospects in labour markets (e.g. Kogan, 2004 on Germany; Portes and Rumbaut, 2006 on the US). There is a huge and varied literature here, sometimes with consistent but also complex results for different national groups and different countries. I will not, however, review these studies here. In any case, some scholars have also tried to bridge human capital with the more critical approach of labour market segmentation (Kogan, 2004; Mumford and Smith, 2004; Sousa-Poza, 2004). Likewise, urban and economic geographers have produced very sophisticated analyses by studying the relationship between human capital, social capital, elements of social reproduction including housing and residential location, and ‘employment niching’ (why immigrants concentrate in particular industries). They have examined this relationship within and across cities and metropolitan regions to explain the socio-spatial division of labour, that is, labour market outcomes (e.g. Mattingly, 1999; Wright and Ellis, 2000a; Ellis, Wright, and Parks, 2007). Ellis, Wright, and Parks (2007) argue that – numerous exceptions aside – the residential location of immigrants matter to the concentration of immigrants in particular jobs, or to put it in their words, spatial accessibility to jobs may be as significant as social access to jobs. Their findings that the local geographies of home and work are important to understanding the fine-grained intra-metropolitan socio-spatial division of labour suggest connections between the nature of capitalist production and social reproduction – a connection which we will return to later.

These instances of a more nuanced human capital theory aside, the bulk of human capital research suffers from at least four chief problems. First, many HCT studies rely on an oversimplification of migrant experiences and characteristics (such as ‘holding English skills constant’
or other questionable assumptions about the homogenous character of immigrant groups). Second, and with respect to the assumptions of homogeneity, human capital theorists are guilty of ‘naturalizing’ social distinctions that occur in both labour markets and the wider society in which these labour markets operate (Hanson and Pratt, 1991). For instance, it has not been uncommon in some French labour market statistics to use the categories of ‘North Africans’ and ‘Black Africans’, and the 2007 annual report on migration published by the OECD now uses a North Africa/West Africa split, which is hardly an improvement. The significance of this regional split for employment outcomes is unclear and should not be assumed from the outset. These apparently ‘natural’ distinctions do not stop at national or ethnic assumptions of homogeneity, however; HCT studies also assume that the legal categories of migrants remain constant while they are employed, when in fact their hiring may change their migration status. In Italy for example, employment or the lack of employment have plunged migrants into an endless and bizarre cycle of legality and illegality, as government ‘regularization schemes’ which provide legal residential status to migrants are subject to the vicissitudes of having formal employment on a continual basis (Reyneri, 2001; Schuster, 2005). Gender too is taken at face value, rather than acknowledging that gender is actually ‘produced’ in the process of employment. For example, in the US, Filipina and Latina women have been hired as domestic labour or nurses in part because these jobs are seen as ‘women’s jobs’, which then reinforces the connection between domestic labour and the perception of women as ‘carers’ (e.g. Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2002).

Since many human capital theorists and countless employers assume that men, women, particular nationalities, undocumented immigrants and so forth have certain common characteristics, it is therefore not surprising that labour market outcomes are evaluated after scholars or even employers have already divided them in the data. Aside from the French example cited above, this is standard practice in many HCT studies of labour market performance around the globe. In short, HCT is not concerned with how employers construct or re-construct migrant worker identities and their position within labour market hierarchies.

There is a strange irony here though. The decision of employers to channel their workers into particular jobs is often based on prevailing
stereotypes (perceptions of difference based on let us say nationality, ethnicity, and gender) or on the basis of their bodily and behavioural performances in particular settings (manner of dress, etc). This can have the effect of reinforcing group identities, and it raises a very tricky problem: if group identities and practices are reinforced, then are these group identities not ‘real’ because they are socially constructed as such by employers? If they are indeed ‘real’, then to work with data based on national distinctions for example, as human capital theory does, is quite legitimate. Possibly, but this also denies any within-group differences and the multiple identities of workers (McDowell, Batnitzky, and Dyer, 2007). And it simply freezes group identities and practices, both on paper (in HCT) and in the heads of employers. It therefore contributes to racial and cultural stereotypes.

A third problem with human capital theory in the context of immigration seems to be its failure to address explicitly the issue of ‘socio-professional downgrading’ (Reyneri, 2001) or ‘the devaluation of immigrant labour’ (Bauder, 2005). That is, while some migrants arrive with high levels of education, and/or a range of skills and qualifications, their education, skills, and other qualifications are not recognized among employers in the receiving countries, so migrants cannot easily transfer their foreign credentials to work in such sectors as architecture, engineering, law, and medicine (Bauder, 2005; Raghuram and Kofman, 2002). For example, Raghuram and Kofman (2002) show how doctors from India become under-qualified to work in the UK and are required to take costly and time-consuming exams for an elusive and unstable position in the British National Health Service. More generally, it is common across the wealthier countries for doctors to become hospital workers, electronic engineers to become electricians, and highly educated political activists fleeing persecution to claim asylum and work in low-paid service work, or remain unemployed. In fact, many migrants and asylum-seekers are formally educated to the post-secondary level. Human capital often describes these ‘poor returns to human capital’ among migrants in terms of an ‘immigrant wage penalty’ (Kogan, 2004) – a deviation from the model of potentially perfect returns, rather than as a pervasive element of labour markets created by government policies and employer decisions. In short, we can argue that there is no one-to-one correspondence between labour market outcomes and one’s education,
qualification, and skills. A fourth problem with human capital theory in the context of immigration is that it is preoccupied with the socio-economic mobility of migrants (that is, an improvement in their labour market outcomes) rather than with the conditions under which migrants must scrape a living.

The beginnings of an alternative view: the dual labour market hypothesis as an initial version of labour market segmentation theory

We will recall from Chapter 2 that the Dual labour market hypothesis claims there are two sectors in the labour markets of ‘modern industrial societies’, a primary sector with more favorable working conditions, higher pay, more stable positions, and possibilities for promotion, and a secondary sector composed of jobs with poorer working conditions, lower pay, less stable positions, and little possibility of promotion (‘promotion blockages’). Migrants were argued to be mainly involved in this secondary sector because of the nature of industrial production at the time, and the unwillingness of citizen workers to accept these positions.

This is both an elegant understanding of labour markets and of migration. It is, however, quite flawed and incomplete. First, it focuses entirely on the demand for labour generated by employers. It says very little about the role of the state and other institutions and says almost nothing about the social reproduction of workers. Second, its conception of only two sectors in labour markets is hopelessly simplistic, despite the sense that richer countries are increasingly composed of the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. In the same vein, manufacturing (the ‘industry’ in modern industrial societies) has declined significantly so that manufacturing in many richer countries employs less than about 25% of all workers in most of the wealthier countries of the European Union, North America, and some Asian countries such as Hong Kong and Singapore. Calling such countries ‘modern industrial societies’ then, bears some critical thought, and begs the question to what extent (if at all) Piore’s (1979) analysis is relevant to societies where service-oriented employment is numerically dominant. Third, many supposedly secondary jobs are actually quite stable, while many supposedly primary jobs involve fixed-term projects. Fourth, Piore completely ignored
both informal employment and immigrant entrepreneurship, though this is not surprising since they had faded from the academic radar at the time he completed his book. In short, Piore’s analysis had its own limitations at that time, and these limitations and others linger in the twenty-first century. Fifth, Piore employed a crude notion of citizenship (one is either a native or foreign worker) and he neglected how job segmentation involved assumption on the part of employers for certain ‘embodied performances’ (more on this a little bit later in the chapter).

These criticisms point us towards some revisions of his analysis, and using the insights from the social (migrant) network perspective and that of labour market segmentation theory, we will move ahead to the concept of labour market segmentation.

Beyond the dual labour market: labour market segmentation theory

Reich, Gordon, and Edwards (1973) developed the concept of ‘segmentation’ to describe how different rules of operation within firms governed different ‘cells’ (a segment or a grouping of job positions) within labour markets. These different segments would have different rates of pay, unique working conditions, possibilities for promotion, and so forth. Reich et al. argued that workers were slotted into certain segments partly based on their education, qualifications, language and other skills, as well as assumptions about their suitability for work and productivity based on the colour of their skin, their nationality, their gender, and other ascribed characteristics. This can involve ‘positive’ stereotyping when a certain group of workers is deemed very employable for more highly-paid positions, but also negative stereotyping (prejudice) whereby a certain group is segmented into poorly paid positions with difficult working conditions (Waldinger and Lichter, 2003). What is now known as labour market segmentation theory arose as a reaction to the limitations of both dual labour market theory and HCT. Peck (1996) added to this body of theory, and argued that labour market segmentation could be explained by ‘production imperatives’ (the demand for labour that is created by particular production requirements), forces of regulation (the varied forms of regulation that surround migrant workers from urban policies to
immigration regulations at an international level), and ‘processes of social reproduction’ (the role of families, housing, remittances, and so on in making migrants available for work). These combined processes were said to be shaped by particular places or ‘locally constituted’ in Peck’s words. With its emphasis on ‘space’, and in this case the ‘local’ character of labour market segmentation, his contribution is a considerable improvement on previous approaches, but he neglects the international dimension of labour markets, and I will return to this problem in a subsequent section. Before I do this, however, I will need to say more about how labour markets and migration intersect.

Variations on labour market segmentation theory: cultural capital, cultural judgments and embodiment in place

Harald Bauder (2005) uses the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s work to show how ‘cultural judgments’ and processes of ‘distinction’ on the part of employers, and ‘corporeal (or bodily) performances’ and one’s ‘embodied cultural capital’ on the part of workers, intersect to produce particular labour market outcomes for migrants in Vancouver and on the farms of south central Ontario. Segmentation involves more than just stereotyping and employers have a specific set of traits they see as desirable for a given job or job situation. Such bodily performances are necessary to obtain or maintain a job, and immigrants must ‘play by the rules’ and ‘look and dress the part’ (e.g. Bauder, 2005; McDowell et al., 2007; Waldinger and Lichter, 2003). Those who do not are deemed to lack ‘cultural competence’, and risk unemployment or less desirable jobs.

Some workers have this requisite ‘cultural capital’ and others do not, and the ‘cultural judgments’ on the part of employers are rooted in notions of class, ethnicity, gender and citizenship, which serve to separate or distinguish employers (often ‘white’ Canadians) from racialized non-Canadian others. However, Bauder (2005) is careful to warn that ‘embodied cultural capital’ is not something that workers just bring to the labour market. Rather, it is the question of the interplay of employers’ expectations and worker’s performances in specific spatial contexts (i.e. ‘spatial contingency’). This spatial contingency might involve a city, a neighbourhood, a firm, an NGO, a school, or a café. In Vancouver, he shows how many migrants of South Asian origin who apply for jobs are not accepted either because of their accent,
their dress, or even the smell of their bodies. For example, Bauder recounts how one woman of South Asian origin could not obtain a salaried library job in Vancouver, as library organizations claimed that patrons were unlikely to understand her accent if she had to speak English over the phone. And yet, she had already worked as a librarian in New York and in India’s Supreme Court Library where she spoke daily with many English-speaking foreigners. In other economic activities, however, one’s accent may be largely irrelevant. For example, Bauder tells us that some South Asians who apparently have poor grammatical and pronunciation skills are not excluded from working as taxi drivers in Vancouver. In fact, Bauder points out insightfully that in certain circumstances, a migrant’s distinctive clothing may be an advantage. Here he refers to Sikhs in Vancouver, many of whom work in the security business. The turban that Sikhs wear has now become a symbol of reliability and integrity, rather than a symbol of cultural oddity. Thus, if particular immigrants are concentrated in a particular industry with specific cultural practices, then the expectations of consumers change. As Bauder (2005) writes humorously:

To use a hypothetical example, if ethnic networks channelled large numbers of traditional, lederhosen-wearing southern German men into the pizza-delivery business, then wearing lederhosen might become a legitimate practice in this occupation. If this group dominates the occupation, lederhosen may even become a trademark of the occupation which customers learn to expect from the delivery personnel. What this silly example illustrates is that the concentration of an immigrant group in a given occupation affects the corporeal conventions that dominate in that occupation.

(p. 46)

Similarly, McDowell et al. (2007) show that in a major executive-oriented hotel in West London, legal migrants are selected for their embodied characteristics (smile, dress, and appearance, ways of relating to customers, language ability, and also skin colour). Yet employers associate some embodied characteristics with stereotypical views about employees based on their national origins: for example, ‘he or she is Indian so they must be pleasant, well-groomed and helpful’. We can conjecture that such traits are deemed necessary in the service environ-
ment of similar expensive hotels around the world. In short, embodied cultural capital is spatially contingent; that is, some forms of ‘cultural capital’ and ‘corporeal performances’ matter in some places and not others. Furthermore, hiring practices are not simply the result of ‘negative prejudice’. In fact, in the ‘super-diverse’ (Vertovec, 2007) cities of Canada, the US, and Europe, where the employers may not be citizens, and/or of the dominant ethnicity, the issue of segmentation becomes more complex than prejudice between ‘white’ employers and ‘black’ or ‘brown’ employees. Furthermore, Waldinger and Lichter (2003) argue in their study of employers in Los Angeles that depending upon the job (especially if it is perceived to be a ‘tough job’ by employers), employers may prefer to hire Latino migrants over African-American citizens, because employers believe Latino migrants to be ‘harder-working’ and more deferent (Waldinger and Lichter, 2003).

In contrast to the West London Hotel that McDowell et al. (2007) studied, hiring practices are shaped by whether migrants are perceived to be subservient workers, particularly at the low end of the employment spectrum where working conditions are tough and employers assume they will encounter resistance. Employers hardly wish to hire employees who might ‘give a lot of lip’ (Waldinger and Lichter, 2003). For example, if an employer has hired an employee from Guatemala who is deferent to the boss, then they may hire the employee’s sister who may also be perceived to be deferent, and the employer does not have to spend too much money looking for another worker. This brings us to the question of migrant networks, which I explore below.

Variations on labour market segmentation theory: diversity and social networks in the wealthier countries

The complexity of segmentation has generated two distinctive theories of how migrants end up in certain jobs: those who perceive that firms and organizations segment migrant workers along discriminatory lines (the labour market or labour market segmentation literature); and those who privilege migrant networks as shaping hiring practices (the migration literature). Let me discuss the second of these – the migration approach.

In their study of the Los Angeles metropolitan area, Waldinger and Lichter (2003) argue that employers do not simply advertise jobs and hope workers will show up at the door, although that is still common. Rather,
'social capital' in the form of social networks plays a role in allocating workers to certain jobs. Employers rely on social networks among migrants to recruit other migrant workers, particularly for jobs that are shunned by local citizens. Recruitment of migrants at the bottom end of the labour market where proficiency in the dominant language is often not required is facilitated by the gravitation of migrants with poor language skills to such jobs. However, in terms of being chosen by an employer for a job, their lack of fluency in the dominant knowledge – let us say English – may not always be a disadvantage, especially if all the other workers with which they are likely to interact also speak a language other than English. Language requirements are a function of the nature of the job, including how the worker is likely to interact with others inside and outside the firm or organization. For example, if the majority of the customers are Arabic, Spanish, or Urdu-speaking, would it make sense to hire a person who could only speak English? What happens if most of the workers do not speak English but the customers do? In this case, some workers may need to be bi- or multi-lingual, including in the dominant language. This is required if workers and/or customers are of diverse backgrounds and communication is facilitated with the knowledge of several languages. For example, this appears to be the case in many hospitals in the Los Angeles region.

When migrants end up dominating in a hospital in Los Angeles or anywhere else, and in any other industry or occupation, it may “allow a linguistic minority to establish monopoly control over a set of jobs and, when the characteristics of the job permit, to use language to exclude those who only speak another tongue” (Waldinger and Lichter, 2003, 78). Migrant networks and job searches can thus lead to ‘social closure’ where certain sectors are dominated by certain nationalities or ethnicities, as well as by men or by women. This can lead to both employment (or ethnic) niches and ‘ethnic economies’. What is the difference between these two terms?

Employment niches “are economic sectors . . . where group members are disproportionately represented in the labour force, either in public sector jobs or in private businesses that are typically owned and managed by whites or members of another ethnic group” (Logan, Alba, and Stults, 2003, 346). ‘Ethnic economies’ (Bonacich and Modell, 1980) involve the self-employed and their co-ethnic employees; they are economies that are spatially dispersed across cities, regions, and countries, but whose
networks of interactions are specifically ‘ethnic’ in character (their ethnic character may be defined by a researcher, or self-defined by migrants themselves, and it commonly involves only a single ‘ethnicity’) (Light et al., 1994). Such ethnic economies could therefore be transnational or more translocal in character, more formal or informal. Light, Bernard, and Kim (1999) draw a further distinction between ethnic economies and immigrant economies; in the latter, immigrant entrepreneurs hire other immigrants, but not co-ethnics, such as Korean entrepreneurs hiring Mexicans and Ecuadorians in New York’s Garment industry (Kim, 1999). Note that the ethnic or immigrant economy idea involves both the self-employed (entrepreneurs) and their employees (or workers). The main thrust of the discussion here though, will not be about entrepreneurship (see Box 3.1), so as to focus on the question of low-wage labour in and outside ethnic/immigrant economies, whether they have a particular localized geography to them (that is, ethnic enclaves) or not.

**Box 3.1 ETHNIC OR IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURSHIP?**

Self-employed entrepreneurs and their businesses account for a substantial amount of the employment of migrant wage-earners. Data from the OECD/SOPEMI (2007b) suggest that the percentage of self-employment in total foreign-born employment in wealthier countries for 2005 hovered anywhere from 7.5% in Austria to 14.2% in Portugal. The importance of self-employed entrepreneurs to migrant livelihoods is often missed by much of the literature on migration and labour markets. Rates of entrepreneurship vary by country, region, nationality, gender, and so forth. One of the neglected questions of the entire ‘ethnic entrepreneurship’ literature is whether the entrepreneurs and firms involved are actually different from the firms owned and run by citizens and/or those of the dominant ethnicity (Light, 2005). The answer is not entirely clear.

Questioning the significance of ethnicity to entrepreneurship then, a group of scholars based in the Netherlands now use the continued
term ‘immigrant entrepreneurship’ to denote how the issue of citizenship in particular shapes the fortunes of non-citizen entrepreneurs (Kloosterman, Van der Leun, and Rath, 1999; Rath and Kloosterman, 2000). This has much logic; after all, we are all ‘ethnic’ (Samers, 1998a), and there is no reason to assume beforehand that businesses owned by citizens are any ‘less ethnic’, or that ethnically-specific social networks (social capital) support either citizen or immigrant businesses. This does, however, ignore the long-established problem of racism in the wider labour market and the obstacles that immigrants and ethnic minorities face in not being of the dominant ethnicity (‘labour market disadvantage’) as well as having fewer resources (‘resource disadvantage’). Thus, migrants who face both labour market disadvantage and resource disadvantage suffer from ‘double disadvantage’ and are more likely to establish a more informal than formal business. From this perspective, ethnic entrepreneurship seems to be quite the correct term. For those migrants who do not suffer from either of these, they are more likely to establish formal businesses (Light, 2005), and what may distinguish them is only their citizenship. From this perspective, immigrant entrepreneurship seems the correct term.

In the US literature, ‘interactionism’ has been the preferred conceptualization of immigrant/ethnic entrepreneurship, which refers to the relationship between the self-employed and their customers in an ethnic economy or ethnic enclave (Light, 2005). This perspective persisted until Kloosterman, van der Leun, and Rath (1999) – writing in the context of the Netherlands – argued that the issue of regulation has been neglected by American scholars, in part because the European regulation of entrepreneurs and business in general is more stringent than in the US (Light, 2005). The result is that Turkish bakers or butchers in Amsterdam, for example, will evade a whole range of regulations, and immigrant entrepreneurship in the Netherlands therefore exists along a continuum of the formal and informal. Given then the extent of regulation of small firms in European countries, Kloosterman et al. (1999) developed the idea of ‘mixed embeddedness’, by which they meant ‘the crucial interplay between the social, economic, and institutional
Complicating labour market segmentation theory further: ethnic/immigrant enclaves and ethnic/immigrant dispersal

Thus far, we have said very little about the geography of labour markets and migration. Both geographers and sociologists have contributed enormously to showing how ‘space’ and ‘place’ matter for the labour market outcomes of migrants. In this section, we will explore briefly three prominent spatial phenomena which might have a distinct effect on migrant workers: ethnic enclaves, ethnoburbs, and the general process of geographical dispersal.1 The point of such a discussion is to highlight two issues. First, that stereotypes and expectations of migrants may be different in areas where the majority or at least a large proportion of the employers and employees are migrants than when the local labour market is dominated by ‘white’ and/or citizen employers. Second, that the migrant networks involved in hiring may also be different in certain areas dominated by migrant employers and employees. This does not mean that the concept of labour market segmentation is invalid in ‘ethnic enclaves’, only different.

**Ethnic/immigrant enclaves**

Continuing in the vein of the Chicago School of the 1920s and 1930s, sociologists resumed their study of the spatial manifestation of ethnic/immigrant enclave economies in the 1980s. This literature assumed added importance in the context of industrial decline in the richer countries as the supply of industrial jobs withered for migrants. In fact, racism
in the wider labour markets of the countries of immigration, the lack of employment opportunities as a consequence, and the possibilities for higher income elsewhere are among the primary reasons that drive immigrants to either find work in ‘enclaves’ or entrepreneurial (self-employment) niches (Logan, Alba, and Stults, 2003).

Wilson and Portes (1980) were the first to speak of the ‘immigrant enclave’ – a spatial concept involving the relationship between the self-employed or entrepreneurs and their co-ethnic employees, although the emphasis remained on employees. Whether or not the customers were citizens or immigrants did not matter in their original formulation. The concept of immigrant and later ‘ethnic enclave economy’ has been stretched in a number of different directions (Light et al., 1994), including the incorporation of co-ethnic residence within the enclave (Sanders and Nee, 1987, 1992). A debate ensued on the pages of the American Sociological Review (1987) about what exactly constituted an ethnic enclave economy, and as Light et al. (1994) quipped, the term has become something a ‘rubber yardstick’ (p. 69). In any case, what came to be called the ‘ethnic enclave hypothesis’ generated a number of debates. First, a question emerged over whether wages were higher among employees in the ‘ethnic enclave’ than they were for co-ethnics in the ‘general labour market’ (the issue of ‘relative wages’) and to what degree, the self-employed and employers rather than employees were responsible for some of this difference (Sanders and Nee, 1987). This rested on three propositions: first, that employers in the enclave benefit from a co-ethnic labour force by trading training for loyalty and low labour costs (Bailey and Waldinger, 1991); second, that migrants could find jobs in the ethnic enclave, despite their labour market weaknesses (e.g. language); and third, that those with skill would not suffer from socio-professional downgrading – they would find work more suitable to their skill level, and earn more (Wilson and Portes, 1980). The overall evidence for the benefits of the ethnic enclave for employers and employees in terms of income seem to be inconclusive, and as Logan et al. (2003) write “The ethnic strategy is not a magic bullet, but neither is it a poison pill” (p. 381).

A second and parallel debate emerged over whether migrants were ‘trapped’ in the ethnic enclave economy which inhibited their ‘acculturation’ and socio-economic mobility (Bonacich and Modell, 1980). A third debate concerned the question of social reproduction. For example, in her widely received book Chinatown (1992), Zhou notes how Chinese
employers allowed Chinese women to take care of their own children at work. This was unlikely to be permissible outside the ‘ethnic enclave’ of Chinatown, and thus employment for Chinese women in the wider labour market would not be possible.

Ethnoburbs, heterolocalism, and geographical dispersal: implications for migration and work

Migrants, however, do not reside exclusively in enclaves. Yes, they may be concentrated disproportionately in the world’s ‘global cities’ (e.g. Sassen, 2006a) or other large urban areas, but they are not only confined to the city limits or even cities. In this regard, Li (1998a, 1998b) coined the term ‘ethnoburb’ in order to underline the emergent suburban clusters of residential areas and business districts with a dominant, but not exclusive ethnic group, such as those of Chinese immigrants in Orange County outside Los Angeles. As Hardwick (2008) summarizes for the US: “new incoming groups of immigrants are just as likely to settle in the suburbs upon their arrival in the United States as they are to reside in downtown neighbourhoods” (p. 164). The same may be true for any number of cities in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and continental Europe. For example, Johnston et al. (2008) find evidence for ethnoburbs and immigrant dispersal among ‘Asians’ and ‘Pacific Islanders’ living in New Zealand’s cities. The idea of ethnoburbs, however, refers only to a late-twentieth-century intra-metropolitan phenomenon in the wealthy countries, and a more general process of dispersal in the wealthy countries might be captured by the term ‘heterolocalism’.

Situating their analysis in the context of ‘globalization’ and in contrast to the Chicago School of Urban Sociology, Zelinsky and Lee (1998) coined the term ‘heterolocalism’ to refer to the dispersal of migrants in the late twentieth century from central cities to suburban or non-metropolitan areas based on declining transport and communication costs (see Figure 3.1).

According to these authors, businesses and residential spaces no longer need to exist in spatial proximity with each other because of these declining transport and communication costs. Migrants can maintain contacts across physical distances, not only on a ‘metropolitan scale’, but internationally as well.

Yet dispersal might take place for many other reasons (to join family,
co-ethnics, temporary and contract labour migration programmes, etc.), and it may involve particular kinds of migrants and nationalities over others (Liaw and Frey, 2007). Light (2004) offers a novel argument that involves the intersection of undocumented immigration and informal employment in ‘giant cities’ around the world. He identifies a process of settlement whereby the number of migrants exceeds the number of jobs (migration saturation), a ‘buffer’ of informal economic activity expands in order to meet the demand by migrants for work (what he calls buffer expansion). This buffer itself reaches some sort of saturation (buffer saturation), and then migrants leave a particular city for less expensive housing, higher wages and a police force more tolerant of poverty. Some of what Light identifies is visible in a migration from New York City to the city of Reading in eastern Pennsylvania. Many Dominicans have moved out of costly New York City to the much cheaper, deindustrialized

Figure 3.1 ‘Water, electricity and gas included’: ‘for rent’ signs in Spanish on the east side of Lexington, Kentucky in the US. Mexican immigrants and those of Central American origin more generally, have settled in cities and towns well beyond America’s ‘global cities’

Photo © Michael Samers
city of Reading to take up jobs in chicken processing plants (a newer industry), hotels and restaurants (New York Times, October 29, 2006). As the case of this ‘secondary migration’ to Reading also suggests, the availability of decent work is not the only element that attracts migrants; they also seek cheaper housing, which is often found in the smaller deindustrialized, demographically declining, and inevitably poorer cities of the rich world. The conditions of social reproduction in the form of housing are integral then to how and where migrants find work.

Other reasons for dispersal might include refugee settlement policies (e.g. Brown et al., 2007) which have led to the development of Somali-owned small businesses in Minneapolis, Minnesota, while direct recruitment in Mexico has led to legal and undocumented Mexicans and other Central Americans working in the slaughterhouses of south-western Nebraska or the hog farms of Iowa. And quite clearly, migrants do not settle in cities at all. Agriculture and food processing have been one of the most consistent employers of migrants throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries across the wealthy countries. And agriculture continues to provide the grounds for dispersal. In Portugal for example, most of the migrants from Brazil and the former Portuguese colonies in Africa (especially Mozambique) settled in Lisbon and the northern city of Porto. They mainly arrived and settled through the networks of family and friends. However, a new migration has emerged among Eastern European men and women to work in agriculture, domestic work and construction. It is common for this migration to occur through smuggling and trafficking networks rather than through friends and families. A consequence of this type of recruitment has led to a dispersed and rural settlement pattern across Portugal in areas hardly touched by international migration in the past, such as the Alentejo region in the south of the country (Foncseca, 2008).

I have thus far reviewed some variations on, or complications for labour market segmentation, including some of the geographies of labour market demand, regulation, and social reproduction. The emphasis has been on sub-national and localized geographies of migration and work. These sub-national geographies are no doubt significant, but the working lives of migrants are also shaped by international processes that can be portrayed by what I call ‘international labour market segmentation’ (ILMS). ILMS is thus sensitive to the overlapping scales or territories within which migrants work.
International labour market segmentation

‘International labour market segmentation’ (ILMS) (Samers, 2008) can be understood as having three dimensions. First, it entails the dividing up of labour around the world by national and supra-national governments (such as the EU) and their respective immigration policies. But what do I mean by ‘international’ here? I am referring to international actors – that is, national and supra-national governments that segment labour on international grounds. For example, in the UK, only migrants who are citizens of the EU are allowed to fill the least-skilled positions that are created by British firms, thus shutting out non-EU migrants from even the bottom of the labour market (Home Office Border Agency, 2008).

A second dimension of ILMS is that these national and supra-national immigration policies also divide up labour within national economies, in such a way that migrants are segmented into particular kinds of sectors and jobs according to national origin or other characteristics deemed desirable by national states, such as specific occupational skills. This is reflected in a battery of stratified rules that governments use to recruit certain kinds of migrant labour.

A third dimension of ILMS is that it involves the segmentation of migrant workers within private firms (the common understanding of labour market segmentation theory) and within organizations. I include organizations because large numbers of migrants, and especially from China, the Dominican Republic, Ghana, India, Ireland, Jamaica, the Philippines, and South Africa work in the hospitals, clinics, and other medical sites of international health care systems in North America and western Europe. The segmentation within firms has social and spatial dimensions. In terms of its social element, the precariousness of employment created through visa restrictions forces certain nationalities into sectors or occupations where migrants work routinely without papers, such as agriculture and farm work in Europe and North America. Consider, for example, the large number of Polish and other Eastern European migrants who have come to the UK through the SAWS (Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme) (Home Office, 2005; OECD/SOPEMI, 2007b). The spatial dimension concerns the de jure (in other words, legal) confinement of some migrants and asylum-seekers to particular regions within certain EU countries, such as in Germany (Edin et al., 2004) Spain (Mendoza, 2001), and the UK (Phillimore and Goodson, 2006). Indeed,
the UK asylum dispersal policies designed to house asylum-seekers in cheaper housing outside the London metropolitan area only forces them to live in and around northern British cities where labour demand is weaker, thus contributing to their unemployment and poverty (Phillimore and Goodson, 2006). This *de jure* confinement also entails a *de facto* (or practical) dimension. Again, using the example of the UK, Bulgarian and Romanian migrants who come to the UK under the SAWS are only allowed to work in agriculture. Picking vegetables in the heavily agricultural county of Lincolnshire about two hours north of London means that these same migrants cannot simply take up residence in London where their relatives might live, unless they work informally in the city.

In what ways is ILMS distinctive from dual labour market theory and many labour market segmentation variants that followed? First, ILMS assumes that it is not simply the colour of a migrant’s skin or their ‘embodied cultural capital’ that matters, but how citizenship also becomes a source of division. Indeed, Van Parijs (1992) spoke of ‘citizenship exploitation’, in other words, the ways in which the citizenship of a person matters to the conditions they face in labour markets. Certainly, some HCT studies now take this into account but they assume that citizenship remains constant before and during the period of employment. Second, the idea of ILMS assumes that social reproduction is not just ‘local’ in character (e.g. the nature of housing, transportation, welfare policies, and so forth), but that it is shaped by international financial flows in the form of the inter- and intra-family pooling of money (this has been shown to be significant in the case of Chinese immigrants in Paris as a means of economic survival (White et al., 1987), and international social transfers and remittances. As was suggested in Chapter 2, these financial flows serve to mediate the relationship between household/family decision-making, migration, the level of vulnerability in the workplace (in short, how desperate someone is to work), and thus the willingness to accept certain types of jobs (Kofman, 2005a.; Kofman and Raghuram, 2006; Yeates, 2004). Employers will exploit this disadvantage to segment certain migrant workers into specific jobs. Sometimes, the internationalization of social reproduction seems to work in reverse. For example, many extremely low-paid undocumented migrants working in small ‘takeaway’ (take-out) fast-food restaurants in east London are supported financially by their relatives in Pakistan, not the reverse. This enables
them to carry on in the miserable conditions under which they either ‘voluntarily’ work, or are forced to because they have been trafficked (Ahmad, 2007a).

Let us explore these ideas more concretely by dividing the discussion into the wealthier and then the poorer countries. This distinction may seem both ‘methodologically nationalist’ and crude in hemispheric terms since many of the jobs that migrants perform in the ‘global north’ and ‘global south’ are often very similar, and after all there are sub-national differences as well. Nonetheless, a few rough distinctions can be drawn. First, the economic structures of the wealthier countries are increasingly dominated by service employment and until only very recently, a huge source of demand for migrant labour of all types and levels of skills. Second, immigration policies in wealthier countries entail a highly stratified set of immigration policies, frequently termed ‘points systems’ (more about this later in the chapter) which many poorer countries have simply not established for complex reasons. Third, the conditions of social reproduction are on the whole considerably more grave than they are in wealthier countries, although as we shall see, the social reproduction of migrants in wealthier countries can also be somewhere between dismal and horrific.

ILMS in the richer countries

In order to provide a portrait of ILMS in the wealthier countries, it will be useful to roughly divide our discussion using Peck’s (1996) three-fold labour market segmentation schema, which includes ‘production imperatives’ (‘labour demand’), ‘processes of social reproduction’ (conditions surrounding the availability of migrant workers), and ‘forces of regulation’ (immigration and labour policies, etc.) discussed earlier in the chapter. Let us begin then with some basic characteristics of the economic structure of the richer countries and the labour demand this creates.

Labour demand and the segmentation of migrant workers

A number of general characteristics about the economies of the wealthier countries in the twenty-first century can be highlighted. These elements include:
The dominance of service-oriented employment in terms of the numbers of workers employed, and a decline in the number of those employed in manufacturing; what has come to be called ‘post-Fordist’, or ‘post-industrial’ economies.

A significant demand for highly educated/highly-skilled employees (computer and other engineers, business executives, and scientists, to name a few). This demand leads some to describe post-Fordist/post-industrial economies as ‘knowledge-intensive’, hence also ‘knowledge economies’.

A demand for personnel in ‘welfare sectors’, anyone from doctors and nurses, to social workers and teachers.

The proliferation of ‘flexible’, part-time, temporary/short-term, and project-oriented employment that, for some, is associated with the rise of post-Fordism and neo-liberalism. The terms ‘flexible’ and ‘project-oriented’ need a little elaboration here. ‘Flexibility’ is a broad and confused term, but for our purposes here, we can divide it into ‘qualitative’ flexibility (i.e. the ability of employers to switch easily between different kinds of workers with different kinds of skills and aptitudes), and quantitative flexibility (the ability of employers to use workers at will, and to hire and fire the required number of workers, if and when they deem it necessary). ‘Project-oriented’ employment (e.g. Grabher, 2002) refers to short-term projects that are associated with research and development, and other innovative activities in computer software, pharmaceuticals, high-end consumer products, and so forth. This terminology seems more relevant to highly-skilled migrants, but ‘projects’ may also be applied to low-skilled/low-paid workers. For example, day-labouring, which usually involves low-skilled legal or undocumented migrant workers, very much concerns daily projects.

The ‘outsourcing’ of some element of the production or development of a final product or service of a parent firm, to other firms. This has led to the growth of sub-contracting chains, involving both formal and informal or ‘cash-in-hand’ employment and sweatshops. In the case of informal employment, employers compete on price rather than the quality of the product resort to such employment in order to reduce wages or the non-wage costs (unemployment insurance, etc.) and the ability to hire and fire at will (quantitative flexibility).
Despite the development of so-called knowledge-intensive jobs, there is a consistent demand for low-skilled/low-paid labour to perform jobs across the occupational spectrum, but particularly in agriculture, manufacturing, and services, especially the three ‘Cs’ (care, cleaning, and catering).

It is not clear that any or all of these points above represent an accurate portrayal of the wealthier country economies, and some of these characteristics are more relevant to particular countries, regions, cities, rural areas, and so forth, than others. With respect to the geographies of labour demand for immigrants in the richer countries, one of the most novel and path-breaking discussions can be found in Sassen’s ‘global city hypothesis’ (1991).

**Global cities, urban labour demand, and migration**

To recall from Chapter 2, Sassen’s ‘global city hypothesis’ (GCH) connects the economic structure and the character of labour demand with labour migration and the availability of migrant workers. We have already discussed the relationship between highly-paid and low-paid workers in ‘global cities’, but another element of Sassen’s argument concerns the ‘informalization’ of economic activity (in other words, the development of more informal economic activity). She argues that the inability of some firms to compete for the necessary and unusually expensive resources in global cities such as commercial space, business inputs (e.g. legal services, graphics, etc.), related services, and labour have led to informalization and the growth of so-called ‘sweatshops’. She calls sweatshops ‘down-graded manufacturing’. At the same time, low-paid migrants and other ethnic minorities cannot afford the luxury goods on offer in global cities. As a consequence, they rely on ‘co-ethnic’ producers, and/or other low-cost immigrant-run shops for their required goods – what she refers to as ‘down-graded mass consumer services’. At the same time, niche-market small-batch goods that target more affluent consumers – what she refers to as upgraded ‘nonmass consumer services’, leads to the development of labour-intensive, small-scale subcontracting in these cities which itself is dominated by migrant labour. However, in a later discussion (Sassen, 1996), her argument assumes a more explicitly ‘supply-side’ perspective. She claims that the growth in
the number of migrants in global cities has led to the expansion of small-scale producers that can compete with large chain stores and supermarkets, although competition is fierce, profits are slim, and this in turn creates a demand for ever cheaper labour.² Let us look a little bit more closely at this demand for low-paid legal and undocumented migrant workers.

Legal and undocumented low-skilled/low-income migrants: informal employment and undocumented migration

Low-paid legal and undocumented migrants may work both formally or informally, although undocumented migrants generally work informally. The relationship between different degrees of informal employment and undocumented migration is complex (see Boxes 3.2 and 3.3). Given that employers wish to hire workers who are cheap, docile, reliable, productive, and have what Ross (2003) calls ‘zero drag’ (having no ‘baggage’ whatsoever, including children), it might seem logical for employers to prefer undocumented migrants over legal migrants.³ This is not necessarily the case, and depends upon what firms produce or what services they perform. For example, Iskander (2000) noted how employers in the Paris garment industry began to substitute legal migrants for undocumented migrant workers during the 1990s because only legal migrants, and not undocumented migrants, could operate across the different phases of production in the industry, some of which were informal and some legal in character.

Furthermore, many migrants with legal residence do not have the right to work beyond a stipulated number of hours, and therefore may be forced to work informally. When migrants who have the legal right to reside in the country, but not the right to work, and choose to work, or work more hours than is stipulated by their visas, this is referred to by Anderson et al. (2006) as ‘semi-compliance’. And some migrants may be constrained by these lack of rights to accept only certain jobs, often those that are the least desirable.

Nonetheless, a considerable amount of low-paid work (we do not know how much exactly) in the wealthier countries, including in Malaysia, Japan, Singapore, and Thailand, is undertaken by undocumented migrants who are informally employed (points 5 and 6 in Box 3.2).

Perhaps not surprisingly, there are no shortage of media reports and
Rather than speak of a formal and informal sector (e.g. Hart, 1973), it is more appropriate to think of formal and informal economic activity in relative terms and to employ the term ‘informalization’ (Sassen, 1998). Jobs or livelihoods may have both formal and informal moments (Smith and Stenning, 2006). Thus, Williams and Windebank (1998) define the ‘informal sphere’ as ‘all productive’ or ‘work activities’ that are ‘unregistered by or hidden from the state and/or tax, social security and/or labour law purposes, but which are legal in all other respects’ (p. 4) (see also earlier Castells and Portes, 1989). Yet Williams and Windebank distinguish further between informal economic activities that are paid – what they call informal employment – and two other related forms of informal economic activity: unpaid informal work (also called ‘mutual aid’ between individuals and groups, which I do not discuss here), and illegal employment (which I touch upon further below). Illegal employment refers to the production of a product that would be illegal under any conditions of production, such as banned drugs. Considering this definition of informal employment, it will also be necessary to distinguish between the different legal statuses of migrants and the various kinds of economic activity in which they might be engaged (from Samers, 2005).

1. Migrants (including asylum-seekers and refugees) with legal residence and work authorization employed illegally producing licit (generally legal) goods and services. The process of production or service provision is illegal, although the final product or service, if produced or performed under legal conditions, would not be illegal – e.g. the ‘sweatshop’ production of garments.

2. Migrants (including asylum-seekers and refugees) with legal residence and no work authorization employed illegally producing licit goods (as in 1 above).

3. Migrants (including asylum-seekers and refugees) with legal residence and work authorization employed illegally producing
illicit goods (‘sweatshop’ production of banned items, drug trafficking, sex/sexual labour).
4. Migrants (including asylum-seekers and refugees) with legal residence and no work authorization employed illegally-producing illicit goods (as in 3 above).
5. Undocumented migrants (that is, they have neither legal-residence nor the authorization to work) employed illegally-producing licit goods and services (as in 1 above).
6. Undocumented migrants employed illegally producing illicit goods and services (as in 3 and 4 above).
7. Undocumented immigrants employed legally producing licit goods and services (this is less common, and although it is illegal from the standpoint of residence and work authorization, the employer has hired the person legally based on falsified documents).

Points 1–7 above tells us that the categories we may have assumed to be quite black and white are actually much more complex, and knowledge of this complexity allows us to engage with media representations of these issues with a little bit more critical scrutiny. The situation described by points 1–4 concerns legal migrants with residence and work rights, or only residence rights. Point 7 is explained in Box 3.3.

**Box 3.3 HOW CAN UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS WORK LEGALLY?**

It may seem impossible for undocumented immigrants to work legally. However, given the necessary social networks and the ability to pay, obtaining a ‘social insurance’ (SI) number is relatively easy. Indeed, in the UK a huge market exists for stolen SI numbers, and undocumented immigrants may find themselves working alongside legal migrants (Ahmad, 2008a). Similarly, in the US, there seems to be an ever-expanding market for very convincing identification cards (*mica*) and other necessary documents that migrants can purchase in Mexican cities and certain US cities with large Mexican populations (Cornelius, 2005; Nevins, 2008).
academic papers about the growth of informal employment and undocumented immigration in Asia, Europe, and North America. Informal employment is hardly new (Castells and Portes, 1989), although it seems to be an increasing component of richer countries (Schneider and Enste, 2000). I say seems because at least until the 1990s, evidence from Finland, Sweden, and Norway demonstrated that the informal employment of undocumented migrants was not extensive, given especially the organization, regulation, and power of trade unions and collective agreements in regulating labour markets (Hjarnø, 2003; Schierup, Hansen, and Castles, 2006). Whatever the status of the growth of informal employment, there is considerable anecdotal and some statistical evidence to suggest that the number of undocumented migrants has in fact grown rapidly in wealthier countries over the last decade (Massey et al., 2002; SOPEMI, 2000; Seol and Skrentny, 2004; Tsuda and Cornelius, 2004; Samers, 2005). However, in France, the number of undocumented migrants may not necessarily be higher than in previous decades (e.g. Marie, 2000), and in fact it is perhaps little known that the majority of migrant workers who arrived in France in the 1960s were undocumented, but were later regularized (Tripier, 1990).

**Legal and undocumented low-skilled/low-income migrants: where do they work?**

It is common throughout Asia, Europe, and North America for undocumented and legal migrants to be employed interchangeably across the occupational spectrum, but especially in what are now considered ethnic/immigrant niches such as agriculture, clothing/textiles, and other down-graded and light manufacturing; construction, food processing, small grocery shops, landscape gardening, retail, street peddling, and the ‘three Cs’ (care, cleaning, catering), and sex and sexual work. Across some of these sectors at least, one might also characterize the work that migrants perform in terms of the ‘three Ds’ (dirty, dangerous, and difficult). We might add ‘demeaning’ to that as well, perhaps when it relates to sex or sexual work, or wherever and whenever migrants are treated in ways which they themselves see as ‘unacceptable’.

Below I present some examples of migrants working in agriculture, clothing/textile production, construction, food processing, landscape gardening, and the three ‘Cs’. In agriculture, Polish and other eastern...
European workers pick vegetables and increasingly work in intensive horticulture in southern and eastern England (Anderson and Rogaly, 2005; Rogaly, 2008). Jamaican and Mexican men gather strawberries in Ontario and California, and many Moroccans do the same in Spain (Bauder, 2005; Mendoza, 2001). However, a notable exception is Korea, where migrants have not been employed in agriculture for the most part (Seol and Skrentny, 2004). In terms of clothing and textile production, one might argue that it continues in the rich world only because it can rely on low-paid undocumented workers to survive, from predominantly Turkish men in Amsterdam’s garment industry (Raes et al., 2002), to Central American men and women in Los Angeles and New York City (Light et al., 1999; Kim, 1999). In construction, I discussed earlier how an ‘army’ of Indian and Pakistani migrants have for some time now laboured in the terrible construction jobs of Dubai, but during the 1990s, both legal and undocumented Polish workers built the ‘new Berlin’ in similarly tough conditions before Poland’s 2004 integration into the EU (Wilpert, 1998). Some 21% of the Lithuanians in the UK were concentrated in London’s construction industry in the early 2000s (Spence, 2005), and Algerians and Moroccans are segmented into the least desirable and least paid jobs in the French building industry (Jouin, 2006).

The hundreds of thousands of sandwiches that are consumed each day in the UK would not be possible without the thousands of African and South Asian migrants working in food processing and sandwich-making factories in the London area (Holgate, 2004) (see Box 3.4 for another example of food processing).

The employment of migrants in landscape gardening is particularly important in the US, where the owners of often large, multi-acre executive homes demand pristine lawns and gardens. In this ‘industry’, commonly Mexican and other Central American migrants of different nationalities wait near hardware stores or similar informal sites to work as ‘day labourers’ in teams or as individuals. Those who choose them may be small business people with landscape firms or simply private homeowners (Valenzuela, 2001). While day labouring extends across the employment spectrum in the US often involving both legal and more shadowy temporary firms (Valenzuela, 2001; Theodore, 2003), this sort of day labouring is, however, not widespread in EU countries, and may even be increasingly curtailed in the US because of a combination of a reduced demand for workers and municipal ordinances outlawing such
Box 3.4 IS IOWA THAT DIFFERENT FROM DUBAI?

On May 12, 2008, at the very time I sat down to write this chapter, US immigration officers raided a Kosher meatpacking plant owned and operated by Agriprocessors, Inc., in the town of Postville, Iowa. The plant had already been cited previously for a whole host of violations, in part at the behest of Jewish community leaders elsewhere in the US who were dissatisfied with conditions in the plant. The raid found 389 undocumented immigrants mainly from Guatemala, working in a plant that routinely violated labour and safety violations, including hiring workers under the age of 18 (the state-defined legal working age in the meatpacking industry). Managers provided little training; they harassed workers – sometimes in a derogatory manner – and employees were forced to work overly long hours with little rest. At least one Guatemalan, named Elmer, worked 17 hours a day, 6 days a week, and the New York Times reported on July 27 that “he was constantly tired and did not have time to do anything but work and sleep”. In the article, Elmer claimed that “I was very sad”, “and I felt like I was a slave.” This led to protests by, on one hand, Rabbis not associated with the plant, pro-immigrant supporters, and legal and undocumented Latino workers themselves (many of whom face arrest and/or deportation). On the other hand were locals and anti-illegal immigration counter-protestors from the Federation for Immigration Reform, content that immigration authorities had rounded up ‘illegals’. The firm itself claimed that they did not willingly hire workers under the age of 18, and that the documents of workers were forged. The immigrants claimed that managers knew they were under age although many acknowledged using false papers to find work (New York Times, July 28, 2008). Does all of this sound that different from the story of south Asian workers in Dubai?

Employment in the ‘three Cs’ is heavily gendered, with so-called ‘caring’ jobs or ‘emotional labour’ (Hochschild, 1983) increasingly domin-
ated by migrant women, and particularly ‘women of colour’ from poorer countries. For example, some 690,000 Indonesian women left Indonesia, mainly for domestic work abroad, and an estimated 50% of the domestic workers in Italy are migrants from outside the EU (IOM, 2008a). I already addressed some of the reasons for the demand for migrant women as domestics in Chapter 2. Hochschild (2000) sees this movement of domestic labour as part of a ‘care chain’, that is “a series of personal links between people across the globe based on the paid or unpaid work of caring” (p. 131). Typically, a care chain involves “an older daughter from a poor family who cares for her siblings while her mother works as a nanny caring for the children of a migrating nanny who, in turn, cares for the child of a family in a rich country” (ibid). Such caring jobs include child-care, domestic work in the form of both live-in and live-out maids, nursing and general health care work in hospitals, clinics, elderly/retirement homes, and private residences. And though it may seem odd to label it so, another form of ‘caring’ or ‘emotional labour’ is sex and sexual work (see Box 3.5), which often involves trafficking.

**Box 3.5 TRAFFICKING AND SEXUAL TRAFFICKING**

We will recall from Chapter 1 that trafficking usually refers to a combination of an illegal mode of entry tied with informal or illegal employment, often involving ‘exploitative conditions’ (a ‘slave-importing operation’). For the United Nations (2000) “‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs” (UN, 2000, Article 3a, p. 3). Such a definition is inadequate though to cover the type and

continued
motivations behind the movements involved. For example, de Lange (2007) points out in the context of Burkina Faso, that child migration and child trafficking within the country are not so easily distinguished for a whole range of reasons, and thus what exactly constitutes ‘exploitative’ and ‘forced’ is unclear. Likewise, the relationship between smuggling and trafficking is more ‘grey’ than is asserted by the UN, since for example, smuggling can also involve the repayment of debts through difficult work with extremely low wages (e.g. Ahmad, 2008b; Kyle and Koslowski, 2001; Salt, 2000). Nevertheless, the UN’s conceptualization of trafficking above is widely seen as a benchmark definition, including by the IOM (International Organization for Migration), NGOs, and a range of scholars concerned with ‘trafficking’. As with most illegal flows, precise figures for trafficking are far from available, but it seems to be a widespread phenomenon, involving perhaps hundreds of thousands of people across the entire world. The reasons and conditions of trafficking vary from country and country and from sub-national region to another. What seems clear from surveys is that trafficking, whether sexual or otherwise, entails a spectrum between a certain degree of voluntarism on one hand, involving a combination of cajoling and seduction about future opportunities (the lure of a ‘western’ lifestyle and consumer goods, for example), and on the other hand, kidnapping, coercion, threats, fraud, false promises of acceptable work, forced labour, and pseudo-imprisonment (Askola, 2007; Ahmad, 2008b; Salt, 2000).

Sexual trafficking seems to have received the greatest scholarly and media attention (Askola, 2007). Agustín (2006) and Kempadoo (2007) have argued that sexual trafficking should not necessarily be viewed as forced migration, as women are aware that some level of sexual work will be involved (which they may not necessarily dislike). In fact, from experience in their own countries, some women may prefer prostitution over other work. Thus, for Agustín (2006) and Kempadoo (2007), it is not incorrect to characterize at least some of the supposedly ‘sexually trafficked’ as simply migrant women who are prostitutes, and there is a need to separate migration for the purposes of sex/sexual work from sexual
trafficking. Thus, governments and the popular press’ ‘victimization discourse’ and the misreading of migration for sex/sexual work as only sexual trafficking rests in part on moral expectations of women’s proper sexual behaviour and simply leads to tighter migration control over ‘third world populations’ and a policing of women’s ‘sexual agency’ (Kempadoo, 2007, 82; Giordano, 2008). However, as Agustín (2006) recognizes, many women often do not expect the working conditions they end up experiencing, as many exposés by newspapers and magazines have pointed out.

For example, The New Yorker’s (May 5, 2008) lengthy discussion of sexual trafficking from Moldova paints a much grimmer picture. For The New Yorker, sexual trafficking is partly the result of Moldova’s economic situation, now one of the poorest counties in a wider Europe. It has suffered severe economic decline since the early 1990s, and there are few opportunities for women in wage labour. Migration is common and encouraged among many Moldovans, and about a quarter of the working population is living abroad. Young women are actively recruited by mostly other Moldovans. Sometimes these are other ‘trafficked’ women who have returned to Moldova and present trafficking as a ‘happy’ experience, despite the underestimated acknowledgement that women will have to engage in some prostitution. Many women are fleeing domestic abuse and/or poverty in Moldova, and their parents and friends may provide the consent for their daughters to accept ‘trafficking’ (or smuggling?). Yet the young women do not expect the beatings, rapes, and pseudo-imprisonment to which they may be subjected. In fact, they may not even end up in the country they believed they would be ‘working’ in. Many expect they will be going to western Europe, but are sold to non-Moldovan networks that operate in cities such as Dubai or Istanbul.

Though working conditions vary enormously, dozens of studies point to the difficult, demeaning, and sometimes downright repressive conditions under which migrant women work. In the context of domestic labour in particular, I referred in Chapter 2 to the ‘always on’ (Anderson, 2001b) condition of migrant women that makes them
especially attractive for employers. Migrant women typically work 60–75 hours a week with little rest or days off, as Yeoh and Huang (1998) show in their study of Filipino, Sri Lankan, Thai, Indian, and Burmese women in Singapore. Domestic migrant workers may work in expensive but isolated homes with few amenities and little or no means of transport. Some women are restricted from bringing home boyfriends during the work week, making telephone calls, or entertaining guests (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2002). In extreme cases, they are sexually abused and/or their passports are taken (Anderson, 2001b), and nationality and citizenship status are important determinants of what working conditions a migrant may accept. These work difficulties do not stop at domestic workers, as migrant nurses also face a host of problems in the hospitals and clinics of the rich world, from low pay to long hours (e.g. Yeates, 2004).

Catering and cleaning, on the other hand, employ both men and women, and this involves a whole range of activities. Among them, Ahmad (2008a) and Wahlbeck (2007) document the difficult lives of Pakistani and Turkish migrants in London and Finland’s takeaway (take-out) shops – what Wahlbeck (2007) calls work in the ‘kebab economy’. Here, the all-too-familiar working conditions reign. The undocumented ‘Dead men walking’ (the title of Ahmad’s paper) tells the story of long hours, low pay, but also a poor diet composed of the greasy and unhealthy food that the workers are usually provided free of charge by their employers. Sure, some migrants prefer working for co-ethnic bosses and may even report quite fair treatment, but many regret the confinement to the ‘tiny physical space’ of work and home in an ‘endless cycle of work’, the chronic instability that freezes them “in a vacuous present fraught with anxiety and question marks about tomorrow” (Ahmad, 2008a, 315). That is a story of dismal lives in an ‘ethnic enclave’, but there is labour market segmentation and frustration even in the up-scale hotels of West London, where in the food and beverage division studied by McDowell et al. (2007), there were few people who were not white in the ‘front’ while ‘people of colour’ were relegated to ‘back of the shop’ operations.

The cleaning sector in London and the UK is not remarkably different. Not associated with a particular ethnic enclave, there is little doubt that cleaning has become an immigrant (and not an ethnic) niche in cities across the wealthier countries. Recruiting migrant workers as cleaners has coincided with the privatization and contracting out of cleaning.
Typically, in this cost-conscious sector, migrant workers are recruited because they are simply cheaper (May et al., 2007; Pai, 2004). Whether it is cleaners in hospitals, schools, supermarkets, other large retailers, or London’s Underground (metro), more than 90% surveyed by May et al. were foreign-born. Some migrated to the UK for tourism purposes, others as asylum-seekers, students, au pairs, and so forth. In the study by May et al., they reported mainly legal workers from principally Nigeria and Ghana. There seemed to be a gender division of labour across the industry. Women were numerically dominant in semi-private spaces (e.g. hotels), and men in semi-public spaces (office cleaning, the Underground). Some 90% were earning below the ‘London living wage’, working for about £5.45 an hour (about US$10), and £10,200 a year (about US$20,000). Most were working as legal workers with written work contracts, and they paid taxes and social contributions.

Pai (2004) found both legal and undocumented migrants working for a firm that had been contracted out by a supermarket chain in London’s Canary Warf towers. The migrants were from Ghana, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and South America. The supermarket chain had ‘opted out’ of the British Working Time Directive, and therefore cleaners could be requested by the contracted firm to work for more than 48 hours a week. Working for more than 48 hours entitled one to four weeks of holiday (vacation) pay, but this regulation had been routinely violated. Some migrants were paid differently for the same work that other migrants performed. The contracts did not confirm hourly pay, and there seemed to be the all too typical divide in terms of working conditions between those who were legal and those who were not. That points to the importance of regulation in shaping the working experiences of migration.

**Forces of regulation and the segmentation of migrant workers**

Entry and settlement policies as well as other economic and social policies, from labour market regulations to housing initiatives, matter to the likelihood of migrants finding employment, and their position and experiences in workplaces. Since these policies are geographically diverse and national regulations overlap with supra-national forms of regulation, such as in the EU, it is impossible here to explore in any depth the myriad ‘forces of regulation’ that intersect with migrant workers’ lives. Such a task would require at least another book. Nonetheless, a few broad points
should be either reiterated or emphasized at this stage, namely the role of
entry and settlement policies in shaping labour market outcomes and
experiences. These policies and regulations are aimed at both migrants
and employers.

With respect to migrants, national governments use formal citizenship
and visa regulations to control access to, and the duration of, different
kinds of work. This might include tying work permits to proof of resi-
dential status, and tying residential status to the proof of employment,
demanding evidence of adequate housing and evidence of sufficient
financial resources in order that migrants are not a ‘burden on the public
purse’ (a phrase uttered to virtually all foreign residents in the UK by
customs officials, including this author on many occasions). In China,
labour market segmentation assumes a peculiarly different form which
concerns internal migrants. During the 1950s, China developed the hukou
(or household registration) system that prevented rural people from
migrating easily to the coastal cities. The hukou entitles a resident to cer-
tain state subsidies and benefits for urban residents, but not for rural
migrants. The Chinese government relaxed this system in the last years of
the twentieth century to allow migrant workers in especially the large
coastal cities, but the most desirable and prestigious jobs are reserved for
those with a hukou, and migrants without are forced into the least paid,
and most unpleasant jobs. In short, resident status shapes the job pros-
pects of the vast number of rural-to-urban internal migrants (Fan, 2001).

Quite clearly, these policies are strati
fied so that different working
regulations exist for different categories of migrants, and as we will see in
the subsequent section, immigration policies together with economic
and other social programs can contribute to the weakened position of
migrants vis-à-vis their employers – described earlier as ‘citizenship
exploitation’. Asylum-seekers and refugees in particular often have stipu-
lations on the amount of hours they can work, or if they can work at all.
In the UK, for example, most asylum-seekers are prevented from working
until they are granted ‘leave to remain’ (that is, residential status), while
in Sweden, an asylum-seeker may work if the processing of their claim is
likely to take more than four months (Phillimore and Goodson, 2006).

With respect to employer regulations, governments create rules and
incentives to attract certain kinds of workers, whether highly-skilled/
high-income or otherwise. Canada pioneered the idea of a ‘points
system’ (Hiebert, 2002), in which a combination of a migrant’s ‘adapt-
ability’, age, educational qualifications, investible income (including the willingness to purchase and operate a farm in Canada), and language ability provides differential access to citizenship. The various national policies to recruit highly-skilled and entrepreneurial individuals entail variations on the theme of the Canadian point system in countries such as France, Germany, the UK, and the US. In 2008, the UK introduced its own points system, building upon a similar and earlier system of ‘tiers’. The UK’s ‘points system’ uses a complicated system of various tiers, including entry for highly-skilled migrants, entrepreneurs, sponsored skilled workers, temporary workers, European Economic Area (including Swiss workers), and ‘other workers’.4 In this brave new world of points, some people are instantly disqualified. That is, if a migrant is categorized as low-skilled and low-paid, and from outside the EU and the European Economic Area, it is almost impossible to gain entry as a worker, though they may be able to enter on other grounds.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, governments deploy employer sanctions (fines and criminal charges) to dissuade employers from using either undocumented migrants, or employing legal migrants in an illegal manner. These, however, are only sporadically enforced (see Box 3.6).

Box 3.6 EMPLOYER SANCTIONS – DO THEY MATTER?

Since 1986, the US government has imposed employer sanctions on those employers who ‘knowingly’ hire undocumented immigrants. However, the Immigration and Naturalization Service has only devoted 2% of its funding to enforcing these sanctions, and involves only 124 immigration officials for the whole country, compared to 9,500 at the border. The number of hours devoted to investigations fell by 50% between 1999 and 2003 (Cornelius, 2005). While the border has become increasingly ‘militarized’ (Andreas, 2000), the enforcement of violations fell by 70% from 1992 to 2002. And in 2002, only 53 employers in the entire US were fined for violations and only four employers were prosecuted in 2003. The average fine was about US$9,729, which is, for most
large employers anyway, very little money. Clearly, employer sanctions are not a priority for the US Congress, even if they are for the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency. There have been attempts by the US Department of Justice to prosecute large corporations such as Tyson Foods (a food and especially chicken processing company) and Walmart for hiring undocumented workers. Tyson foods for example, were accused of hiring undocumented immigrants in 2001, but were never convicted. Part of the problem is that the clause ‘knowingly’ in the 1986 law, means that employers do not have to verify if the documents presented by potential workers are authentic. Similarly, there are no laws in the US against private home-owners hiring undocumented immigrants, and we have seen how significant this sort of hiring is from domestic work to landscape gardening (Cornelius, 2005). In the UK, employer fines have also proved weak and ineffective (Layton-Henry, 2004), though fines have risen sharply from around £5,000 (about $10,000 dollars) in 2001 to £10,000 ($20,000 dollars) in 2008 for each undocumented immigrant (Home Office UK Border Agency, 2008). In Japan, whose employer sanctions are modelled on those of the US and Europe, they too have proved inadequate (Tsuda and Cornelius, 2004). The only country where employer sanctions seems to have any recorded effect at all is in France during the late 1990s, perhaps because of the comprehensive and wide-ranging cooperation between different agencies (Marie, 2000).

**Processes of social reproduction**

Forces of regulation intersect with processes of social reproduction to create differential employment opportunities and experiences for migrant workers. The discussion that follows suggests how legality and social support, or indeed the lack of it, may create varying degrees of docility among migrants in the workplace. The equation I have in mind is simple enough; the less social support and the less rights migrants have, the more vulnerable and docile they are likely to be. This may not always be the case in practice, but this assumption will nonetheless motivate the following discussion. Again, it is impossible to produce more than a sketch of social
reproduction across the richer countries, as the territoriality of social reproduction is exceedingly complex. Below I focus on two dimensions of social reproduction, a general picture of welfare transformations and how housing issues shape labour market participation and experiences.

In all their diversity, these social reproduction processes commonly include state-provided welfare (social and subsidized housing, food programs, health care, etc.) and other ‘integration’ policies from free schooling and language instruction to job training (e.g. Morrisens and Sainsbury, 2005). Beyond the state, rentable housing, family and kinship dynamics, social support provided by world-wide NGOs such as the Red Cross, CBOs (Community-based Organizations such as ‘one-stop shops’, drop-in legal clinics, and the like), hometown or homeland associations, houses of worship or religious organizations, trade unions, and domestic labour in both the countries of origin and destination fill in the holes where states have formally retreated from the international landscapes of social reproduction.

One certainly broad and pervasive argument that encapsulates this ‘retreat’ is that the neo-liberalization of social reproduction has entailed a reduction in state-provided social assistance for citizens across the wealthier countries over the last 30 years or so and by extension for migrants. This has led to what Hondagneu-Sotelo (2002) calls the ‘commodification of social reproduction’ and the development of ‘care-chains’. By this she means that if social welfare is reduced and there is an increase in the proportion of dual-earner couples, then someone has to be paid (i.e. ‘commodification’) to perform the task of social reproduction (caring for children, cooking, cleaning, and so on). Migrant domestic workers are that someone.

However, the neo-liberalization of social reproduction and its implications for migrants is certainly not uniform (Bommes and Geddes, 2000; Schuster, 2000), and it is easy to overlook the informal networks of social reproduction. Indeed, Cravey (2003) shows in her very evocative and personal study of social venues (the dance hall, a local flea market) and social relationships among Mexicans in a small town in Carolina del Norte (North Carolina) that sustenance and emotional support can be provided by friends in small but meaningful ways. Nonetheless, in most European countries, for example, it is clear that state policies have been tightened to reduce state provision for asylum-seekers and undocumented immigrants specifically (e.g. Dwyer, 2005; Schuster, 2000). In contrast, in most countries legal
migrants and refugees are provided with social assistance on par with citizens (Bommes and Geddes, 2000; Geddes, 2000a; Samers, 2004a), but these social entitlements are dependent on time of residence, and increasingly of diminished value (Dwyer, 2005). This has cemented a divide between those who do not have EU citizenship or the right to remain in EU, with those who are EU citizens and/or those who have longer-term residential status.

In Spain, for example, the Programa Greco (Programa Global de Regulacion y Coordinacion de la Extranjeria y la Immigracion en Espana) implemented in 2000, has ruled that only immigrants who pay social security and taxes can have access to ‘integration services’. This has had the effect of excluding both undocumented immigrants and legal immigrants working in informal employment from some of these services. On the other hand, all immigrants, regardless of legality, have in theory access to free medical care and school enrolment. Other organizations such as the Red Cross, Caritas, and SOS Racismo have tried to supplement governmental funding by providing services to migrants through centros de acogida (social service centres) that are managed by NGOs but financially supported (if inadequately to meet the demand) by the government and the Catholic Church. The services have included child care, legal aid, and Spanish language instruction. The situation for the children of undocumented immigrants has proven more difficult. Whereas few children are likely to be rejected from schools because they are not of legal status, they are not entitled to scholarships or vocational training, they cannot be given a diploma at the end of their elementary school studies; they cannot be provided with a work permit which in turn limits them to informal employment. As such, it is rare to see the older child of an undocumented immigrant working in more formal jobs (Cornelius, 2004).

In the US, the welfare reform bill of 1996 (the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act or PRWORA) created a new complex territoriality of welfare policies involving in large measure a shift from the Federal level to greater discretion by individual US states over the provision of welfare. On the whole, this legislation stipulated that non-citizens could no longer access welfare funds in the first five years after their arrival, and could no longer use welfare for more than five years in their lifetime. They could not access the food stamp program (a system in which clients purchase food with vouchers) or the SSI (Supplemental Security Income or ‘old age assistance’). The only
exceptions were refugees and asylum-seekers, and those who could prove they had lived and worked continuously in the US for 10 years. Though some of these benefits (food stamps and SSI) were partially restored by 2002, especially for children, most legal immigrants and many elderly and disabled immigrants either could not, or had difficulty accessing these benefits, often in the context of racialized welfare delivery (Marchevsky and Theoharis, 2006). Furthermore, the curtailing of non-citizens’ access to the food stamp program has led to food insecurity among older and immigrant children in particular (Nam and Jung, 2008; Van Hook and Balistieri, 2006), as well as undocumented immigrants of any age (Hadley et al., 2008). Like welfare policies in the EU, it has created a divide between citizens and non-citizens; it has deprived migrants of bargaining power and forces them to work two jobs at poverty-level wages (Hero and Preuhs, 2007; Marchevsky and Theoharis, 2006; Zimmerman and Tumlin, 1999).

Housing is a central element of social reproduction that shapes the employability of migrants and the conditions of their working lives. While finding suitable housing among high-income migrants is unlikely to be difficult, for low-paid migrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees access to, and the availability and cost of social or rental housing are likely to preoccupy their initial settlement, and may continue to weigh on their lives in subsequent years. For social housing, access varies according to citizenship. In many countries, refugees are accorded social housing or vouchers for the rental market (although the standard obtainable is very poor), but for asylum-seekers and undocumented immigrants, access to social housing is generally not provided. The UK, for example, has a larger proportion of social housing compared to many EU countries, especially southern European countries, but there are sub-national differences. Waiting lists for such housing have ranged from seven years in the southeast (in and around London) to several months in more northern towns and cities. Overall in the UK, the amount of social housing has decreased, consistent with arguments concerning the neo-liberalization of social reproduction (Dell’Olio, 2004).

Private rental housing is not a simple alternative to social housing, and in many countries the supply is very constrained, although again with substantial intra-country differences. Indeed, the brutally high property prices of so-called global cities restrict the amount of affordable private rental housing, combined with an inadequate stock of social housing,
leaving migrants to struggle for a place to live. Yet this may be equally true in other cities or rural areas with a limited social or rental housing sector, as in Belgium, Italy, Finland, Ireland, and Luxembourg. The Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK have a comparatively larger rental market than other countries in the EU, but there is a sub-national geography to this supply of housing. In fact, asylum-seekers in the UK were dispersed to northern England precisely because of the lack of affordable housing in the southeast of England (Audit Commission, 2000). This in turn limits their employment possibilities in cities that have generally weaker labour demand (Phillimore and Goodson, 2006). Discrimination against migrants ‘of colour’ and charging ‘above-market’ rents exacerbate the shortage. The result is ‘overcrowding’ which presents innumerable problems for migrant workers, from lack of sleep and inadequate cooking facilities, to the problems of accessing jobs based on their residential location (Ahmad, 2008a; Blumenberg, 2008; Dell’Olio, 2004; Dwyer, 2005; Ozuekren and Van Kempen, 2002). The problem of housing and even homelessness is vividly portrayed in Juan Carlos Frey’s film Invisible Mexicans of Deer Canyon. In this film, he depicts the lives of undocumented Mexican immigrants living in isolated shacks without electricity or running water in the mountain canyons that surround the city of San Diego, California. These shacks and encampments are often only a stone’s throw from the multi-million dollars homes that crown the surrounding ridges, and the Mexican men move between their mini-shanty towns and mainly the sporadic informal ‘day labouring’ they can manage in San Diego’s suburbs. It is difficult then to develop one’s ‘human capital’ living and working under such conditions.

Highly-skilled/highly-paid migrants and international students

Often at the opposite end of the labour market from San Diego’s most marginalized migrant workers are highly-skilled/highly-paid migrants, which is the subject of this section. As I argued in the Introduction to this book, my concern with more highly-skilled migrants is their contribution to the spatially uneven pattern of economic development within richer countries, how the dominance of the wealthy countries is enabled by such migration, and the ‘socio-professional down-grading’ or lower wages that they often experience.

If someone is considered ‘highly-skilled’ by governments, employers,
or recruitment agencies, it is usually based on a combination of education (measured in tertiary degrees), occupation, and to a less extent professional experience, though the precise definition of ‘highly-skilled’ in different contexts is debated (IOM, 2008a). Iredale (2005) reminds us that any definitions are certainly gendered, and if nothing else, ‘highly-skilled migrants’ are a diverse range of individuals with quite varied geographies. There have been attempts to create international standards for what constitutes ‘highly-skilled’ in terms of science and technology demands, such as the OECD’s and European Commission’s 1995 Canberra Manual (IOM, 2008). Yet even its definitions are questioned. In this cloud of definitional ambiguity, Mahroun (1999, cited in Williams, Baláz, and Wallace, 2004, 30) offers a five-fold categorization of highly-skilled migrants which consists of: managers and executives, engineers and technicians (oddly, those working in health sectors, such as doctors and nurses, are included in this category), academics and scientists, entrepreneur migration, and student mobility. With the exception of academics and scientists, I take these categories very briefly in turn.

In terms of highly-skilled migrants and executives then, Beaverstock (2002, 2005) and Beaverstock and Boardwell (2000) have conducted research on British accountant and banker inter-company transferees in New York, London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Zurich. Most of these are men. Their argument is that highly-skilled migrants reinforce capital accumulation in these international financial centres, which in turn strengthens the demand for highly-skilled migrants. Similarly, Bauer and Kunze (2004) argue that it is often foreign-owned multi-national corporations concentrated in the wealthiest regions that demand a multi-national labour force. Evidence certainly bears this out. For example, in 2002, some 91% of all the work permits issued to migrants in financial services were concentrated in London and its surrounding region (Home Office/DTI, 2002, cited in Williams et al., 2004). In terms of engineers and technicians, Williams et al. point out that they are more spatially dispersed than the executives and managers within global cities. No doubt this is the case, though there tends to be a concentration of foreign engineers and technicians in ‘high-technology’ cities and urban regions, from Austin, Texas, to Munich and southern Germany in general (Bauer and Kunze, 2004). Silicon Valley offers a well-known example of recruiting such individuals, where 53% of all scientists and engineers were born overseas, and approximately a quarter were Indian and Chinese (Saxenian,
In the UK, engineers and technicians live within a triangle that stretches from Bristol through Oxford, to Cambridge and London. Most of these are men too. In contrast, only 12% of all highly-skilled migrants in Britain’s National Health Service (NHS) were located in London and the Southeast of England (Williams et al., 2004). The matter of foreign doctors in the NHS is instructive in terms of what I have referred continually to as ‘socio-professional downgrading’. The number of doctors qualified and migrating to the UK from outside the European Economic Area (EEA) increased from 23 to 26% between 1995 and 2000, yet in contrast to those from within the EEA, they are concentrated in less remunerated ‘non-consultant career grades’, in part a function of how they migrated to the UK in the first place, that is, as students (Raghuram and Kofman, 2002) or sometimes as asylum-seekers and refugees (Stewart, 2008). If we narrow our analysis to the movement of nurses, and of teachers, then this migration is overwhelmingly female (Iredale, 2005).

With respect to immigrant/ethnic entrepreneurship, the range and types of businesses, and the sectors and niches into which entrepreneurs insert themselves, is geographically diverse (see Kloosterman and Rath, 2003). One of the more studied cases is of Hong Kong-born ‘astronauts’, that is highly-skilled, and especially high-income businessmen who ‘buy’ their citizenship from the US or Canada, and fly between Hong Kong and the west coast of North America to conduct their often transnational businesses (Ong, 1999; Kobayashi and Preston, 2007; Ley, 2003, 2006). Although it has remained a strategy to recruit such entrepreneurs by the Canadian government, they are far from always economically successful, owing in part to their unfamiliarity with the regulations and practices associated with operating businesses in for example Vancouver (Ley, 2003, 2006). Similarly, Chiang (2004) shows that many Taiwanese-born business owners and ‘skilled migrants’ find themselves unemployed in the Australian cities of Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney. This is owned in part to their lack of English skills, their unfamiliarity with Australian ‘business culture’, business regulations, the small size of the local market for the goods or services they produce, but also the unwillingness to perform certain tasks that do not seem to coincide with their educational and financial background (see also Ho and Alcorsco, 2004).

Despite this diversity of categories, broadly speaking, the number of highly-skilled migrants in the wealthiest countries has increased since the early 1990s. Below I provide just a brief picture of the number of
highly-skilled migrants and their origins in different countries. About 10% of all highly-skilled individuals from poorer countries now live in richer countries. Faist (2008) notes that some 12% of those deemed ‘highly-qualified’ in the US are foreign-born (p. 33), and in the EU, the percentage of highly-skilled migrants among all migrants has increased from 15% in 1991 to 25% in 2001 (IOM, 2008a). The origins of highly-skilled migrants are regionalized at a continental scale, with 86% of ‘highly-skilled’ migrants in Korea coming from Asia, and 77% in Japan. In contrast to this more continental pattern, Canada and the US draw a large proportion of highly-skilled migrants from Asian countries (35 and 41% respectively). Most European countries attract the highly-skilled from other European countries, except for the UK which draws highly-skilled migrants more or less evenly from Asian (33%), African (21%), and EU countries (27%). Explaining these patterns is not easy, but the IOM (2008a) suggests that they can be explained by spatial proximity, familiarity with neighbouring countries, ease of travel and the reduced cost of migration; but also historical linkages, including military interventions, and lest we forget, immigration policies.

International students, as we noted in Chapter 2, constitute a significant proportion of migrants around the world, and they are emblematic of the problem of distinguishing between temporary and permanent migration, as well as distinguishing between ‘highly-skilled’ and ‘low-skilled’ migrants. Just as doctors find themselves unqualified in the country of immigration, students who, for instance, might have had a bare-bones understanding of calculus when they first arrived in the country of immigration, graduate with a Masters degree in engineering and then find themselves as assistants designing mega-engineering projects. Thus, countless surveys show that at least some students stay in the country where they pursue their higher education, while others return to their ‘home’ countries (Hazen and Alberts, 2006). Like other forms of highly-skilled migration, student migration is distinct in terms of its geographies. Some 80% of the world’s foreign students are concentrated in just five countries (the Australia, Germany, France, the US, and the UK) (Tremblay, 2002, in Iredale, 2005), and these geographies are complicated by differences in the ease of mobility between macro-regions such as the EU and countries such as the US. In the EU, policies of unfettered student movement between EU countries (and programmes to encourage it, such as SOCRATES) have greatly enhanced student migration. Yet even
within the EU, there is a concentration of foreign students in the UK, given the desire of students to learn English (to acquire ‘language capital’). And at the Masters and PhD levels, foreign students tend to concentrate in the most prestigious universities, which have an urban inflection to them (Williams et al., 2004). Though urban universities in the US, for example, seem to capture the largest number of foreign students, at the undergraduate level, students are also found in universities in smaller cities and rural areas alike (Open Doors, 2008).

In the US, the events of September 11, 2001 curtailed student migration in the US from 2001 to about 2005 by complicating the procedures and checks for obtaining a student visa. In 2002/2003, the number of foreign students enrolled in US universities decreased from a little over 586,300 in 2000–2001, to approximately 564,700 in 2005–6, and showed year on year declines between 2002 and 2005. Not until 2006/7 did the foreign student population increase again (by 3.2%) (Open Doors, 2008). The latest increase reflects at least in part an effort by US immigration authorities to simplify visa procedures for student migration, which may also affect their propensity to stay in the US and reside as highly-skilled permanent residents (Hazen and Alberts, 2006).

Having discussed the nature of international labour market segmentation in richer countries in considerable detail, we now turn our attention to similar, but not identical processes in poorer countries.

Labour market segmentation and migration in poorer countries

In terms of ‘production imperatives’ in poorer countries, it is difficult to create a universal picture, though a very rough sketch is possible. From the new industrial heartlands of Asia, including China, India, Malaysia, and Thailand, to countries with declining industrial output in Southern Africa, such as Zambia and Zimbabwe, the image is one of uneven economic development both within and across these countries (e.g. Davis, 2004). Certainly, one dominant argument amongst social scientists is that two decades of structural adjustment and neo-liberalism have created severe problems for migrants and citizens of countless poorer countries, while a limited number of urban regions have witnessed rising living standards for some people, from Mumbai to Shanghai. In the wealthiest regions and largest cities of many poorer countries, migrant workers are increasingly found in service-oriented employment, though in smaller
urban areas and rural areas, primary activities (agriculture and mining especially), secondary activities (manufacturing), and tertiary activities (such as street vending) continue to employ both internal and international migrants (e.g. IOM, 2003). Some scholars have also claimed that because of structural adjustment and neo-liberalism, informal employment in the form of domestic work, street vending, and virtually every form of service imaginable, has done nothing but expand in countries around the world (Beneria, 2001; Davis, 2004; Harriss-White, 2003; Schneider and Enste, 2000). How do these set of production imperatives merge with ‘forces of regulation’?

Here let me briefly mention two. The first are immigration policies, which are clearly tighter and more strictly enforced in some countries than in others depending on economic conditions and political will, as well as, crucially, the resources available for enforcement. In terms of enforcement, and especially with respect to work-related immigration rules, the lack of available resources for enforcement negates the importance of such regulations on paper. Nonetheless, as with the Mexico-US border, many of the borders between poorer countries are now heavily policed, such as between Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, although such control is routinely flouted by undocumented immigrants who either evade control individually, are smuggled and trafficked, or who bribe border guards and other officials. Such evasion is common elsewhere, and rampant where borders are even more porous. In terms of labour standards, which have been in many instances curtailed under structural adjustment anyway, residual regulations are routinely ignored or violated (e.g Hughes, 1999).

**Agricultural production and the demand for migrant workers: migrants from Lesotho in South Africa**

Let us look at two examples of agricultural production and the demand for migrant labour. The first involves a study of migrant farm workers in South Africa (Johnston, 2007). In South Africa’s predominantly rural Free State during the early 1990s, ‘white’ farmers began to switch from hiring ‘black’ South Africans to hiring mostly Basotho women (citizens of neighbouring Lesotho) to work in harvesting and processing a diverse range of crops at an approximate wage of a meagre $1.65 per day, for a gruelling 10 hours a day, 6.5 days a week (see Map 3.1).
A number of ‘forces of regulation’ (or more appropriately de- or re-regulation) on the eve of the fall of Apartheid conspired against white farmers; these included a de-regulation of marketing and processing of many agricultural products, lower crop-specific subsidies from the South African government, a decline in other financial subsidies including for cheaper credit, a worsening macro-economic environment that involved the deteriorating exchange rate of the South African currency (the Rand), which led in turn to a rise in the cost of imported agricultural inputs, and drought which exacerbated farmer indebtedness. All of these together placed enormous cost pressures on most white South African farmers.

As a consequence, farmers began to plant more asparagus and other horticultural products in the Free State mainly because it proved more profitable than cultivating other staples such as wheat and maize. While certainly, labour costs remained a significant component of costs for employers, that alone did not explain the hiring of Basotho workers and women in particular, since many men offered to work at the same wage.
Rather, the answer lies partly in the nature of the product and its ‘production imperatives’, but mainly in gendered stereotypes. Asparagus farming, which is extremely delicate and time-sensitive, is heavily mechanized and labour costs were actually a declining percentage of total production costs for employers. However, given how time-sensitive the harvesting of asparagus is, employers depended upon a night-shift-ready flexible labour force that could be called to the fields and canning factories at precisely the right moment. At the same time, employers were worried as much about labour stoppages or outright strikes than they were about cost, anticipating that ‘black’ South Africans would become more demanding after the official fall of Apartheid in 1994. In short, labour costs figured in the production equation, but so too did flexibility and docility. Thus, using labour contractors, employers turned especially, but not exclusively to Basotho women with the legal right to work in South Africa. Women were considered to be appropriate for what employers perceived to be ‘women’s work’. In Basotho women, employers saw a more docile, harder working, and more dexterous workforce than they did in South African or even Basotho men (by the way, dexterity and docility are also common stereotypes of Asian women). This might explain why some 60–75% of the farm workers were women, and why on at least one farm surveyed by Johnston, the percentage of Basotho seasonal migrant workers increased from 10% in 1985 to 82% in 1992. Employers preferred to recruit women with older children (their average age seemed to be 40), rather than those with infants or very young children. They believed that Basotho women with older children were saddled with considerable household responsibilities, and therefore would be more desperate for the money they sought to earn. As Johnston (2007) points out astutely, while white South African farmers claimed this would improve the lives of these poor women, ironically, these same farmers protested against earlier South African legislation that would have improved the pay and conditions of farm work.

This contract labour system appears to be an ideal system for employers but it ran into the problem of losing skilled canning labour throughout the year, and thus missing out on maximizing their investment in the on-site canning factories. Farmers began to plant other vegetables outside the asparagus growing season, lengthening the contract of some workers and issuing promises of employment in subsequent season. According to Johnston, employers’ efforts in this regard were emblematic of a nascent
‘migration system’ between the Free State and Lesotho in order to maximize worker productivity and thus returns on farmers’ investment.

Legal restrictions on hiring undocumented workers included considerable fines (for both employers and employees) and a five year prison sentence for each migrant worker employed. Fines however, were rarely imposed, since the South African government did not commit the necessary financial resources to upholding these regulations. In any case, even the legal migrant women in the Free State who were allegedly protected by Lesotho’s legislation on pay and working conditions for migrant workers, often had contracts that were easily violated. Migrants were often forced to pay the cost of their recruitment, and transportation and health care were deducted from their wages in a haphazard manner; the wage payment system remained erratic. While legal migrant women (some of them had previously worked illegally) were predominant on many farms, undocumented women were hired despite legal restrictions. The seasonal nature of asparagus farming meant most work contracts lasted between four and six months a year and employers seemed to prefer migrant workers because they could easily be repatriated or deported at the end of their work period. Workers were segmented along ethno-linguistic lines into work teams; Sotho-speaking Lesotho workers were distinguished from South African Xhosa or Tswana speakers, but also Sotho-speaking South African workers. Employers seemed to use ethnic-based segmentation to prevent workers from organizing, which is an all too common strategy among employers in poorer and richer countries alike.

The same ethnic distinctions mentioned above spilled over into the sphere of reproduction, where dormitories near the farms were also segregated along ethnic lines. Yet the abysmal conditions of social reproduction in Lesotho as well, were also crucial to this putative migration system, and as we discussed in Chapter 2, may be an exemplary case of ‘super-exploitation’. Employment opportunities – especially more formal employment – were scarce, and wages extremely low in Lesotho. Basotho migrant workers originated from particularly poor families with little education and poor health care. Many were single mothers with large numbers of children, and if married, remittances from male family members were unlikely. As with so many other labour migrations, this created a desperate labour force willing to work under conditions that would allow white South African farmers to remain profitable (Johnston, 2007).
Agricultural production and the demand for migrant workers: Guatemalan and Honduran migrants in the Belizean banana industry

A second example is that of the Belizean banana industry during the early 1990s (Moberg, 1996) (see Map 3.2).

Banana production in Central America is a system, despite the different characteristics of production in individual countries. Technological innovation and the transition from state-controlled to privately-owned plantations in the Guatemalan and Honduran banana industry led to a decline in the demand for workers. Without an abundance of alternatives for employment, banana workers from Guatemala and Honduras migrated to Belize. Until the early 1970s, Belizean workers constituted some 89% of all workers in the Belizean banana industry. By the 1970s, however, employers sought to sever their connection with the United General Workers’ Union (UGWU), and began to shed Belizean labour en masse. Government farms were privatized in 1985 and most of the farms were relatively small, though an Irish multinational company – responsible for marketing the bulk of Belizean fruit, not just bananas – owned three large farms. This privatization only strengthened the reliance on migrant workers as it eliminated the presence of union officials on plantations and rendered any existing contracts between employers and Belizean workers obsolete. Employers turned to both legal and undocumented Guatemalans, Hondurans, and Salvadorans fleeing the civil wars that plagued Central America during the 1980s and early 1990s. The wars had exacerbated poverty, and some Central Americans were seeking work to obtain exchangeable currency for eventual migration to the US. Many of the legal workers were refugees, and men and women were recruited alike, although men comprised the majority on the farms. Hiring migrant workers allowed employers to eliminate benefits such as protective clothing, transportation in and around the plantations, medical benefits, and vacation pay, which were formerly provided by the UGWU. As Moberg (1996) argues then, it is incorrect to assume that Belizeans did not want to work on the plantations; it was simply more profitable for the employers to hire migrant workers.

According to Moberg (1996), of the 1,380 farm workers on nearly all of the 23 banana production farms in the industry in 1993, 34% of the workers were Guatemalan, 32% Honduran, 25% Salvadoran, and...
Map 3.2 Belize and Cow Pen
Belizean workers (themselves of various ethnicities) constituted little more than 8% of all workers. Labour market segmentation along national lines proved integral to the industry, with Salvadorans working in the least desirable jobs, and with comparatively few in supervisory positions. Stereotypes of particular nationalities may have mattered here, as the field managers were themselves migrants who transferred their work regime from Guatemala and Honduras to the plantations of Belize. Yet there is another possible explanation. While work on banana plantations is not seasonal, many of the workers were transient, shifting to other banana farms or entirely different economic sectors, and many returned home to their countries of origin on occasion. Yet Salvadoran workers seemed to return home less than other Central Americans, and Salvadorans who had not yet migrated from El Salvador simply had less contact with workers in Belize. As a consequence, they were not necessarily aware of working conditions in the banana industry. It seemed therefore that Salvadorans were ‘willing’ to work under conditions that others were not. Moberg (1996) commented that one Danish company, which had a reputation for the use of child labour and fraudulent practices, hired a disproportionate number of Salvadorans (58% of the workers on one farm). It is not surprising to learn then that across the plantations, workers were treated differently depending on their nationality. Salvadorans reported $76 a month earnings, compared to $85 for Guatemalans, $84 for Hondurans and $98 for Belizeans. Employers used national and other ethnic differences and the conflicts between workers to their advantage, as it reduced workers’ willingness and ability to organize against employers. These ‘divide and rule’ strategies are hardly new, and actually quite pervasive within capitalist firms around the world (e.g. Samers, 1998b).

However, national differences were not the only divisions that employers exploited. We will recall the idea of ‘citizenship exploitation’ discussed earlier, and how the importance of certain ‘forces of regulation’ matter to segmentation. In this case, Belizean officials distinguished between refugees and ‘economic migrants’, though as Moberg reminds us, economic migrants can equally be considered ‘refugees’ insofar as malnutrition and starvation are also a form of persecution. Nevertheless, ‘economic migrants’ did not benefit from the residential status that refugees enjoyed and therefore had to tolerate working conditions that refugees did not. The working conditions on the plantations are
thus extremely difficult. Employers used overt intimidation and, as we discussed above, implanting immigrant informers on large farms.

The social reproduction of banana workers is bleak. Moberg’s case study revolves around Cowpen, a squatter settlement with some 1,800 residents near four large firms in the southern half of Belize. Immigrants live in dilapidated and unplanned housing, with no running water, electricity, health or medical facilities, and inadequate sewage infrastructure. The price of canned goods in the farm stores remained costly, despite that wages were 50% higher on the Belizean farms than elsewhere in Central America. These unhealthy and difficult conditions were made worse by routine crop-dusting with its carcinogenic effects. As one worker that Moberg recounts, claims: “I know workers who were poisoned when they were spraying Gramoxone [paraquat]. When they asked to be reassigned to do something else, they were fired instead. The managers have plenty here to take your place” (cited in Moberg, 1996, p. 432). Note how the words ‘plenty to take your place’ is redolent of Marx’s notion of the ‘relative surplus army’ that we discussed in Chapter 2 on ‘structural approaches’ to migration.

Alcohol-abuse and racist violence (based around nationality) were rife. Other forms of violence not immediately motivated by racism were common. The refugee communities were subject to oppression by individuals within the Guatemalan and Salvadoran security forces, who worked covertly on the farms. There was little escape from these conditions as most workers could not practice subsistence farming; most of the nearby land was fully owned by banana plantations. Farm workers often had to resort to theft, debt, or simply move to other farms.

One might assume then that Cowpen and other housing sites would have leant to social cohesion and the establishment of migrant ‘communities’ because most of the workers were Spanish-speaking and maintained cultural practices which were distinctive from Belize’s Afro-Caribbean Anglophone majority, because the types of social relations that existed in the squatter settlements were based on former banana production communities in El Salvador and Honduras, and because most workers did not want to return to their ‘home countries’, thus serving to cement local support networks in Cowpen and elsewhere. However, Moberg claimed that the variety of different nationalities within the squatter settlement seemed to thwart a sense of community.

The two case studies mentioned above represent a set of processes
which are by no means unique to other poorer countries or to richer ones, but nonetheless in their timing and territoriality, create a specific constellation of production imperatives, forces of regulation and processes of social reproduction which converged to create a geographically specific experience for migrant workers.

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, we briefly discussed the reasons for labour migration, and then outlined three prominent theories that concern the relationship between labour markets and migration, namely human capital theory, dual labour market theory, and labour market segmentation theory (LMST). Without completely discounting human capital theory and the idea of dual labour markets, I argued that LMST is a more relevant and sophisticated approach for understanding the position of migrants in twenty-first century labour markets. This approach typically implied that citizen employers (usually ‘white’) segmented migrants from poorer countries into – generally speaking – low-paid jobs based on migrants’ immigration status, nationality, and other ascribed (stereotyped) ethnic, gender, or racial characteristics. Such an assumption is certainly still valid, but it is not sufficient, given that in certain cities and their surrounding suburbs (sometimes ‘ethnoburbs’), migrants are part of ethnic economies or enclaves, where the employers are themselves migrants. In these sectors or occupations, migrant workers constitute such a large proportion of the labour force (that is, they are ethnic or immigrant ‘niches’) that migrants rather than citizens are recruited for jobs. This micro-geography of labour markets matter for how workers find jobs, what jobs they might perform, and perhaps the experiences they have of work, which are often awful. The global city hypothesis is yet another spatial theory connecting migrants with labour markets. It has much merit, but it neglects other cities that are also shaped by global flows. Sure, what are taken to be global cities concentrate considerable numbers of highly-skilled and low-skilled/low-paid migrants, but there are simply other geographies of work and migration. Adopting these insights, I then introduced what I call ‘international labour market segmentation’. This, I argued, is a useful means to understand the position of migrants through different territorialities, not least those of cities, but also rural areas and small towns, national states, and macro-regions such as the European
Union. I outlined some ‘production imperatives’ that were roughly universal among the wealthier countries. Again, the global city hypothesis serves as a guide, but it is inadequately nuanced concerning undocumented immigration and informal employment. We explored in some depth the relationship between these twinned phenomena, which I maintained were central features of migration and work in both wealthier and poorer countries. I finished the discussion of wealthy countries in particular, by exploring in more detail some of the ‘niches’ in which migrants work, and then outlining some basic points concerning the reproduction and regulation of labour migrants. The chapter came to conclusion by exploring two examples of labour market segmentation in poorer countries, which seemed to mirror many of the processes associated with segmentation in richer countries.

Since economic expansion and job creation is such a crucial goal for the majority of ruling governments in the world, labour migration becomes a pivotal strategy to meet this objective. Wealthier countries are especially preoccupied with attracting more highly-skilled labour and poorer countries with retaining highly-skilled labour, but most governments recognize the need to create channels for all different levels of skill for a diverse range of sectors and occupations. Thus work and its geographies feature at the heart of governmental responses to migration and immigration in countries around the world, and it is to understanding these varied immigration policies to which we turn our attention in Chapter 4.

FOR FURTHER READING

of Economic Sociology provide empirical material and overviews. Harald Bauder’s (2005) Labour Movement: How migration shapes labour markets provides considerable theoretical and empirical material on the experiences of low-skilled/low-paid migrant workers. SOPEMI provides data on OECD countries in its annual publication International Migration Outlook, and the IOM (International Organization for Migration) World Migration Report 2008 provides data on labour migration and labour migrants for the entire world, not just the OECD countries. And the World Migration Report 2008 includes individual chapters on highly-skilled migrants and international student mobility. Open Doors Online (http://opendoors.iienetwork.org/) also contains some very useful data on international student mobility.

SUMMARY QUESTIONS

1. Explain the limitations of human capital theory with respect to understanding the employment of migrant labour.
2. Explain the basic features of ‘international labour market segmentation’.
3. Elaborate on any differences between the economic activity and experiences of migrant workers in ‘wealthier’ and ‘poorer’ countries.
5. Discuss some of the reasons for the demand for migrant labour in the wealthier countries.
6. Elaborate on why social welfare and housing policies matter for the experiences of migrant workers.
INTRODUCTION

Even the casual observer at any international airport, bus terminal, or border crossing cannot help but notice the fortress-like quality of nation-states. National borders are porous, ever-changing and complex spaces (for example Anzaldúa, 1987) but they also display the symbolic and material power of national states. In this respect, it is a common assumption that states and their respective legal systems are essentially anti-immigration, uniformly racist, xenophobic, and exclusionary. Publics too might be expected to be univocally racist, culturalist, and xenophobic and essentially against immigration, wary of being ‘swamped’ (the term used by the former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher during the 1980s) and paranoid of ‘hordes’ and ‘invasions’ of certain kinds of migrants. There is no doubt much truth in these assumptions about states and publics, except for the adverbs ‘uniformly’ and ‘univocally’. Actual migration and immigration politics are far messier both in a social and spatial sense. If wealthy states are fortresses or ‘gated communities’ (van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007), then their draw-bridges are lowered for some in different times and in different sub-national spaces for quite specific purposes. For example, Hollifield (2004) speaks of ‘the emerging migration state’ in contrast to the nineteenth-century ‘garrison state’. For
Hollifield, ‘the migration state’ is caught in a ‘liberal paradox’ whereby it must reconcile openness to trade, investment, and people, with security. The migration state must ensure economic well-being, but also provide for the security of its citizens.

Yet states do not even meet ‘their’ own objectives. In fact, Cornelius (1994) develops what he calls the ‘gap hypothesis’, which suggests reasonably that the governments of wealthier countries are intent generally on restricting migration, but in reality, migration increases over time. Put differently, there are limits to governmental control and states often fail in achieving ‘their’ stated objectives (for example Castles, 2004).

Hollifield’s ‘migration state’ and Cornelius’ ‘gap hypothesis’ are simple conceptions of states and their (failed) objectives. For as political sociologists have long pointed out, ‘the state’ is not monolithic; that is, the state is not a ‘thing’ with one voice; it is not simply a one-room chamber of expert sages that churn out policy. Rather, states are complex apparatuses which contain many levels and different ‘branches’ or ‘wings’, often in conflict with each other. Nonetheless, Hollifield and Cornelius’ conception is stimulating enough to begin a discussion. In that regard, much ink has been spilled by political scientists in particular, to try to understand how migration politics and policies unfold. Yet like other dimensions of the study of migration, the multiple scales of these politics and policies have not been neglected, but it remains relatively under-evaluated and hardly explicit in most studies. Indeed, Favell (2008) argues that the last 30 years of devolution of power from national states to local levels of governments in Europe and North America have meant that local states are increasingly responsible for the regulation of citizenship and immigrant settlement. To take but one example, in 2006, the American states of Georgia and North Carolina proposed a tax on undocumented migrants’ remittances which they saw as ‘excess’ earnings that belonged to their respective governments (Smith and Winders, 2008). Thus, as Favell (2008) notes, it is against these sub-national policies that an alternative geo-politics of migration may erupt.

In order to explain the development of migration policies and some of their characteristics, I introduce a set of theoretical and conceptual arguments by scholars working on the geopolitics of migration. I say ‘arguments’ rather than ‘theories’ since many of the supposed theories of migration policy are not explicit about their philosophical foundations, nor are they as well-developed or clearly demarcated as theories of
migration. Nonetheless, enough differences can be discerned between them, and as in Chapter 1, I introduce a set of different perspectives in a systematic fashion. I begin with Marxist, neo-Marxist, and related approaches, including the critical analysis of neo-liberalism and its relation to the concept of ‘migration management’. I follow with a brief discussion of a ‘national identity approach’, and then move on to Freeman’s influential ‘client politics’ thesis. This thesis acts as a jumping-off point to explore further perspectives and elaborate on the relationship between states and migration. Although I have titled this chapter ‘geo-political economies of migration control’, many of these perspectives could not be classified as having an ‘economistic’ dimension at all, but some do. That may be a limitation of some of the arguments, but equally problematic is once again the neglect of ‘space’. The purpose of this chapter then, is to expose the reader to these different approaches, as well as to emphasize the significance of place, scale, and territory in migration policies without discussing these policies on a region-by-region or country-by-country-type analysis, as is typical of most conventional studies. As in the previous chapter, I also divide my discussion of migration policies into those more relevant to the ‘global north’ and a shorter discussion of migration policies in the ‘global south’. Once again, this may seem like a crude distinction since governments in poorer countries have similar concerns, but there are significant differences in their objectives from richer countries, and it is important to underline these.

THEORIES OF MIGRATION CONTROL IN THE ‘GLOBAL NORTH’

Marxist and neo-Marxist explanations of migration policy

Let us explore these theories systematically, beginning with Marxist and neo-Marxist accounts of migration policy. A crucial point to begin with is that generally speaking, theories emerge as a product of particular historical ‘moments’, and Marxist theories of migration control were by far more popular amongst scholars of migration in European countries and South Africa from the 1950s to the 1970s. The Marxist and Marxist-inspired literature focuses essentially on labour migration policies, and migrants are viewed as an exploited class, an ‘industrial reserve army’ – a ‘relative surplus population’ that can be easily called upon during times
of economic expansion, and easily fired during times of contraction or devaluation (recession). Migrants are seen further as a racialized fraction of the working class, a quantitatively and qualitatively flexible labour force that can weaken ‘working-class’ power and force down the ‘value of labour power’ (the rough equivalent of the ‘cost of labour’ in conventional/neo-classical economics), which would in turn benefit capitalists and the governments of particular nation-states. At the same time, migrants are perceived to lower the costs of social reproduction for capitalists and the state. This is so because many migrants will arrive in the country of immigration as working adults, and they do not need to be educated or housed by the state during their childhood. Furthermore, from a Marxist perspective, migrants are seen as reducing inflationary pressures in the country of immigration since employers pay extremely low wages to migrant workers. The combined low wages and lower costs of social reproduction accelerate capital accumulation. It is not surprising then that Marxist scholars spoke of the ‘structural necessity’ of migrant labour for European industry (for example Castells, 1975, Castles and Kosack, 1973; Miles, 1982).

Finally, in Marxist thought, the state is considered the ‘executive committee of the bourgeoisie’; in other words, the state is said to represent the interests of the capitalist class in either the country of emigration or immigration, but more likely the country of immigration. Since the 1970s, few people have adopted a Marxist approach to explain migration policies. This might be explained by the withering of Marxist analysis in general and the decline in (industrial) labour migration to countries in north-western Europe during the 1970s and 1980s. Another reason is that Marxist approaches have never involved a very sophisticated treatment of the state with respect to especially different kinds of migration and they therefore fail to capture comprehensively the relationship between states and migration. Some scholars (for example Cohen, 1987; Samers, 1999, 2003a; Sivanandan, 2001) do try to construct a nuanced neo-Marxist appreciation of migration policy by incorporating a more complex analysis of the state in terms of migration, but most people have abandoned such an approach. Nonetheless, the Marxist perspective seems to show up implicitly in the critique of neo-liberalism.
From a neo-Marxist approach to the critique of neo-liberalism

Over the last decade, there has been a renewed academic focus on the relationship between government policies and labour migration, and this is couched typically in terms of a critique of neo-liberalism. I have already elaborated on the idea of neo-liberalism in earlier chapters so I will not reiterate its contours here. I will point out simply that governments have come under critical scrutiny by academics in particular for privileging the liberalization of the movements of some people at the expense of others, hence the implicit (and sometimes explicit) critique of the class dimension of migration policies within the critique of neo-liberalism. In fact, even when ‘low-skilled’ migrants are accepted, their social entitlements are severely limited and their economic rights curtailed. As Smith and Winders (2008) insist, neo-liberal policies, programmes, practices, and discourses expect migrants to be “hyper-mobile, reliable, disposable, productive, affordable, implicitly youthful and male” (pp. 63–64). In any case, scholars have relied critically on different versions of the idea of ‘neo-liberal governance’ or ‘neo-liberal ‘governmentality’ to explain migration policies in the wealthier countries in particular. For example, Bauder (2008) explores how a neo-liberal-oriented media reinforced the restructuring of welfare in Germany and the privileging of highly-skilled migrants in migration policy. In contrast, Coleman (2005) and Sparke (2006) explore the contradictions of neo-liberal governance on one hand with security concerns on the other in the US. If neo-liberalism has remained dominant over the past two decades as a set of policies and programmes, then the essential argument is that governments have selectively liberalized migration (or neglected to some extent stopping those who are entering clandestinely) because:

- ‘Low-wage’ migrants perform jobs that allegedly citizens do not wish to perform under the prevailing conditions and/or low wages that are offered, and by providing cheap labour, they benefit capital accumulation. At the same time, they are only desirable in the eyes of national governments insofar as they do not create unusual burdens on now skeletal welfare systems.
- Governments (especially those of the European countries and Japan) perceive there to be a ‘demographic deficit’ and are worried about the effect that fewer domestic workers will have on the sustainability of social programs in the future, especially pension schemes.
• Governments believe that highly-skilled immigrants (from business managers to computer scientists and doctors and nurses) either stimulate capital accumulation through innovation and investment, or save cash-strapped health and other social services by providing necessary skills.

• Governments agree that international students provide financial resources directly for universities, and often indirectly for governments and businesses. They see international students as ensuring that science and engineering departments receive adequate students and that national competitiveness is secured through scientific and engineering innovation.

Neo-liberalism or ‘migration management’?

As mentioned briefly in the previous chapters, governments and some less critical scholars prefer to speak of ‘migration management’ rather than ‘neo-liberalism’. ‘Migration management’ or ‘managed migration’ refers to a set of policies across the wealthier countries that are designed to regulate carefully the type and number of migrants, whether it concerns asylum-seekers, family members, or workers. However, migration management is aimed especially at ensuring that the ‘right’ kind (and often the ‘right’ number) of migrants meets specific labour market demands (see Morris, 2002 and Kofman, 2008 for discussions). This is accomplished through Canadian- and Australian-inspired ‘points systems’ or similar tiered migration management systems that either involve different ‘tiers’ or skill categories or attach a certain number of points to a migrant’s education, skills, finances, and so forth. They allow entrance into a country based on the total number of points, usually out of 100. These labour market demands are closely monitored and various national agencies and programs have proliferated over the last decade to streamline labour migration and recruit more highly-skilled migrants, while carefully restricting others, from Finland’s Migration Policy Programme to the Migration Advisory Committee in the UK and Canada’s Foreign Credential Referral Office (OECD/SOPEMI, 2008). While these kinds of recruitment ‘organizations’ are hardly new, what is new is the complex ways in which different kinds of migration are assessed for their ‘value’ to especially labour market needs and national economic competitiveness. For example, the UK has developed an Australian-type tiered
migration management system, Germany fashioned a special ‘Green card’ for information technology specialists in the early 2000s, as did Ireland for highly-skilled migrants in general, and Denmark implemented a ‘foreign experts’ visa (Pellerin, 2008; OECD/SOPEMI, 2008). Compared to the 1980s and early 1990s, migration management also involves an increasing reliance on temporary labour migration to satisfy labour market demands, again with close monitoring of the ‘temporariness’ of migrants (Pellerin, 2008).

In this respect, ‘migration management’ as a set of discourses and policies is certainly compatible with neo-liberalism in that it is designed to promote economic competitiveness on the one hand and restrict access to those who might be a burden on stripped-down welfare systems on the other. At the same time, paradoxically, it requires a small army of state workers to manage such migration. And perhaps more importantly, migration management reflects government’s concern with other issues including security, the dictates of foreign policy, trade liberalization, promoting the international standing of a country, creating ethnic or racial homogeneity, nation-building (see for example Walsh, 2007 on Australia), and advancing ‘an imagined future’ (Walton-Roberts, 2004 on Canada). Equally, governments seek to control the growth of informal labour markets, stop smuggling and trafficking, sustain pension systems, meet or address humanitarian obligations such as family reunification, and regulate acceptance and settlement of asylum-seekers and refugees. By now it should be clear, however, that the balance at the beginning of the twenty-first century has shifted on the one hand to the selective and sometimes temporary recruitment of highly-skilled labour, a restrictive stance towards family reunification (for example Kofman, 2004), tightening the criteria by which asylum-seekers and refugees are accorded a haven, and reducing low-wage migration through bureaucratic and highly scrutinized temporary labour migration schemes for certain low-wage economic activities that I discussed in Chapter 3.

Those critical of the discourse of ‘migration management’ from both the ‘left’ and the ‘right’ in the countries of immigration stress its effect on creating undocumented migration by at least two means. The first ‘means’ is the use of regularization programs (also called amnesties or legalization programs) such as in France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the US over the last 20 years. The right tends to view such programs suspiciously on the
grounds that it encourages others to migrate and ‘wait it out’ in an irregular status until the next ‘amnesty’. There is little evidence of this, however. They also see regularizations as a signal that a government has lost control of migration. In contrast, those more left-leaning citizens may favour certain kinds of regularizations in certain countries at particular moments. However, they also see the tightening of asylum policy as creating undocumented migration because by making it more difficult to enter through the legal channel of asylum-seeking, migrants are left with little choice but to enter clandestinely. Regularization programs, along with other policies, seem to highlight not only the many unintended consequences of managed migration and greater restriction (for example Castles, 2004; Massey et al., 2002), but also the class dimensions of migration management (McGregor, 2008, or Datta et al. 2007). Nevertheless, most critical discussions of migration management do not couch it in a language of class. It is more common to see ‘migration management’ as a means of dividing migrants into the ‘desirable’ and the ‘less desirable’ through ‘exclusionary’ processes that involve a fortress-like mentality (for example, the idea of ‘Fortress Europe’ that emerged in the 1990s). Nevertheless, Marxist arguments still seem remarkably useful, but changed social and political economic realities, academic fashions, the desire to provide fresh perspectives, and a focus on asylum-seekers and refugees and those marginalized from the world of work altogether, have all but buried a Marxist analysis of migration policy.

The national identity approach

In what Meyers (2000) calls the ‘national identity’ approach, migration policy can be understood through national models of citizenship, self-understandings of nationhood among governments and publics, myths of national homogeneity and identity, and the character of political and legal culture in a given country. He recalls the now widely read works of Higham (1955) and Jones (1960) who link a sense of ‘American identity’ to US immigration policies during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As Meyers (2000) explains:

They [Higham and Jones] argue that social cleavages, social unrest and industrial unrest within American society foster fears of losing national identity and of national breakdown. This in turn produces
nationalism and nativism (xenophobia). Higham and Jones view nativism as a psychological phenomenon: a decline in American confidence in the country’s unity produces nativistic outbursts; an optimistic mood limits nativism.

(p. 1253)

Other ‘classic’ readings within a national identity approach divide the wealthy countries of immigration into ‘settler societies’ (for example, Australia, Canada, and the US) and ‘ethnic states’ (for example, Austria, Germany, and Switzerland); homogenous and heterogeneous states (see Castles and Miller, 1993), and countries which subscribe to a jus soli (law of soil) or a jus sanguinis (law of blood) conception of citizenship (I will discuss this distinction later in the chapter). Still others, such as Faist (1995), speaks of only two forms of citizenship today in the wealthy countries: ‘ethno-cultural political inclusion’ and ‘pluralist political inclusion’. Certainly, we could carry on ad infinitum with these typologies, and given the common thread of critiquing methodological nationalism in this book, it would be easy to poke fun at such a way of thinking. However, Meyers (2000) suggests that this approach has three strengths: first, it examines national cultural idioms and traditions which frame what is politically possible. As he argues, ‘State policies are not constructed in a vacuum, but rather are influenced, to some degree, by the history and traditional ways of thinking of a society’ (p. 1255). A second strength for Meyers is that it explains why some states prefer temporary migration (e.g. Germany) and others permanent (e.g. France). For example, Hollifield (2000) argues that France’s migration and immigration politics are still shaped by a peculiarly French notion of republicanism, a universalizing vision in which all ‘foreigners’ are ‘good’ insofar as they assimilate or integrate into French political culture. Only permanent immigrants, successive French administrations claim, will embrace this political culture (see Brubaker, 1992). Third, conflict along ethnic, racial, and religious lines, such as between Anglophones and Francophones in Quebec, and Jews and Palestinians in Israel, can drive what kind of migration or immigration is desirable.

With the exception perhaps of the third purported strength indicated by Meyers, this approach is hopelessly flawed and limited. Indeed, instead of taking ‘national identities’ as given, more critical thinkers have explored the way in which national discourses intersect with age, gender,
sexuality, ethnicity, ‘race’, and so forth, to construct multiple affinities, identities, and state policies (see Box 4.1).

Box 4.1 CONTROLLING THE MIGRATION OF BANGLADESHI WOMEN TO MALAYSIA: A QUESTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY? (ADAPTED FROM DANNECKER, 2005)

Can the politics of emigration from Bangladesh and the politics of migration in Malaysia be understood from a national identity perspective? In the early 1980s, certain Asian countries became major destination countries for migrant women from other Asian countries, including Bangladesh. Both Bangladesh and Malaysia are predominantly Muslim countries and Malaysia, like the Gulf states, have sought Muslim migrants as low-paid workers. However, a male-dominated migrant workers’ organization in Kuwait and an Islamic organization in Bangladesh pushed the Bangladeshi government to halt the emigration of Bangladeshi women in 1981, and the government began to allow only professional Bangladeshi women to emigrate. They justified this decision on the argument “that women’s honour could only be protected if women were not allowed to leave their families, their communities and their ‘home’” (Dannecker, 2005, 657). In 1988, the Bangladeshi government reversed the 1981 decree, and migration increased significantly. However, in 1997, a new and even more stringent ban was implemented, and professional women were also prevented from migrating. Women were not allowed to leave Bangladesh without a man, and this time, the Bangladeshi government justified its policies ironically on the research of human rights organizations which warned of the dangers that migrant women face while overseas. The human rights organizations denounced in turn the use of their research in this way. To understand the 1981 and 1997 emigration controls, we need to look more closely at Bangladeshi society. In fact, the restriction on the emigration of women could be viewed from the ‘outside’ as a matter of a national (Islamic) identity, but in fact it is as much shaped by gender relations between men and women.
Many Bangladeshi men view Bangladeshi women abroad as ‘loose’, sexually promiscuous, and unable to control their wishes for consumer goods and other desires when in Malaysia. This is part of a larger perspective among Bangladeshi men who see the freedom of migrating women as a violation of purdah (a common practice in Islamic countries whereby women are physically separated from men other than their husbands, and their bodies and faces are covered and veiled). Purdah remains a powerful idea and practice in Bangladesh. All of the men that Dannecker interviews refer to purdah as the ideal gender order, and as one of the male migrants in Malaysia claims:

‘It is not good for Bangladeshi women to come to Malaysia and work here. They are without guardians. Therefore they often behave wrongly. They have contact with men, they do not dress properly and they spend their money on consumer items instead of sending it home, therefore we keep away from them.’

(p. 660)

Bangladeshi women may have different views. Consider the thoughts of one Bangladeshi woman in Malaysia:

‘See, Malaysia is a Muslim country. Nevertheless, women can work here. They can earn their own money and people do not gossip about them. On the contrary, their husbands support them and even help them with their housework. In Bangladesh, men do not work in the house, they just leave their lungis [a man’s garment in the form of a skirt] wherever they are. Men are idle in our country. At home, we are not supposed to work and even if we do, people will say bad things. Our husbands will never support a working woman, even if he has no job. In Bangladesh, they say that a good Muslim woman does not work outside the house, but the Malays are also good Muslims, aren’t they?’

(p. 667)

Male migrants to Malaysia bring back this image of the ‘loose’ Bangladeshi woman, and that shapes the opinions of even those who have never migrated. As Dannecker notes, ‘The bad reputation
of migrant women in Bangladesh is a result of the successful transnational networking of male migrants, Islamic organizations and intellectuals’ (p. 662). These organizations have gained in strength while pushing for an Islamic identity. They create a transnational space by regular visits of representatives of their organizations of migrant workers in Malaysia and the Middle East. So whereas men display with pride the material goods in their homes which they have earned from migration, Bangladeshi women tend to avoid this. As one Bangladeshi man claims:

‘We are very embarrassed that our daughter went to Malaysia even though we need the money she earns. We all know how the women behave there and that the environment is not good for them. Probably she will not find a husband after coming back.’

(p. 660)

As a consequence, Bangladeshi men tend to avoid migrant women either in Bangladesh or Malaysia. Thus men mobilize the notion of purdah to exclude women from the spaces of migration and in doing so construct a particular kind of Bangladeshi nationality and community. And in Malaysia, Bangladeshi men present themselves as representatives of Bangladeshi culture, a sort of national identity if you will. This supposed ‘national identity’ is really a reflection of Bangladeshi men’s wishes to change the ‘gender order’, as well as the practices of the Bangladeshi and Malaysian government. It is therefore a strategy to maintain male privilege. That the Bangladeshi government implemented bans on female migration made the Malaysian government increasingly reluctant to allow Bangladeshi women to enter Malaysia. However, regardless of attempts by Bangladeshi men to impede migration, protests from civil society organizations in Bangladesh and recruitment agencies forced the government to change its mind on the ban. Still, the procedures for the migration of women are much more complicated than for men.
Wright and Ellis (2000b) have added an explicitly spatial argument to this well-worn critique of the idea of ‘national identity’ as the source of migration and immigration policies. In a unique paper, they contend that the politics of migration and immigration in the US will be shaped increasingly by the city-region, state-based, or regional character of migration settlement in an extraordinarily diverse US. Assimilation is not dead, but the idea of an American national identity centred on ‘whiteness’ is to one degree or another no longer tenable, if it ever was. They caution, however, that such regionalized migration politics will increasingly be the product of the relationship between a new white minority living in regions dominated numerically and politically by immigrants, and the politics of immigrants in these same regions.

From a different but similarly spatially-sensitive angle, national identity and a nativist (i.e. anti-immigrant) response appear as more localized and focused on ‘culture’ rather than explicitly on ‘race’. For example, Smith and Winders (2008) note that in Nashville, in the American state of Tennessee, the resentment among many citizens towards undocumented Latino migrants is couched in the ‘neutral language’ of ‘illegality’, but it is also about the defence of place, heritage, and ‘culture’, where migrants are perceived to be a threat to an ‘American culture’, represented presumably by ‘the culture’ of Nashville. Campaigns in the southern US to make English the official language are common, but it is not just a struggle over culture; there is resentment on economic grounds as well. One ‘black worker’ who they interviewed resented migrants for taking ‘all the benefits’ while African-Americans were citizens and received nothing. Similarly, Smith and Winders cite the Governor of Georgia who complained that “It is simply unacceptable for people to sneak into this country illegally on Thursday, obtain a government-issued ID on Friday, head for the welfare office on Monday, and cast a vote on Tuesday” (Office of the Governor, 2006, cited in Smith and Winders, 2008, 67). In light of such a statement, Smith and Winders (2008) protest that, “Moving through illicit border crossings, identification theft, stolen public resources and voter fraud in one breath, these allegations of criminality invoke fear that not only Georgia but also the nation is threatened and encourage militaristic defences of ‘America’ at multiple scales” (p. 67). At other times, this localized politics can be confused and contradictory. For example, the Governor of the state of Arkansas supported the deportation of ‘illegal aliens’ but insisted also on free prenatal services...
for undocumented pregnant women because it promoted a ‘pro-life’/anti-abortion agenda (Smith and Winders, 2008).

The discussions of Wright and Ellis and Smith and Winders illustrate that sub-national spaces matter to the politics of migration, a point often missed by much of the migration studies literature that is still mired in a methodologically nationalist mindset.

Freeman’s ‘client politics’ thesis

In Freeman’s (1995) influential notion of ‘client politics’, migration policies are a product of different ‘clients’: the “small and well organized groups intensely interested in policy . . . [who] develop close working relationships with those officials responsible for it” (p. 886). Migration policy will be shaped disproportionately by the strongest clients. Freeman argues that since migrant and related ethnic minority groups are increasingly making their voices heard among governments, and since certain employers will lobby for more liberal migration policies because they depend on migrant labour, migration policies are likely to be ‘expansionary’ (that is, geared towards increasing migration). The ‘clients’ can be divided into two groups: those that support migration (business leaders, immigrant and ethnic minority groups, pro-migrant NGOs, etc.) and those who, generally speaking, do not support migration (nativist; in other words, nationalist or anti-immigrant groups and their related NGOs). Freeman argues that migration policies will be expansionary because the benefits of liberal immigration policies are concentrated among employers and pro-migrant groups, while the costs are diffused amongst everyone else who makes up the voting citizens of a nation state.

Drawing on the work of Ruggie (1982) and later Hollifield (1992), a final claim of Freeman is that the ‘advanced liberal democracies’ of North America and western Europe are composed of an ‘embedded liberalism’ which prevents the selective exclusion of migrants based on racial or ethnic grounds. He calls this an ‘anti-populist’ norm, and concludes therefore that a consensus will be sought across the political spectrum, instead of allowing debates on immigration to seep into party politics.

Joppke’s ‘self-limited sovereignty’ argument

Freeman’s analysis received considerable attention and set a certain agenda for research, while quickly attracting critics. And many of his
direct critics were to be found in Europe, or at least they used European countries to explore the veracity of Freeman’s claims. To begin with, Joppke (1998a) argues that Freeman’s analysis, which arose out of the lobbying climate of the US, made little sense in the context of what he called ‘unwanted family reunification’ in European countries after the early 1970s, when Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Germany, and the UK had halted labour and family migration. They only reluctantly agreed in the late 1970s and early 1980s to once again accept family reunification owing to the moral and legal rights of labour migrants. But then this was not a result of lobbying by ‘client groups’, but rather by the decisions of liberal courts. In fact, Joppke points out that Freeman paid little attention to the judicial dimension of states, and how the legal process within countries also serves to create expansionary immigration policies. Specifically, Joppke argues that judges are immune to the demands of ‘clients’ (e.g. anti-immigrant groups), and are therefore more preoccupied with constitutional laws and statues. Thus, rather than Freeman’s ‘clients’ shaping migration policies, Joppke insists that the legal process (moral obligations and legal constraints) figure prominently in expansionary immigration policies. He does acknowledge, however, that these obligations and constraints change over time and national differences in the moral responses to ‘unwanted immigration’ matter, especially between northern and southern European countries. Italy, in particular, only began experiencing immigration in the mid-1970s. Yet Freeman concludes his analysis that courts’ liberal jurisprudence prevents states from barring entry to ‘unwanted family migrants’ and/or to deporting migrants that governments see as undesirable or illegal. Thus, national states limit their own sovereignty – their own ability to control increasing migration. He calls this ‘self-limited sovereignty’. Clearly, this is a much different interpretation of state practices than what is provided by the more critical literature on the surge of deportations of especially asylum-seekers and undocumented migrants after September 11, 2001.

In any case, Joppke (1998a) agrees that Freeman’s anti-immigration clients still matter to one degree or another to the politics and policies of migration (what he calls political process in contrast to legal process), and thus migration policies will not always be ‘expansionary’. We will discuss this seemingly obvious point about anti-immigrant politics in a subsequent section, but let us first turn to the extent to which pro-migrant clients actually can and do exercise their power by drawing on a very different and
unusual critique of Freeman’s work from a political sociology perspective.

A political sociology of migration policy

Writing from the context of Italy and Europe more broadly, Sciortino (2000) raises a number of objections to Freeman’s analysis, but let me specify just two of these reservations. First, for Sciortino, migration policy is only rarely shaped by resident foreigners. That is, they are not very powerful ‘clients’. This is even more the case with undocumented migrants and asylum-seekers who, for Sciortino, are hardly lobbyists because they are outside the formal political system. Second, in his rejection of the political economy approach to migration policy (whether it be Marxist, client politics-based, or otherwise), Sciortino argues that political decision-makers and legislators do not simply process ‘information’ from ‘clients’ (let us say, a demand for amnesty or regularization for undocumented migrants on the part of migrant NGOs, or a demand by NGOs to liberalize family migration). Rather, he advocates a general political sociology approach, and specifically, a ‘sociology of decision-making’ whereby we should study how policy-makers actually do relate to lobbyists, and whether they care what lobbyists have to say (see also Guiraudon, 2003; Boswell, 2008). However, whether or not policy-makers are in fact influenced by lobbyists, policy-makers are themselves shaped by class, racial, and other gender identities which in turn form what is and what is not acceptable migration policy (Samers, 2003a).

Are all employers similar ‘clients’? Government responses to the employers of undocumented migrants

In Freeman’s thesis, the category of ‘employer’ is too simplistic, since some employers claim that other employers are using undocumented migrant workers unfairly (‘social dumping’), which threatens their own competitiveness. Do employers of undocumented migrants lobby governments for an expansionary migration? Perhaps, although there is little research on this issue. More to the point, that employers using undocumented migrant workers are simply appeased by governments is clearly not the case, at least not according to political rhetoric. Indeed, Freeman completely ignores that most governments in the rich world are
concerned increasingly with the relationship between undocumented migration and informal employment over the last two decades, either because of the implications of a completely ‘disorganized national labour market’, because publics associate undocumented immigrants with security risks, or because governments feel the pressure among worried, anti-immigrant citizens that the government should once again be ‘doing something’ to stamp out informal/illegal work and undocumented migration. Work raids and deportations act as effective symbols of this capacity to regulate both. However, the politics around informal employment and undocumented migration are also contradictory. The lack of personnel to scrutinize errant employers, the difficulty of imposing fines and the obstacles to deporting workers, the periodic shortages of migrant workers during moments of crackdowns, and the apparent benefits to national competitiveness that stem from paying workers extremely low wages and little or no benefits, might go a long way in explaining the contradictions of regulating informal employment and undocumented migration.

The ‘up-scaling’ of migration policy

A second clear problem with Freeman’s analysis is the question of the re-territorialization or re-scaling of migration control. Recall from the Introduction to this book that I use ‘scale’ partly as a synonym for ‘territory’, and ‘territorialization’ as a synonym for the scale(s) of regulation or control. Writing again in the context of the European Union, Guiraudon (2000) and Guiraudon and Lahav (2000) argue that migration policy is undergoing a process of ‘up-scaling’, ‘down-scaling’, and ‘out-scaling’. The term ‘up-scaling’ is consistent with arguments concerning the globalization or internationalization of politics of which so much has been written about in the last two decades. More specifically, up-scaling involves the shifting of migration and immigration policy decision-making from national states to supra-national institutions such as the European Commission or the Council of the European Union. This might also be called the ‘globalization’, ‘internationalization’, or ‘post-nationalization’ of migration control. Down-scaling entails shifting power or decision-making to local governments, NGOs, charities, and other bodies, and ‘out-scaling’ (or in a more common terminology, ‘outsourcing’) shifts control to private actors. Clearly, Guiraudon is not the only person to develop such a ‘re-scaling’ framework in order to
characterize these sorts of changes in the governance of migration, but it is nonetheless a useful, if not unproblematic way of thinking about the politics of migration. We can examine this particular re-scaling argument by focusing at this stage on the question of ‘up-scaling’, and return to ‘down-scaling’ and ‘out-scaling’ in a subsequent section. In the migration literature, the term used for this ‘up-scaling’ is often ‘supranationalization’, and we can assess its value using three examples: the supranationalization of migration policies in the EU and the world more generally; the supranationalization of asylum and refugee protection around the world; and the implications that international trading blocs and institutions such as NAFTA and GATS have for the development of national migration politics and policies.

(1) Is there a supranationalization of migration policies to and within the EU? The answer to this question is ‘yes’ and ‘no’. While the Brussels-centred European Commission (and to a less extent the European Parliament) are now responsible for devising European-wide migration policy legislation, these are still to one extent or another decided upon or legislated by the Council of Ministers, also located in Brussels, which is an intergovernmental body composed of representatives of the member states, and is not strictly a supra-national decision-making body. Geddes (2000, 2003b) calls this ‘communatarization’ (policies are devised at the level of the European ‘community’), but with a creeping ‘supra-nationalization’ (because policies are becoming truly European-wide policies). This means that there is not yet (at the time of this writing) a single European-wide migration policy for migration from outside the EU, but there is an intra-European migration policy and an emergent European regime, which is composed of the following attributes:

a) National governments still determine the number and type of labour and other migrants to their respective countries from outside the EU, including family members (see Box 4.2) and asylum-seekers and refugees. However, there is an emergent European-level asylum and refugee regime or system, involving the Dublin II convention, so-called ‘burden-sharing’, and the European Refugee Fund. (See Box 4.4)

b) Initially based on the 1985 Schengen Agreement, land border controls within European countries were eliminated in 2007, except for the UK and Ireland, where their respective governments have instead
developed a ‘Common Travel Area’. Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Romania are also not included within this intra-European space of Schengen countries as of 2008. And despite open land borders, airports continue to separate passengers coming from Schengen countries, from passengers originating in non-Schengen countries.

c) The beginnings of a European-wide policy to impose sanctions on employers who hire ‘third country nationals’ (migrants from outside the EU).

d) The beginnings of a European-wide ‘integration policy’, in which the European Commission has proposed an EU-wide policy that would create a universal European permit in terms of working and residence rights.

e) The creation of a European ‘blue card’ for highly-skilled migrants and offering privileged status to them. This is designed to increase the ‘competitiveness’ of the EU vis-à-vis other regions (OECD/SOPEMI, 2008).

Box 4.2 FAMILY MIGRATION POLICIES IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (FROM KOFMAN, 2004)

Family migration remains understudied, particularly in the context of the European Union (Kofman, 2004). The lack of studies that address such migration in the context of the EU is, on one hand, surprising since the majority of migrants from outside the EU have been family migrants from about the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s, and family migration also represents more than two-thirds of all migrants in the US, and about one-third in Canada and about 25% in Australia. On the other hand, it is not surprising since Kofman argues that there has been an emphasis on labour migration in which men are associated with economic life and the public sphere, while women are associated with social life and the private sphere (p. 256). Nonetheless, family migration has generally been tightened in European countries since the 1990s. For example, in Italy, family migration policies remained relatively generous and parents and brothers and sisters could join their initial migrant relation in Italy fairly easily, until the Bossi-Fini law of 2002. While individual European countries have developed more restrictive
policies, the EU has not yet produced any law with legal teeth that
gives the right to family life for ‘third country nationals’. Therefore,
this allows individual member states a certain amount of legal,
political, and social space to formulate their own policies, albeit
subject to such conventions as the European Convention on
Human Rights, and other European laws and policies. There are
different dimensions to this tightening and they vary from country
to country.

The primary means by which states regulate migration are
through the definition of the family, minimum and probationary
residence periods, adequate financial resources and ‘sufficient’
housing, age requirements, regulating family visits, and regulating
the family reunion of refugees and others granted temporary pro-
tection. Let us explore these eight different dimensions.

1) Families are diverse and often involve ‘transnational’ forms
with family members spread out over a number of continents
(e.g. Hong Kong families dispersed across Australia, Europe,
and North America) Yet European governments have generally
retained a very narrow definition of family, limiting it to
spouses and dependent children (under 18). As Kofman points
out, migrants cannot determine who their family members
are; this is determined by the state of immigration in question.
The Netherlands, Scandinavian countries, and the UK are the
only three countries that allow ‘same-sex’ couples to enter if
they resemble a ‘conventional’ nuclear family. Indeed, migra-
tion policies in the EU rest on assumptions of the heterosexual
family (Simmons, 2008).

2) There are enormous differences in the residency requirements
between European countries before a migrant can bring in
family members. The longest required period of residence
before family reunification can occur is in Germany and
Switzerland, and many European states do not allow family
reunification for temporary visa holders, except for highly-
skilled temporary migrants.

continued
3) The migration of parents is very restricted. In only Denmark, Spain, and the UK are the parents of migrants able to join the original migrants and only if they are dependent upon them. In other countries, such as Germany, a migrant may bring in their parents for ‘humanitarian reasons’, and in the Netherlands, parents may be brought in if they face ‘serious difficulties’ (p. 245).

4) Governments are particularly concerned with what are perceived as fraudulent ‘marriages of convenience’ or ‘arranged marriages’ involving willing or reluctant men and women. The UK’s Nationality and Immigration Act of 2002 addressed this issue by preventing migrants from changing their residence status from a temporary permit to a more settled situation through marriage. Though this sort of policy is not common throughout the EU, other governments such as that of the Netherlands remain vigilant. For example, a significant age difference signals to authorities that a marriage may be fraudulent, and couples have to demonstrate that they have not united other than for reasons of love and commitment. And further restrictive policies directed at the spouse of a migrant in the Netherlands limits that person to dependence on the initial migrant. In the UK, domestic violence has been taken into account when marriages break down during the probationary period, but they can also be used as a pretext for extending the period. Many are refused family reunion on the grounds of insufficient income and/or housing.

5) In terms of adequate income and other financial resources, dependence on benefits is also an obstacle to family reunion in Germany and the Netherlands. In France, family allowances cannot be considered part of one’s minimum income, and a migrant’s income must be at least equal to the government minimum wage. For family members in the UK, they cannot rely on child benefits, disability allowance, housing benefits, and unemployment. Higher unemployment levels and the diminished stocks of public housing are likely to lessen the possibility of bringing in family members. Domestic workers,
such as maids, nannies, and so forth may find it particularly difficult to bring in family members since they often live with the family for whom they work. This is especially the case in Italy, although many Filipina women who have been in Italy for a long time have now brought in husbands.

6) States may regulate family migration through age requirements. For example, the age of children to be allowed into Germany is now 12 (down from 18), and in 2002, Denmark raised the age that a spouse can be brought in by both citizens and non-citizens to at least 24. This severe legislation passed by a more right-wing government at the time seemed to be targeted against the rapidly growing Turkish, North African and hence generally Islamic population in Denmark. This policy quickly became the subject of a legal debate.

7) In the UK, family visits are restricted if there is any hint that a visiting family member may overstay their tourist visa. This has fallen particularly hard on Jamaicans, whose applications have been disproportionately rejected. Even worse, they are denied admission after a long voyage to the UK. In general, such visa restrictions are tighter on countries whose residents are suspected of potentially ‘overstaying’ their visa. This has implications for those family members who are visiting for care purposes. Close relatives may be forced to leave, thus disrupting their caring for someone who is ill.

8) Only ‘convention refugees’ are allowed to bring in close family. Most others who are granted temporary protection status must satisfy income and housing criteria and wait for a few years while complying with other conditions before their family can join them. Evidence from the UK suggests that most must wait a few years before family reunion. Again, in the case of refugees, extended family members may be spread out throughout the globe, and the restricted definition of the family does not help.

Despite this restrictive stance towards migration, Kofman recognizes that this runs up against states’ interest in liberalizing migration for those family members with the ‘right skills’.
If we look beyond the EU to regulation at the global scale, other major international legal instruments include the International Labour Organization Conventions on the Rights of Migrant Workers (ILO 97 in 1949, and ILO no. 143 in 1975), and the UN Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Family (1990, but effective only in 2003), as well as two protocols on trafficking (in 2003) and smuggling (2004). There are limitations to this global, or more accurately, international human rights regime. One, there is no means of enforcing adherence to these legal instruments, only a general agreement that their principles should be followed, and second, ILO and related conventions only cover workers whose jobs “are defined as continuous and indefinite”, which clearly does not cover the growing number of temporary labour migrants and their respective families. Considering the above, it seems that such conventions have only limited effects on constructing migration policy (Pellerin, 2008, 32).

2) Is there a supranationalization of asylum and refugee protection? Concerning a global human rights regime, the key legislation as I noted in the Introduction to the book is the Geneva Convention (1951) and the 1967 (New York) Protocol. While the 1967 protocol dissolved the racist and exclusionary character of the Convention for persons claiming asylum, it tended to privilege civil and political rights to refugees in Europe, rather than to economic and social assistance in poorer countries (Hyndman, 2000). Furthermore, in the early twenty-first century, states have interpreted the Geneva Convention very strictly, and social protection once in Europe and North America for example, is rather limited (Hyndman and Mountz, 2008). In Asia, only three countries have signed both the Geneva Convention and the 1967 (New York) Protocol: Cambodia, East Timor, and the Philippines, and there seems to be no counterpart to other regional-based Conventions in other regions of the world (Hedman, 2008). And while aid and humanitarian-oriented assistance is pursued in many signatory countries, it is often caught up with foreign policy concerns, or does not meet the needs of the people it intends to serve, or it has counter-productive effects. Finally, despite the Geneva Convention as international law, it is routinely violated because there is little enforcement and asylum-seekers have become subject to security concerns (Hyndman and Mountz, 2008).

3) Do international trading blocs and institutions have an effect on national politics of migration? Can we discern whether global or international ‘neo-liberal’
institutions such as GATS (the General Agreement on Trade in Services) and NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) shape national migration politics? Pellerin (2008) focuses on so-called ‘Mode 4’ of the World Trade Organization’s global-oriented GATS. ‘Mode 4’ pertains to the ‘temporary presence of physical persons of one member state in order to supply services to another member state’ (p. 31). Services have become among the most propulsive sectors of global capital accumulation, and poorer countries (especially those who are the chief exporter of service labour such as India) are interested in liberalizing trade in services, but only if this includes Mode 4. While richer countries agreed to this stipulation, they insist that they should be able to regulate such limited mobility as they see fit, and should be able to intervene if such mobility threatens the ‘territorial integrity’ of their country. Furthermore, it should not be underestimated that this limited mobility is geared towards mainly high-income/highly-skilled workers. In Canada for example, this translates into three categories: business visitors, professionals and intra-company transferees who receive preferential treatment such as waiving the requirement that an employer verify if a ‘native worker’ is available for their position. A similar set of selective criteria are to be found in negotiations between Japan, the European Union, and other poorer countries. In sum, Pellerin (2008) argues that what is called ‘lex mercatoria’ (commercial law), which is part and parcel of GATS, has a distinct effect on shaping (if not determining) both the definition of a migrant worker and temporary migration policies. She argues in this context that even highly-skilled workers are often not entitled to benefits accorded to citizens, and human rights are dispensed with. The effect of GATS on shaping who is and who is not a migrant worker and temporary migration policies are accomplished through its legally-binding measures that must be incorporated into national migration policies (Pellerin, 2008).

NAFTA was signed between Canada, Mexico, and the US in 1994, and comprises limited provisions for mobility under Chapter 16. Four categories of temporary migrants are involved: business visitors, intra-company transferees, professionals, and traders and investors, and they only apply to citizens of the signatory countries. Furthermore, spouses of these temporary migrants were not provided with any entry privileges and would have to funnel through the usual migration channels. Trade NAFTA (or TN) visas provide Canadian professionals (this includes about
60 occupations) with a faster track to temporary employment in the US without having to apply for a conventional visa. The granting of visas is discriminatory on the part of the US. From 1994–2004, the US government imposed regulations on Mexican professionals that were not demanded of Canadian professionals. In fact, the comparable American and Canadian education systems and the common use of English may disadvantage Mexican workers (Gabriel, 2008).

Gabriel (2008) explores the issue of Canadian migrant nurses in particular, and for her, the story of NAFTA is a lesson in the combined internationalization, neo-liberalization, and the gendering of migration policy. NAFTA fits within the neo-liberalization of Canada’s economic development, which has included both trade liberalization and ‘continentalization’ on the one hand and marketization, privatization, and re-regulation of Canada’s political economy on the other. This process of re-regulation included substantial financial cuts in Canadian hospital funding and financial austerity that led to work intensification and a loss of control by health care providers. The overall result was deterioration in the working conditions for Canadian nurses, and many migrated to the US, where conditions were arguably much better. Furthermore, the use of the more liberal TN visas seemed less possible for the next biggest groups of foreign nurses (Chinese and Indians), which simply privileged Canadian nurses and further encouraged such mobility. While data is problematic, US Immigration and Naturalisation Service data suggests that in 1991, a total of 2,195 visas were granted to Canadian nurses for working in the US, but this had reached 6,809 by 1999 (of which most – 5,975 – were women). However, while Canadian nurses enjoyed fast-tracking privileges to working in the US during the 1990s, under the new US policy called ‘VisaScreen’, Canadian nurses also have to meet similar credential requirements to all other foreign nurses (including English language proficiency and qualifying exams), and these requirements can even vary by US state. NAFTA itself does not contain any provision for the mutual recognition for nurses’ qualifications, and despite that NAFTA functions to liberalize the movements of people to some extent, it does this selectively and runs up against the power of national (and sub-national) migration policies (Gabriel, 2008). From a not dissimilar perspective but with a different focus, Coleman (2005) and Sparke (2006) speak of the contradictions of NAFTA after the events of September 11, 2001 when the neo-liberal geo-economics of maintaining
the flows of goods and services across the Canadian-American border in the context of NAFTA, bumped up against geo-political demands to securitize the border in the context of the ‘war on terror’. Ultimately, Sparke argues, the geo-economic imperative trumped the ‘geopolitical imaginations of homeland fortification’ (2006, 12).

Though with differences in the contours of labour mobility, other regional trading agreements also have labour mobility provisions alongside GATS, including ANZCERTA (the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations and Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Protocol II of CARICOM (the Caribbean Community and Common Market), the Japan-Singapore Free Trade Agreement; various agreements between the ASEAN bloc countries (a large group of East Asian countries), APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum), MERCUSOR (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Venezuela, and a number of associated countries), and SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation). Lavenex (2007) argues that in their various ways, all of these regional trading agreements in conjunction with GATS not only demonstrate the liberalization of the movement of the highly-skilled, but also how states’ migration policies are shaped, but not determined necessarily, by international trading blocs and related agreements. As Lavenex makes clear, states control their own movements of highly-skilled migrants but they must meet the dictates of GATS or regional trading agreements when relevant.

A final point to be added here is that alongside this qualified supranationalization of mobility, private employers now play a substantial role in the movement of highly-skilled workers, and illustrates the ‘outsourcing’ that Guiraudon and Lahav (2000) have written about. For example, the UK government launched a pilot scheme in 2000 for corporate multinational firms to ‘self-certify’ work permits for intra-company transferees to the UK (Lavenex, 2007). Yet these ‘temporary workers’ are a far cry from undocumented migrants and distant family members, and in their case the state wields its powerful presence together with other private actors too numerous to mention here.

Let us now turn to an examination of another of Freeman’s claims: the importance of ‘embedded liberalism’, all the while not forgetting the scalar or territorial character of migration policies.
Migration policies: the product of an ‘embedded liberalism’ or criminalization and increasing restriction?

In the section on ‘self-limited sovereignty’, I noted how Joppke acknowledges that politics (or what he calls political process, rather than legal process) is more prone to groups who are anti-immigrant, and therefore migration policies are not always the product of an ‘embedded liberalism’; that is they are not always expansionary, especially for some categories of migrants. Understanding why citizens resist more liberal migration policies is complex and cannot be addressed adequately in this volume. Nonetheless, among the most prominent and fundamental ideas that intersect with a ‘national identity’ approach is that nativist responses are rooted in the perception of the ‘third world other’ as ‘inferior’ owing to a long history of colonialism and racism (e.g. Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991). Others have focused on the fear of cultural dilution. In fact, Guiraudon (2000) argues that citizens resist migration as a symbol of the decline of national culture and therefore the ‘costs’ of an expansionary migration policy are not as diffuse as Freeman claims. Governments may be as concerned then with satisfying nativist (i.e. anti-immigrant) political parties and their constituents as they are with meeting employers’ demands for a certain number of low-paid or highly-skilled workers. This translates into a problem for the governments who seek to legitimate more liberal migration policies to citizens in the country of immigration, and as a consequence migration policy becomes more restrictive (e.g. Boswell, 2008; Samers, 1999).

Given these seemingly timeless theoretical claims, it would be an error to associate criminalization, anti-immigrant politics and policies, and an increasing restriction with the period after September 11, 2001. To do so would be to ignore a long history of ‘immigration panics’, and severely restrictive policies to keep out ‘dangerous foreign hordes’, whether it is the seemingly now unfathomable ‘Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882’ in the US, or the ‘White Australia’ policy during much of the twentieth century. These are simply two examples of the many moments in which nationalism, national identity, racism, and economic uncertainty mix together in the most toxic and exclusionary ways. Even the more restrictive stance on asylum-seekers and undocumented migrants that we might associate with the first decade of the twenty-first century was visible in the early 1990s across the wealthy countries. In 1993, the Australian government
enacted a law on mandatory detention, in which any migrant without the necessary papers could be expelled or imprisoned (Hyndman and Mountz, 2008). Similarly, the militarization of the southern US border began in earnest with the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), and intensified with the Illegal Immigration Reform and the Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) in response to fears of terrorism, among other anxieties (e.g. Massey et al., 2002). In the EU too, most European countries drastically lowered their ‘acceptance rates’ for asylum-seekers (i.e. the percentage of asylum applications governments approve). For example, the number of asylum applications that were approved in France fell from 28% in 1992 to 17% in 2000 (Legoux, 1999; Le Monde, 28 April 2001). Again, all of these policies and practices were enacted and played out well before September 11, 2001. However, such restrictive moments in the wealthier countries are interspersed with periods of liberalization for some categories of migrants (the late 1990s comes to mind for especially highly-skilled migrants), and thus countries oscillate between liberalization at some times and restriction and criminalization at others. Yet restriction and criminalization are in fact two distinct but also connected processes; the first might be defined as limiting the number and/or specific categories of migrants permitted to enter a country, and the second, to a range of laws, policies, programmes, and practices which treat those who violate migration policies as ‘criminals’ and creates a more general atmosphere of suspicion about all migrants’ behaviour and motives.

Nonetheless, it would not be inappropriate to argue that the first decade of the twenty-first century has entailed another episode in the intensified restriction and criminalization of asylum-seekers, refugees, undocumented migrants and similar denizens in the wealthier countries, especially the US. Even Joppke’s (1998a) argument that the legal process is expansionary can be seriously questioned by various states’ reactions to the ‘unwanted’. Gill (2009) argues in the UK, for example, that judges, lawyers, and case workers (including interviewers and translators) are overwhelmed by asylum cases. Under rules enacted in 2004, legal aid has diminished, and lawyers are forced to limit the time they can spend on any asylum case. Consequently, the proportion of unsuccessful initial claims and failed appeals has risen noticeably. In the UK, the number of incarcerated asylum-seekers increased dramatically from about 250 in 1993 to more than 2,500 in 2005 (Bacon, 2005, in Gill, 2009).
Up-scaling and down-scaling restriction and criminalization

I outlined earlier the extent to which there has been a ‘supranationalization’ of migration policies in the EU. While individual European Union member governments can still decide on how many and which asylum-seekers are accorded temporary or permanent settlement, I noted that there is now a well-developed European-wide asylum and refugee regime or system, which has become especially detrimental to the welfare of asylum-seekers. In this respect, Zolberg (2002) uses the term ‘remote control’ to refer to the general process of preventing migrants from ever reaching the borders or shores of the wealthier countries before they can claim asylum. This ‘externalization’ of asylum control out to ‘countries of transit’ (that is, countries through which asylum-seekers might travel to reach their final destination) or the countries of origin has been described usefully by Hyndman and Mountz (2008) as ‘neo-refoulement’, which “refers to a geographically based strategy of preventing the possibility of asylum through a new form of forced return different from non-refoulement, the strictly legal term that prohibits a signatory state from forcibly repatriating a refugee against its commitment codified in Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention” (p. 250). Neo-refoulement involves therefore the return of asylum-seekers and other migrants to transit countries or regions of origin before they reach the sovereign territory in which they could make a claim (p. 250). As Hyndman and Mountz recognize, this is not new, but they add that it deserves more attention given how common a practice neo-refoulement has become. This neo-refoulement is manifested in a number of different countries, but it is particularly noticeable in Australia’s ‘Pacific Solution’ (see Box 4.3), but it is also visible in the European Union’s asylum and refugee regime (see Box 4.4).

Although we can gather a number of insights from the event discussed in Box 4.3, the point of this discussion is to highlight two processes: first, the suspension of ‘normal’ legal procedures, and second, a certain ‘rescaling’ of the problem of asylum control to islands that do not fall under the jurisdiction of a country’s migration law.

In contrast to the European Union, NAFTA has only minimal supranationalization in terms of asylum, refugee, and low-skilled labour agreements. More visible perhaps, is the ‘localization’ of restrictive policies and the criminalisation of especially Latino-origin undocumented migrants in the US, for example (see Box 4.5).
Box 4.3 THE TAMPA INCIDENT AND ‘THE PACIFIC SOLUTION’ OF THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT (FROM HYNDMAN AND MOUNTZ, 2008)'

Hyndman and Mountz (2008) recount the terrible history of an Indonesian ship (the Palapa) with 433 (largely Afghan) asylum-seekers on board, which began to sink in the waters between Australia and Indonesia in late August 2001. The ship was heading for Australia’s Christmas Island so that migrants could claim asylum there. In trouble, the asylum-seekers were rescued by a Norwegian vessel (the Tampa). Upon the request of the asylum-seekers, the captain of the Norwegian ship brought them towards Christmas Island, but the Australian government denied the ship access to the territorial waters surrounding the island, warning that the Captain would be charged with ‘people smuggling’ if he tried to land the boat. The health conditions of the asylum-seekers (including 47 children) worsened on the exposed decks of the Tampa. Diarrhoea, dehydration, limb injuries, skin diseases, insufficient toilets, and hypothermia presented the Captain with a dilemma. Requests for medical assistance from Australian authorities were ignored initially and the government insisted that medical help would only be accorded if the Tampa stayed outside a 12-mile exclusion zone around the Island. After three days, the Captain attempted to enter territorial waters and dock the boat, but was denied access. In this stand-off within the ‘get tough on immigration’ re-election campaign of then Conservative Prime Minister John Howard, the Australian Navy eventually seized the boat and on September 3, the asylum seekers were moved to the island of Nauru. As Hyndman and Mountz (2008) write:

This moment signalled new realms of cruelty in the detention regime in Australia with the introduction of what was called the Pacific solution. Australia refused to land migrants arriving by sea. Instead, detention and processing was subcontracted out to small, poor islands north of Australia, including Manus, Papua New Guinea and Nauru.

(p. 259)
The Pacific solution entailed the ‘power of excision’, whereby the Australian parliament declared that certain outlying islands of Australia were no longer part of national territory in terms of migration law. This included Christmas Island and robbed the migrants of their ability to claim asylum. And so began the start of a two-tiered strategy which involved interdiction; that is, intercepting migrants at sea so that they could not reach the Australian mainland. This might also involve towing boats to Indonesia (Australia has signed agreements with Indonesia and other counties to halt smuggling operations) which is not a signatory to the Geneva Convention, and thus migrants would be unlikely to find much safe haven. The ‘tier’ of the Pacific Solution involved holding asylum-seekers and other migrants in detention centres on one of the islands. This meant no access to lawyers or Australian legal procedures. If asylum-seekers were ill, they might be flown to the mainland, but they would remain unable to claim asylum. Shockingly, the International Organization for Migration (the IOM) ran the detention centre on the impoverished island of Nauru, in which asylum-seekers had only sporadic access to semi-potable water; disease moved from toilets to food, and they had no means of contacting their families. As one asylum-seeker put it, “The detention camp is a small jail and the island is a big jail. All of the island, same jail. I want to get freedom” (Gordon, 2005, cited in Hyndman and Mountz, 2008, 261). The Australian government is accused of violating international law, and numerous elements of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Furthermore, the US High Commission on Human Rights has raised its objections to Australia’s actions and policies in public fora. Eventually, the fate of the asylum-seekers was resolved in part by the United Nations Higher Commission on Refugees, which stepped in to negotiate the resettlement of these asylum-seekers with other countries. In the end, 131 of the Asylum-seekers on board the Tampa eventually found refuge in New Zealand, and the remaining were dispersed among various countries, including Canada.
Increasing national restrictions were simultaneously accompanied by the implementation of the 1990 Dublin Convention to restrict and ‘ease and share the burden’ of asylum-seeking at the European scale (Thielemann, 2004). The 1990 Dublin Convention consisted of two principal elements: ‘confinement’ and ‘refoulement’. Confinement sought to distinguish between ‘economic migrants’ and ‘true political refugees’ by imposing visa restrictions on countries which would potentially be the source of asylum-seekers. This was to be enhanced by the use of ‘carrier sanctions’ – that is, fines which were to be levied on ferry companies, airlines, and other ‘carriers’ for bringing in an undocumented migrant. Thus, transport companies were now required to verify migrants’ papers before they stepped on to a means of international transport. Suddenly, carriers were now responsible for controlling who should or who should not reach European shores to claim asylum. Since such private actors are not well-trained as immigration officers, they do not have the means of distinguishing between passports, visas, and other travel documents that have so-called ‘manifest irregularities’. Furthermore, in the case where an undocumented migrant wishes to use a carrier to then claim asylum in a European country, the carriers are required to judge between ‘true asylum seekers’ and those whose case is ‘manifestly unfounded’. This would require, however, that they ‘second guess’ the decisions of customs officials on the other side in terms of who or who might not be granted asylum. At the risk of being fined then, their reading of documents tends to be very restrictive, and it prevents most would-be asylum-seekers from using transport companies, channelling them instead to enter European countries through clandestine means (e.g. through trafficking networks) (Legoux, 1999; Marie, 1996). In any case, this use of private actors to undertake migration control (which is thoroughly missed by Freeman’s ‘client politics thesis’) is

The second feature of the Dublin convention consists of ‘refoulement’, which itself has three dimensions. First, an asylum-seeker’s claim must be processed in the first country where the asylum-seeker claims asylum, which is designed to reduce ‘asylum-shopping’. Second, asylum-seekers are to be returned to the first ‘safe country’ or ‘safe country of transit’ (which are often not safe at all). In other words, if the Ukraine, for example, is deemed a ‘safe country’ by the EU, then an asylum-seeker from the Ukraine cannot claim asylum in the EU. Similarly, if a migrant from Uzbekistan travels through the Ukraine and later reaches the EU, the migrant may also be returned to the Ukraine. Such refoulement practices intensified throughout Europe during the 1990s (Samers, 2003a), but Dublin I has now been replaced by Dublin II. Building on the essential principles of Dublin I, Dublin II came into effect in February 2003 and is designed to instruct European countries on which country should be responsible for a decision on an asylum request. The responsible state will also have to accept the return (within a specific and limited time period) of an asylum-seeker residing ‘illegally’ in another member state. For this purpose, Dublin II added the EURODAC (European Automated Fingerprint Recognition System), as well as only two weeks after September 11, the approval of the VIS (Visa Information System, which includes such measures as iris scanning, finger-printing and face recognition) to dissuade ‘visa shopping’ among other objectives. This was to be joined by SIS II (a second generation of the Schengen Information System), which involves countries in the EU that have eliminated their internal border controls (Boswell, 2007b; Samers, 2004a; Walters, 2008).

A third but perhaps less well-known feature of the EU’s asylum system is the process of remote control mentioned earlier in the chapter. However, this now seems to entail more than just posting border guards in foreign airports or on, let us say, the external borders of the EU. Rather, it is a way of preventing asylum-seekers from ever even reaching Europe’s external borders through a
process of ‘very remote control’ and the tightening of borders in regions awash in smuggling and trafficking operations, such as the Ferghana Valley of eastern Uzbekistan. This ‘very remote control’ is now tied up with overseas development and other technical assistance, as a means of ‘re-scaling’ migration control out to countries beyond the European Union, typically far from the watchful eyes of human rights groups (Samers, 2004a).

Box 4.5 FEDERAL POLICY CHANGE, WHITE/ANGLO IDENTITY AND THE LOCAL CRIMINALISATION OF LATINO MIGRANTS IN AMERICAN CITIES AND TOWNS

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (usually abbreviated as IIRIRA), in the US became effective in 1996. Section 287(g) within this act allows the Department of Homeland Security to authorise state and local law enforcement officials to carry out duties that were previously accorded to only Federal officials, subject to mutual agreement between all the different levels of government and subject to ‘appropriate training’ and that they ‘function under the supervision of sworn US. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers’.12 This involves the issues of gang or other organized crime activity, human smuggling and trafficking, money laundering, the movement and sale of narcotics, sexual-related offences, other violent crimes, and material and other support for tackling problems in remote areas.

Yet after September 11, 2001, Varsanyi (2008) shows how the city of Phoenix, Arizona declined the invitation of the Federal government to become partners in Federal law enforcement. The police in particular have rejected this invitation on the grounds of the excessive costs of implementing such a policing strategy. Instead, local voters have urged their governments to undertake immigration policing ‘through the back door’ by enacting local
ordinances that prevent certain kinds of behaviour among undocumented day labourers, such as waiting at hiring locations in order to be picked up by employers. All of these ordinances are designed to rid certain neighbourhoods of undocumented migrants as ‘dirty’ and ‘disorderly human beings’ who are ‘out of place’ in the landscape.

This immigration policing ‘through the back door’ is witnessed throughout the US. Among the most infamous cases is that of Hazelton, Pennsylvania (a small city of about 30,000 people in the northeast part of this US state). In July 2006, the city council approved the Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance which stipulated that businesses and landlords would be fined for hiring and renting housing to undocumented migrants, and declared English the official language. The Mayor argued that illegal immigration had caused overcrowded schools, hospitals, and social services and increased crime. A Federal District court judge ruled that the Hazelton ordinance was unconstitutional. This has had repercussions for other towns across the US who are seeking to pass, or are considering passing similar ordinances. In the ruling against the city council, the Judge argued that “Federal law prohibits Hazelton from enforcing any of the provisions in its ordinances,” “Thus, we will issue a permanent injunction enjoining their enforcement” (New York Times, July 26, 2007).

A similar tension has arisen in the city of Carpentersville, Illinois (about 40 miles northwest of Chicago). There, the number of migrants from Mexico and Central America rose by about 17% between 1990 and 2007, and about 40% of the town’s 37,000 residents are of Latino origin. An immigration ordinance is being sought by many of its ‘white’ citizens where two residents have been elected on to the village board with the support of two local newspapers brandishing an anti-illegal immigration agenda. It has divided the city, not just between ‘white’ citizens who reject the presence of the large numbers of undocumented migrants, the use of Spanish, and the changing cultural landscape, but also between ‘white’ citizens, some who rely on immigrants as employees in their businesses. Some police leaders too are worried about the
Another form of ‘out-scaled’ migration control: Paramilitary vigilante groups and the criminalization of migrants in the US and Malaysia

Even non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are active in creating informal policies of restriction and criminalization. Let us consider two such organizations which are remarkably similar, despite that they operate in completely different national contexts. The first is the ‘Minutemen’ (MCDC or Minutemen Civil Defense Corps), a group of ‘citizen volunteers’ that patrol the US-Mexico border. Composed allegedly of some 350,000 members (DeChaine, 2009), its purpose is “to secure America’s sovereign territory against incursion, invasion and terrorism.”\(^{13}\) It is especially concerned now with the so-called ‘Border Fence Project’ which consists of a steel security fence all along the US southern border. The group seeks to “continue to stand watch at the border and report illegal activity, build border fencing, urge local and federal officials to enforce the law and push for the enforcement of our laws to keep our country and your families and children safe” (Interview with the leader of the MCDC, cited in DeChaine, 2009, 57).

Malaysia too has a certain version of the ‘Minutemen’ – the ‘Rela’ (Ikatan Relawan Rakyat) or ‘People’s Volunteer Corps’ (Hedman, 2008). It began as an ‘auxiliary enforcement unit’ – a para-public organization – set up by a 1964 government act. Its initial mission was to “help maintain security in the country and the well-being of its people” (cited in Hedman, 2008, 375). Consisting of somewhere between 340,000 to 475,000 people (in about 2006–7), this number far exceeds the number of Malaysian police and other armed officers. Over the last decade, Rela
has practiced what are effectively illegal ‘Rela raiding parties’, rounding up ‘illegal migrants’ in cities such as Kuala Lumpur. For example, a ‘raiding force’ of 300 people, joined by the Police and City Hall officials and the Immigration Department, swept through shops and restaurants in the Jalan Masjid India area in January 2001. Rela’s powers were expanded in February 2005, and it has experienced closer government involvement and tacit support for its orientation towards policing ‘illegal’ immigration. After the 2005 expansion of powers, Rela had the right to enter people’s homes without warrant, use firearms, request people’s immigration papers at will, and manage detention centres. Rela members are largely insulated from government prosecution for its actions. Worse, members would be paid RM80 (about US$22) for each apprehended undocumented migrant, and not surprisingly, the number of detained immigrants has doubled from about 17,000 in 2005 to at least 34,000 in 2007. Evictions of migrants and destruction of their homes have occurred in villages outside Kuala Lumpur. Raids have continued and on one night in February 2006, a similar ‘round-up’ of ‘illegal migrants’ occurred in Selayang Baru in Greater Kuala Lumpur, where beatings by the Rela were reported. Five migrants were found dead. And often the people who are ‘rounded up’ are refugees recognized by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (Hedman, 2008). It is not surprising then that Rela have been accused of excessive force, arbitrary arrest, and stealing illegal immigrants’ possessions during these raids. The government’s Human Rights Commission have been aware of this problem and recommended ways of reforming Rela, acknowledging that some members of Rela were “taking the law into their own hands” (cited in Hedman, 2008, 374), and that ‘We cannot condone abuse of power by Rela members and we will take steps to prevent a repeat of such incidents’ (Ibid). It appears, however, that this has been little more than government rhetoric.

Detentions, deportations and dispersals

The last 20 years has witnessed a growing number of detentions, deportations, and dispersals in a number of countries (e.g. Hagan et al., 2008; Hedman, 2008; Hyndman and Mountz, 2008; Schuster, 2005). Let us first tackle the issue of detention, removal, or ‘accommodation’ centres. These are far from new, but their number and capacity have increased
since the 1990s. Again, a critical literature has sprouted across the social sciences, which draws upon the work of the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben who speaks of ‘states of exception’, in which states suspend prevailing laws and asylum-seekers are reduced to ‘bare life’ in camps and similar installations (think of the Australian island detention centres mentioned earlier). Others such as Ong (2006) question whether laws are completely suspended, preferring to call them ‘spaces of graduated sovereignty’. In any case, some of these ‘detention centres’ are used immediately to house asylum-seekers before their claim is assessed. Some are used as ‘holding centres’ while a migrant’s claim is undergoing appeal or has been rejected, and an asylum-seeker or other category of ‘non-citizen’ is awaiting deportation (e.g. Hyndman and Mountz, 2008). In fact, some who have actually been granted refugee status after a history of torture, rape, or other forms of violence are also frequently detained before they are ‘released’ into ‘the world outside’. Many countries have time limits for how long an asylum-seeker can be detained, varying from anywhere between 32 days in France to usually about 6 months in Germany. This is not true for Denmark, Greece, Ireland, or the UK however, where asylum-seekers can languish indefinitely. Conditions vary, and among the worst are the zones d’attente (waiting zones) at Paris’ Charles de Gaulle Airport. Access to necessary information, legal support, even adequate food and sanitation is far from guaranteed. Similarly, in Malaysian detention camps, abuse and torture have been reported and publicly decried (Hedman, 2008), and we have already discussed the case of Australian detention centres. Conditions may not always be as terrible as this in other centres, but they are nevertheless prison-like structures usually surrounded by razor (barbed) wire and tight security (Hayter, 2004; Schuster, 2005). In many cases, governments find it difficult to even construct these detention centres, given citizens’ aversion to the very presence of asylum-seekers (see Box 4.6).

Deportation is part of the means by which the mobility of asylum-seekers and undocumented migration is controlled, and the privilege of citizenship and the ‘bad illegal alien’ is re-affirmed (Peutz, 2006). Gibney and Hansen (2003, in Schuster, 2005) argue that states see deportation as both ineffective yet absolutely necessary. ‘Absolutely necessary’ because it sends a number of signals to both citizens and to asylum-seekers, namely that: 1) it placates a public who may be quite vocal about the failure of government to control the number of asylum-seekers – the state
Box 4.6 LOCATING AN ASYLUM ‘ACCOMMODATION CENTRE’ IN ENGLAND’S COUNTRYSIDE (FROM HUBBARD, 2005a, 2005b)

Detention centres are placed *somewhere* by governments, and their emplacement can encounter local resistance. In 2002, the British government chose three locations as possible sites for asylum ‘accommodation centres’: Bicester in the British county of Oxfordshire, Throckmorton in Worcestershire, and Newton in Nottinghamshire. Hubbard (2005a, 2005b) explores the politics surrounding the proposed accommodation centre at Newton. The site was the location of a former Ministry of Defence installation which included an airfield and military housing in a fairly isolated rural setting. The town of Bingham was about 1km away. Like the other two sites, Newton was to be an ‘open’ facility where asylum-seekers could leave and move about as they pleased, unlike the Oakington reception centre mentioned in the Introduction to this book and some of the more prison-like installations discussed above. And like the other proposed sites, the Newton site would be designed to contain the full range of services in order to avoid a ‘burden’ on local social services, while housing about 750 asylum-seekers. This would include religious spaces for Christian and Muslim individuals, a health centre, nursery, and education centre. The British government recognized that its location was likely to stir up opposition and so it conducted a closed meeting with local government officials. The plans for the proposed site were publicized, however, and a local group (the Newton Action Group) mobilized a sizeable grass-roots opposition against the plans. The local council argued that an asylum accommodation facility at the site was ‘inappropriate and incongruous’ in Nottinghamshire’s countryside because of the visual impact of the new centre; because it would prevent the construction of homes that were needed by first-time buyers; that the centre would lead to increased traffic; and that asylum-seekers would be more appropriately housed elsewhere where they could access a range of services. The political arguments of local residents were varied, and in most cases
seemed to hide racist attitudes. Some involved a dubious regard for the welfare of asylum-seekers, claiming that asylum-seekers would not have access to sufficient services and the support of friends, relatives, or other community members. It is worth noting, however, that the Refugee council also shared these concerns. Other arguments focused on the opposition to such a centre on ‘green-belt land’ and the countryside more generally, as the Council argued. Hubbard notes, however, that there was remarkably little opposition to the earlier proposal to construct residential homes on the Newton site, but this changed with the plans to build an accommodation centre.

In fact, Hubbard explores critically the justifications of the local council and residents against the site, and he insists instead that racism and notions of ‘whiteness’ figured in the protest among ‘white’ citizens against the proposal for the Newton site. Hubbard argues that the countryside was seen as the location of a pure, white English identity in contrast to the potential arrival of ‘not quite white’ bodies that were deemed to be dirty, dangerous, sexually predatory, and ultimately threatening to local residents, and in particular ‘white’ women. The fear of trespass, rape, and other forms of violence permeated the arguments of Bingham’s residents for why the asylum-centre should not be located at the Newton site. Ultimately, the British government chose not to construct the accommodation centre, arguing that it was not suitable given problems with its ‘site sustainability’, including its accessibility by transport and its location on ‘greenbelt’ land.

The case of the Newton site underlines the significance of the meaning of places discussed in the Introduction to this book and how a local politics of migration may be just as significant as a supposed ‘national’ politics of migration, although in Hubbard’s study, notions of ‘national identity’ are also invoked to exclude asylum-seekers from rural areas.
has to be seen to be ‘doing something’ (what I referred to earlier as the problem of legitimation); 2) deportation acts as a disincentive to other would-be asylum-seekers; and 3) states can apply pressure on failed asylum-seekers and others to leave voluntarily by the threat of forced removal. Whether it actually has these effects is quite another story, and deporting migrants is difficult and expensive. Migrants may not have the proper documents, or their actual country of origin is unknown (perhaps because they purposely destroyed their own documents), or they actively resist this deportation. And in what has come to be known as ‘extraordinary rendition’ in the US, migrants may be removed immediately (not to say kidnapped) from their places of home or work with only the possessions that they have on their bodies, placed on special unscheduled flights registered under the name of ‘dummy corporations’ from private (military) airports, often obscured from the glaring eyes of the media and the wider public (Peutz, 2006).

In the US, deportations increased from about 40,000 annually from 1990 to 1995, to about 208,000 in 2005 (Hagan et al., 2008). Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia and Thailand have also deported large numbers of migrants, especially since the ‘Asian financial crisis’ of 1997–98. For example, in May 2003, the Thai government allegedly deported some 10,000 Burmese migrants back to Burma through a single border checkpoint at Mae Sot, and Malaysia also ‘encouraged’ or deported some 400,000 ‘illegal migrants’ in 2004 (Hedman, 2008). In 2003, the UK deported over 17,000 asylum-seekers from a total of just over 61,000 applicants. The Labour government under Prime Minister Tony Blair saw these figures as an achievement, rather than a cause for alarm, and the responses are similar in other wealthier countries. Joint bi- or multinational deportations have now become part of the internationalization of the landscape of control (Schuster, 2005).

Yet it is all too easy to see those who are deported as ‘obvious criminals’ and dangerous to the security of liberal western republics. Indeed, for Hyndman and Mountz (2008), public discussion of migration lump together all migrants into a feared group consisting of ‘terrorists’, ‘refugees’, and ‘economic migrants, and as a consequence migrants are stripped of their individuality. An attention to the individuality of the deported is tackled in Peutz’ (2006) evocative, eye-opening and path-breaking fieldwork among Somalis deported from Canada and the US to Somaliland. Peutz (2006) calls for an ‘anthropology of removal’ to try to
understand the lives of deportees in what might be called an ‘industry’. Her ‘anthropology of removal’ explores the lives of the deported in both the country from which they are deported and the country in which they are forced to return. Many Somalis in the US and Canada are convicted of very minor offences that might hardly even warrant jail time for a citizen, and I have already mentioned how Somalis may be ‘kidnapped’ by US immigration authorities and immediately sent on a plane back to Somalia. But what happens when they arrive in the country of origin, especially in a ‘failed state’ such as Somalia? Among the Somalis that she interviews who were returning to Somaliland (the northern part of Somalia), they are largely unwelcome in their country of origin, and they face the shame of returning without evidence of ‘success’, strangers in a strange land whose language(s) and culture(s) they have forgotten. Indeed, one of the individuals that she interviews tells of the need to find support networks upon their return that are different from those in the US. ‘No more American mentality, no more western mentality now. This is Somali [sic] now, now everybody’s got to go with his own clan’ (cited in Peutz, 2006, 223). As Peutz puts it, ‘many deportees are “returned” to a certain place and time in such a way that it can never be a homecoming for them, only another arrival’ (p. 225).

Let us now turn our attention to the dispersal of asylum-seekers and refugees. This is a tactic used by governments to ‘lessen the burden’ on particular areas of countries and/or to avoid the ‘concentration’ of particular nationalities in certain regions, cities or towns. It can also be used for the questionable purpose of trying to avoid racial or ethnic conflict between indigenous citizens and new arrivals, as if asylum-seekers were the cause of racism! This is simply another example of ‘blaming the victim’. In any case, as a particularly spatial tactic or strategy (what again Foucault would call a ‘technology of government’), dispersal has unintended consequences. For example, during the 1970s, Vietnamese refugees (the so-called ‘boat people’ fleeing the end of the Vietnam War) were taken in by the French government under the auspices of the UNHCR (the United Nations High Commission on Refugees) and were dispersed from the Paris region to western France. After about a year, most of the refugees chose to re-settle in the Paris region in order to be closer to other Vietnamese and Asian immigrants (White et al., 1987). In 1999, the UK sought to ‘manage’ the so-called ‘asylum crisis’ by replacing welfare payments with vouchers for clothing and food, and
dispersing asylum-seekers away from their predominant settlement in London and the greater southeast to northern British cities. This was justified on two grounds. First, cheaper accommodation could be found in northern areas with a large amount of empty or very low-rent housing. Second, it would reduce the likelihood of reducing potential conflict between asylum-seekers and some of the nativist, xenophobic, and racist citizens living in a few poor southern British coastal towns, no longer attractive to domestic or international tourists, and where migrants were increasingly housed in bed and breakfast-type hotels (Audit Commission, 2000; Schuster, 2005). Ironically, the decision to disperse asylum-seekers and refugees to cities and towns outside the southeast led to conflicts in these new areas of settlement. For example, approximately 3,500 Kurds were settled in the Sighthill section of Glasgow, and in July 2001 a Turkish asylum-seeker was killed in clashes with local citizens (Hubbard, 2005a; Phillimore and Goodson, 2006).

What this section on restriction and criminalization tells us is that Freeman’s use of the idea of ‘embedded liberalism’ appears as myopic, and is not limited to strictly national scales of government. Sure, there may be moments of ‘humanitarian’ concern, or a legal, policy, and voluntaristic commitment to a humane settlement and treatment of undocumented migrants, asylum-seekers, refugees, and others. And sure, there may be stories of refugees pleased generally with their new-found surroundings in wealthy countries. Yet these instances now seem the exception, rather than the rule. So having explored the contours and consequences of restrictive migration policies and the criminalization of migrants, let us turn to the related issue of the securitization of migration policies.

The securitization of migration and the critique of client politics

Associated with the heightened criminalization and restriction of migration policy are security concerns and the ‘securitization’ of migration policies, which further questions whether Freeman has highlighted the most significant ‘clients’ (e.g. institutions devoted to domestic security) and whether ‘embedded liberalism’ is present at all in the politics of migration. Quite simply, Freeman neglects the importance of security for states, whether this is a matter for local governments, national states, international fora, or private bodies. But what is meant exactly by the ‘securitization’ of migration? Boswell (2008) defines it as the links made
between migration and terrorism in political discourse, rather than just highly restrictive policies. It would be tempting to argue then that the securitization of migration began with the events of September 11, 2001. Yet again, this would be to ignore the gradual securitization of migration well before 2001 in the wealthier countries (see e.g. Huysmans, 2000; Tirman, 2004; Weiner, 1995). Yet in deploying Boswell’s definition, September 11, 2001 seems to have only heightened the securitization of migration policy (see Box 4.7).

**Box 4.7 THE SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION**

The US seems to be the paradigmatic example of how the politics and practices of securitization have been central to migration and immigration policy-making. This has entailed new institutions, laws, and programmes, including the integration of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (now US Citizenship and Immigration Services), in combination with the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, within the new Department of Homeland Security (2002); the creation of the US Patriot Act, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) which abolished more or less “the judicial review for all categories of immigrants eligible for deportation” (Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodriguez, 2008, 65), the Enhanced Border Security Act, the Visa Entry Reform Act, and the implementation of the US-VISIT biometric system for non-clandestine entry (fingerprinting, body and retina scans, ‘dataveillance’ in the form of national digital intelligence databases, and so forth). Together, these are designed to create so-called ‘smart borders’ which integrate sophisticated military technology into the policing of entry at borders and transportation hubs, fast-tracked entry for the ‘right’ people (through the NEXUS, FAST, and CANPASS programmes) in-country surveillance, and racial or ethnic profiling based on country of origin and other criteria. At the same time, all of this has been accompanied

continued
by a record number of deportations, though this is often not related to terrorism charges, but rather to the associated criminalization of migration (e.g. Coleman, 2005; Cornelius, 2004; Nevins, 2008; Sparke, 2006; Tirman, 2004).

Like the US, a whole range of European-level institutions, policies, programmes, and practices similar to those of the US and performing the same basic functions of security have proliferated. And yet, this seemingly obvious securitisation of migration in the EU, which is re-told in the ‘critical security studies literature’, has been questioned by Boswell (2007b). Thus, in the context of the EU after September 11, 2001, Boswell argues counter-intuitively that first, there is a need to separate the securitization of migration (by which again, she means the links made between migration and terrorism in political discourse, rather than just highly restrictive policies) and securitization practices. Second, Boswell argues that neither in France, Germany, the UK, nor the EU as a whole is there much evidence that migration has been linked to terrorism in political discourse. She does acknowledge, however, that there are national differences in how political discourses integrated questions of security at particular moments. Nonetheless, with respect to actual policies (security practices), Boswell argues that in the EU, counter-terrorism measures adopted the information from migration databases in Europe, rather than migration policies relying on information gathered for counter-terrorism purposes. Once again, this is an important critique, but as she herself recognizes, migration and security practices do become fused together to one degree or another. And finally, Boswell may be neglecting a more localized securitization of migration.

Though most migrants (and countless citizens) have felt the force of securitization in one way or another, this has had terrible consequences for Muslims throughout the ‘West’ in particular. From all across Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, and even the Middle East, immigration and other authorities have ‘cracked down’ on Muslim-dominated organizations, towns, or neighbourhoods. Innocent Muslims have been swept up in raids, deportations, closures of Mosques and Islamic organizations.
of every stripe and colour, confiscations of property, cultural and religious humiliation, and the loss of jobs and income. I do not have the space to detail these here (see e.g. Howell and Shryock, 2003), but let me instead devote a few moments to some theoretical reflections on the securitization of migration.

The critical literature on the relationship between security and migration is diverse. Some have interrogated the symbolism or significance of ‘home’ in political discourse. In this respect, Sparke (2006) points out that even the word ‘homeland’ in the US Department of Homeland Security seems to signify a new form of excluding those from outside the US. Likewise, Walters (2004) speaks of the ‘domopolitics’ of security in which the Latin word domo (meaning ‘to tame’ or ‘break in’) is closely related to domus, meaning home. The emphasis on ‘home’ is crucial, insofar as ‘home’ is a place of ‘family’, ‘refuge’, or ‘sanctuary’. Walters is critical of this conception of home in the context of migration:

. . . in a great many of these uses it [home] has powerful affinities with family, intimacy, place: “. . . the home as our place, where we belong naturally, and where by definition, others do not; international order as a space of homes – every people should have (at least) one; home as a place we must protect. We may invite guests in our home, but they come at our invitation; they don’t stay indefinitely. Others are, by definition, uninvited. Illegal migrants and bogus refugees should be returned to ‘their’ homes”.

(Walters, 2004, 241)

Another body of literature on the relationship between security and migration in the decade after September 11, 2001, draws upon Michel Foucault’s idea of ‘bio-politics’ and the Foucauldian-inspired notion of ‘governmentality’ (Burchell et al., 1991) to underline how states use sophisticated techniques (so-called ‘technologies of power’), rather than always just brute force, in order to mark, code, measure, and regulate migrant ‘bodies’ for the purpose of control. In short, the geo-political economies of migration control are ‘embodied’ (see especially Mountz, 2004 and Hyndman and Mountz, 2008). Ultimately, this is what Mbembe (2003) calls a ‘necro-politics’, the ability of states to increasingly decide who literally gets to live and who gets to die.
Localizing securitization

Most studies of security and migration tend to be methodologically nationalist or supra-nationalist. Fortunately, geographers, critical legal scholars, and other social scientists have over the last decade begun to focus on the local dimensions of security and migration. In this sense, I have already explored some scholarly ideas that involve the re-scaling of migration control that involve both ‘up-scaling’ and ‘down-scaling’, such as the island geographies of neo-refoulement in Australia. Other spatially-explicit studies have highlighted how ‘securitization’ is not simply a set of discourses or policies that are imposed from above by central, Federal, or supra-national governments on societies. For example, I mentioned previously Section 287(g) of the US IIRIRA and its implications for the policing of migration by local governments in the US. From a rather different perspective, Gill (2009, citing Back, 2006) points to a micro-territoriality of the securitization of asylum in the UK’s Lunar House (the headquarters of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate in Croydon, south of London). This is where asylum-seekers often report to claim asylum or address similar matters. After standing for hours in a long separate queue from other migrants, they finally reach the decision hall, whereby they

are separated from interviewers by means of a protective plastic screen and are prevented from drawing closer to the screen by chairs that are bolted into position (Back, 2006) . . . This means that they often have to raise their voices in a public room in order to recount their cases for asylum, which can include harrowing accounts of their experiences in their countries of origin. The rationale for both the protective screen and the bolting of the chairs is security.

(p. 225)

While security here (the protective screen, the bolted chairs, etc.) is not designed to protect Home Office officials against acts of terrorism, which are highly unlikely anyway, they are designed as a measure of security and as a not-so-subtle indication of distrust (Gill, 2009). He argues in his study of four types of asylum sector intermediaries (i.e. those working in detention centres, the National Asylum Support Service, asylum case-workers, and immigration judges) that the actors he interviews have a
certain discretionary authority, which if it is directed against the wishes of asylum-seekers, it is not because of the legal process or financial constraints, but because they are steered in a number of different ways. He cautions that “This steering does not operate through the disciplining, sanctioning or threatening of subjects (although the findings of this article do not rule it out)” (p. 20). Alternatively, he seems to argue that these actors with their discretionary authority treat asylum-seekers in deleterious ways because state power depicts asylum seekers in “damaging and defamatory ways, thereby depicting them as a population that is deserving of particular treatments” (Ibid). In short, these actors are not coerced into treating asylum seekers ‘badly’, but rather seduced through ‘damaging and defamatory’ depictions into treating them in this way. These ‘depictions’ are not just through discourse, however, but through the terrible ‘spaces’ such as Lunar House (p. 229).

Resisting the criminalization and securitization of migration

While certain publics and their sub-national representatives have accepted this criminalization and securitization of migration, it does not proceed without contestation. Indeed, academic attention to only top-down policy measures constructed by local, national, or international states and other actors would miss a grassroots geography of opposition (variously described as ‘contentious politics’, ‘social movements’, or ‘resistance’) to criminalization, securitization, and more restrictive migration and immigration policies in general. Migrants are not simply the victims or passive receptors of state actions and policies. Rather, migration shapes the development of states and state policies themselves. For example, the French government experienced some resistance from a group of undocumented Malian migrants in July 1996 who began protesting their impossible status as non-residents, non-refugees, but also as non-deportable persons as well. They lived in limbo. Staging a live-in hunger strike in the St. Ambroise and St. Bernard churches in Paris, they were joined by an entourage of academics, celebrities, clergy, NGOs, and a 10,000-strong march of supporters. The police eventually evicted the migrants from the two churches in order to send a message to other would-be migrants to France that they “will have no luck in France” (President Chirac, cited in Chemillier-Gendreau, 1998, no page). However, it did prove an embarrassing headache for President Chirac’s
government, and the migrants sent a reciprocal message in return: this will happen again (Samers, 2003a).

Several years later, the French government did encounter similar protests, this time around the Sangatte refugee centre near the Channel Tunnel port of Calais, which eventually contributed to the closure of the Centre. Certainly there were other reasons for its closure, such as the objections of the British government which saw it as facilitating illegal migration to the UK through the Channel Tunnel. Yet migrants did play their part in lamenting publicly the inadequate conditions of the centre and treatment by local police. At the same time, the British government has faced its own troubles in acts of resistance at the Oakington Reception Centre and Campsfield Removal Centres near Cambridge and Oxford in the UK (Hayter, 2004; Schuster, 2003). In fact, Campsfield has been the site of hunger strikers, rooftop protests, public appeals, self-harm, and suicide since the 1990s (Gill, 2009).

In the US over the last decade, migrants have become especially vociferous in protesting against US immigration policies. This was no better demonstrated than in the ‘Immigrant Workers Freedom Ride’ of 2003. In September of that year, some 1,000 immigrant workers boarded 18 buses from 10 cities and set out to Washington DC with numerous stops along the way. The idea for the Freedom Ride began in Los Angeles as a burgeoning capital for trade unionism and other allied movements along the lines of ‘race’, gender, ethnicity, and so forth. In particular, the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union, in which thousands of migrants work, became the engine room of the Freedom Ride. Washington, as the seat of national political power, became an obvious destination for the buses, given its strategic and symbolic importance (Leitner et al., 2008). As Leitner et al. (2008) point out, the immigrants involved hoped to voice certain demands in Washington DC, which included:

a) The legalization of undocumented migrants, particularly those who were working and paying taxes.
b) Easing restrictions on obtaining citizenship.
c) Demanding rights and the reform of US immigration policy.
d) Bringing back workers’ rights that had been decimated under ‘neo-liberal’ policies.
e) The respect for civil liberties and rights for all.
In the “‘safe’ space-time of the buses”, far from the grip of political and police power, migrants shared stories of crossing the border, of the fear of deportation and the experience of discrimination (Leitner et al., 2008, 167). They sang songs, practiced civil disobedience tactics, and formed a collective political identity. The various stops along the way allowed the migrants to connect with a variety of organizations, such as the local branches of unions, faith-based organizations, student organizations, job organizations, and local community groups. In this mobile movement, all of these organizations lent support, provided comradery, formulated politics and built solidarities in this mobile movement. They used every manner of protest available in the cities and towns through which the buses travelled, from religious services to marches. When they faced political leaders in Washington DC, however, their collective identities began to fracture between more radical and more reformist lines, and their oppositional discourses changed from one of human rights to a more mainstream motto of “hardworking, tax-paying, ‘play-by-the rules’ immigrants” (Leitner, 2008, 168). While the Freedom Rides meant that the Immigration and Customs Enforcement office cracked down on migrant organizations such as the ‘New American Opportunity Campaign’ (Ibid), it has also no doubt shaped the debates concerning the estimated 12 million undocumented migrants in the US in 2009. In particular, as I write this, the US government may pass a bill for a mass legalization program that would be based on meeting certain criteria, including the payment of a fee for legalisation.15

A more permanent feature of this resistance in the context of the US is San Francisco’s ‘City of Refuge Ordinance’ (Ridgley, 2008). Ridgley explores and outlines what she calls the ‘insurgent genealogies of citizenship’ in US sanctuary cities, by which she means the history and emergence of an alternative vision and path of citizenship. Sanctuary cities emerged in the 1980s to protect the rights of Central American refugees in the US against police enforcement of US immigration laws, and have to one degree or another successfully challenged the criminalization and securitization of migration. While these examples may not convince the reader that asylum-seekers and undocumented migrants can exercise much claims-making power, historical evidence suggest that migrants do shape government practices; sometimes these practices have damaging consequences for all migrants; sometimes they may raise consciences and lead to humanitarian gestures in the most imperceptible ways.
By now, we should have a broad understanding of migration policies in wealthier countries, and some of their contradictions and consequences. We now turn our attention to poorer countries whose migration issues and migration policies are similar in many ways to those of wealthier countries, but different enough to warrant a separate section.

MIGRATION CONTROL IN POORER COUNTRIES

It would be a mistake to assume that the governments and publics of the poorer countries within Africa, Asia, and Latin America are not concerned with controlling migration. Poorer countries are not countries of emigration only. In fact, in 2005, India had the eighth largest number of migrants of all the countries in the world (some 5.7 million), compared to, for example, the UK (5.4 million) and Spain (4.8 million). And if one considers Saudi Arabia among poorer countries, it has the sixth largest number of migrants (6.4 million) (Koslowski, 2008). Poorer countries, like richer states must balance a number often competing objectives in the context of crippling debt, poverty, and unemployment. These contradictory objectives might include:

1) Encouraging emigration for the purposes of obtaining foreign exchange through remittances. Remittances are encouraged as a means of development in lieu of overseas aid or other state-led or international programs of assistance. As discussed in Chapter 2, remittances (besides being used for the construction of homes and the purchase of luxury goods) can also be used to develop a range of more socially oriented projects (‘social remittances’) such as for schools, religious institutions, roads, community centres, and the like. Indonesia and the Philippines have special government-regulated labour export agencies to facilitate this very purpose. Some governments, such as that of Algeria and Morocco, require returning migrants to purchase local currency at customs, in order to obtain foreign currency reserves.

2) Encouraging emigration in order to reduce unemployment (a so-called ‘safety valve’), and in order that a country’s émigrés will return with new skills for accelerated economic development.

3) Cooperating with the countries of origin through bi-national and multi-lateral agreements in order to realize the benefits of the two
objectives above. This may involve unwelcome and dissatisfactory compromises in foreign policies, whether economic or otherwise, in the name of economic development.

4) Discouraging the emigration of certain categories of workers in order to avoid ‘brain drain’ or at least the depletion of particular skill sets for specific economic sectors. A prominent example here is the South African government’s concern about the loss of doctors and nurses to Europe and North America especially.

5) Protesting against the illiberal migration policies of wealthier countries, which might impede migration, and therefore the objectives of points 1 and 2.

6) Curbing the continual migration of refugees and undocumented migrants from neighbouring and often poorer states as a means of quelling unrest generated by increased unemployment, or as a perceived means of preventing ‘terrorism’. For example, while it may seem as if Somaliland (northern Somalia) is simply a country of emigration, it is also home to thousands of migrants from neighbouring Djibouti, Ethiopia, and southern Somalia. In October, 2003, three European ‘humanitarian workers’ were murdered in different cities in Somaliland. Although it was unclear who the perpetrators were, the government then cracked down immediately on ‘illegal’ migrants and deported 77,000 migrants within the span of 45 days. These ‘illegal’ immigrants were seen as the source of ‘black magic’, HIV/AIDS, drugs, and ‘spoiled (i.e. inappropriate) culture’ (Peutz, 2006).

7) Placating already impoverished citizens against further immigration and periodic bouts of nativism and xenophobia. That is, poorer country governments also face issues of legitimation. For example, Klotz (2000) identifies a ‘new non-racial xenophobia’ in South Africa in the shadow of apartheid. Indeed, in 2007, Zimbabweans became the targets of violence, simply for being migrants, and Indonesian and other migrants have become the target of anti-illegal immigrant violence in Malaysia (as discussed earlier in the chapter).

This, again, is not an exhaustive list, but it does highlight some of the contradictory objectives of the countries of origin. Like the geo-political economies of migration control in richer countries, the pressures on states are diverse, and often involve unexpected conflicts (see Box 4.8).
Box 4.8 THE SURPRISING GEO-POLITICS OF MIGRATION CONTROL IN THE DOM-TOM (THE FRENCH OVERSEAS TERRITORIES AND DEPARTMENTS)

Migration control in the DOM-TOM provide but one example of the strange peculiarity of how migration controls work in certain countries, and in this case post-colonial territories. The mayors of cities and towns in French Guyane on the northeast coast of South America, the island of Guadeloupe in the southern Caribbean, and Mayotte, an island off the northwest coast of Madagascar (part of the Comorian Islands) have begun protesting the apparent virtues of France’s liberal republic, because Mayotte, Guyane, and Guadeloupe have become the site of large numbers of undocumented migrants. In this ironic twist of post-colonial protest (where the ‘formerly colonized’ protest against the liberal measures of the former colony), xenophobia and the fear of undocumented migrants has allegedly grown. Consider the protests of the President of the Association of Mayors of the Comorian Islands (Ali Souf), who claimed that the island had become the principal entry point for migrants into the territory of France. Speaking to the French newspaper Le Monde in 2006 (22 November, 2006), Ali Souf regretted that Mamadzou, the small capital of Mayotte, is now home to over 7,000 infants, of which 80% have undocumented mothers, the schools are ‘overcrowded’ with a ‘foreign population’ of 40%. There were 11,000 deportations in 2006 alone, and the Comorian population is likely to exceed the Mahoran (or native population) in about a decade. Since French citizenship rests on the premise of jus soli (or citizenship granted on the basis of birth in the territory), many of the children will eventually obtain nationality over a certain period of time. Souf admitted that many elected officials wished to abandon the French republican notion of citizenship acquisition based on where one is born, which is more liberal and expansive, in favour of a more restrictive citizenship granted on the basis of ‘blood’, i.e. ethnic ties to the ‘nation’. Besides considering the modification of the citizenship laws, at least two radar detectors have been installed to thwart clandestine boat dockings.
These rather less common and surprising elements of migration policy aside, a more notorious dimension of migration policies is its gendered character, and thus the final discussion of this chapter will explore the intersection of gender and migration policies in Asian countries.
Gender and migration policies in Asia

Gender is yet another dimension completely neglected by Freeman, and laws and policies in terms of both emigration and immigration in poorer (or at least less wealthy) countries are either clearly discriminatory or they are ‘gender-neutral’ but have gendered consequences. There are commonalities in terms of emigration and immigration policies across Asian countries, but the emphasis in this section is on especially poorer South-east Asian countries. Migration policies across most of Asia can be characterized as limiting quantitatively the number of labour migrants, limiting the duration of migrant’s residence, and limiting the ease with which they can settle through the absence of ‘integration’ policies. Most legal migration for women to Asian countries is limited to often two-year domestic labour contracts tied to a single employer, reflecting the stereotyping of women as domestic workers or carers. Since their contracts are not permanent, and women work in the private sphere, national labour laws do not apply. This, as we saw in Chapter 3, can have the most detrimental consequences for migrant workers (Piper, 2004, 2006). As Silvey (2004) notes, Asian governments have remained relatively silent on the abuses that occur in the private sphere, and it has been left to NGOs to address their often muted suffering. More generally, the policies and societal practices in both the countries of origin and destination in Asian countries have meant that the choices for migrant women are very constrained (Piper, 2004, 2006). Think, for example, of Bangladeshi women in Malaysia as discussed in Box 4.1.

Piper (2004) divides a discussion of migration policies into state and non-state actors and their interests; national and international human rights instruments, and the role of NGOs. Concerning the first, that is state actors, most migration policy seems to be delivered ‘top-down’ by governmental elites. Piper argues that the majority of government officials cannot relate to the lives of migrant women and especially poorer migrant women, and officials are viewed as ‘aloof’, ‘arrogant’, or ‘disinterested’ (p. 221). States are heavily involved (as noted in point 1 of the 7 general characteristics of state objectives in migration policy above) in organizing the emigration of female migrant workers to countries such as Saudi Arabia, but illegal ‘labour export agencies’ also exist, and most Asian governments, especially in Indonesia either do not have the
resources to clamp down on these informal agencies, or simply tolerate them since they seem to serve the aims of national economic development, and/or conform to what is acceptable treatment of poor women in both the country of emigration and immigration. Often police and other officials are involved in illegal cooperation with these informal labour export operations. The result is anaemic protection for emigrant women overseas, and again the conditions of Indonesian women in Saudi Arabia comes to mind (Silvey, 2004b; Rudnyckyj, 2004). Although governments are generally concerned about the welfare of their citizens overseas, they are usually in a weak bargaining position vis-à-vis the country of destination. Bilateral agreements are rare, and if there is mistreatment of a government’s citizens abroad, there is little they can do, especially if the country of immigration threatens to deport the migrants, which would damage the gains from remittances (Piper, 2006).

While there is cooperation within Asian countries on undocumented migration (for example, the ‘Bangkok Declaration of 1999’), such agreements are not legally-binding, as they often are in the European Union. Indeed, there is little migration cooperation between Asian countries, despite some of the regional trading agreements discussed earlier in the chapter. Migration is increasingly becoming the battleground between different Ministries. On one hand are the Ministries of Labour, which are typically more in tune with the needs of labour migrants (for example, through the creation of labour protection standards and labour complaint desks, as in Hong Kong, Japan, and Singapore), and the Ministries of the Interior, which are divorced from the concerns of migrant labour and are more interested in security issues (Piper, 2004, 2006).

In terms of non-state actors, NGOs and voluntary organizations are proliferating across Asian countries. A number of NGOs, such as Migrant Forum in Asia based in Manila, and CARAMASIA (Coordination of Action Research on Aids and Mobility) in Kuala Lumpur, are increasingly establishing international networks for assisting migrants (especially women) with their problems of welfare, education, documentation and legal needs, both in the countries of origin and destination. Likewise, migrants themselves have formed religious or ethnic-based mutual aid associations, and this is very common among the large numbers of Filipinos overseas. Depending on the country, home-and-abroad NGOs linking the entire migration chain are emerging in countries such as the Philippines, but are weaker in countries such as Cambodia and Vietnam. The
point is that these NGOs are a bottom-up and often grassroots response to elite-driven migration policies (Ibid).

National and international instruments such as the 1990 UN Convention, mentioned earlier in the chapter, has been ratified by only the Philippines and Sri Lanka. The convention could offer a minimum level of protection, but given the low levels of ratification in Asian countries and the rest of the world, the fate of migrant workers is left to the generosity of NGOs and national governments’ labour laws overseas, and even then there is a problem of enforcement. As one of the members of a pro-migrant worker NGO stated, “There are all those laws out there, but then when it comes to reality, there is nothing” (cited in Piper, 2004, 224).

Conclusions

Like migration itself, the answers to why states pursue the particular migration policies that they do and the character of these policies is complex. In this chapter, I reviewed a number of broad approaches to migration politics and policy as a means of illustrating the often contradictory and competing objectives which are condensed into state-based ‘migration management’ strategies. Once again, some of these approaches are downright incompatible, some are complementary and overlap. The important point to be gathered here is that migration is not a ‘natural’ phenomenon decided upon by magical economic laws or just the individual decisions of migrants. National states (including in the countries of origin) both control and are shaped by migrants, markets, non-state actors, international institutions such as in the EU or NAFTA, and sub-national or sub-state territories. It is difficult to say which territorial scale might matter more than another, though clearly national control has not disappeared, whatever the demands for the end of ‘methodological nationalism’ in the study of migration. On a practical level, there might be a well-meaning temptation to supra-nationalize or conversely localize migration policies as a means of addressing the social issues facing less fortunate migrants. However, neither of these re-scaling options for migration policies should be seen as an antidote to the plight of migrants around the world. Rather, it is the actual content of migration policies, and not necessarily the precise scale from which they are conceived that matters. In any case, states seem to privilege the highly-skilled and the wealthy as a general competitive strategy, and exclude the legal migration of those
who are not deemed to have ‘skills’. This ‘other half of the world’ has been described in various ways in academic research, yet whatever name or category is given to those less fortunate, they themselves change the nature of migration policies (though not always in ways which might benefit them). Nonetheless, migrants continue to organize and clamour for greater rights, and it is to these rights and citizenship that I devote my attention in Chapter 5.

FOR FURTHER READING

spatially-sensitive study of the ‘Freedom Ride’ of undocumented migrants in the US.

SUMMARY QUESTIONS

1. Explain why migration policies in the wealthy countries are not simply restrictive.
2. Discuss some of the ways in which migration policy has been ‘up-scaled’.
3. What are the Dublin Conventions and how do they effect asylum-seeking?
4. In what ways is migration policy a local affair?
5. How are migration policies gendered?
6. Discuss some of the differences between migration policies in wealthier and poorer countries.
INTRODUCTION

Consider the lives of one Ecuadorian family in New York City. The parents have settled as undocumented immigrants in Queens, a borough in the city. The mother, who had a difficult career as a computer systems analyst in Ecuador, now does babysitting. The father, who had a series of low-paid engineering jobs in Ecuador, and had already studied for an unfinished engineering degree in New York in the 1980s, now works as a draftsman for a Chinese immigrant-owned construction company. The father arrived clandestinely via Texas in 2001, while the mother and daughter arrived in New York on tourist visas, but overstay in the same year. The son was born in Miami and is an American citizen. They are therefore a ‘mixed status family’, where the son is legal and the daughter is undocumented. While the son can travel freely back and forth between Ecuador and the US, and pursue a formal job in the US, he wishes to return to Ecuador and the family feels that he has taken his citizenship for granted. Meanwhile, the mother has tried to use her son’s citizenship status to obtain a ‘green card’ (meaning a permanent residency card) for herself.

The daughter, who loves living in the US with all her friends, and has graduated with honours from a local high school and university, fears leaving the city because of the danger of being apprehended by
immigration authorities. She cannot take a high-paying job with the accounting degree she holds, obtain a driving license or a social security number. The diligent daughter worries about her future, but has found a reasonable, if low-paying job working legally as a bookkeeper for a small company that provides immigrants with information about immigration policy and visas. She works legally because the US government provides tax identification numbers for people without social security numbers. The mother wants her daughter to find an American husband to obtain citizenship status. She is reluctant, though perhaps slowly changing her mind, but nevertheless works with her undocumented boyfriend for an NGO that is lobbying the American government to push the ‘Dream Act’ which would give legal status to undocumented high school graduates brought to the US by their parents.

The above anecdote points to the centrality of citizenship and belonging to migrants and migrant families. This chapter has two aims then, to continue the discussion as to how citizenship figures in immigration policies and the relationship between forms of citizenship and migrant belonging. The study of this second relationship, particularly with respect to nationality law, is surprisingly young. It was widely assumed by academics during the nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries that migrants would gradually assimilate over time (especially in the US), or that they would be restricted to ‘guest-workers’ (in Europe for example) who would eventually return ‘home’. Not until the 1980s did the relationship between migration, citizenship and belonging begin to generate vigorous debate amongst academics in Europe and North America, as it became clear that neither assimilation nor ‘guest-workers’ returning home were simple or inevitable outcomes (Bauböck, 2006; Hansen and Weil, 2002b). While spatial ideas and arguments have permeated academic debates, these debates still remain spatially ‘immature’, having on occasion hastily thrown out the nation-state in favour of either transnational citizenship or local participation and belonging. This chapter is designed to understand these complex geographies of citizenship, migration and belonging.

After an explanation of the chapter’s geographical premise, I draw on some basic distinctions now used in the literature on citizenship and migration, namely the differences between citizenship as legal status; citizenship as rights; citizenship as belonging, and citizenship as political participation (e.g. Bloemraad et al., 2008; Bosniak, 2000; Leitner and Ehrkamp, 2006; Lister and Pia, 2008), and I use these academic and
social distinctions to divide the chapter’s discussion into four separate, but related sections.

**Space, migration, and citizenship**

A central debate in the migration studies literature around citizenship and belonging involves the continual salience of nation-states as the determinant or locus of citizenship and belonging in the face of international law, the emergence of an international human rights regime, transnational belonging, and the apparent ‘denationalization’ of citizenship (Sassen, 2006b). This is sometimes referred to as the debate between ‘nationally-oriented’ forms of citizenship on one hand, and ‘globalist’, ‘post-national’, ‘denationalized’, or ‘transnational’ forms of citizenship on the other (e.g. Joppke, 1998a, 1998b; Sassen, 2006b). To add to this are the calls by Favell (2001, 2008) to move away from national states as a lens on citizenship, in favour of viewing citizenship from the perspective of cities and their wider urban areas. It may even be necessary to lower further the resolution of any analysis down to households. The opening anecdote of this chapter tells us this, and Elias (2008), for example, also argues that the household or home scale is crucial. This is because the discourse and delivery of migrants’ rights is distinctly gendered in Malaysia, since Indonesian and Filipino women constitute the bulk of domestic workers in the country. Rights associated with the public sphere are often meaningless in the private worlds of households in which domestic workers circulate.

Despite the promising dual corrective of analysing citizenship in terms of supranational and sub-national entities, this obscures how nation-states as forms of territories still matter to the creation and contours of citizenship. In that sense, it is still too easy to dismiss the significance of nationally-centred forms of citizenship and belonging amidst the fervour and haze of transnationalism or globalism (e.g. Geddes, 2003; Faist, 2008; Kofman, 2002, 2005b; Koopmans, 2004). Thus, I maintain that interlocking supranational, national, and sub-national territories matter for the production of differential, ‘stratified’, or ‘segmented’ forms of citizenship and belonging. For many migrants around the world, citizenship (and even better dual citizenship) in the country of immigration is an ultimate goal, though permanent residency may in some cases be equally desirable. In that sense, we might think of citizenship as a ‘strategy’ too (see Box 5.1).
Box 5.1 CITIZENSHIP AS STRATEGY

Many studies on migration and legal status discuss migration as either a ‘waiting room’ where migrants ‘do their time’ and finally achieve full legal citizenship, or they show how migrants have actively protested for regularization, residence permits, and other social rights. While the transnational citizenship literature certainly explores the obtainment of citizenship as a (coping) strategy, this is still a less common perspective. In contrast, Ong’s well-received book *Flexible Citizenship* (1999) speaks of citizenship as a ‘flexible strategy’ (‘flexible citizenship’) in order to survive and even prosper economically. Specifically, she discusses the lives of the so-called astronauts, that is highly-skilled, and especially high-income businessmen who ‘buy’ their citizenship from the US, and fly between Hong Kong and the west coast of the US to conduct businesses. Meanwhile, their wives and children, and sometimes only their children, live out their lives in the suburbs of San Francisco for example, taking advantage of educational and other opportunities in the US. In the process, they transform the urban and suburban economic, political, and social landscapes of the west coast of the US (see also the research in Canada by Kobayashi and Ley, 2005, Preston *et al.*, 2006, and Waters, 2003). Contrary to Ong’s (1999) research of ‘flexible citizenship’ for economic ends, Preston *et al.*’s (2006) study of Hong Kong men and women living in Toronto and Vancouver found different motivations and strategies. To begin with, many of the men were not ‘astronauts’ at all, and some had relatively low incomes in these two Canadian cities. Few had remaining economic ties or owned property in Hong Kong. Most women had migrated either because their husbands wished to settle in Canada or because they thought a Canadian education would be better for their children. In addition, for men, family reasons and the fear of political repression after Hong Kong’s hand-over from the UK to China in 1997 were the source of seeking citizenship in Canada. Overall then, for both men and women, citizenship seems to be a goal for the sake of their families.
Migrants’ complex origins and destinations and their different levels of formal citizenship affect the type, quality, and scope of rights that they receive. Yet it is not states that unilaterally provide these rights in some generous top-down manner; rather, migrants themselves clamour for specific rights to which states respond out of appeals to humanitarianism, matters of (economic) practicality, or the fear of large-scale protest. Indeed, as we saw in Chapter 4, protest for citizenship and greater rights are common among immigrants throughout the world. Like other forms of citizenship, such contestation on the part of migrants is inflected by different places, spaces, and territories, these geographies of citizenship will prove central to the perspective adopted in the remainder of this chapter.

Citizenship as legal status (formal citizenship, nationality and naturalization)

The idea of citizenship is as old as the Greek polis, but if we can speak of the ‘modern form’ (nation-state-based citizenship), then its origins lay in the French Revolution and the formation and consolidation of nation
states in the nineteenth century (e.g. Brubaker, 1992; Hansen and Weil, 2002a). This modern form of citizenship, which gave birth to such elements of control as the ‘passport’ (Torpey, 2000), concerns bounded populations with rights and responsibilities and it excludes others by virtue of nationality. Sassen (2006b) explains:

Today citizenship and nationality both refer to the national state. While essentially the same concept, each term reflects a different legal framework. Both identify the legal status of an individual in terms of state membership. But citizenship is largely confined to the national dimension, while nationality refers to the international legal dimension in the context of an interstate system.

(Sassen, 2006b, 281)

Thus, it is important to emphasize that while nationality may be another word for citizenship, it seems important to distinguish between the two. They are not synonymous but “two sides of the same coin” (Bauböck, 2006, 17).

This section of the chapter is in essence about the attribution or acquisition of nationality and from that, full citizenship. This can occur through citizenship by birth, by descent, by marital status, or by residence (Hansen and Weil, 2002b). Depending on the country in question, full citizenship might involve a set of rights and responsibilities from the right to vote in national elections to holding public office and required military service. While the idea of even formal citizenship might seem complex, the point to be gleaned from the above discussion is that formal citizenship and nationality are by definition exclusionary – they exclude others – even if they are not bounded by a single territory such as a nation-state.

In the introduction to this book, I highlighted how certain migration categories used to define migrant statuses have been the subject of increasing criticisms. Such criticisms are warranted, but they are also exaggerated. Certainly, individuals who migrate as students for example, may convert their status to permanent residency, and eventually obtain nationality over time on the grounds of, let us say, family reunification or employment. Similarly, migrants from outside the European Union and living in a European country may be entitled to a range of social benefits that are accorded to citizens, either immediately or over time. However, undocumented migrants may remain undocumented for decades,
depending on the availability and timing of regularization programmes, the migrant’s age, time of entry, national background, and gender. In this case, it is somewhat far-fetched to label their status as ‘fluid’. This suggests that nationality and formal citizenship are not to be dismissed as simple artefacts of a more nationally-oriented age.

National ‘models’ of formal citizenship?

For most of the twentieth century, researchers typically couched the relationship between migrants and citizenship in terms of national ‘models’ of citizenship. These models of citizenship were argued to shape rates of naturalization, and notions of ‘integration’ and belonging (Brubaker, 1992; Favell, 1998[2001]). For example, Brubaker (1992) contrasts France’s ‘model’ of jus soli³ (citizenship at birth or law of territory) with Germany’s jus sanguinis (citizenship by descent or law of blood). In France, jus soli essentially granted citizenship automatically to a child of foreign parents if the child was born on French territory. The idea rested on a ‘statist’, republican and universalist ideal. In other words, the French government entertained an expansionist conception of citizenship that welcomed those who wished to be part of French political culture (the statist and republican dimension), regardless of their ethnic origins (the universalist dimension). It has been argued that French universalism explains in part why the legal, political, and even social recognition of ‘race’ and ‘ethnic minorities’ have been taboo since the inception of the French Republic (e.g. Feldblum, 1993). And it may explain in part angst about the wearing of veils (and other visibly religious symbols) in public places in France. In contrast, Germany’s jus sanguinis (‘law of blood’) is founded on the notion of an ‘ethnic community’ (volksgemeinschaft) or ‘community of descent’, a sense of ‘Germanness’, in which citizenship would only be granted sparsely to those who could demonstrate their ethnic German background, usually through parental heritage. Brubaker (1992) argued that this explained why it proved more difficult to obtain legal citizenship (measured in rates of naturalization) in Germany than in France.

With the exception of Austria, Greece and Switzerland which were rooted in a jus sanguinis notion of citizenship, most other European countries and the UK lay somewhere in between the poles of territory and blood. Australia, Canada, and the US have leaned more towards jus soli. These
‘national models’ were never pure, however (e.g. Kastoryano, 2002). For example, during the 1950s and 1960s, the German government seemed to combine jus sanguinis with quite liberal refugee policies, while the French government, and various other elements within French society, have scrutinized African and Muslim immigrants on the basis of a ‘cultural problem’ of integration, regardless of their territorial birthright and willingness to participate in the political life of France (Bloemraad et al., 2008; Laurence and Vaisse, 2006). If nation-states did harbour comparatively different conceptions of citizenship during the twentieth century, then they seem to have converged over the last decade and a half (e.g. Geddes, 2003). In fact, Faist (2000) argues, advocating the existence of such ‘models’ is now discredited.

Dual and plural nationality

Dual and plural nationality concerns the acquisition or eventual attribution of citizenship through jus sanguinis, jus soli, or marriage for a person holding nationality in another country or countries. However, it is not simply a matter of a country of immigration granting naturalization to a migrant who has another nationality; the country of emigration must also accept that one of its nationals is adopting nationality elsewhere. The country of origin may be more lenient if the second nationality is acquired through jus soli, that is involuntarily, rather than by purposeful naturalization (Schuck, 2002). Though little comparative quantitative evidence is available on the extent of dual nationality across the world, case studies of certain countries suggests that it is growing, and growing rapidly. It is estimated that about half of the world’s countries now have dual nationality or dual citizenship provisions (Bauböck, 2006; Kraler, 2006). It is especially significant for countries such as Switzerland, where it was estimated in the late 1990s that some 60% of its citizens were living abroad as dual nationals (Koslowski, 1997, in Schuck, 2002, 67). Dual (and even triple) nationality emerges because, let us say, ‘a German marrying a Turk and giving birth in the US will give birth to a Turk and German by descent and an American by birth’ (Hansen and Weil, 2002b, 3). Thus multiple citizenships will tend to increase with escalating international migration (Hansen and Weil, 2002b).

Yet despite the apparent proliferation of dual or multiple nationalities, many migrants still find it difficult to adopt another nationality without
their home country granting this wish, such as for Haitians living in the US, Japanese living in Brazil (the Haitian and Japanese governments do not allow dual nationality), and let us say Syrians living in Argentina (the process of renunciation in Syria is extremely arduous and therefore uncommon) (Escobar, 2007; Forcense, 2006; Schuck, 2002; Surak, 2008). Argentina, in fact, represents an extraordinary case of the problems of dual nationality, as the state does not explicitly allow dual or multiple nationalities, and will not allow for the renunciation of citizenship. Thus, its citizens abroad have dual nationality anyway because they adopt it without the Argentine government being aware of this (Escobar, 2007). One might distinguish in this sense between ‘open’, ‘tolerant’, and ‘restrictive’ dual nationality regimes (Aleinkoff and Klusmeyer, 2001, in Escobar, 2007, 47). For example, let us look at the UK, the US, and India, which represent different shades of openness, toleration, and restriction (see Box 5.2 and Box 5.3).

**Box 5.2 LIBERALIZING DUAL CITIZENSHIP IN INDIA, FOR SOME (FROM DICKENSON AND BAILEY, 2007)**

In contrast to Argentina’s very restrictive stance, India’s 2003 Dual Citizenship (Amendment) Bill and its 2005 revision liberalized dual citizenship for many, but not, all Indians overseas. There are two categories: ‘non-resident indians’ (NRIs) or those who live outside India for more than 183 days, and ‘a person of indian origin’ (PIO), that is anyone who once held an Indian passport, or whose parents or grandparents were Indian citizens, or who has married an Indian citizen. The liberalization of dual citizenship has its motivation in the government’s renewed interest in attracting back to India those who are perceived to be the successful artistic, business, intellectual, and professional ‘heroes’ of the diaspora (see Box 5.6 and the Glossary for the definition of ‘diaspora’). After all, there are about 20 million Indians living outside India. For the government, attracting back Indians from abroad hopefully serves two purposes: it stimulates national economic development by encouraging foreign direct investment and the transfer of technology; and it serves to reinforce an imagined nationalism centred on a moderate and

continued
tolerant form of Hinduism. Concerning economic development, dual nationality becomes an element of the general move towards the liberalization of the Indian economy. In fact, the government developed a two-pronged strategy which entailed The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) organizing the *Pravasi Bhartiya Divas* (Overseas Indian Day, which really lasted three days and involved meetings, performances, parties, and speeches) in order to celebrate the contribution of NRIs and PIOs to build closer links with India. A second feature of this strategy was to provide dual citizenship to some of these NRIs and PIOs. Ultimately, dual citizenship has been offered to Indians in 16 countries in Australasia, Europe, and North America but not in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East which contain much larger Indian populations and which are excluded from the list of countries (two exceptions are Nigeria and Lebanon). Those who are ultimately accorded dual citizenship can travel to India without a visa. They can stay without registering, they can invest in various economic activities, they can buy land and property, and they can enrol their children in Indian universities (Dickenson and Bailey, 2007).

It is important to recognize that India distinguishes between its pre- and post-independence diaspora, in which the pre-independence diaspora is associated with the ‘old India’ of British colonialism and oppression. In that way, this liberal attitude of dual citizenship is not extended, for example, to South African Indians, who arrived in South Africa as indentured workers or traders between 1860 and 1911, and who appear not to conform to the Indian government’s ideal of the perfectly integrated citizen overseas or desirable member of the diaspora. That is, Indians in South Africa are perceived by the Indian government to have rejected multi-culturalism, aloof from the black majority and living behind ‘gilded cages’ (Dickenson and Bailey, 2007: 768), and ultimately too far removed from a ‘modern’ India. In contrast, India’s post-independence diaspora is viewed as able to prosper economically through transnational networks and able to contribute to the ‘new India’. As Dickenson and Baily argue, the Indian state is
constructing a notion of diaspora around ‘professional success, ecumenical Hinduism, and multiculturalism’ (p. 765). For these authors, there is a class dimension to dual citizenship, since it is only offered to those who sought educational and professional activities in ‘the West’, while denied to those who left as indentured servants in what are now poorer countries. In short, the Indian government distinguishes between who and who is not worthy of dual nationality based on their geographic and social origins, which is itself infused with ideas of ‘Indian-ness’.

**Box 5.3 DUAL CITIZENSHIP IN THE UK AND THE US COMPARED**

Perhaps the most effective way of documenting the nature and significance of dual nationality is to compare its actual contours in the UK (a tolerant regime) and the US (by law restrictive but in practice tolerant). In contrast to Germany or the US, for example, the UK government has maintained a liberal or indifferent approach to dual nationality, neither pushing migrants to nationalize, nor encouraging them to renounce their citizenship.5 This indifference has been mirrored by the lack of protest amongst the majority of the British polity. For Hansen (2002), tolerance for dual nationality in the twenty-first century reflects, first, the creation of ‘British citizenship’ in 1948 as ‘plural citizenship’ (that is, citizenship with a sense of a UK and a greater British Commonwealth); second, that dual nationality is seen quite simply by the government as a means by which migrants may be better ‘integrated’ into ‘British society’; and third, that it seems to create no practical problems for the British government. There are virtually no limits concerning dual nationality, and the British government does not maintain statistics on its occurrence. British citizens abroad can obtain citizenship in another country, while immigrants in the UK do not have

continued
to renounce their former citizenship on obtaining British nationality. In fact, the UK Home Office does not query the intentions of the individual wishing to naturalize in the UK, and does not inform or divulge the process of naturalization to the government of the individual’s original nationality. However, two caveats are necessary here. First, in what Lewis and Neal (2005) call ‘neo-assimilation’, citizenship tests are proliferating across the rich countries, including the UK. This will ensure that while dual nationality may be tolerated, it will probably be more difficult to obtain, and particularly for migrants originating from Islamic countries. Second, dual nationals are not accorded exactly the same rights as nationals. For example, in a situation in which a dual national is naturalized as a UK citizen, and is accused of ‘high treason’ and/or a threat to ‘the security of the British people’, a government-appointed ad hoc committee may revoke a person’s status as a national, unless that will lead to the individual’s statelessness. British nationality cannot be revoked under any circumstances for an individual born with British nationality (Hansen, 2002). One of the significant implications of Hansen’s analysis is that there is no evidence of a relationship between dual nationality and loyalty to the British state. This is illustrated in the notable decision by the British government not to detain British-German dual nationals during WWII, unlike in the US where Japanese-Americans were imprisoned in camps. The above discussion, however, is not to suggest that somehow the British government entertains a general liberal set of policies vis-à-vis migration and settlement. After all, as Hansen (2002) points out, “a senior Conservative politician suggested as late as 1990 that West Indians take a ‘cricket test’ as proof of their loyalty (Which side do they cheer for? England or Jamaica?)” (p. 188).

In the US, the Federal government remained for a long time suspicious of dual nationality since the signing of the US Constitution, although since at least the 1990s, the government has increasingly tolerated but not encouraged it (Schuck, 2002), particularly for the problems it is argued to raise for political allegiance and loyalty to the US (whatever these ideas mean exactly?), but
also for perhaps less obvious reasons such as the complexities of offering diplomatic protection to dual nationals in the context of a ‘war on terror’ (Forcese, 2006). Thus, dual nationality is constitutionally forbidden, and a requirement for naturalization is the renunciation of one’s original citizenship. However, it is increasingly tolerated partly because, first, it is difficult or impossible to verify, since many states do not divulge this information to the US government. Second, the US government does not have a legal requirement for this renunciation of citizenship to take place, and thus it is hardly enforceable. However, the record number of naturalizations requested along with the liberalization of dual nationality in Latin American countries suggests that it is growing rapidly in the US as well. The US government has now dramatically increased the amount of resources it devotes to naturalization, paradoxically during a decade in which it also escalated its spending on border enforcement. For a migrant to obtain naturalization in the US, she or he must have had a certain period of residence (Schuck, 2002). The toleration of dual nationality in the US shifted some political burden on Latin American governments and other governments with large numbers of its emigrants living in the US, including Canada, India, and the Philippines to address the issue of dual nationality (Escobar, 2007; Portes and Rumbaut, 2006; Schuck, 2002). Not surprisingly, dual nationality and naturalizations became increasingly common among Latino migrants for example. Martin (2002) identifies at least five reasons for this:

1. The number of migrants eligible for naturalization rose sharply during the 1990s.
2. ‘Green cards’ replaced easily counterfeited long-term residence cards. These were as expensive as the cost of naturalization, and many migrants simply chose to naturalize rather than obtain a ‘green card’.
3. The Immigration and Naturalisation Service moved towards emphasising ‘naturalisation’ and established a program to handle the increasing number of naturalisations.
4. The liberalisation of Mexican dual nationality encouraged naturalisation among Mexicans in the US, as discussed above.

continued
From national models to denizenship and jus domicili: the convergence of national models

France and Germany’s nationality laws illustrate the importance of both the convergence of naturalisation policies in ‘western liberal democracies’ and the rise in the importance of length of residence as a determinant of rights.

Changes in France’s nationality code

In France, Articles 44 of the Nationality Code of 1889 concerned the acquisition of citizenship and Article 23 concerned the attribution of citizenship. Article 44 of the French Nationality code had granted citizenship (upon request and at the age of majority) to children born on French soil, regardless of whether the parents were themselves immigrants of foreign origin. Article 23 concerned what was called double jus soli – the attribution of citizenship to children of especially Algerian immigrant parents (Algeria was a Département or region of France until 1962). In late 1993, France passed a Nationality Law (effective January 1, 1994) that restricted Article 23, by requiring a minimum number of years of residence for immigrant parents from former French colonies (including Algeria) before children born in France could be attributed French nationality. The same law also reversed and disavowed Article 44, and children would no longer be entitled to citizenship if their parents were...

5. Welfare restructuring encouraged (impelled?) migrants to naturalize in order not to lose social benefits. Martin refers to this as the ‘devaluation of citizenship’ because immigrants only naturalize to obtain social benefits, thus debasing the very idea of American citizenship.

To Martin’s list, we can add the effects of 9/11 and its manifestation in the 2001 Patriot Act, which facilitated the deportation of ‘non-resident aliens’. Quite simply, Latino and other migrants viewed naturalization as protection against deportation, and at the same time, it would allow them to cement ties to their ‘home’ countries, especially the ability to vote in home elections (Escobar, 2007; Levitt, 2002).
of immigrant and foreign origin, but lived on French soil. Feldblum (1999) explains:

Up until 1993, children born in France to immigrant parents not born in France arguably were defined – if only in principle – less by their nationality status at birth (i.e. foreigner) than by their birthright (i.e. the absolute right to be French). The 1993 reform inverted this logic . . . Children born in France of immigrant parents were to be defined by their birth status – as foreigners – until they achieved their birthright. They were to be foreign until they could prove themselves French.

Yet the 1993 reform did not abolish *jus soli*, it simply became more difficult to obtain French nationality. In somewhat of a reaction against the previous conservative administration’s decision to tighten citizenship policies, the Guigou Bill of 1998 under the French Socialists re-implemented the quasi-automatic attainment of citizenship for immigrants at age 18, provided they maintained consistent residency in France for at least five years from the age of 11 (young immigrants could also decline the acquisition of nationality if they wished). It also reintroduced double *jus soli* rights for the children of Algerian immigrants, which had been eliminated during the 1993 reforms. However, this revision did not apply to other Francophone migrants of colonial origin, and certainly not to those immigrants from other countries beyond the European Union (Feldblum, 1999). Finally, the 1998 Guigou law allowed for the regularization of some undocumented immigrants, particularly those with links to families in France, or conversely single people, and these were defined in relation to Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, suggesting that the supra-national legislation had some impact on determining national laws (Kofman, 2002).

Changes in Germany’s Nationality Law

In 1990, the German government changed its Nationality Law of 1913 and passed the Aliens Act. It facilitated German citizenship for first-generation immigrants after 15 years of residence in Germany if they had not been convicted of a crime and renounced their original citizenship, and if they had ‘adequate’ living funds. In turn, second
generation children (i.e. the children of migrants) could naturalize after eight years of residence and six years of German schooling provided they apply between the ages of 16 and 23. The costs of naturalization were also lowered (Bryant, 1997; Köppe, 2003). There were further calls to liberalize citizenship during the late 1990s and on January 1, 2000, the age of naturalization was reduced from 15 to 8 years. Again, any potential citizens could not have committed a crime; they could not have relied on social security or social welfare ‘for any reasons of their own making’ (Köppe, 2003, 440); they must pronounce their faith in the German political (constitutional and democratic) system, and demonstrate ‘a sound knowledge’ of German. Furthermore, the acceptance of dual citizenship with naturalization was eliminated and dual citizenship through jus soli could not occur until the age of 23. That is, ‘second generation’ immigrants automatically received German nationality by birth (provided one of their parents had lived in Germany for at least eight years or they had an ‘unlimited permit of residence’), but they had to choose either the German or their original nationality at the age of 23. In principle, immigrants would still have to give up their foreign nationality in order to remain German citizens. If they opted for the latter, German nationality would be withdrawn. This ‘option model’ drew its inspiration from the French nationality reform of 1994 (Green, 2001; Klumsmeyer, 2001; Köppe, 2003; Rotte, 2000), and it is clear that France and Germany have converged to one degree or another in terms of the importance of length of residence (Joppke, 2007).

Denizenship and jus domicili
In an influential book, Democracy and the Nation State (1990), Hammar argued that long-term resident immigrants in various European countries enjoyed a number of social and political rights, including access to social welfare and sometimes the right to vote in local or regional elections. He referred to this situation as ‘denizenship’; that is, a spectrum of partial and stratified citizenship depending on a combination of a migrant’s country of origin, migration category, and length of residence. This state of differential rights has also been usefully referred to as ‘civic stratification’ in the context of the EU (Morris, 2001; Kofman, 2002). It is length of residence that prompted scholars such as Faist (1995) to argue that access to social services in countries such as the UK, Germany, Sweden, and France increasingly involve legal recognition based on a migrant’s
length of residence in the country as much as they might involve either place of birth or ethno-national belonging. He in turn called this *jus domicili* (loosely translated as law of residence). In countries of the EU, migrants are subject to a sort of tiered citizenship, whereby citizenship is based on five categories: citizens of a particular national state; citizens from an EU country residing in another EU country; those migrating to, or residing in the EU from a non-EU country; dual citizens, those with bilateral agreements; and asylum-seekers, refugees, and undocumented immigrants. In short, migrants in Europe are stratified or segmented. While Hammar’s book focused on the EU, the citizenship policies of countries around the world certainly involve civic stratification and denizenship based on *jus domicili* to one degree or another.

**Citizenship as rights**

Citizenship, as I noted in the introduction to this chapter, is more than just nationality. Substantive or *de facto* citizenship also involves rights. Certainly, they intersect, but our focus in this section is on the differential landscape of economic, political, and social rights accorded to migrants, especially in relation to citizens. One of the starting points for much of the literature on citizenship and rights with respect to migration is T.H. Marshall’s now widely-read book *Citizenship and Social Class* (1950). In it, he argued that people first obtain civil rights (e.g. the right to a fair trial, ‘free speech’, ‘free movement’, etc.), then political rights (e.g. the right to vote), then social rights (e.g. access to social welfare). This linear sequence has been criticized precisely for its linear-evolutionary character and because Marshall neglected the struggles between migrants and governments over the very acquisition and content of citizenship (e.g. Isin and Wood, 1999; Bloemraad et al., 2008). In the first decade of the twenty-first century, this sequence seems to have been re-ordered, so social rights may be accorded initially, but political rights such as voting in local elections, for example, may be highly contested (e.g. Guiraudon, 2000). Even for undocumented immigrants without legal status, social rights are not necessarily eliminated, such as in Spain. It is not simply a matter of a new order replacing a previous sequence, but rather a complexity of orders that vary geographically. However, rather than document endlessly the actual accumulated rights of migrants in different countries, it will be perhaps a better route to review some general
arguments and concepts concerning the acquisition of rights for migrants across the richer countries, and introduce the actual landscape of rights through these different arguments.

Towards postnational forms of citizenship?

If national forms of citizenship were either converging during the 1990s, and/or based increasingly on other criteria such as ‘jus domicili’ in Europe, they were also experiencing other processes of change, which concerned both legal status and rights. These changing forms of citizenship are often referred to as post-national, transnational, or global. Unfortunately, these processes involve less a theory than an approach, framework of analysis, or research agenda, and the differences or similarities between these terms are sometimes unclear (Lister and Pia, 2008).

Drawing on an analysis of European countries in particular, Soysal (1994) argues in Limits to Citizenship, that national forms of citizenship are moving towards universal forms of ‘personhood’, whereby supranational or international charters, codes, conventions, and laws increasingly attach universal rights and privileges to individuals regardless of their membership status in a nation-state. She calls this new ‘model’ postnational citizenship (or as Jacobson, 1996 puts it: ‘rights across borders’), and it is predicated or legitimated on the idea of international or global human rights. On these grounds, not just individuals but migrant ‘groups’ are accorded protection on the basis of rights to their identity, including for example language and religion (Soysal, 1997). Thus for Soysal (1994, 1997) national forms of citizenship are deteriorating, accompanied by a ‘decoupling’ of rights from national territories. As she insists, a ‘guest-worker’ in Sweden need not have a knowledge of Swedish history or even the Swedish language to access a bundle of rights in that country. However, Soysal recognizes that paradoxically, postnational rights are organized by national states.

Criticisms of Soysal’s idea of ‘postnational citizenship’

Although Soysal’s argument set a certain agenda for research, a number of significant criticisms can be levelled at her work. First, ‘postnational’ is not quite the same as ‘denationalized’ (Bosniak, 2000) or what Sassen (2006b) calls the ‘denationalization’ of citizenship. For Sassen,
postnational citizenship is something beyond national states, but ‘denationalisation’ refers to change within national states and the way in which they have absorbed international and post-national norms. Thus, ‘de-nationalization’ means that an international or global human rights regime is slowly at work, but this involves national courts using international human rights instruments for jurisprudence (the interpretation of the law) and legal decision-making. For Sassen then, the issue is not simply a matter of something happening beyond the national state, but that ‘the national’ is itself changing and absorbing the ‘international’ and ‘post-national’ (e.g. the acknowledgement of dual citizenship). This is why it is crucial to distinguish between denationalization and postnational citizenship, which are different but deeply intertwined processes.

Second, Soysal incorrectly refers to the process of post-national citizenship as indicative of ‘deterritorialization’. This is strictly speaking, incorrect; what is happening instead is the formation of new scales of regulation, involving new national territorial policies with respect to citizenship and their interrelationship with new supra-national territorial policies. This dual and sometimes contradictory movement is about changing forms of territoriality and citizenship and not about ‘deterritorialization’.

A third group of reservations focuses on the relationship between migrants and higher (often European) courts. Among the questions raised are whether migrants’ legal status and rights are still meted out by national states, and whether individual migrants have access to higher (European) courts to claim rights and privileges that they are not accorded by national states. Similarly, a question remains as to the degree to which migrants actually make these claims to higher authorities, rather than to national governments, and the extent to which the decisions of international institutions have the ‘legal teeth’ to render decisions over and above the rights and responsibilities offered and dictated by national states, never mind the enforcement of these decisions (e.g. Joppke, 1998a; Kofman, 2005b; Surak, 2008). In terms of these third group of criticisms, it is worth spending more than just a few moments to discuss the actual scalar progression of rights in the European Union, since the EU is held up as the region of the world in which the ‘supranationalization’ or ‘post-nationalization’ of rights has progressed the furthest. In this respect, some important legal decisions emanating from both the Luxembourg-based European Court of Justice (the supreme
judiciary of the European Union) and the Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights (or the Single Court)\(^6\) during the 1990s, have in fact come to supranationalize or postnationalize citizenship and the extension of rights to a degree (e.g. Geddes, 2003; Guiraudon, 2000; Kostakopolou, 2002). Indeed, some crucial caveats are necessary. To begin with, a citizen of any European country is a citizen of the European Union, but it is national governments that determine the citizenship of ‘third country nationals’ (or TCNs – those migrants from outside the European Union) whether they are asylum-seekers, family members, or labour migrants. Thus, it should be emphasized that any reality of postnational rights is partly dependent on an individual’s denizenship in a national state, a denizenship which is in turn partially determined by jus domicili (citizenship and rights based on length of residence). For example, TCNs who have lived in a European country for less than five years do not possess the same rights as those who have resided in an EU country for a longer period of time. Yet even those nationals of an EU country living in another EU country, who are by law citizens of the European Union, are entitled by European law to similar economic and social rights, but political rights (such as holding public office) is still not permitted in most EU countries (Perchinig, 2006). For asylum-seekers in the EU, the situation is overall grim, where most states now provide the most meagre social support and isolated accommodation as to avoid alleged ‘asylum-shopping’ among would-be asylum-seekers. In the UK for example, benefits for asylum-seekers have been progressively reduced over the last decade, and for the most part asylum-seekers can only receive benefits if they are deemed ‘destitute’ (Dwyer, 2005).

The result are different levels of citizenship in the EU, based on differences between European citizens living in their own country, European citizens living outside their country of nationality, legally-residing TCNs, asylum-seekers, and undocumented migrants (e.g. Kofman, 2005b). Thus in terms of economic, social, and political rights, the situation is sometimes unfathomably complex, dependent as it is upon not only the jus domicili of member states, but also European directives and other legal rulings concerning the provision of rights, and bi-lateral labour and European association and cooperation agreements between European countries and between European countries and those outside the EU. While there has been some national convergence and some postnationalization of rights, Feldblum’s (1998) idea of ‘neo-national membership’
seems more appropriate. By this she means the “developments whose effects are to reconfigure cultural, national, and transnational boundaries to ensure closure” (p. 232). In sum, multiple territorialities are at work in the acquisition and provision of social rights, producing both national and European denizenships.

As with many other debates concerning citizenship and rights around the world, the terminology is different depending on which country is the subject of investigation. In North America and Asia, it seems more common to speak of ‘transnational citizenship’ (e.g. Bauböck, 1994), ‘rights across borders’ (Jacobson, 1996), or an international human rights regime (e.g. Benhabib, 2008) rather than ‘post-national’ citizenship. This is probably because Soysal used the EU as her ‘test case’, and because outside the EU, citizenship does not have the same supra-national laws and regulations as those dictated by European institutions, whatever the claims for the rise of international human rights. In fact, at the same time that human rights talk has arisen across the world, so has the chatter about the ‘neo-liberalization’ of rights.

The ‘neo-liberalization’ of migrants’ rights?

Oddly, so much of the literature on citizenship, migration, and belonging is divorced from neo-liberal arguments about political-economic change (for prominent exceptions, see e.g. Mitchell, 2003, and Schierup et al., 2006). This is not entirely surprising given the emphasis on the increasing acquisition of economic, political, and social rights for at least legal migrants around the world. However, the actual content of these newly acquired rights – particularly economic and social rights in most countries for most categories of migrants – has been depleted, consistent with arguments concerning neo-liberalism (e.g. Schierup et al., 2006). EU countries and particularly Scandinavian countries are still assumed to be models of strong welfare states. Yet in Sweden, as in France (Samers, 2004b), the content or quality of migrants’ rights have been slowly eroded (see Box 5.4). Similarly, changes in rights for migrants in the US seem to only reinforce the assumption that the US is a weak welfare state that has further weakened under ‘roll back neo-liberalism’ (see Box 5.5).

In wealthier countries beyond Europe and North America, such as Japan, the rights of migrants have arguably increased, particularly for long-term resident Koreans since the end of World War II, and especially
Box 5.4 MIGRANTS AND SOCIAL RIGHTS IN A ONCE STRONG WELFARE STATE: SWEDEN

As is the case with other Scandinavian countries, Sweden has had a long-standing reputation as a strong welfare state, geared towards universal principles – that is, everyone is in theory entitled to support. Sweden continues to have relatively strong welfare policies, but social protection has weakened considerably since the 1980s, and may be irrelevant for the growing number of undocumented immigrants (Schierup, Hansen and Castles, 2006). Citizenship in Sweden is based on *jus sanguinis*, but naturalization is relatively liberal and dependent upon length of residence (*jus domicili*), now set at five years. Unlike in Germany and the US, there is no citizenship test (Sainsbury, 2006).

In her discussion of the social rights of immigrants in Sweden, Sainsbury (2006) compares the Swedish case with the Germany and the US. From the 1950s to the 1990s in Sweden, the foundation of formal citizenship came to be seen as discriminatory and now length of residence and employment status have replaced nationality or legal citizenship as the criterion for access to rights. The economic, political, and social rights of immigrants are now wide-ranging, including unemployment and occupational insurance, national health insurance, pensions for disability and retirement, illness compensation, and parental allocations for children, to name just some of the benefits. Sweden’s welfare system has a number of features that distinguish it from either Germany or the US. ‘Work tests’ in Sweden (which are a measure of eligibility for benefits based on the ability to work – the equivalent of means-testing – are hardly very stringent) and family members have individual access to social entitlements regardless of employment, although they must be residents. This is in contrast to Germany, where the right to social benefits depends on a person’s direct or indirect relationship to employment, whether or not the individual lives in Germany; in Sweden, social rights are accorded to *residents*, and family members living outside the country do not have access to benefits. In Germany, child benefits are usually paid to the father.
as head of the household, whereas in Sweden, by law social allowances belong to the child, but are commonly given to the mother. In Germany, maternity benefits are a ‘derived right’, that is subject to labour force participation, while it is an individual right in Sweden. There is no distinction between political migrants (asylum-seekers, refugees) and economic migrants in Sweden (Ibid).

Immigrants received the right to vote and run for office in local and regional elections in 1975, and the 2001 nationality law introduced dual citizenship. The social entitlements of immigrants have remained stronger than those in the US or Germany, and even the tightening and weakening of Swedish welfare policies were not aimed at immigrants specifically, at least not overtly. The ‘reform’ of welfare policies did, however, have the most detrimental effect on immigrants as the sharp decline in the amount of welfare provision affected people on low incomes in particular. This coincided with rising unemployment during the 1990s so job prospects worsened, and this only exacerbated their right to benefits as migrants lost connection with the world of work. The percentage of migrants who were asylum-seekers and refugees grew during the 1990s and social benefits became all the more crucial, yet the government reduced asylum benefits in 1992 by 10%. The government argued that because other benefits were being reduced for citizens and other migrants, asylum-seekers should be no different. Furthermore, the Swedish government responded to an increase in the number of asylum-seekers by issuing only temporary rather than permanent resident cards. Issuing permanent residency cards meant that asylum-seekers and refugees could not access general social insurance. As Sainsbury (2006) puts it, “In this instance the principle of domicile was converted from a mechanism of inclusion to one of social exclusion” (p. 239). Nonetheless, a 1996 bill gave asylum-seekers and refugees the right to work, and bolstered educational opportunities for their children. The requirement that elderly migrants joining their families should be ‘self-sustaining’ in terms of income and accommodation was dropped on the basis
that Swedish citizens were not required to support their own elderly parents, and thus led to discrimination between citizens and non-citizens (Sainsbury, 2006; Schierup, Hansen and Castles, 2006). While many social benefits remain intact for migrants, even in a putatively strong welfare state such as Sweden, the reduction in social benefits associated with ‘neo-liberalisation’ has had a profound effect on immigrant lives.

Box 5.5 MIGRANTS AND CHANGING SOCIAL RIGHTS IN A ‘WEAK’ WELFARE STATE: THE US

Let us re-visit the US case in a little more detail, having already discussed to some degree changes in social entitlements in Chapter 3. In contrast to European countries, there is no supra-national authority in the US, and the delivery of rights in the US is shaped by the relationship between Federal, state, and local governments. Prior to 1996 and the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRCA), legal migrants enjoyed most of the same social rights as US citizens, and even undocumented immigrants were entitled to some social services prior to the 1990s. For legal migrants, this included access to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Supplementary Security Income (SSI) for elderly and disabled people, and Food Stamps. Not everyone was immediately eligible, however, and a stipulation called ‘deeming’ required that the ‘sponsors’ of an immigrant (most family category immigrants required sponsors) have their income estimated (‘deemed’) in the first 3–5 years of entry. As Martin (2002) argues, one of the advantages of this is that it had a limited time period attached to the deeming process so that “it did not construct a permanent second class of resident who paid taxes but would not realise any benefits” (Martin, 2002, 217). After 1996, a number of changes to social entitlements ensued; chief among them that legal migrants and especially undocumented migrants should not benefit from the same social rights as citizens. And
whatever cuts were protested by immigrant-friendly advocacy groups and state and local political parties, the basic premise that there should be a distinction between legal immigrants and citizens remained. With reference to the specific policies, access to SSI and Food Stamps only became possible after 40 quarters (roughly 10 years) and with the added restriction that during those 40 quarters, the immigrant could not have accessed any means-tested public benefits. There were exceptions for the elderly, children, asylum-seekers and refugees, and a few other categories of persons. Yet most legal immigrants became ineligible for means-tested public benefits prior to 5 years of residence. This includes those fleeing conflict, environmental degradation and other problems and entering under Temporary Protected Status (TPS), which provides no certainty of eventual citizenship, let alone asylum or permanent residency. For example, Bailey et al. (2002) find in their study of Salvadoran migrants within the TPS programme that it does not entitle them to health insurance, and the meagre earnings of Salvadoran migrants mean that many do not carry insurance. The effect has been the lack of preventative and ongoing health care, which has in turn led to chronic illnesses.

Despite these transformations at the Federal scale, individual American states are allowed to determine whether legal migrants can continue to receive Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF, or the successor to AFDC). Some US states do try to address the problems of these reforms by cobbling together resources from Federal and state funds, and some of the states with the largest immigrant populations, such as California and New York, have enacted state-only Food Stamp and other aid programs to fill the void which the Federal government had eviscerated. Still worse is the fate of undocumented immigrants (‘illegal aliens’) who continue to be ineligible for most social programs, with the exception of emergency Medicaid (healthcare) and some housing and other emergency support at the local level (Martin, 2002). Nonetheless, the actual access to social and medical care that migrants receive seems to be dependent upon place of birth,
the visa through which one enters the country (e.g. those on highly-skilled H1B visas enjoy different rights from asylum-seekers or those on temporary agricultural contracts), the length of time spent in the US, and the nationality of the mother (e.g. Durden, 2007). Interestingly, in what amounts to an indictment of the weak economic, political, and social rights for migrants in the US, Bloemraad (2006) argues that the absence or skeletal nature of rights accounts for the low rate of US citizenship acquisition compared to Canada, which has relatively more generous rights.

since the 1990 Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act. Though there are plenty of exceptions, such as the lack of racial discrimination legislation and access to political representation among migrants, overall the expansion of rights has progressed to such an extent for legal migrants that permanent residency seems to be even more desirable than citizenship in Japan given the parity of rights between citizens and migrants. Much of this expansion of rights is attributable to first, the compliance on the part of the Japanese government to international human rights conventions since the 1980s; and second, to local officials, whose practical outlook towards ensuring the welfare of their migrant constituencies have lobbied for rights to jobs, health insurance, and pensions. National immigration policy-makers have taken their cues from this local landscape of expansive rights, and not necessarily the other way around (Surak, 2008). While this says nothing about the limited social protection associated with these rights, especially for refugees (Dean and Nagashima 2007), the narrative of neo-liberalization in terms of migrant and refugee rights seems somewhat misplaced in the context of Japan. This is equally true of Korea, where migrants enjoyed few rights for the first two-thirds of the twentieth century. While legal migrant workers’ rights are now broadly consistent with citizens in Japan and Korea, and other migrants have benefited from new social policies (Surak, 2008, Lee, 2008), the neo-liberalization of workers’ rights in general has taken its toll. And certainly, few of the emollient claims about expansive rights say much about the rights of undocumented migrants, an allegedly increasing percentage of the migrant population in countries such as Japan and
Korea. Thus, migrants’ rights are stratified in Korea and Japan, as they are elsewhere in the world.

In other, especially poorer countries, it may be similarly problematic to deploy the term ‘neo-liberalization’ in terms of the actual content of rights, since economic, social, and political rights were never institutionalized to the same degree in the first place for migrants. And whatever rights existed for migrants in the past, structural adjustment in the poorest countries over the last 25 years or so has eviscerated these already skeletal rights. Consequently, most low-income migrants, especially those who are undocumented, must fend for themselves in the burgeoning and desperate informal economies of the ever-mushrooming ‘mega-cities’ of the global south (Davis, 2004).

In sum, it is easy to exaggerate the claim of post-national rights or transnational citizenship. The content of these rights seem to have eroded at the very moment migrants have obtained access to them, especially in the EU. As we have seen in the US, even access has been constrained, combined with a more general transformation of welfare. That migrants experience different bundles of rights suggests that their opportunities for participation and belonging in the countries of immigration will also be shaped, but not determined by such rights, and it is to this question of belonging that I turn to in the next section.

Citizenship as belonging

While citizenship may be defined by legal status and social rights, it is also about ‘belonging’. By ‘belonging’, I mean subjective senses and practices of citizenship that hinge upon migrant identities, and this third part of the chapter explores migrants’ sense of belonging in relation to their country or countries of origin and immigration, but particularly with respect to cities. I start however, by elaborating on social exclusion and cultural marginalization, which may seem like an odd way of beginning a chapter section on belonging, but social exclusion and marginalization can be viewed as somewhat opposite to the process of belonging, and therefore generative of these feelings of belonging. After this discussion of social exclusion, I then review some of the distinctions between ‘assimilation’, ‘multi-culturalism’, and ‘integration’ (sometimes called ‘acculturation’ or ‘adaptation’), and then move on to a discussion of ‘transnational belonging’, including political participation among
migrants. This part of the chapter mixes a ‘top-down’ understanding of citizenship, in which governments shape belonging through discourses, policies and practices, and a ‘bottom-up’ understanding, in which migrants carve out their own complex identities in relation to these discourses, policies and practices.

**Urban social exclusion and cultural marginalization**

‘Social exclusion’ gained its popularity in Europe in the 1980s as an alternative to the Anglo-American idea of poverty or poverty lines, because as a concept it emphasizes the range of social processes that result in “inadequate social participation, lack of social integration and lack of power” (Room, 1995, 5). Elsewhere in the world, ‘marginalization’ or ‘vulnerability’ (particularly in the context of asylum-seekers, refugees, and internally displaced persons) seem to be more widely used terms, although these are not necessarily inscribed in policies as is social exclusion, and the term ‘social exclusion’ also appears in different contexts outside Europe. While policy discourses in Europe itself have gradually shifted to focus either on ‘inequality’ or ‘social inclusion’, the processes described by social exclusion have not disappeared and it serves as a useful if very general and flawed metaphor for the problems that migrants face in cities in both the global north and the global south (for critiques of the term, see Madanipour et al., 1998; Samers, 1998a). Let me focus then on processes of urban social exclusion that operate through racism, nationalism, xenophobia, and various forms of negative prejudice around the many axes of differentiation that I have spoken about throughout this text (e.g. age, class, disability, ethnicity, gender, nationality, sexuality, and so forth). Again, this not simply a ‘white’ on ‘black’ exclusion, nor is it limited to the western countries.

Social exclusion involves both material and discursive dimensions (Samers, 1998a; Musterd et al., 2006). Material exclusions might include exclusion from formal waged employment or entrepreneurial possibilities, from banks and other financial institutions, from higher or prestigious education, and from ‘adequate’ housing, health and social services, training, and leisure spaces such as parks. It might also involve the inability of migrants to vote in local or national elections, and more generally to ‘sit down at the table’ with government officials in various local, national, and international contexts. Discursive exclusions may
entail the invisibility of migrants in certain policy reports, and the absence of their individual or collective voices from the dominant media. Thus social exclusion as a set of processes and effects does not happen just anywhere; it happens in and through particular places and scales. It would be more appropriate then to speak of ‘socio-spatial exclusion’ (e.g. Sibley, 1995). Yet migrants are ‘culturally marginalized’ as well, insofar as they are viewed as ‘different’ and feared by many citizens for cultural practices such as polygamy or patriarchy, their language or religion.

At the same time, some immigrants are seen as more ‘acceptable’ in the minds of citizens than others, with skin colour, language use, national and ethnic background, perceptions of their ‘work ethic’, their real or imagined economic success, and their willingness to embrace political liberalism, as significant in determining the ‘acceptability’ of migrants in the eyes of citizens. Attitudes change over time though, sometimes favourably. For example, in Ignatiev’s fascinating book *How the Irish became White* (1995), he discusses the period before the American Civil War, in which the Irish were viewed as ‘unacceptable immigrants’ but later ‘whitened’ (accepted) as part of the dominant racial class after the Civil War. Acceptability then, is a question of ‘moments’ or periods of history.

However, many migrants do not necessarily enjoy a growing acceptance at the beginning of the twenty-first century. For example, the American government has scrutinized and used repressive measures against Latino and Muslim migrants (or those perceived to be Latino or Muslim) after the events of September 11, 2001 (Howell and Shryock, 2003; Ashutosh, 2008; Shoeb et al., 2007; Staeheli and Nagel, 2006). European governments have responded in similar ways to Muslim migrants across the EU, and this type of often violent cultural marginalization is hardly limited to Europe and North America. The Malaysian government and many Malaysians welcomed Indonesian migrants in the 1980s as a neighbouring and fellow Muslim work force, but anti-Indonesian sentiment is now widespread and related to a resurgent Malay nationalism in which Indonesian migrant workers are seen as ‘foreign Islamic nationals’ (Spaan et al., 2002).

Migrants feel this cultural hostility which eventually has an effect on their sense of belonging. There is an almost limitless literature on socio-spatial exclusion and cultural marginalization among migrants in the context of cities. Let me discuss just one example: an activist-oriented
study of mostly ‘second generation’ teenagers (that is, their parents may be recent legal or undocumented immigrants) in the extraordinarily diverse neighbourhood of Jackson Heights, Queens, New York City (Driscoll et al., 2008).8 (Recall the borough of Queens from the opening anecdote in this chapter). The point of the following discussion is to show that social exclusion extends into the second generation or ‘young people of migrant origin’, but it is not necessarily always (or at least not just) racism and xenophobia that immediately concerns them. Rather, they face other processes of socio-spatial exclusion.

In Jackson Heights, the young people with whom Driscoll et al. conduct their study have few places that they can go to that are both safe and free of ‘repression’ from adults. In fact, while the young people recognize the value of rules, they also see these rules as ‘adultist’ and ‘anti-youth’ (p. 2836). The one park in the approximately 30-bloc area is seen as a place of attraction for young people, but also a place of crowds and danger, especially drug dealing and fights. It seems to be dominated by younger children and adults, and teenagers resent that the park has been encroached upon by the expansion of a children’s playground area. At the same time, they are not allowed to congregate in front of schools, and in accordance with local building regulations, prohibited from the interior green spaces of their apartment complexes unless accompanied by an adult. In general, resident associations and private management companies in Jackson Heights have increasingly carved up public spaces against other adults and young people who are deemed to be dangerous, and have created a gated and fortified urban neighbourhood denying young people’s ‘right to the city’ (D. Mitchell, 2003). If the street seems a likely refuge from this fortification, they are also shunted off the streets by parents and police concerned with both their safety and loitering.

Besides the park mentioned above, one of the few places they are able to congregate is in the local McDonalds for the ‘price of an ice cream cone’ (Driscoll et al., 2008, 2837). There they can sit and talk in peace, free from the incursions of parents, police, and other adults. Whatever spaces of relative privacy may or may not be open to them, they also feel disenfranchised from local decisions, insisting that their (often undocumented) parents, local authorities, police, and others do not listen. In addition, when a group of young people decided to paint a mural as a contribution to the neighbourhood’s beautification program, their project was quickly rejected by the leader of a local ‘beautification
committee’ on the grounds that Jackson Heights is an ‘historical landmark neighbourhood’ and that residents of the neighbourhood do not like murals. For all of the above reasons, and because of the fragility of their parents’ legal status, some young people do not wish to build strong roots in the area, while others feel enormous pride and a desire to build ‘a community’. In fact, despite the enormous diversity of the young people involved and the obstacles they face, they have come together and succeeded in creating a mobile mural which has been shown throughout the neighbourhood. They also created a fixed mural on a building just outside the boundaries of historical preservation district. They were successful in requesting a local politician to purchase two “solar powered ‘compacting’ trash cans” (p. 2840) for an area around their school that had no rubbish bins. They created a garden in conjunction with local businesses, and they wrote petitions that asked for access to the interior green spaces of their apartments (Driscoll et al., 2008). In short, social exclusion consisted of more than issues of legal status, and a diverse group of young people in Jackson Heights cobbled together and practiced a form of informal civic engagement that ensured, to one degree another, their ‘inclusion’ in one of the most diverse neighbourhoods in the US.

From the above discussion, it should be clear that socio-spatial exclusion and marginalization can be manifested in a variety of ways. The consequences may be that migrants reject the cultural discourses and practices of the dominant culture, it may lead to the adoption of these discourses of practices, it may lead to new negotiations and challenges to dominant representations, and celebrations of migrants’ cultures of origin. This last process is often expressed in parades, for example, which are commonplace displays of migrant cultures and very subtle forms of protest against racism, stigmatization, and other exclusionary or marginalizing processes throughout the world. They involve what Mitchell (1995) calls ‘spaces for representation’. To provide one illustration, Veronis (2006) shows the significance of the Canadian Hispanic Day Parade in Toronto for various Latino communities that exist in the Jane and Finch section of north-western Toronto. The Parade, which proceeds down a central boulevard in the area and passes through commercial areas, is infused with music, dancing (including a dance group of children), food, and a beauty pageant. The parade is not an act of rebellion against living in Canada or Canadians, but a much more celebratory
and subtle form of protest against the stigmatization of Latinos, the impoverished spaces of public housing which they inhabit, and the lack of possibility for social mobility. It displays the diversity of Latin Americans as well as their unity and pride in being Latin American, while embracing the value of ‘multi-culturalism’ in Canadian political discourse. It is aimed at challenging dominant representations of migrants as “poor, uneducated, corrupted, lazy, and violent” (p. 1665). As Veronis argues, however, the parade is also inflected by ‘neo-liberal’ ideas insofar as it is designed to support local businesses, and to provide opportunities for disadvantaged youth. Whether or not the support of businesses and employment is necessarily ‘neo-liberal’ is another matter, but the parade also fosters the values of ‘individual responsibilization’; in other words, the neo-liberal idea that people should be responsible for their own lives and welfare, rather than rely on the state for support. Again, in the parade, there is a celebration of Latino culture, but that does not mean that Latino migrants in Toronto necessarily reject all facets of Canadian life, and it would be difficult to do so given the weight of assimilation pressures. It is in fact the idea of these pressures to which I now divert our attention.

Assimilation

In the immigration studies literature during most of the twentieth century, ‘assimilation’ seemed to have at least three meanings: immigrants adapt to or adopt the cultural ideas and practices of the dominant culture over time; immigrants achieve the same socio-economic status measured in terms of some ‘mean’ for the ‘native born’ (Zhou et al., 2008, 41); and immigrants develop a spatial pattern in terms of residence and employment that is indistinguishable from the dominant or more dominant cultural groups. Although the term ‘assimilation’ still has some currency within European countries, it is in countries such as the US and Japan where ‘assimilation’ appears to have the strongest resonance in academic and public debate. In the US, the preoccupation with ‘assimilation’ in part reflects the long-standing idea of American society as a ‘melting pot’ in which successive waves of immigrants would ‘melt’ into an idealized conception of ‘Americanness’. During the nineteenth century, assimilation meant adopting the cultural practices and expectations of the nationally dominant culture (white, Anglo-Saxon Protestantism, or WASP culture). Assimilationist ideals have shifted over time as waves of
immigrants (especially Catholics and to a less extent Jews) re-shaped the cultural landscapes of the US, and a nationally dominant culture seems less visible. In fact, Cadge and Ecklund (2007) refer to the US during the twentieth century as a ‘triple melting pot’ composed of Protestants, Catholics and Jews. Thus, assimilation as public discourse and practice has not disappeared. As in other countries such as Japan, candidates for naturalization in the US must take a citizenship exam, which attempts to re-assert a certain vision of ‘Americanness’ (from questions on what battle happened when, to particular amendments to the US constitution).

One would have thought that ‘assimilation’ in academic discourse would have disappeared in diverse ‘western’ countries, but this is not the case. However, the nature of assimilation arguments has changed. In fact, against the ‘straight-line’ assimilation arguments of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in which over time, all immigrants’ lives eventually mirror those of citizens, Portes and Zhou (1993) develop a less linear conception of assimilation. They argue in fact that the differences in the achievement of socio-economic status and socio-cultural practices among second generation immigrants (understood in terms of national groups) can be called ‘segmented assimilation’ (Portes and Zhou, 1993, Portes and Fernandez-Kelly, 2008; Zhou et al., 2008). In Portes and Zhou’s (1993) initial statement, segmented assimilation is viewed in the following way:

\[
\text{... the question is into what sector of American society a particular immigrant group assimilates. Instead of a relatively uniform mainstream whose mores and prejudices dictate a common path of integration, we observe today several distinct forms of adaptation. One of them replicates the time-honoured portrayal of growing acculturation and parallel integration into the white middle class; a second leads straight in the opposite direction to permanent poverty and assimilation into the underclass; still a third associates rapid economic advancement with deliberate preservation of the immigrant community’s values and tight solidarity.}
\]

(p. 82)

Portes and Zhou do not neglect space in their analysis. In fact, for them it is the paradox of Haitians’ apparent cultural assimilation into a particular African-American dominated area of Miami, at the same time that they are not assimilated socio-economically (measured in terms of education,
occupation, income, home ownership, etc.), that in many ways motivates their call for the idea of ‘segmented assimilation’. In order to explain these segmented outcomes, Portes and Zhou refer to ‘modes of incorporation’ by which they mean “the complex formed by policies of the host government; the values and prejudices of the receiving society; and the characteristics of the coethnic community” (p. 83).10 These modes of incorporation depend upon how citizens view the skin colour or what they called ‘racial type’ of migrants, their location, and the absence of ‘mobility ladders’ (meaning how deindustrialization in the US wiped out many highly-paying, unionized manufacturing jobs). Not satisfied with this understanding of segmented assimilation nor the ‘traditional’ literature on assimilation in general, Zhou et al. (2008) develop the concept of segmented assimilation further by suggesting that the conventional measures of assimilation are problematic insofar as what is equally important is a measure of ‘inter-generational progress’, that is, how far migrant groups move beyond their parents’ attainment. Yet they take it one step further by proposing a ‘subject-centred’ approach to assimilation that accords priority to the way in which migrants themselves “perceive, define, and measure mobility and success” (p. 42). This ‘subject-centred’ approach is really an exercise in ethnography and other forms of qualitative research that are familiar to anthropologists, other sociologists, and critical human geographers, and it is only weakly elaborated upon in their analysis. In any case, to the original elements of incorporation then, they add such ‘variables’ as family structure, cultural, economic, human, and social capital, the legal status of parents, the expectations and investment priorities of parents, the legal status of the second generation individual (this is akin to civic stratification, as discussed earlier in the context of the EU), the cultural memory of difficult lives in the country of origin, and access to public resources and services, especially for disadvantaged migrants. They find that whatever their socio-economic attainment measured in conventional ways, Chinese and Vietnamese respondents do not perceive themselves to be ‘successful’, while Mexicans with less ‘success’ in terms of conventional measures are more likely to report feeling successful.

Again, this updated, but generally-speaking still standard assimilation literature seems to assume national differences from the start, given that its research design uses a comparison of national groups. We have seen from other literatures on labour markets cited in Chapter 3 that axes of
differentiation such as gender, but also other ‘variables’ such as time of arrival, generation, and the political and social contexts of the countries of emigration, and even return policies, may shape standard measures of socio-economic status. Other studies that focus more on ‘cultural assimilation’ expect that citizens as well as immigrants change their own cultural and social practices over time in this process of assimilation (see Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007 for a review). Another very different assimilation literature has emerged over the last decade, which seeks to place assimilation back on the agenda for critical social scientists in the wake of the obsession with transnationalism (see the special issue edited by Leitner and Ehrkamp, 2006). This literature, however, focuses not so much on the measurement of adaptation as on examining assimilation as a discourse and the way in which these discourses are received.

What this latter literature on assimilation makes explicit is that who and what is not acceptable is also a matter of space and the complex identities of citizens and denizens alike. The same practices that might be viewed as acceptable in the city of Dearborn, Michigan and the surrounding towns, with the largest concentration of Arab (if not necessarily Muslim) immigrants in the US, may seem rather odd, and perhaps even unacceptable in, let us say, the predominantly ‘white’ state of West Virginia. In certain places then, migrants are viewed as ‘out of place’ (Cresswell, 1996). Conversely, migrants may be viewed as ‘in place’ in certain cities, towns, and neighbourhoods in the US (as elsewhere) that are dominated by particular national, ethnic or religious groups who may be considered minorities in the country of immigration as a whole, but who form a dominant culture in those cities, towns, neighbourhoods, and so forth. In fact, the predominance of the Spanish language may not only be acceptable but actively encouraged in Miami or on the southern Texas border with Mexico. Thus, ‘assimilation’ (and the discourses of assimilation) become more complex, as the cultural benchmarks and practices of immigrants are complicated by a nationally dominant cultural discourses and practices, but with local territories dominated by ‘minority’ cultures.

This is thoroughly documented in Ehrkamp’s (2006) ethnographic study of native German and Turkish identity in the small city of Marxloh (about 20,000 people) in the deindustrialized Ruhr region of Germany. In the late 1990s, Turks accounted for about 25% of Marxloh’s residents. Ehrkamp is concerned not so much with assessing the degree of assimilation than with the presence of assimilation discourses, and she
mobilizes the work of the late philosopher Jacques Derrida who likened ‘assimilation’ or ‘integration’ to a matter of ‘hospitality’. The host decides what the rules are and the guests must obey. In the context of Germany as elsewhere, the ‘guestworkers’ (this is a term contested by many Turkish migrants) are subject to assimilation discourses at the national and local scales which demand that Turkish and other migrants assimilate. There is, however, a perverse logic at work, as Ehrkamp explains insightfully,

By asking immigrants to become similar, non-immigrant residents portray them as more different, thereby making adaptation or Integration [the common term used in German political discourse] almost impossible. This in turn provides politicians as well as the mass media with plentiful ammunition to deem Turkish immigrants unassimilable. The resident majority imposes on immigrants the responsibility for cultural change and adaptation to German norms. Assimilation discourses thus create societal norms that become a convenient mode of dealing with immigrants without disturbing the identity of the majority.

(2006, 1678, brackets were added)

Put differently, these discourses transform Turkish migrants into ‘exotic others’; it ‘orientalizes’ them (Said, 1978) as culturally distinct and perhaps even ultimately unassimilable.

The discourses of assimilation that circulate at the national and local scales are implicated in local German political leaders’ and residents’ stances against the demand for an Islamic call to prayer in the city and practices such as bilingualism or speaking Turkish only in the street, or using Turkish on store fronts, and so forth. In exploring these two issues, Ehrkamp argues that the construction of a Turkish identity can only be understood in relation to a sense of German identity, and both are produced through assimilation discourses at national and local scales. These discourses construct Turkish migrants in opposition to ‘Germanness’. Thus while Turkish migrants are perceived to want to ‘stick to themselves’ in ‘ghettos’, one of the migrants that Ehrkamp interviews claims that ‘living apart’ is not desirable, but forced on Turkish migrants because of housing discrimination.

While Turkish migrants internalize the negative discourses about
them, Turkish migrants also contest the social and spatial representations of them by the different levels of government, by the ‘mass media’ and by German citizens. Yet their contestation moves beyond simply representation. Turkish migrants complain of Germans’ unwillingness to ‘integrate’, that is, to take part in Turkish cultural practices, instead of Turks having to always adapt to German cultural practices. Given this discursively imagined sense of difference, the migrants that Ehrkamp studies see themselves as ‘not German’. As one Turkish migrant claimed, “We Turks are no Germans”.

Another principal argument of Ehrkamp’s paper is how certain behaviours are not applauded by fellow migrants in Turkish areas of Marxloh, such as acting ‘too European’, or being ‘too conformed’ or ‘too Germanized’. In these places, migrant assimilation takes on a very different form. When they visit larger cities such as Essen or Dusseldorf, Turks dress and act differently. In these cities, the same local assimilation discourses do not seem to prevail, or at least do not shape Turkish cultural practices. Ehrkamp concludes then that ‘The spatiality of assimilation discourses also generates a spatiality of (immigrant) identities’ (p. 1688).

**Multi-culturalism**

Multiculturalism is a set of discourses, ideologies, political philosophies, policies, the aims of political movements in the name of recognition and representation, and a context of pluralism defined in group terms through which people feel a sense of belonging (Kymlicka, 1995; Parekh, 2000; Vertovec, 2007). And it is now far from novel to declare countries such as Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, or the UK as resolutely ‘multicultural’; in fact, multiculturalism has been an official policy in Canada since 1971, although it has now been discredited or abandoned as a policy in the Netherlands and the UK after more than two decades (Joppke, 2007). Similarly, in the US, it is a pervasive argument that American society has changed from a ‘melting pot’ to an extraordinarily diverse ‘salad bowl’, where most immigrants retain their cultural practices from the country of origin and mix with others who have retained their own cultural practices. That western liberal democracies are diverse can hardly be denied, but what is in question is the extent to which multi-culturalism continues to figure in government policies at different scales, and whether differences do hinge or should hinge on particular
nationally-defined cultures, rather than on ever-changing cultural mixes that are marked by the multitude of axes of differentiation discussed in this book. In other words, the question is: Does multi-culturalism imply that cultures are internally coherent, and is this the most appropriate way of looking at, or even regulating ‘belonging’? In earlier understandings of this term – let us say in the 1980s – the discourses and policies of multiculturalism seemed to imply that migrants and their cultural practices were distinctive and sharply delineated from the practices of the cultural majority or other immigrants; and that they were fixed, stable, unchanging, and rooted in national or ethnic attachments. More recent writings on multiculturalism (e.g. Parekh, 2000) recognize that while cultural practices are relatively enduring, they also change over time and are far from internally coherent. One example might be the concentration of ‘South Asian’ businesses and residents along West Devon Avenue on the north side of Chicago. While most Indians and Pakistanis had little social contact with each other in this area prior to September 11, 2001, they later perceived each other as mutually ‘brown’ or ‘South Asian’ in the context of intense Islamaphobia and government scrutiny. Thus, as a brown/South Asian ‘culture’ has been cobbled together in this neighbourhood, it is therefore difficult to speak of a distinctly Indian or Pakistani identity (Ashutosh, 2008).

Similarly, earlier versions of multi-culturalism rested on recognizing national cultures, ‘minority cultures’ (in the Netherlands), or even ‘races’, as in the UK’s former ‘race relations paradigm’. Regardless of the problems of using the terms ‘minority’ (that is, who is a minority, and when and where?) and ‘race’ (there is no biological basis for race), few would deny that cultural practices can be identifiable with particular nationalities and that nationality and ethnic background contribute to identities and senses of belonging. Yet once again, there are other axes of differentiation, including gender, language skills, generational differences, religious beliefs and practices, individualized experiences of racism or historical relations and affective ties to others from the same village, region, or country of origin that may be as central to one’s identity as nationality or ethnicity are. For example, Robins and Aksoy (2001) insist that for Turkish Cypriots in the UK, they have never expressed their identity in national terms, fragmented as they are by the presence of Greek Cypriots in the UK, the age of the immigrants with respect to those who arrived before and after the division of Cyprus into
it its Greek and Turkish halves, and the more contemporary contexts of the
UK and Turkey.

Ultimately, it is difficult to deny the existence of plural cultural
identities. What is at stake though is how to reconcile cultural differences
in western liberal democracies. In this regard, a multi-cultural sensibility
has vied for the spotlight with the various discourses, meanings, and
practices that are called ‘integration’, and this is precisely the subject of
the next section.

Integration

Among European citizens, it is common to hear the words, ‘he or she is
well integrated in Sweden’, or ‘he or she is poorly integrated in Austria’.
Yet the term ‘integration’ is as contested as any other in both academic
and policy circles. For our purposes here, we might consider the term
‘integration’ to have at least three principal meanings. The first is closer to
‘assimilation’ and is often used in the context of EU countries, notably in
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK since the early 2000s.
When governments or citizens lament that there is a problem of ‘integra-
tion’, they are referring to the extent to which migrants fit into an
imagined and idealized set of dominant practices and values of the citizen
majority, or to their access to such material goods as housing, employ-
ment, education, and health (e.g. Ager and Strang, 2008). The second
meaning of integration is closer to that of multiculturalism, whereby
immigrants do not somehow ‘lose their culture’ but rather retain ‘their
culture’ and join the liberal political culture of the western liberal
democracy in question. A young woman who is French but who has
Algerian parents illustrates this well:

‘Me. I find myself totally integrated in France, so I feel at home every-
where. Given that I was born in France, that I speak French, that my
culture is French, that I learned French history – France is my country
. . . My identity is: French of Algerian origin, of Muslim religion.’
(‘Fatima’, cited in Keaton, 2006, p. 40)

The third definition is much less common, and that is the ‘coming
together’ of migrants and citizens, whereby each adopts the cultural
practices (language, religion, food, music, and so on) from another.
While the popular meanings of the term ‘integration’ in France and Germany may be closer to ‘assimilation’, the European Union has in fact publicly called for this ‘coming together’ in its ‘common basic principles’ for immigrant integration policies. The November 2004 European Council Agreement proclaimed that “Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of the Member States” (cited in Joppke, 2007, 3). As Joppke points out, this statement by the Council of the European Union that European citizens should accommodate and respect the cultures, languages, and religions of migrants was an “unprecedented stance to take” (Ibid), and it is also a mark of the emphasis on ‘integration’ rather than ‘assimilation’. After all, the practice of culture and religion is guaranteed under European constitutional law. Nevertheless, the Council’s ‘common basic principles’ also demands a respect for the “basic values of the European Union” (Ibid), which include “the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law”. In addition, the Council insists that migrants should respect the “equality of women”, “the rights and interests of children”, and the freedom to practice or not to practice a particular religion’ (Ibid). This stems from concerns about Islamic fundamentalism in European societies, while the Council fails to acknowledge the oppression of women in ‘western’ cultures (e.g. the demands placed on western women in terms of beauty and sexuality), and the way in which children’s rights and wishes are often neglected, as I noted earlier in the discussion of Jackson Heights.

Returning to the first understanding of integration above, it is clear that, like assimilation, it rests on a notion of citizens and others, though who and to what degree these ‘others’ are seen as different and unacceptable is a matter of space and place, as discussed in the previous section on assimilation. Nonetheless, the ‘othering’ of migrants tends to have class, racial, ethnic, and xenophobic currents within it, so that those who are ‘darker-skinned’ and/or are Muslim are commonly viewed by western governments and publics as threats to the ‘cultural homogeneity’ or the apparent ‘Judao-Christian’ roots of western liberal democracies (e.g. Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991; Staeheli and Nagel, 2006). The Netherlands is a paradigmatic case in how ‘multi-culturalism’ has now been abandoned in the name of what Joppke (2007) calls ‘civic integration’. This again is closer to assimilation and demands that low-income and family visa applicants to the Netherlands be required to take an ‘integration
test’, including proficiency in the Dutch language. But since Dutch language training is generally not available overseas, it effectively blocks the legal migration of most low-income migrants. France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK have adopted similar measures (Joppke, 2007; Lister and Pia, 2008). In the UK, these tests were meant to create a “sense of belonging around ‘core British values’” (Lewis and Neal, 2005, 431). And suddenly, after years of the Commission for Racial Equality supporting multi-culturalism as an extension of the 1970s ‘race relations paradigm’, the Chairman of the Commission abandoned the discourse of multi-culturalism, and instead asserted the value of ‘integration’. This was nothing less than remarkable, as Lewis and Neal (2005) noted. In sum, states want to somehow ensure the ‘allegiance’ of their potential citizens to not just the state as an abstract concept, but to connect it again with some form of nationhood. European states ‘are foregrounding the notion of core national values as the spine around which to achieve social cohesion and integration’ (Lewis and Neal, 2005, 433). Thus, citizenship policies in Europe have shifted since September 11, 2001 from one of multiculturalism to ‘civic integration’, or what might be called a ‘neo-assimilationist’ stance (Joppke, 2007; Kofman, 2005b).

Yet despite this era of civic integration and neo-assimilation, it would be erroneous to assume that nation-states are homogenous or that civic integration or neo-assimilation eliminates migrant cultures. Far from it, pluralism, heterogeneity, and the support of ‘diversity’ (see Faist, 2009) are incontrovertible features of western liberal democracies, even in southern European countries such as Portugal and Greece that may not be thought of as diverse by outsiders. Rather than envisaging then that migrants simply adopt these assimilative or integrative pressures, perhaps it would be better to return to the cultural theorist Homi Bhabha’s (1994) notion of ‘negotiation’. Migrants navigate or negotiate different social pressures, from those of their co-ethnics in the country of origin or immigration, to those of citizens in a variety of different settings. It is the transnational dimension of this negotiation of identity that will preoccupy us in the next section.

**Transnational belonging?**

Keaton (2006) recounts the words of ‘Aicha’, the pseudonym of a young woman of Moroccan origin living in the suburbs of Paris:
‘Despite being French on paper, I’ll always be an Arab, and it’s not a simple paper that could change my culture. I was born in France. I have French culture, but I live with Moroccans. Every year, for 2 months, I go to Morocco. I speak Moroccan, I eat Moroccan food. In fact, I have 2 cultures, French and the other, Moroccan. I practically have to be French in order to succeed in life, otherwise you’re screwed . . . So I’m Muslim of Moroccan origin.’

(‘Aicha’, cited in Keaton, 2006, p. 35)

The feeling of belonging that ‘Aicha’ feels across two countries, and two nationalities, while also self-identifying herself as a Muslim, speaks to what is called ‘transnational belonging’ (e.g. Basch et al., 1994; Levitt, 2001). It is a sense of belonging both to the ‘creolized’ (mixed) society of the country of immigration and to the equally complex society associated with the country or countries of origin, or indeed other countries involved in particular national or ethnic diasporas. Some have also referred to this as ‘bi-focality’ (Rouse, 1992) or a ‘double engagement’ (Grillo and Mazzucato, 2008) in which migrants constantly think of the ‘here’ and the ‘there’, often in contradictory ways (Turner, 2008). In some cases, such as when an Italian immigration law (the Bossi-Fini law of 2002) outlawed the repatriation of national insurance contributions of migrants in Italy, many Senegalese migrants with children in Italy increasingly abandoned the hopes of ever returning to Senegal, and as Riccio (2008) puts it ‘are now starting to feel that they belong neither here nor there’ (p. 230). This ‘transnational belonging’ (or its absence) will be expressed through a variety of cultural, economic, political and social practices (for thorough reviews, see Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007 and Vertovec, 2004), and it may be useful to distinguish between senses of belonging and their expression or practices (Glick-Schiller, 2003).

‘Transnational belonging’ among migrants can be understood as the opposite end of the spectrum from assimilation (Ehrkamp, 2006), or segmented assimilation. Others, such as Lucassen (2006), do not see these processes as mutually exclusive, arguing that transnational belonging may be certainly aligned with assimilative practices. Still others (e.g. Glick-Schiller, Caglar and Guldbransen, 2006) prefer the term ‘incorporation’ together with transnationalism, which is probably a more
sophisticated way of expressing migrants’ position within ‘transnational social fields’. For Glick-Schiller et al. (2006) incorporation refers to

\[ \ldots \text{the processes of building or maintaining networks of social relations through which an individual or an organized group of individuals becomes linked to an institution recognized by one or more nation-states. Our entry points into the study of incorporation are individual migrants, the networks they form, and the social fields created by their networks.} \]

(p. 614)

To return to the discussion of transnational issues discussed in the Introduction and Chapter 2, transnational networks allow for the development and sustenance of transnational belonging, yet a debate unfolded during the 1990s as to whether or not (and to what degree) transnational belonging could actually be considered a new phenomenon. In Glick-Schiller et al.’s (1992) path-breaking *Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration* and Basch et al.’s (1994) *Nations Unbound*, they argue that the transmigrants of the last decades of the twentieth century between the Caribbean and the US were different from previous cohorts of immigrants of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries insofar as the extent of their political and social participation in both countries. This might be tempered, however, by at least the extent of return migration between 1910 and 1920, in which Foner (2000) notes that for every 100 immigrants entering the US in this 10-year period, more than one-third returned home, even Russian Jews who initially fled political persecution (cited in Levitt, 2001, 21).

And as we also learned in the introduction and Chapter 2, senses of belonging are unlikely to be only transnational in character; after all, what exactly is meant by ‘national’ anyway? Instead, national cultural, economic, political, and social ties are conditioned by a set of other spatial and social dimensions. From a spatial dimension, a more sensitive understanding would question the ‘methodological nationalism’ of transnational academic discourse. Consider once again Ashutosh’s (2008) study of ‘South Asians’ on the north side of Chicago. In one restaurant, Ashutosh notes, a sign bearing the name ‘Southall’ (a reference to an area of west London well-known as a cultural centre for South Asian life in the UK) appears on the wall. Though hardly unusual as a phenomenon,
Indian migrants in Chicago not only have attachments to the sub-continent, but also to the wider spaces of the Indian (or South Asian) diaspora, including Hong Kong and Nairobi. Perhaps then, we should not speak so much of uniquely transnational belonging but multiple territorial attachments and practices.

Thus to have a greater appreciation of the complex spatial attachments associated with migrant belonging, anthropologists and sociologists have devised a number of widely employed concepts, including ‘transnational social field’, ‘transnational social space’, ‘trans-localism’, ‘trans-locality’, ‘trans-regionalism’, ‘transnational urbanism’ and ‘transnational village’ (see Vertovec, 2001 for a review of some of these terms). Many of these ideas overlap, and I will not work through all of their definitions. Instead, let me concentrate on the last two of these: ‘transnational urbanism’ and ‘transnational village’. For those concerned with cities and migrants, Michael Peter Smith’s (2001) ‘transnational urbanism’ has become especially influential. In this concept, transnational social actors are individuals who take advantage of what cosmopolitan cities as nodes in transnational networks can offer in terms of their cultural opportunities (the chance to pursue particular cosmopolitan lifestyles and images and the pursuit of higher education), economic opportunities (finding employment, putting remittances to work for developing economic capital, such as the acquisition or creation of small businesses), and political opportunities (working for pro-migrant and transnational organizations, for example). All of this is accomplished by migrants exploiting their circuits of travel and communication that extend from major city to major city across borders.

A less urban, but frequently invoked understanding of transnational belonging is encapsulated in Levitt’s (2001) idea of a ‘transnational village’. For her, a transnational village has four unique dimensions. First, international migrants are not actually required to be a member of ‘the village’ (or transnational social field); second, such villages emerge and are sustained through social remittances (social capital, behaviour and ideas) that originate in the country of immigration and flow to the country of emigration. Third, transnational villages both emerge from and create a range of religious, civic, and political organizations. A fourth element is the ‘social cost’. That is, some migrants return far wealthier, while others have little more than what they left with, which reinforces previous class, gender, and generational divisions.
With respect to these social divisions that Levitt underlines, a small selection of research should suffice to convince us how transnational belonging is simply not just trans-national in character. To begin with, McGregor (2008) reminds us of the salience of class distinctions in the relationship between ‘home’ and the UK in her study of Zimbabwean asylum-seekers and undocumented men and women in the ‘abject (poverty) spaces’ of London. Class distinctions are sometimes reproduced among Zimbabweans, especially those who migrate with little capital or the requisite skills to open up businesses in London. Others with substantial sums of money manage to start at least small businesses. What is remarkable, though, is also how these class distinctions are often dissolved, as those who were considered ‘highly-skilled’ in Zimbabwe end up cleaning buildings or performing low-paid caring jobs, alongside Zimbabwean asylum-seekers and refugees. They share neighbourhoods, hometown associations, and the hope for a more prosperous Zimbabwe. Similarly, McAuliffe’s (2008) ethnographic work with second-generation Muslim and Baha’i Iranians in Sydney, London and Vancouver, reveals that relationships with the ‘homeland’ are not predicated so much on national origins, as on the dynamics of class aspirations or self-perceived class position (‘low’, ‘middle’, and ‘higher’), religion (Muslim or Baha’i), and place (their settlement patterns). For example, Baha’i are required to settle in certain areas of the city to establish what is called ‘home-front pioneering’, or the creation of local spiritual assemblies composed of nine adult Baha’is in a designated area of the city. This call to form an assembly in what is sometimes an undesirable area of the city often contradicts with their class aspirations, but Baha’is seem to reconcile these contradictions. While they may live near other Muslim Iranians, they do not necessarily share Muslim’s stronger attachment to the ‘homeland’, given the historical pattern of persecution against Baha’is in Iran.

Once again, what we might mistake for distinctly transnational practices and spaces may actually be ones of also locality, kinship, family relations, and gender. Concerning gender, consider for example Ehrkamp’s (2008) study of young Turkish and Kurdish immigrant men in Marxloh, Germany. She argues that the masculinities performed by these men in relation to Turkish women in public spaces were racialized as ‘Turkish’ by the German media, politicians, and citizens, rather than reading these masculinist and exclusionary spaces as gendered. Again,
apparently transnational cultural practices cannot simply be associated with ‘cultures’ of the country of origin but may intersect with particular kinds of gendered performances. Although with no specific reference to the importance of cities, towns, and villages as scales or territories, Salih’s (2001) account of Moroccan women in Italy underlines gendered differences in transnational belonging. She argues that the gendered expectations and family responsibilities of Moroccan women in Italy create different kinds of transnational attachments to Morocco, depending upon a mixture of their employment, marital and residential status in Italy and the need to care for relatives and children in both countries. Finally Glick-Schiller, Caglar, and Gulbrandsen (2006) speak of the problem of the ‘ethnic lens’ in migration research, arguing that migration research has confused religion with ethnicity, and transnational ties may be more about religious social fields than ethnic ones. For example, Somalis in London and Toronto self-identify as Muslims, rather than as part of a broader African diaspora (Grillo and Mazzucato, 2008). This brings us to the question of religion in transnational identity.

In fact, we have barely spoken of religion until now. Religion is a pivotal dimension of transnational identities and practices, and while it is Islam, and especially fundamentalist Islam that has preoccupied the ‘western’ media, every stripe of religious adherence figures in the daily lives of immigrants, including not only Islam in all its diversity, but Baha’ism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and various forms of Christianity, including Pentecostalism, the latter especially significant among African immigrants in ‘western’ countries. These are just some of the religions practiced by migrants.15

In this brief section, I cannot but suggest a few connections between transnationalism and religion, and we must be careful not to hazard rash generalizations about the ever-complex spaces and places of religious practices among migrants. Indeed, if anything is true of transnationalism and religion, it is that the ‘evidence’ does not point in any clear direction. Despite this complexity, perhaps one of the most significant findings in the study of this relationship is that piousness may not simply be an effect of transnational identities, but also constitutive of them. In fact, far from migration to richer countries leading to more secular practices, some research on religion and migration suggests that religious identities and practices become more intense after migration and settlement. This is visible, for instance, among Koreans and the practice of evangelical
Christianity, as well as among West Africans and Pentecostalism (e.g. Riccio, 2008). Religion does not somehow travel ‘intact’ from country of origin to destination, however. It changes and adapts to new circumstances. For example, Predelli (2008) notes Muslim women’s increasing participation in the social life and spaces of Mosques in Norway, although the Mosques remain the locus of ‘patriarchal gender regimes’. In contrast, a study of Christian Indian women in Houston, Texas also reports greater participation in church life with diminishing patriarchal control, but also a more orthodox Christianity brought to Texas from India.

Other studies in the US and Europe seem to further reinforce the idea that the second generation have more conservative notions of religion and more fervent practices than the first, as a means of carving out a distinctive religious identity in pluri-religious and pluri-ethnic western countries (Cadge and Ecklund, 2007; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2007; Kepel, 1997; Laurence and Vaisse, 2006). For example, renewed piety may relate to the perception and bewilderment among migrants that they have settled in more individualistic, secular, and choice-ridden societies. In a study of Iraqi refugees in Dearborn, Michigan, Shoeb et al. (2007) show how Iraqis’ war trauma, living in refugee camps in Saudi Arabia, the feeling of exile in the US, the complicated freedom and influences in American society, and the myth of return push Iraqi refugees to be more devout Muslims in order to ‘hold their families together’. Likewise, Riccio (2008) finds that religion seems to serve a similar moral purpose among Senegalese Muslims in northern Italy. More specifically, Riccio (2008) and Kaag (2008) discuss how the Mouride Sufi brotherhood (an Islamic Sufi order) helps to provide an ideological and spiritual compass to Senegalese for the complex transnational lives which they lead, including the racism and discrimination they face. Riccio (2008) explains:

Mouride transnational formations are kept alive by oral conversation and the selling of cassettes, where besides prayers and kasaisds (sacred poems) one finds information about ndiguel (orders, decrees) from the Khalifa (the head of the order). These social formations are shaped and strengthened mainly by the activities of the numerous dahiras (religious circles) widespread in the receiving countries, and by the frequent visits of marabouts (spiritual leaders) from Senegal.

(p. 229)
In this regard, the intensification of religious practice may also be in part related to the neo-liberalization of societies, as states retreat from social welfare provision, and immigrant churches, mosques, and temples of many faiths fill the void—what Ley (2008) in his study of Vancouver calls the ‘urban service hub’. Though the role of religion in providing social protection is hardly new, ‘neo-liberalization’ is considered to be part of the picture. Anything from “political opportunity structures” (I discuss these in the last section of the chapter) within overlapping scales to the diverse social axes of differentiation discussed many times in this book might have an effect on the complex identities forged out of the connections between transnationalism, religion, and identity (e.g. Turner, 2008). It might seem the case that religiosity would somehow impede naturalization, but many religious organizations alongside hometown associations actually assist immigrants in obtaining US citizenship. And most research suggests that increased religiosity encourages transnational social and political involvement, including in the form of Catholic-based political protest against the militarized character of the US/Mexico border (Cadge and Ecklund, 2007).

To complete our discussion of transnational identities, I would underline that the expression of these identities (let us say in pursuing naturalization, as one among many) are often seen as a matter of individual preferences, but they are constrained or enabled by states, organizations, and group practices. We might say then, that transnational or ‘diasporic belonging’ (see Box 5.6), and religious identities and practices are produced by states in both the countries of origin and destination. This is clearly evident in the relationship between France’s immigration and foreign policies, and the discourses of the Algerian and Moroccan embassies and consulates which figure centrally in the production of a ‘French Islam’. In this complex governmental relationship, the French, Algerian, and Moroccan governments shape the actual practice of Islam in France, and the ethnic and religious identities among Algerian and Moroccan immigrants (Samers, 2003c).

To summarize our discussion in this section, it is difficult to imagine a theory of transnational belonging. Rather, we should expect migrants to have diverse transnational and other attachments (trans-local, trans-regional, etc.) within and across multiple territories. These attachments are likely to produce different forms of political participation, and I will now devote some time to this very issue.
Box 5.6 DIASPORIC IDENTITIES?

The term ‘diaspora’ and the study of diasporas have a long history. It has become common to speak of certain ‘classic’ diasporas, such as those of Africans, Chinese, Jews, and Palestinians, but this term could be extended to a range of ‘groups’ from Albanians to Tamils (Brubaker, 2005; Safran, 1991; Sheffer, 1986, 2003; Cohen, 1997). Although the meaning of the term ‘diaspora’ is contested, Brubaker (2005) argues that a diaspora has the following elements: dispersion, homeland orientation, and boundary maintenance. Dispersion refers to the spreading out of a group of people either in ethno-cultural or national terms) and usually forced from an initial homeland to another part of the world. This ‘another part of the world’ does not have to be far; it may simply be over an international boundary, and may occur even within the same country. Some scholars of diaspora see division rather than dispersion, arguing that state borders that divide a group of people can create diasporas. Homeland orientation involves a longing for a real or imagined homeland. This implies a certain memory, usually a ‘myth’ about the homeland, and a ‘myth of return’. But as Brubaker (2005) points out, not everyone agrees that diaspora involves a longing for return to the homeland. For example, the work of the anthropologist James Clifford on South Asians suggests that their desire to re-create a sense of culture and community in a new home seems to be considerable. Boundary maintenance refers to diasporas maintaining strong identities by distinguishing themselves from other groups, and especially the dominant group or groups. There may, however, be a tension between boundary maintenance and boundary erosion. Boundaries must be maintained over an ‘extended time’ (p. 7), perhaps over generations. For Brubaker, the “interesting question, and the question relevant to the existence of diaspora, is to what extent and in what forms boundaries are maintained by second, third and subsequent generations” (2005, 7). Is this “the ‘dawning of an age of diaspora’ or are we seeing simply a proliferation of diaspora talk, a change in idiom rather than in the world”? (Ibid).

continued
This question is not easily answered since for one thing, the concept of diaspora itself has been the subject of critical scrutiny. Let me mention briefly four criticisms. First, it may not be an appropriate term to describe labour migrations, which are often temporary and voluntaristic (Faist, 2000). Second, the idea of ‘diaspora’ may in fact be an undesirable Weberian ‘ideal type’, that is, an abstract concept that cannot capture the contradictory nature of social change among certain groups of people (Wahlbeck, 2002). Third, the idea of diaspora hinges upon the importance of ‘ethnicity’ in the country of origin as central to the construction of identity and solidarity, rather than other axes of differentiation. Fourth and similarly, diaspora has been ‘fetishized’ (turned into an object over which scholars obsess), which then obscures the importance of other social dimensions or processes such as class, capital accumulation, and intra-national trans-ethnic alliances. Fifth, diasporas are not truly diasporas because they are always mediated by states that follow them (Basch et al., 1994). Sixth, diasporas are not only shaped by national economies, cultures, and politics; there are localized attachments that shape diasporic belonging (for a review, see Blunt, 2007). The point to be made here is that it is hard to distinguish between transnational and diasporic identities. It depends on whose definition of diaspora and transnational is used by a researcher, and the actual subjects of the research.

Citizenship as civic and political participation

The final dimension of citizenship to be discussed in this chapter is that of civic and political participation. For more than half of the twentieth century in European countries for example, immigrants had few official political rights from the ability to vote in local elections, to engaging in trade unions. In fact, European governments and publics largely expected immigrants to be politically silent, ironically labelling them as politically docile when it would be difficult to be otherwise. They were considered ‘here to work’ – guest-workers to simply serve the economic needs of European countries. Yet political passivity is no measure of a disinterest in
politics and civic life, and over the last 30 years in Europe, the lack of political enfranchisement has changed dramatically in terms of the acquisition of political rights (e.g. voting rights, liberalization of nationality laws, etc.). There is still a rather pronounced geography to these formal political rights however, with northern and western European countries (such as the Netherlands and the UK) seemingly providing more opportunities for political participation than in most eastern and southern European countries (see Table 5.1).

Table 5.1 The right to vote in local elections in 25 EU countries for ‘third country nationals’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Right to vote</th>
<th>Eligibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>After 5 years</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>No (under discussion in 2006)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>For those migrants for which the Czech Republic has a signed an international agreement (in 2006, no non-EU country)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>After 3 years, but no residence for Nordic citizens</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Permanent residents only (minimum residence for PR permit: 3 years) with 5 years’ residence in municipality</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>After 2 years, minimum residence for Nordic citizens</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Yes, no minimum residence</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Yes, no minimum residence</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Permanent residents (minimum residence for PR permit: 5 years)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>After 5 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued Overleaf)
As ever, there are also local and regional differences (not least in terms of voting rights) whereby an apparently ‘liberal city’ such as Berlin is alleged to have more in common with Amsterdam, Paris, and London and other ‘global cities’ in terms of providing opportunities for migrant political participation, than it does with the typically conservative cities of Munich or Stuttgart in southern Germany. Counter-intuitively,

Table 5.1 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Right to vote</th>
<th>Eligibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>After 6 months of residence, but subject to Council of Europe reciprocity agreement which in 2006 did not include any non-EU state</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>After 5 years</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>After 3 years</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>No (under discussion in 2006)</td>
<td>Nationals of reciprocity agreements after 2–3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Nationals of reciprocity agreements after 2–3 years</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Permanent residence (minimum residence for PR permit: 3 years)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Permanent residents (minimum residence for PR permit: 8 years) but cannot be elected mayor</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Norwegian nationals after 3 years</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>After 3 years; no minimum residence for Nordic citizens</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>After 5–10 years residence in 4 cantons; right can be granted in two more cantons</td>
<td>After 5–10 years residence in 3 cantons; right can be granted in one more canton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Commonwealth and Irish citizens only; no minimum residency requirements</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on the research by Harald Waldrauch (2004), adapted from Martiniello (2006)
however, such ‘global cities’ may not offer more enabling environments than smaller ‘more provincial’ cities, and national states still provide crucial sites for fostering political participation. A paramount question then is to what degree local variation ‘override[s] the impact of national differences in [political] incorporation regimes’ (Koopmans, 2004, 451). Koopmans argues that political participation takes place at the ‘local level’ only insofar as the ‘local level’ is part of “national repertoires of citizenship and integration policies” (p. 467). Indeed, if the political participation of migrants appears to have increased, Koopmans (2004) and Martiniello (2006) believe that the chief explanation for this growing political mobilization has been the ‘political opportunity structure’. Martiniello (2006) explains the political opportunity structure in this way:

By granting or denying voting rights to foreigners, by facilitating or impeding access to citizenship and nationality, by granting or constraining freedom of association, by ensuring or blocking the representation of migrants’ interests, by establishing or not establishing arenas and institutions for consultative politics, states open or close avenues of political participation for migrants and provide them with more or less opportunities to participate in the management of collective affairs.

(p. 88)

Yet the political opportunity structure (or ‘context of reception’ as it is often called in the North American literature) is only one among many reasons, and certainly cannot explain completely the varied level of civic and political participation among different individuals or groups of people. For example, Portes and Rumbaut (2006) suggest the importance of ‘generation’ (first, second, etc.) in defining at least the form of political participation oriented towards the country of origin, or conversely the country of immigration. Portes and Rumbaut suggest that equally significant to the contours of political participation are the characteristics of the countries of origin: stateless countries, hostile states, consolidated but indifferent states, or states that promoted emigration.

At this stage, it seems essential to define what is meant by political participation. Martiniello (2006) defines it as
the various ways in which individuals take part in the management of collective affairs of a given political community. Political participation cannot be restricted, as much political science research is, to conventional forms such as voting or running for election. It also covers other and less conventional types of political activities such as protest, demonstration, sit-ins, hunger strikes, boycotts, etc.

(p. 84)

Martiniello adds that the line between conventional and unconventional (and between individual and collective politics) is rather grey, and perhaps there are alternative ways of categorizing political participation. Levitt and Jaworsky (2007) summarize a large body of research on migrant political participation and consider it to have at least three dimensions: participation in electoral politics; involvement in political parties or campaigns and politically-oriented associations; and lobbying or political agitation for political ends in one or more countries. This would include a homeland politics and a host country politics.

Homeland politics is a politics geared towards issues in the country of origin, but it is commonly also two-way whereby politicians in the home country visit the countries of immigration for political support. After all, the President of the Dominican Republic in 2004 was actually raised in New York City (Portes and Rumbaut, 2006). Thus, such homeland politics might involve participating in expatriate campaigns and elections abroad, and even running for an elected office. This may have a number of different aims, but in particular, influencing foreign policies in the country of origin. This varied homeland-oriented politics may or may not be directly connected with a host country politics (Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007), and that might give the impression that the rise of dual or multiple nationalities, and migrant transnationalism more generally, will hinder the ‘political integration’ of migrants. In the US, Portes and Rumbaut (2006) explain why this assumption may be misplaced:

While it is possible that transnational activities may slow the acquisition of loyalties and identities in some cases, the bulk of the evidence indicates that this is not a zero-sum game and that many aspects of transnationalism end up accelerating the political integration of immigrants in the US.

(p. 138)
Rather, Koopmans (2004) finds in Germany that immigrants are more oriented towards a homeland politics in those towns where migrants have the slimmest political channels to decision-making and are de-legitimized from the public sphere. For Portes and Rumbaut (2006), ‘political integration’ as they call it, is achieved because: first, experience with transnational politics provides expertise for engaging in political activity in the US; second, because dual nationality allows migrants to feel they can become involved in American politics without losing their involvement in home country politics; and third, because immigrants use American institutions and political culture for export back to their home countries.

Host country politics usually involves mobilizing for rights, regularization, residence and work permits, access to services, and to fighting discrimination, or increasing a group’s visibility (sometimes called ‘claims-making’). It may also involve homeland resources. The Moroccan and Turkish governments have routinely intervened in the affairs of the French and German governments respectively to ensure particular outcomes for its emigrants. But this kind of politics in the host country does not necessarily have to involve the homeland. It can be about using one or several host country resources to lobby a regional or international organization (such as the Council of Europe) for the recognition of a group’s autonomy, or the creation of a protective state, as both rebel Eritreans and Kurds have perennially requested (Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007).

Another variant of political participation noted by Levitt and Jaworsky is translocal politics. This may entail engaging with hometown associations to support economic projects in the village or town of origin, especially through the use of remittances. Initially economic in character, such projects quickly become politicized as the government in the country of origin attempts to regulate or support it (Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007). This is especially true among Mexicans and Salvadorans in the US, but this phenomenon is as present among Ghanaians in the UK or Moroccans in France, for example (Mohan, 2008; Samers, 2003c).

I noted above that immigrants’ political participation does not necessarily have to involve formalized politics expressed in electoral or party venues. Indeed, a whole range of migrant NGOs and immigrant associations have emerged in Europe and North America to represent migrant interests. Pro-migrant NGOs in the EU have concentrated in Brussels to take advantage of lobbying opportunities with European institutions that
are located there, but they exist in all major cities and towns with comparatively large immigrant populations. ‘Consultative committees’ were also established in the late 1960s in Belgium in order to more thoroughly engage migrants in the political process and spread throughout Europe. Mayors, city and town councils regularly consult these committees as alternatives to direct representation, especially for the purposes of delivering public services. Often so-called immigrant or ethnic organizations, such as those centred on the Moluccan, Moroccan, Surinamese and Turkish ‘communities’ are largely involved in clamouring for specifically religious demands, facilitated by the political structure of the Netherlands (so-called ‘pillarization’) which provides a certain room for religious diversity. This, along with a long-time commitment to mult-culturalism in Dutch policy, explains why a range of Islam and Hindu schools have been established in the Netherlands. This is not an unusual process by any means, and similar outcomes, from the establishment of religious schools to the construction of Churches and Mosques, are replicated throughout Belgium, France, Germany, and the UK for example (Dumont, 2008; Martiniello, 2006).

In terms of the consultative committees discussed above, however, they seem to exercise very little power. Instead, they largely appear to act as ‘lip service’ to democracy, a means of legitimating the participatory process for local governments, or they serve as a means of contracting out public service delivery through local immigrant elites, without the effective political inclusion of the bulk of migrants themselves (Dumont, 2008; Martiniello, 2006). For example, Martiniello discusses some of the reluctance of local officials in southern European countries such as Italy and Spain where the local political participation of migrants seems more difficult than in northern and western European countries. One representative of the National Government of Catalan (the Catalan-speaking region that includes Barcelona) claimed that “they [immigrants] cannot really understand the history of oppression of the Catalan people” (2006: 95). Similarly, in Bologna (a city in northern central Italy), a militant left democrat pronounced that “they are not accustomed to democracy” (2006: 95). Although clearly a stereotype-informed generalization, this claim may not be totally unfounded. For example, Bilodeau (2008) notes that migrants who emigrate from the most repressive regimes (their ‘pre-migration experience’) are less likely to participate in protest politics. Similarly, Preston et al. (2006) report that Hong Kong migrants in Canada
have low levels of formal political participation, which owes to the only very recent history of representative democracy in Hong Kong. However, they also noted that men were slightly more likely to participate in formal Canadian politics, but women are also involved especially when it concerns local education policy and their children. Most Hong Kong migrants in their study, regardless of gender, mentioned political rights (and especially voting) as the most important aspect of Canadian citizenship. In any case, these findings do, however, neglect the significance of political opportunity structures in the state and localities of immigration, not to mention countless other possible explanations.

Nonetheless, even undocumented immigrants (“unauthorized yet recognized”, as Sassen, 1999, calls them) may participate through a host of informal acts. The protest for regularization among Malian sans papiers (undocumented migrants) in St. Bernard’s Church in Paris during the mid-1990s that I discussed in Chapter 4 is one example. Another example – also discussed in Chapter 4 – is the hundreds of thousands of undocumented immigrants who marched and protested throughout the US in 2005 against the restrictive immigration policies of the US government. In contrast to these grandiose and heroic acts, however, simply participating in neighbourhood associations and similar activities constitutes a more mundane, yet equally significant form of political participation for migrants.

**CONCLUSIONS**

This chapter has explored the various dimensions of citizenship, including legal status, social rights, belonging, and political participation. I began the chapter by arguing that the migration literature, including by geographers, has sometimes hastily jettisoned the importance of local and national territories in favour of transnational linkages and identities. I then examined so-called ‘citizenship models’. It became evident that these models are increasingly irrelevant (especially in the EU) as jus domicili becomes ever more significant to both naturalization and to social rights, although this is certainly not the case for those who find themselves undocumented and indefinitely marginalized. States are increasingly allowing dual nationality for political and economic reasons, and migrants are availing themselves of these new possibilities, in part out of fear, in part out of practical utility.
In the second part of the chapter, I argued that despite ‘post-national’ membership and citizenship (Soysal, 1994), or ‘rights across borders’ (Jacobson, 1996), the scale of nation-states remains significant. Post-nationalization may be occurring more prominently in the EU than anywhere else in the world, but different categories of migrants access different levels of rights in the EU (‘denizenship’ or ‘civic stratification’). In any case, the content of social welfare entitlements in the EU, as elsewhere in the world, seem to have been eviscerated in the context of what can arguably be called neo-liberalism, although social protection certainly varies across countries and sub-national territories.

The third part of this chapter addressed the complex issues of urban social and cultural exclusion, assimilation, multi-culturalism, integration, and transnational belonging. I argued that place, scale, territory, and also time are vital if we want to engage with these ideas. All of these represent powerful discourses, policies and practices, and many ‘western’ countries seemed to have moved from operating with official or unofficial notions of multi-culturalism to what is now called ‘civic integration’ and ‘neo-assimilation’ after the events of September 11, 2001. This, along with other processes of exclusion (in employment, housing, and so forth) has had profound and often deleterious effects on particular immigrant communities. Yet migrants negotiate these multi-scalar realities in the context of ‘super-diversity’, sometimes by rejecting the norms and practices of the country of immigration, sometimes by adopting them, and sometimes by constructing, navigating, or negotiating complex transnational (or diasporic) identities, which involve attachments to real or imagined ‘homelands’. These attachments may be as much urban, trans-local, trans-regional, gendered, classed, kin-based, pan-ethnic, or pan-religious, as they are decidedly transnational in character. Religion is a significant feature of transnational migrant belonging, and what we might take as an expression of trans-nationalism may instead be co-religious attachments across borders.

Dual nationality, jus domicili, and multiple belongings do not overall seem to dissuade political participation in the country of immigration. Quite the contrary, it may stimulate political involvement as countries of origin and destination become tied by large overseas communities and intertwined cultural, political, social, and economic networks. It could be tempting to explain political participation by the poly-ethnic settings of ‘liberal’ global cities, but what seems more important is the national,
regional, and local ‘political opportunity structures’ which provide for both formal and less formal opportunities for migrants to become politically enfranchised in the process of citizenship.

FOR FURTHER READING


SUMMARY QUESTIONS

1. Why are national models of citizenship problematic?
2. What are some of the limitations of Soysal’s ‘post-nationalization’ argument?
3. In what sense has there been a ‘neo-liberalization’ of rights?
4. How does geography matter to the processes of assimilation or integration?
5. Why is transnational belonging not simply transnational?
6. What is a political opportunity structure, and why is political participation a local affair?
CONCLUSIONS

International migration has been a fundamental feature of nation-states since their emergence in the sixteenth century, and it is likely to continue to shape the economic, political, and social life of societies across the world in the twenty-first century, regardless or because of the gyrations of world economic activity, the restrictionist stance of countless governments, the hospitality of citizens, or the energy, determination, and wishes of migrants themselves. Yet the ‘new mobilities paradigm’ in the social sciences may risk exaggerating the ease with which people move and the extent that they do. As I pointed out in the Introduction, it has been estimated that approximately 3% of the world’s population lives outside their country of origin. Even if this is a gross under-estimation of migration and immigration, the majority of the world is not involved in international migration. They suffer from what Carling (2002) calls an ‘involuntary immobility’. At the same time, it would be irresponsible to deny the vast and unprecedented numbers of migrants in the world: estimated to be somewhere around 193 million, including some 14 million refugees. And while the new mobilities paradigm is pregnant with a fresh social imagination and a rich corpus of ethnographic studies that reflect the voices of migrants as ‘actors’ rather than simply as victims of poverty or war, international migration should not be absorbed uncritically within this paradigm. The bulk of governments and publics continue to create obstacles for especially low-skilled/low-income
migrants, and international migration is hardly a whimsical project taken lightly by most individuals. Indeed, mobility runs into the problem of territory. International migration is therefore segmented or stratified, with some having the capacity to be more legally mobile than others.

Indeed, despite the obsession in the social sciences in the twenty-first century with dissolving social categories in academic discourse, we should not be reluctant to draw certain distinctions between, let us say, high-income migrants moving fairly effortlessly between highly-paid jobs in the affluent business districts of so-called ‘global cities’, and the thousands of asylum-seekers confined to detention centres and camps, or the millions of undocumented immigrants around the world, many of whom are unable or unwilling to return home for fear of never being allowed back into the country of immigration. However, it would be erroneous to draw an equation of the kind: higher income = higher mobility; lower income = lower mobility. Rather, low-income migrants – whether they are ‘highly-skilled’ or not – may suffer from forced mobility. Mobility is then an ironic strategy for coping in a world where mobility is impeded by the very governments responsible for the foreign policies that may have uprooted migrants in the first place. Impeded mobility in the context of what geographers call ‘uneven development’ (Smith, 1984) is then cause for further mobility as migrants seek out a ‘better life’. This is the paradox of mobility for low-income international migrants.

I argued that understanding this relationship between differential migrations and space is best understood through greater attention to spatial metaphors such as space, place, scale, and territory. Surprisingly, the migration studies literature – even those studies produced by geographers – is more often than not ‘spatially immature’, seldom bothering to adequately define spatial terms or failing to indicate the precise effect of interrelated territories or scales, even when the term ‘multi-scalar’ or transnationalism, trans-local, and so forth, are employed. Likewise, if and when a place (a city, town, neighbourhood, etc.) is carefully documented, the precise effect of ‘place’ is not always articulated clearly, and this is reinforced by the absence of a comparison to other places and territories (Bloemraad, 2006, and Bloch, 2007 provide some guidelines here for comparative research). In that respect, it is hard to always discern how exactly ‘geography matters’. This has been one of the aims of the book.
As I showed in Chapter 2, explaining such migrations is far from a simple task, given their enormously variegated character, from family migrants to refugees. I did, however, argue that using ‘push-pull’ theories or ‘demographic disparity’ arguments are not where we should begin to look for answers. Alternatively, explaining migration by reference to global capitalism and global inequality is a giant step in the right direction, but this can only amount to an incomplete and/or vague picture of the how, why, where, and when of migration. These questions cannot be answered without attention to the specific migrant networks, institutions (hometown associations, labour recruitment, and remittance offices, etc.), and ultimately the territories that shape and are shaped by the movement of people. In short, migration cannot simply be ‘read off’ from global capitalism; migration shapes the very contours of capitalism and the territories through which it is reproduced.

In Chapter 3, it became apparent that the fortunes of migrants and immigrants in different countries are as diverse as the immigrants themselves. It is probably impossible to generalize about their socio-economic achievement across the world, since conditions in the countries of emigration, time of arrival in the countries of immigration, issues of immigration status, the context of cultural and social reception, gender, national and ethnic background, and other axes of differentiation combine with racism, sexism, xenophobia, and the embodied expectations and practices of employers and migrants alike. All of these processes have an effect on their prospects for entrepreneurship and waged employment in particular places. Analysing these outcomes by starting with pre-defined ethnic or national groups as countless studies do is problematic, however, since they seem to assume from the outset that individuals labelled under these categories are homogenous or that it is something about their nationality or ethnicity which should make a difference to their socio-economic mobility. I am not arguing, however, that nationality does not matter for the working lives of migrants. It does, if only because of the way in which migration and immigration discourses, practices, and policies create the social importance of nationality. Nevertheless, the use of surveys and ethnographic work that focus on the processes of what I call ‘international labour market segmentation’ (ILMS) and what others refer to as ‘the embodied character of labour markets’ seem to provide an antidote to the limitations of a more ‘conventional’ approach to understanding the geographies of migration and work.
Use of the concept of ILMS and related approaches suggest that none of these labour market outcomes can be divorced from the social rights, immigration policies, housing policies, and the character of urban and rural economies (including employment prospects, wages, and so forth) that are associated with specific, but interrelated territories. The important story here, however, is far more than how different labour market outcomes relate to complex geographies. Rather, as I showed in Chapter 3, it is crucial to underline that for the least fortunate migrants, life is marked by monotonous, low-paid and sometimes downright dangerous work, from cleaning homes in Italy and Malaysia, to cutting meat in Nebraskan slaughterhouses; from arduous street peddling in Brazil to mining precious metals in South Africa. For those subject to especially callous employers, bereft of the most meagre social rights, subject to exclusion and marginalization, migration can prove to be a terrible experience, in many ways not much better (and sometimes worse) than the conditions from which they chose or were forced to leave. In the wake of low-wage employment or chronic unemployment, their health suffers and their children suffer in turn.

Chapter 4 outlined the diversity, but also the commonalities, between entry policies for low-income migrants, asylum-seekers, and highly-skilled migrants in richer and poorer countries. Most countries’ migration policies are driven either by an estimation or perception of fluctuating labour market demand for certain skills, security fears, cultural racism or ethnicism, xenophobia, a fear of the poor, foreign policy dictates, the implications of immigration for public budgets, but also nation-building (in Canada for example), notions of cultural affinity, and humanitarian concerns, including family reunion. However, in most theoretical understandings of migration policies, what is often missing are how complex sub-national territorialities shape national policies (as I noted in Chapter 4 for the US, and in Chapter 5 for Japan), and in the same vein, how entry policies are shaped by migrants themselves. Entry and settlement policies are usually viewed as creating migration, but migration creates entry and settlement policies through different territories or scales of regulation.

For richer countries, the mantra of ‘migration management’ has meant the introduction of Canadian or Australian-inspired points systems, or other tiered migration systems, in order to attract the ‘right kind’ of immigrants, that is, those who are ‘highly-skilled’ as determined by the needs of employers, or those who have substantial capital to invest. At
the same time, low-income migration is restricted to the bare minimum in the name of protecting allegedly cash-strapped welfare systems. Such policies may or may not be considered as central to a process of neo-liberalization in the wealthy countries since the 1980s. If we do accept that it is, then these policies are hardly new. Since at least the nineteenth century, states have sought highly-skilled workers from overseas, while nativist anti-immigration panics have managed to exclude ‘the poor’ and the ‘unhealthy’. At the same time, it would be incorrect to assume that the governments of wealthier countries have completely barred entry to low-skilled/low-income migrants at the beginning of the twenty-first century. While certainly regulations against low-skilled migration are tighter today than they were in the 1950s and 1960s during the heyday of manual labour demand in European countries, many governments – including the American, British, Canadian, French, Malaysian, Saudi Arabian, Singaporean, and Spanish governments – have encouraged certain forms of low-skilled labour migration, particularly in agriculture (in the UK and the US) and domestic work (Malaysia and Saudi Arabia). Many countries in Europe have also accepted certain forms of family reunification as a codified social right, or actively encouraged it since the 1960s through specific policies (the US). And for all the panic about asylum-seeking, especially in the EU, thousands of asylum-seekers and refugees have found at least a modicum of protection in Europe and North America, though they have also faced exclusion, poverty, and violence in the places they settle. Thus, migration and immigration policies cannot be reduced to governmental preoccupations with labour demand. Even if governments succeed in creating completely class-based restrictive policies, hundreds of thousands of migrants have overstayed their visas or flouted militarized borders and security-obsessed governments to settle semi-permanently or eventually obtain regularization or naturalization over a long period of time. Furthermore, liberal courts will intervene, in some cases at least, to prevent the deportation of undocumented immigrants or ensure the reunification of internationally-divided families.

The reaction of governments in poorer countries to migration and especially emigration is ambivalent. On the one hand, losing highly-skilled labour means losing valuable skills for both economic development and for social services such as nursing, the latter of special concern to the South African government for example. On the other hand, many governments see the opportunity for the export of unemployment, the
potential for vast remittances, and the possibility for their citizens to learn new skills, with the hope that migrants will some day return. Sometimes they do; sometimes they do not. In some cases, computer engineers trained in Silicon Valley have returned to southern India, and particularly Bangalore, contributing to the development of India’s burgeoning software industry. This is now referred to as ‘brain circulation’ rather than brain drain, but it also might be labelled as a clear illustration of ‘brain gain’ for poorer countries. But who precisely gains from this circulation, everyone in India, everyone in the urban region of Bangalore, or just those fortunate enough to circulate between India and Silicon Valley? That is a question that cannot easily be answered, although in light of uneven development, critical attention to matters of class and space seem vital here.

Chapter 5 outlined four different dimensions of citizenship, including legal status, social rights, issues of belonging or ‘identity’, and political participation. It is clear that dual and even multiple nationalities are proliferating in innumerable countries, although some countries of immigration and emigration continue to be reticent about accepting dual nationality, let alone multiple nationalities. At the same time, national models of citizenship seem to be eroding in favour of differential rights based on the length of residence (jus domicili). As national models fade, some scholars have argued for the significance of a ‘post-national’ citizenship (in the European Union), or ‘transnational citizenship’, ‘rights across borders’ or ‘global or international human rights’ (as they are referred to elsewhere in the world). In the EU, where post-national citizenship has allegedly progressed the furthest, there is actually only limited evidence that this is the case for ‘resident third country nationals’ (TCNs) and especially their dependents, never mind for asylum-seekers, or those who are undocumented. As Benhabib (2004[2007]) laments, “Not having one’s papers in order in our societies is a form of civil death” (p. 215). Nevertheless, there also seems to be a general movement towards the increasing incorporation of post-national elements in national citizenship policies, including for long-term resident TCNs or full citizens of another EU country. Needless to say, ‘denizenship’ and ‘civic stratification’ are complex in the EU.

Despite the emergence of jus domicili, and all the rhetoric about ‘post-national rights’, ‘rights across borders’, or a ‘global human rights regime’, access to social entitlements for legal and undocumented
migrants, as well as for asylum-seekers and refugees, is generally now more difficult in the EU, and their actual welfare content reduced in most of the richer countries. This is consistent with arguments concerning ‘neo-liberalization’, although Canada and the US stand out as exceptions here in terms of refugee protection. At the same time, migrants over the last decade have suffered from deportations based on groundless accusations or the most minimal crimes. But this has inflicted some groups more than others: Muslims (in Europe and North America), those of Latino origin (in the US in particular), Indonesians in Malaysia, Zimbabweans in South Africa, or Bangladeshis, Indians, and Pakistanis in Saudi Arabia, to name just some of the nationalities and religious groups affected by state repression. In most of the poorer countries, years of structural adjustment have left citizens with bare-bones social entitlements, and not surprisingly, state-based entitlements for asylum-seekers, refugees, and migrants are generally non-existent. Low-income migrants are by and large reduced to settling in favelas, shantytowns, and other informal settlements devoid of even the skeletal social support that some migrants receive in richer countries.

A sense of belonging among migrants in the wealthier countries of the twenty-first century is partly tied to their multiple legal statuses and their access to social rights, and partly dependent upon the discourses, practices, and policies of assimilation, multiculturalism, or integration, including the contradictory post-multicultural re-emergence of civic integration policies and the emphasis on ‘diversity’ in many European countries. Here, the UK and the Netherlands especially, provide clear examples of these changes. We should be wary, however, of the idea that migrants follow a linear path from ‘foreign’ to ‘assimilated’. After all, since the societies of immigration are constantly changing, into what precisely do migrants assimilate or integrate? With the poly-ethnic, polyglot character of cities, assimilation or integration in certain neighbourhoods may mean as much pressure to maintain the practices of one’s own co-nationals or co-ethnics, or indeed of another migrant group, as it does to adopt nationally-dominant cultural practices. In this respect, migrant identities involve complex trans-nationalized, trans-localized, pan-religious, pan-ethnic, or even kinship practices that may equally be influenced by matters of skin colour and the experience of racism, gender, class, sexual practices, labour market skills, use of the Internet, the strength of hometown associations, and the multitude of cultures of
other migrants that they encounter in the country of immigration. In short, the discourses and practices of ‘assimilation’ or ‘integration’ are complex and operate across different territories with sometimes unique outcomes. By the same token, through choice or necessity, citizens also learn from, and adapt to, the cultural practices of migrants in particular places (think of food and music, for example). Thus, national, regional, and local ‘creolized’ practices develop around particular constellations of migrants and citizens, as migrants too shape the cultural, economic, social, and political character of places and their wider societies. Once again then, ‘space’ should figure centrally in debates around citizenship and belonging.

What can be un-done?

There are innumerable pro-migrant organizations who have offered policy proposals for modifying entry and settlement policies across the world. Apart from ‘bottom-up’ activism and advocacy work with migrants, I want to suggest two ‘top-down policies’ that might literally create the space for new, more radical possibilities. Two existing ideas come to mind. The first is the idea of national or global mobility regimes (see e.g. Papademetriou, 2007; Koslowski, 2008). For proponents of such regimes, governments should not fight, but harness mobility, including circular migration. International mobility is seen as an ineluctable reality, and those governments most capable of facilitating it are those that will most benefit from it. Though I object to the neo-liberalism or national economic utilitarianism that are often at the core of such arguments, facilitating international mobility and explaining the importance of mobility to reticent publics is likely to offer new opportunities for migrants. However, in order for international mobility to have beneficial outcomes for migrants rather than just for citizens, employers, or states, these regimes must also address issues of xenophobia, exclusion, and marginalization. For this to happen, international mobility must take place in accordance with what Benhabib (2004[2007]) refers to as the ‘decriminalization of global migration’ and the granting of the ‘dignity of moral personhood’ to all individuals (p. 179).2 Drawing on Hanna Arendt’s idea of the ‘right to have rights’, Benhabib and other, more radical critics, insist that mobility regimes should not consist of the usual ‘guestworker’ or temporary migration programs in which migrants do
not share the same rights as citizens. On the contrary, international mobility must be accompanied by international human rights norms that involve universal political and social rights for temporary, semi-permanent, and permanent residents, including voting rights at the national, regional, and local scales, and full access to health care and other social entitlements. Voting rights for even the most temporary ‘guests’ will ensure that international mobility increasingly involves the consent and political participation of migrants themselves. In this respect, Benhabib calls for a ‘cosmopolitan federalism’ in which states operate within a cosmopolitanism defined by universal human rights norms. She is therefore calling for porous but not open borders (p. 220). This is so because Benhabib, like so many other political theorists, wonder how democracies can function without ‘closure’, that is, without boundaries (but compare with Cole, 2000, pp. 180–88). Nonetheless, Benhabib recognizes that new non-territorially based models of democratic representation are possible and might come to supplant, or at least complicate existing connections between territory and democracy, and she believes these new ‘models’ should be encouraged.

Given how migration appears to exceed the territorial limitations of national democracies, why not advocate for a global state? Many social thinkers remain wary of a world or global state. This frosty reception has its roots in the writings of the eighteenth-century philosopher Immanuel Kant, who believed that a world state would lead to a ‘universal monarchy’ and a ‘soulless despotism’ (cited in Benhabib, 2004 [2007], 220). The problem for many, including Benhabib herself, is that a global state would face problems of democratic representation and legitimacy, given the sheer size of the potential state involved. This issue cannot be adequately addressed here, but the real problem is that Benhabib’s universal rights norms need more than just a sense of cosmopolitanism. Certainly, cosmopolitan norms do have an effect on the behaviour of states with respect to immigration (for example, Japan), but enforcement as well as norms are necessary. As I noted at the close of Chapter 4, there is a great deal of ‘talk’ about human rights, and a growing cadre of international conventions, but these have little legal teeth. Is it possible to enforce such conventions without a global state? Perhaps not, but other possibilities have been suggested. For instance, the noted economist Jagdish Bagwati has proposed the formation of a ‘world migration organization’ to manage migration as a complement to the World Trade
Organization. Some antecedents to this type of organization have already appeared in the form of multi-lateral commissions, including the creation in 2003 of the Global Commission on International Migration. Similarly, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ ‘dream for the future’ hopes that rich countries will accept the equivalent of 1% of their population for refugee settlement (see Taylor, 2005). With the exception of this UN proposal, one cannot help thinking, however, that these various multi-lateral ideas and institutions for migration management have in mind the welfare of citizens and states, rather than of the migrants themselves.

The second policy idea worth highlighting is the idea of ‘sanctuary cities’ or ‘cities of refuge’ in the US. ‘Sanctuary’ and ‘refuge’ are useful metaphors of care, generosity and hospitality, and sanctuary in the largest cities of the US should also be extended to small cities and towns and rural areas, as well as other countries. In some respects, this is already happening, especially in smaller university-dominated cities and towns in the US. For example, officials and activists in Eugene, Oregon are seeking to incorporate international human rights principles into the city’s operations. Similarly, academics and students at the University of North Carolina are working hard to designate the towns of Chapel Hill and neighbouring Carrboro as ‘human rights cities’ (Naples, 2009). A global international human rights regime (hopefully with some mechanism of enforcement) and the expansion of sanctuary cities to rural areas are but a couple of policies that have the potential to slowly dissolve the severity of international borders, further bolster social rights, foster international cooperation, or modify spaces in such a way that they harbour migrants from state repression at various scales. At this point, rather than continue with a selection of policy ideas, I will conclude with a more academic route by suggesting a few means of imagining a new world of migration.

_Un-doing our imaginations_

For those who yearn for a world in which people, and not just capital, have unimpeded mobility, there are intellectual resources from which we can borrow. Sure, any calls for the dissolution of national borders are up against staunch opposition and the still powerful belief that only nation-states and their apparent ‘collective sense of identity’ can deliver security,
economic well-being, and social justice (e.g. Walzer, 1983). Yet those critical of tight borders, restrictive immigration policies, and the absence of a truly enforceable international human rights regime also have intellectual spokespersons to which they can turn, from the myriad of pro-migrant NGOs and immigrants themselves, to liberal political theorists such as Seyla Benhabib (as above), Joseph Carens, or Philip Cole, and radical geographers and activists such as Harald Bauder, David Harvey, and Theresa Hayter. I do not have the space here to develop their arguments at any length, but they are nonetheless infused with questions of space, social justice, and new geographical imaginations.3 To begin with, Cole (2000) reminds us that liberal ideas do not consider an ‘outside’, and so-called liberal states and their policies and practices are ‘illiberal’ to ‘non-members’ of a society. He concludes that those who see themselves as ‘liberal egalitarians’ and who are against the international freedom of movement must ask themselves what is meant by liberal egalitarianism. Echoing a long-time demand for open borders, Hayter (2000) wishes to incorporate the free movement of people within any discussion, or concrete manifestation of, international human rights. Indeed, Carens (1987) argues that ‘like feudal barriers to mobility, they [borders] protect unjust privilege’ (p. 229), and Benhabib (2008) argues that state borders ‘require moral justification’ (p. 19). Similarly, the geographer Harald Bauder, in a special issue of the critical journal ACME (2003) questions the justice of borders on the grounds that they reproduce social injustice through what Van Parijs (1992) calls ‘citizenship exploitation’, the exploitation of human beings based on their lack of citizenship. Borders allow capital (employers) to exploit migrants, by dividing them and preventing the global political organization of migrants. As a consequence, Bauder calls for the end of borders for the sake of international socialism. Most of the papers in response to Bauder’s proclamations considered his vision of a borderless world ‘unrealistic’, and many critical scholars concede that some borders – even national ones – might be desirable (e.g. Naples, 2009). In my own response to Bauder’s paper (Samers, 2003b), I defended and applauded his willingness to pry open our imaginations and to not let cultural arrogance, fear, cynicism, and selfishness rule such a promising vision. As Carens (1987) writes, “Free migration may not be immediately achievable, but it is a goal towards which we should strive” (p. 270). The significance of Bauder’s intervention is that he keeps the flame of hope burning by underlining what
David Harvey calls the “ridiculous waste and foolishness of our times” (2000, 281) and offering an alternative imaginary. That is certainly one possible means of arguing for change.

Another is to question the way in which citizens view certain migrants. In the imagination of citizens, migrants and asylum-seekers and refugees are often viewed as culturally and racially ‘out of place’ (Cresswell, 1996; Mitchell, 1996; Sibley, 1995), whereas citizens of the rich world would hardly see the same individuals as dangerous, strange or ‘out of place’ if they visited the migrants’ countries of origin. Thus, by not seeing the cultural landscapes of the rich world as fixed, unchanging, and naturally Judeo-Christian, citizens of the global north open up the possibilities that newcomers can contribute to these ever-changing landscapes. This vision of ‘out-of-placeness’ is not confined to the rich ‘West’, but to all countries at different times and with different registers. In the wealthy countries, the fear among many citizens of the ‘non-western other’ may stem from not just racism, culturalism, and xenophobia but all of these territorially-mediated expressions together with what is sometimes called ‘postcolonial guilt’. There may be ways, however, of transforming such postcolonial guilt into postcolonial engagement. As Doreen Massey has argued, “We are responsible to areas beyond the bounds of place not because of what we have done, but because of what we are” (Massey, 2004, 16). In a sense, she is calling for a ‘relational’ way of thinking that sees the ‘other’ as part of ‘the rich world’. By deploying this wisdom in the context of migration and immigration, we might say that the rich world not only borrows and learns so much from the poor world, but the rich world is created through the impoverishment of the poor world through policies that favour the former. Inequality begets wealth, and migration is in part a manifestation of this inequality. By un-doing or de-colonizing citizens’ imaginations of migrants as (post-colonial) ‘burdens’ or ‘out of place’, then we may begin to imagine a more socially just world where migration is more of an opportunity than an unfortunate necessity.

FOR FURTHER READING

The literature on the ethics of ‘free movement’ is extensive. For this reason, I will simply point to some of the references discussed in this ‘Conclusions’ chapter, including Benhabib’s (2004[2007]) *The Rights of...*
Preface

1 Perhaps the most significant of these Anglophone contributions by geographers include the textbook, *Exploring Contemporary Migration* by P. Boyle, K. Halfacree, and V. Robinson, 1998; the introductory text *International Migration: A very short introduction* by K. Koser, the edited collection *A New Geography of European Migrations*, by R. King, 1993; more specialized monographs including *Labor Movement: How migration shapes labour markets*, by Harald Bauder, 2005; *Writing Across Worlds: Literature and migration* by R. King, J. Connell and P. White, 1995, *The Lie of the Land: Migrant Workers and the California Landscape*, by D. Mitchell, 1996; *6 Billion Plus*, by K. Bruce Newbold, 2007; *Making Population Geography* by Adrian Bailey, 2005; *Managing Displacement: Refugees and the politics of humanitarianism*, by Jennifer Hyndman, 2000; *The California Cauldron: Immigration and the fortunes of local communities*, 1998, and *Immigrants and the American Dream: Remaking the middle class*, 2003, both by W.A.V. Clark. Furthermore, many of these were written a decade ago. Beyond the literature by geographers and the myriad edited collections, a more recent and popular text is Castles and Miller’s *The Age of Migration* (2009, 4th ed.), but this volume is designed as a global and encyclopaedic overview, it avoids a core argument – a central feature of the *Key Ideas in Geography Series* – and does not place the critical use of spatial concepts at the heart of its enquiry.

Chapter 1

1 For a review of cultural geographical studies along these lines, see Blunt (2007) and Cresswell (2006).

2 In that sense, I have aimed to fulfil Favell’s (2008) call for ‘post-disciplinarity’ in migration studies.
There are some exceptions to the general use of this definition, such as the case of France’s DOM-TOM (overseas Départements and territories). In French statistics, those who migrate to the French ‘mainland’ from the DOM-TOM are considered immigrants or ‘international migrants’, but are not considered ‘foreigners’.

The OECD or Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development is a set of wealthier countries, including eastern European countries that are now integrated into the European Union, and also a number of so-called ‘middle-income’ countries, including Mexico and Turkey.

At the same time, the literature on the US tends to employ the term ‘immigrant’ and ‘immigration’ more frequently. When discussing the American context then, I have retained the use of the term immigrant and immigration.

To muddy the waters further however, the term ‘undocumented’ in official European Union policy reports literally means migrants who have lost or had their documents stolen. This is in contrast to those immigrants who simply overstay their visas.


We should not lump together highly-skilled and ‘high-income’ migrants (e.g. wealthy entrepreneurs) since the latter possess resources which the former may not, including the ability to literally buy citizenship.

I would note that Castles and Miller never seem to indicate a timeframe for these trends. When precisely did they begin, and where exactly?

By definition, estimating the number of undocumented or ‘illegal’ or ‘irregular’ migrants is a notoriously difficult affair. The IOM has pooled together different estimations by a variety of authors.

In the latest edition of their book Age of Migration, Castles and Miller (2009) move away from the idea that this is an age of migration solely based on the volume or extent of migration, but rather that it is an ‘age of migration’ because global events so often involve migration.

See footnote 4 for a definition of the OECD countries. I recognize the problem of defining countries by what they are not, but it is difficult to label them in any other way. The aggregate income of a country might be one alternative way of classifying them, but that too is problematic. As I hinted at in the beginning of this section, perhaps the whole exercise of recording national data or data at all should be avoided? I will leave this open to critical thought.

An exception is the figure for the ‘Occupied Palestinian Territory’, where we can assume that there are a large number of refugees, and
Palestinians in the occupied territories are part of an estimated total 4.6 million Palestinian refugees worldwide (IOM, 2008b).

15 The term ‘warehoused’ (which is another terrible term, as if it concerned the housing of goods in a warehouse) refers to refugees living in camps and other ‘segregated settlements’. It does not seem to concern asylum-seekers and may involve a large number of internally displaced persons (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2008, p. 24).

16 Social capital may be understood as the resources that may or may not be provided by durable social networks between individuals and institutions. We will discuss this further in Chapter 2.

17 One notable exception, among others, is Smith (2001).

18 Voigt-Graf warns that this does not mean that ‘cultures’ are fixed or frozen in time and space.

Chapter 2

1 In the lengthy discussion of migration approaches in this chapter, I draw heavily on the analytical discussion of Massey et al. (1993, 1998) but also from the similar, extensive and impressive reviews of migration theories by Boyle, Halfacree, and Robinson (1998), Castles and Miller (2003), Goss and Lindquist (1995), Jennissen (2007), Molho (1986), and Wilson (1993). Yet I also hope that I have made these theories more accessible for a student audience. I have eliminated some of the approaches that the authors discuss, but I have also expanded on their reviews to cover more recent approaches to, and studies of, migration.

2 Ravenstein was himself a little bit hesitant to call them laws (see 1885, 1889).

3 The summaries of the neo-classical migration literature tend to homogenize this very diverse literature, if not caricature it. Some studies are more complicated and sophisticated than others and cover vastly different kinds of migration, but the main thrust of most studies, not surprisingly, is that an economic rationality is the determinant of behaviour.

4 I am speaking here of employment which is “unregistered by or hidden from the state and/or tax, social security and/or labour law purposes, but which are legal in all other respects” (Williams and Windebank, 1998, 4).

5 Employers in an ethnic enclave do not necessarily hire migrant workers of the same nationality or ethnicity (co-nationals and co-ethnics). For example, many Mexican and Ecuadorians work in Korean-owned businesses in Los Angeles and New York City, and Spanish may be the first language of Korean entrepreneurs, rather than English (Davis, 1999; Light, Bernard, and Kim, 1999; Logan et al., 2000).

6 Capitalism is generally understood to be a combination of the widespread use of wage labour, the generalization of private property and the extraction of surplus value (e.g. Harvey, 1982) Pre-capitalist modes of
production are usually understood as a set of relations between groups and individuals involved in the transformation of nature (production) that combine *some* of these capitalist elements to one degree or another with let us say barter and the collective ownership of land. I emphasize the adjective ‘so-called’ before the term, as some argued that there is nothing inevitable about such relations becoming capitalist over time, and therefore it was not appropriate to put the ‘pre-’ before them.

7 Comprador governments are generally understood as governments of poorer countries whose policies and practices coincide with more dominant, ‘western’ interests.

8 I elaborate on the idea of neo-liberalism in a subsequent section.

9 Structural adjustment refers to a general policy instituted by the World Bank and the IMF which sought to re-structure the characteristics of the economies of poorer countries, especially in Africa. This involved a ‘carrot and stick’ approach that encouraged or really demanded an increase in export-led development by poorer countries, opening up poorer country economies to foreign imports, reducing state subsidies to firms and industries, and reducing more social and welfare-oriented spending. In this sense, ‘structural adjustment’ may be considered part of neo-liberalism.

10 There are innumerable critiques of Sassen’s global city ideas. See for example McCann (2002) and Robinson (2002).

11 There is a large literature on what constitutes neo-liberalism. Some prefer to speak of ‘neo-liberalisation’ if to emphasize its on-going and incomplete nature (e.g. Ward and England, 2007). For those interested in the debate around the varieties and veracities of neo-liberalism, see what are probably the most recent and comprehensive reviews by Peck and Tickell (2006), the introduction by Ward and England in their edited volume (Ward and England, 2007), the introduction in Leitner, Peck, and Sheppard (2007), and the critique of the whole concept by Barnett (2006).

12 See footnote immediately preceding.

13 See also Canales’ (2003) study of liberalization and industrial restructuring in both Mexico and the US and its implications for migration.

14 There is no reason to believe that this form of educational internationalization will continue unabated. In fact, some of these ventures have failed already, such as Virginia-based George Mason University’s UAE campus in Rhas Al Khaymah, a town northeast of Dubai. They took the decision to close this campus in early 2009 (see ‘George Mason University, among first with an Emirates branch, is pulling out’, *New York Times*, March 1, 2009).

15 It is surprising that there is very little critical discussion of what ‘development’ means in the migration studies literature (but see de Haas, 2006, 2007, Bakewell, 2008, Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan, 2003; Lawson, 1999, and Silvey and Lawson, 1999). It seems to be generally
understood as an increase in the standard metrics of a country of emigration, such as gross domestic or gross national product, and the resulting benefits for poverty reduction. Very little seems to be said about more alternative, creative, cultural, or ‘sustainable’ conceptions of ‘development’.

16 The terms ‘short term’ and ‘medium term’ are often used in the migration literature, but what they mean precisely in terms of years, for example, is never specified.

17 For MacDonald and MacDonald (1964) ‘Chain migration can be defined as that movement in which prospective migrants learn of opportunities, are provided with transportation, and have initial accommodation and employment arranged by means of primary social relationships with previous migrants’ (p. 82).

18 Levitt and Jaworsky (2007) provide a comprehensive discussion of the different ways in which transnationalism is defined.

19 In the context of migration, ‘essentialism’ involves making assumptions about the cultural, political, or qualities of some supposed ethnic or national group. Such a group is supposed to have some ‘essential’ qualities or properties to them. There is thus a thin line between ‘essentializing’ and ‘stereotyping’.

20 The 2006 edition does provide a sex breakdown for the ‘employment of foreigners’ but not for migration.

21 Outside of Mexican-US migration, women as ‘independent’ migrants should not be seen as either ‘new’ or limited to Mexico (Ryan, 2008).


23 See e.g. Boyle et al. (1998); Lawson (2000); Miles and Crush (1993); Ní Laoire (2000, 2007); Vansemb (1995); and Wilson and Habecker (2008).

Chapter 3

1 There are innumerable geographies that I could discuss here, but space forced me to narrow my focus considerably. One other clearly spatial argument concerning immigration is the ‘global city hypothesis’ (GCH) as I discussed in Chapter 2, and I will return to it later when we explore informal employment in more depth. My reason for sidestepping an analysis of global cities at this stage is because the GCH can be considered a theory of the demand for migrant labour and thus I discuss it under a section on labour demand. Another significant literature here is
all the work on ‘transnationalism’ but I will incorporate this concept into my idea of international labour market segmentation which will be discussed in the next section.

2 Criticisms of Sassen’s arguments abound but I will simply point out three. First, all of these supposed ‘global cities’ (let us say London, Hong Kong, New York, Paris, Singapore, Sydney, and Toronto) are somewhat different in terms of their economic and social characteristics (e.g. White, 1998) and thus the ‘production imperatives’ and labour markets associated with them are shaped through different scales and territorialities. Second, what actually distinguishes global cities from other cities is unclear (McCann, 2002; Samers, 2002); every city is in a sense a global city, since all cities are shaped by flows that circulate around the world (Robinson, 2002; Taylor, 2004). To take but one striking example, evidence of ethnic diversity across the world’s largest cities suggests that the city of Mecca is more diverse than Los Angeles (Benton Short et al., 2005), the former hardly on any scholar’s mind a ‘global city’. This has two implications: either the nature of ‘production imperatives’ are similar between supposedly ‘global’ and more ‘ordinary’ cities, or these ‘ordinary’ cities have different geographies of work and migration that demand our attention (Samers, 2010).


5 ‘Overcrowding’ is always relative to prevailing citizen and state-defined norms, practices, and laws.

6 ‘Capital accumulation’ is the critical/ Marxist term for ‘economic development’.

7 The term ‘ethnic niching’ is generally not used to refer to the concentration of highly skilled migrants in such sectors, but it would not be incorrect to use this term.

8 In 2008, the European Economic Area consisted of Liechtenstein, Iceland, and Norway, and these countries benefit from preferential trading and other agreements.


10 The stereotype of expected, docility is not easily dismissed since critical researchers have pointed this out about undocumented migrants in general, who, faced with the threat of deportation, acquiesce to employer demands. It is true, few Basotho workers had the institutional channels to complain, and often few did. However, according to Johnston’s study, Basotho women and other workers did organize themselves by ethnic group or job type to protest frequently about employment conditions, although no strikes longer than about half a day took place.
Chapter 4

1 These approaches are reviewed, and their strengths and weaknesses evaluated, in Boswell (2007a), Hollifield (1992), Massey (1999) and Meyers (2000). My account is far from exhaustive, and Meyers (2000) discusses a rich literature which he calls a ‘domestic politics’ approach, an ‘institutional and bureaucratic politics’ approach, and a ‘realism and neo-realism’ literature. I only touch upon some of these ideas but I do not address them in any comprehensive fashion.

2 Capital accumulation is the Marxist term for ‘economic growth’, because the former emphasizes that class exploitation is part of the process of the accumulation of profit.

3 For those unfamiliar with the term ‘bourgeoisie’, it arose to prominence in the nineteenth century and referred to a long-ascending middle and upper-middle class of business people and property owners who gradually came to supplant feudal lords and aristocratic land owners, and who, in Marxist terms, exploited the mass of workers employed in the ‘dark satanic mills’ of industrial capitalism.

4 It is very questionable whether migrants are uniformly expected to be ‘male’ everywhere. However, the point that Smith and Winders are making is that in the context of the US, and for US employers, women who are pregnant are undesirable because they provide a ‘drag’ on productivity.

5 Again, Meyers (2000) provides a systematic critique of this approach.

6 On this, see e.g. Jordan and Duvell (2003); Massey et al. (2002); Samers (2003a); OECD (2000), and Van der Leun (2003).

7 Before the global recession, shortages of labour appeared from employer crackdowns in American hotels and restaurants (especially in tourist-oriented towns). In fact, the number of temporary work visas (H2B visas) issued to ‘non-agricultural foreign workers’ declined sharply from over 120,000 in 2007 to about 66,000 because of the progressive criminalization and tightening of migration in the US (New York Times, March 14, 2008).

8 For discussions of the supra-nationalization of migration policy in the EU, see Bendel (2005), CEC (2005), Geddes (2003), Kofman (2004), Lavenex (2006a, 200), Samers (2004a), and OECD/SOPEMI (2008).

9 As noted, I discuss the Dublin Conventions and burden-sharing in Box 4.4. The ERF involves about 628 million Euros for the 2008–13 programme, and allocates funding towards EU-member states based partly on the number of asylum-seekers, refugees and displaced persons for the purposes of ‘integrating’ them in the member states.

10 While there were many reasons for these tightened asylum policies, an immediate explanation would point to the rapidly increasing asylum claims owing in part to the collapse of the former Soviet Union, war and the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, continual conflicts in Asia, Africa,
and the Middle East, and as some authors argue, cheaper transport and communications (e.g. Thielemann, 2004; Schuster, 2005).

11 My discussion below draws almost entirely from Hyndman and Mountz, but also the analysis by Amnesty International (see www.amnesty.org.au/refugees/comments/2247/).


14 Studies of security and migration tend to focus on the security of the state and citizens, rather than on the security or ‘insecurity’ of migrants (Castles and Miller, 2009). This is a nice way of re-conceptualizing and re-focusing the ‘securitization’ literature, but my concern in this section, however, is not with migrant’s insecurity, since I will elaborate on the conditions that migrants face in countries of immigration in Chapter 5. Rather, I will be preoccupied with how states’ obsession with the threat of terrorist violence (and the use of the word ‘security’) assumes different spatial forms. Castles and Miller (using Adamson, 2006) are also interested in emphasizing how international migration need not necessarily always be viewed in opposition to security, since states rely on migration for ‘economic security’, for translators who can help during a time of war, for addressing demographic decline, and so forth. Again, this is a welcome and expanded conception of ‘security’ but it is not the focus of this section.

15 See for example ‘Obama to push Immigration Bill as one priority’, New York Times, April 9, 2009.


Chapter 5

1 This story is adopted from ‘A family divided by 2 words, legal and illegal’, New York Times, 26 April 2009.

2 It is legal for undocumented migrants to graduate from New York City universities, and it is estimated that some 65,000 undocumented immigrants in the US graduate from American high schools (Data from the Urban Institute, in the New York Times article cited above).

3 The original Latin spelling appears to be *ius* (with an ‘I’), but it seems more common now to be spelled with a ‘j’.

4 Though, as Silverman (1992) points out, it is a mistake to believe that the French model of *jus soli* does not have ethno-cultural foundations.

5 Elsewhere in Europe, the issue of dual nationality seems to be driven by political and economic elites, rather than by migrants themselves (Kraler,
This is not the case in the US however, where migrants from a number of Latin American countries in the US began a campaign for dual citizenship in the 1990s (Escobar, 2007).

6 The ECHR is not associated with EU law *per se*, but nonetheless has power over a national court if a given national government is signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights.

7 In poorer countries, this concerns even basic education. For example, half of the refugee children living in Kampala, Kenya were not in school (Dryden-Peterson, in Jacobsen, 2006).

8 As Driskell *et al.* (2008) point out, roughly 66% of the population in Jackson Heights is foreign-born, and little more than 50% are citizens. Over 70 nationalities are present in the area, and more than 80% of the residents speak a language other than English at home.

9 For reviews of this literature, one might look at Alba and Nee (2003); Hiebert and Ley (2003); Kivisto (2005); Levitt and Jaworsky (2007); and Waters and Jiminez (2005).

10 By ‘complex’, they presumably mean that social life is composed of complex forces, institutions, processes and so forth.


12 This organization was dissolved and has now become the ‘Equality and Human Rights Commission’.

13 The *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* (2008, Volume 34, 7) contains a theme issue on ‘diasporic tensions: the dilemmas and conflicts of transnational engagement’, and presents some of the latest ethnographic research on the contradictions of transnationalism and transnational belonging.

14 For Glick-Schiller, Caglar, and Gulbrandsen (2006) ‘Social fields are networks of networks that may be locally situated or extend nationally or transnationally’ (p. 614).


16 However, according to a survey conducted by scholars at Princeton University in 1996, not all immigrants, at least in the US, are religious. The survey revealed that 15% considered themselves as having no religion (compared to 12% of American citizens) (Cadge and Ecklund, 2007).

17 However, in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s, trade unions became avenues for quite substantial industrial mobilization in manufacturing sites (e.g. Castells, 1975), a form of political mobilization which has largely disappeared now in the EU, but not necessarily in the US for example.

18 Molucca is an island in Indonesia (Indonesia was a Dutch colony), and Moluccans constitute one of the largest ‘ethnic groups’ in the Netherlands.
Surinam is in northeast South America and was also a Dutch colony, and the Surinamese also constitute one of the largest ethnic groups in the Netherlands.

Chapter 6

1 Certainly, there are numerous exceptions, including those cited in this book. In particular, I would highlight the newer efforts by Leitner et al. (2008) and Glick-Schiller and Caglar (2010) as notable contributions to addressing this problem.

2 But see Popke (2007) for one discussion of how universal or cosmopolitan norms and ethics can be deeply problematic.

3 See ‘For further reading’ at the end of the Conclusions chapter.
Assimilation – This seems to have at least three meanings: immigrants adapt to or adopt the cultural ideas and practices of the dominant culture over time; immigrants achieve the same socioeconomic status measured in terms of some ‘average’ for the ‘native-born’; and immigrants develop a spatial pattern in terms of residence and employment that is indistinguishable from the dominant or more dominant cultural groups.

Asylum-seeker – Refers to a migrant who enters a country clandestinely or by legal means and then requests asylum. An individual may also request asylum from outside the country, and thus enters a country as an ‘asylum-seeker’. An asylum-seeker may or may not in turn be granted asylum or refugee status by a particular national government.

Brain circulation – Used to describe the movement back and forth among ‘highly-skilled’ migrants between the country of emigration and immigration. Skills are acquired in both countries and transferred (‘circulated’) between these countries.

Brain drain – This refers to the loss of ‘skilled’ or ‘highly-skilled’ migrants from a particular country of origin. It is generally used to describe the effects of emigration from poorer countries on the economies of these poorer countries.

Brain gain – The opposite of ‘brain drain’. It generally refers to a country of immigration which benefits economically from an in-migration of ‘skilled’ or ‘highly-skilled’ labour.

Capitalism – A now arguably global system of social relations combining at least the wide-spread use of wage labour, private property, and the extraction of surplus value (exploitation).
Circular migration – Refers to the process by which migrants move back and forth between a country of emigration and a country of immigration. This typically involves seasonal stays in either country, often related to temporary or seasonal patterns of work. The term is also commonly used for constant internal migration from rural areas to urban centres, and back again.

Denizenship – This describes the various shades of legality and access to cultural, economic, political, and social rights among migrants.

Diaspora – A highly contested term in meaning and scope, it generally refers to migrants from some sort of ‘homeland’ who in turn spread out across the world and re-settle in various countries of immigration and re-establish inter-linked communities.

Forced migrant – This is a general term to describe an individual who is forced from their country or countries of origin. ‘Forced’ is an imprecise term that may have economic, environmental, political, or social origins, or a combination of all or any of these.

Friction of distance – The time and cost of overcoming distance.

Geneva Convention – A convention signed in 1951 that offers protection to individuals who are persecuted because of their religion, ethnic background, political affiliation, colour of skin, tribal affiliation, and so forth. If a migrant fears that s/he risks harm or persecution upon returning to their country of origin, that individual is entitled to refugee status by those countries of immigration who are signatories to the Convention.

Governance – This refers to the process by which migration and other social processes are regulated, controlled, enforced, encouraged, or mitigated by various ‘levels’ of government. These ‘levels’ can have a geographical basis (i.e. international, national, regional, local, and so forth) or they can be functionally-based. That is, a whole range of different organizations with various functions can be involved in regulating migration, for example.

Highly-skilled migrants – There is no agreed definition of ‘highly-skilled’. However, it seems to consist of at least two groups of people. The first is those who are immediately recruited into what are considered highly-skilled positions in the country of immigration because these individuals have the required educational backgrounds, qualifications, or skills. A second and less common usage
of the term is to describe those who are considered highly-skilled in their countries or origin but who may end up performing menial jobs in the country of immigration.

‘High-income’ migrants – Individuals who are granted admission to a country based on their net wealth; individuals who might be granted admission to a country based on both their net wealth and their willingness to invest or start a business in the country of immigration; or less commonly, individuals who might literally buy their citizenship.

‘Illegal’ (or clandestine or irregular) migrant/immigrant – See ‘Undocumented migrant’.

Immigrants – (see also ‘migrants’) There is no precise definition of an ‘immigrant’. In this book the term ‘immigrant’ is used interchangeably with ‘migrant’, although the term ‘immigrant’ implies more permanent residence. Some may also refer to those citizens who have recently naturalized as immigrants, given their origins.

Integration – A contested term that has at least three principal meanings. The first is closer to ‘assimilation’ and refers to the extent to which migrants fit into an imagined and idealized set of dominant practices and values of the citizen majority, or to their access to such material goods as housing, employment, education, and health. The second meaning of ‘integration’ is closer to that of multiculturalism, whereby immigrants do not somehow ‘lose their culture’ but rather retain ‘their culture’ and join the liberal political culture of the western liberal democracy in question. The third, less common definition is the ‘coming together’ of migrants and citizens, whereby each adopts the cultural practices (language, religion, food, music, and so on) from another.

International labour market segmentation (ILMS) – A term used to describe the ‘segmenting’ of labour in three ways; first, through supra-national and national immigration policies that sort migrant labour based on international grounds (their nationality); second, by ‘segmenting’ migrant labour within national economies through their confinement into specific sectors; and third, by ‘segmenting’ migrants within firms and organizations.

Jus domicili – The acquisition of citizenship or access to social rights based on the length of time a migrant has resided in the country of immigration. This is usually subject to other stipulations (such as
not being convicted of crime, uninterrupted residence in the country of immigration, and so on).

*Jus sanguinis (or ‘law of blood’)* – The acquisition of citizenship based on descent, or the ethnic ties one has to a country of immigration. This is usually based on the origins of the parents, though it may be combined with elements of *jus soli*.

*Jus soli (or ‘law of soil’)* – The acquisition of citizenship based on the birthplace of a migrant, or of the migrant’s parents. It may be combined with elements of *jus sanguinis*.

‘Low-skilled’ migrants – Like other migration categories, the definition of ‘low-skilled’ is imprecise. It is relative to the skill demands of the countries of immigration, but also may be associated with low wages.

‘Low-income’ migrants – Like other migration categories, the definition of a ‘low-income’ migrant is imprecise. Low income migrants may be defined by what they are not; that is, not high-income migrants as perceived by the policies of the countries of immigration. Their low income may or may not be related to their skills.

‘Low-wage’ migrants – Like other migration categories, there is no precise definition of a ‘low-wage’ migrant. It may refer to a migrant who is either recruited into a ‘low-wage’ job in the country of immigration; someone who emigrates and expects or searches only for ‘low-wage work’; or someone who finds only low-wage work. ‘Low-wage work’ is itself a relative term, although it generally refers to work with low barriers to entry (requiring less capital or skills, etc.).

Migrants – (see also ‘immigrants’) There is no precise definition of a ‘migrant’, although some international institutions refer to international migrants as individuals who reside in another country for more than three months. In this book, the term ‘migrants’ is used interchangeably with ‘immigrants’, although the term ‘migrant’ also implies a more temporary sense of residence.

Myth of return – A psychological condition in which a migrant constantly dreams of returning to the country of origin. Use of the term ‘myth’ refers to the real problems of settling more permanently in the country of origin, and the increasing unlikelihood of returning as residence in the country of immigration lengthens. Returning
permanently is possible, however, and the ‘myth of return’ only refers to a common condition.

**Naturalization** – The process by which a non-citizen migrant becomes a legal citizen of a country (or even countries) of immigration.

**Neo-liberalism** – This generally refers to a set of policies, programs, and discourses (sometimes the term ‘ideology’ is also used) that favour markets over government intervention and social welfare programmes as a ‘solution’ to societal or economic development problems. It is normally associated with a reduction in social welfare and instead the promotion of ‘capital welfare’ (favouring businesses).

**Migration-development nexus** – A term used to describe the relationship between migration and ‘(economic) development’, usually in the context of poorer countries of emigration.

**Migration management** – A term that emerged in the 1990s and used to describe the way in which countries regulate the migration of specific categories of migrants.

**Multi-culturalism** – A set of discourses, ideologies, political philosophies, policies, the aims of political movements in the name of recognition and representation, and a context of pluralism defined in group terms through which people feel a sense of belonging.

**Networks (social networks or migrant networks)** – Social or migrant networks are webs of personal relations and interactions across space that involve both individual migrants and institutions.

**Node** – This is a particular location in a network. In the context of migration, it is sometimes used to describe the ‘cultural hearth’ or ‘cultural centre’ of a transnational community.

**Place** – A geographic term typically used to describe a city, town, village, neighbourhood, and so forth, which has meaning for individual migrants.

**Political opportunity structure** – A term used to describe the structure of social relations in any given territory (country, city, and so forth) which allows migrants to participate politically.

**Refugees** – Often ethnically or nationally defined *groups*, granted refugee status by a state or international organization, and recognized and inscribed in international law, prior to their arrival in another country. Yet *individuals* may be also granted refugee status after a certain period of seeking asylum.
**Remittances** – A term used to describe money that is brought in or sent home to the country of emigration from a country of immigration.

**Scale** – This is a difficult and confused term in the geographical literature. For example, it can refer to territories or the spatial extent of a process (‘spatiality’). It is used more or less synonymously in this book with ‘territory’ (e.g. the urban scale or the national scale). In other words, scales are seen as porous, flexible ‘containers’ such as national states, macro-regions such as the EU, but also the human body, and so forth.

**Scalar (or scalar spatiality)** – An adjective that describes when a process is subject to, but also transcends particular scales.

**Smuggling** – A term used to describe the movement of migrants from one country or another clandestinely, using a variety of agents and institutions.

**Social exclusion** – Used to describe a set of processes which exclude or marginalize people from different facets of social life (e.g. work, housing, education, etc.).

**Social remittances** – Refer to the ideas, practices, but also finances that migrants bring home or send home, and which contribute specifically to the construction of schools, roads, religious institutions, hometown institutions, and other social institutions (see also ‘remittances’).

**Social reproduction** – Social reproduction is a Marxist-Feminist inspired term which has come to mean the process by which people are housed, fed, clothed, educated, and generally raised to become workers and/or citizens under capitalism. In short, people need to be reproduced in particular ways to make them ‘ready’ for capitalism.

**Sojourner migration** – See ‘temporary migration’.

**Substantive citizenship** – Refers to the issues that concern the daily lives of immigrants, including family matters, finding a place to live and work, schooling, participating in organizations and events, the challenges of finding appropriate legal advice, and access to health care.

**Temporary migrants** – As defined by the OECD, international migrants are those whose duration of stay in a given country does not exceed three months.
Territory – An area of geographic space that is occupied and controlled by an individual, a group, or an institution for the purposes of control and influence.

Territoriality – The ability, practice, and strategy of exercising control over a particular geographic space.

Trafficking – A term used to describe the movement of migrants clandestinely from one country or another involving trafficking agents, and which also involves some form of ‘forced’ employment in order to pay back the costs of being smuggled.

Transnationalism – In the context of migration, this usually refers to the multiple cultural, economic, political, and social ties that bind migrants across one or more countries.

Undocumented migrant – The term preferred by migrants and most critical scholars, which refers to a range of individuals, but most commonly those migrants who have entered a country clandestinely without the required papers; or those who have entered legally, but overstayed their visas or other residence regulations.

Voluntary migrant – This is a general term to describe an individual who is not forced to migrate from their country or countries of origin. ‘Voluntary’ is an imprecise and relative term, and there are various degrees of voluntarism. Voluntary migrants may migrate for marriage purposes, to be closer to family, friends, or for other relationships. They also may migrate for a particular job, or simply to experience other cultures. In short, the reasons are very diverse.


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